Iraq receives more water from Turkey
During their meeting in Turkey, where they discussed relations between the two countries and issues of mutual interest, Erdogan agreed to Al-Mashhadani's request to release 420 cubic meters of water per second per day, starting Wednesday, according to a statement cited by the Iraqi News Agency (INA).
Under the two countries' present leadership, Iraqi-Turkish ties are seeing prolonged success, according to Al-Mashhadani. This alliance has a long history and is founded on strong political, social, and geographic ties.
The step will increase water flows along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, delivering water to all Iraqis, particularly in the southern parts of the country that are experiencing drought and water shortages.
According to official estimates, the water shortage in Iraq is becoming worse and has already reached seven percent.
Iraq consumes more than 19.4 million cubic meters of water per day, compared to 18.1 million cubic meters that the country receives.
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Rudaw Net
40 minutes ago
- Rudaw Net
Kurds in the mirror: The psychology of oppressed people
Also in Opinions The 12-day war and silent transformations of western Asia A decade into the Iraq-Kurdistan Region salary crisis: A deeper look behind the numbers The birth of mental health care in Mesopotamia Washington, London agreements: future prospects for Erbil-Baghdad oil, gas relations A+ A- For centuries, Kurdish women and men across various regions have endured severe oppression, structural violence, and cultural assimilation. How have these external labels and self-definitions, linked with recurring persecution and massacres, influenced their collective memory? Has an entrenched sense of victimhood taken root among the Kurds, shaping their personalities, social behaviors, and cultural practices? And precisely how do these experiences affect a community's self-image and its perception by others? Which psychological mechanisms come to the fore when members of an oppressed group seek a way out of the endless repetition of such violent experiences? Countless events - from massacres to genocides - accompanied by violence, discrimination, torture, death, flight, and sustained persecution over many centuries have left profound marks on Kurdish society. To what extent are Kurds truly free to think, feel, and act in a manner that reflects their Kurdish identity? We know that identifying as a victim society can intensify across generations, as younger Kurds inherit and pass on a collective sense of threat, exclusion, low self-esteem, and guilt. This inheritance includes the experience of being vulnerable to renewed violence at any moment, of being unable to defend oneself, and of feeling helplessly at the mercy of powerful authorities - alongside the awareness of lacking full participation in the majority societies around them. In rural Kurdish regions, tribal structures and large extended families remain central. On one hand, they can offer protection, especially in times of political instability. On the other hand, they can trigger internal conflicts when different tribes align with opposing political camps or, in the worst cases, strike collaborative deals with oppressors. The Kurdish concept of ixanetî (betrayal) has become firmly embedded: groups, parties, or individuals are quickly labeled traitors even when no betrayal has occurred. Such internal divisions deepen existing mistrust and perpetuate lasting fractures within the collective identity. Personal and collective consequences The ongoing experience of oppression often leads to pronounced symptoms of resignation, commonly known as learned helplessness. At the collective level, this can manifest as retreat into one's own group or political passivity. Feelings of isolation, denial, and distancing from one's own people may arise from disappointment or the painful recognition of belonging to a marginalized community. This can breed shame and a desire to adopt Turkish, Arab, or Persian identities - even when individuals remain conscious of their Kurdish heritage. At the same time, dynamics of resistance continually surface, whether through protest movements or the growth of Kurdish parties and organizations up to the point of armed struggle, all striving to assert a confident identity. What impact do these conflicting developments have on the Kurdish community? A key element in the psychology of oppressed groups is the danger of falling into a permanent victim stance. On an individual level, this stance is accompanied by feelings of fear, powerlessness, and resignation; on a collective level, it can crystallize into pervasive pessimism. The affected group may adopt the creed that their situation can never change and that they will always be victims. Such negative expectations for the future can severely limit their scope for action: mobilization, uprising, or political participation become difficult. Many suffer so profoundly under this victim stance that they struggle to achieve personal success, slipping into chronic dissatisfaction and responding to everything with complaint and pessimism. It is a form of inner self-abandonment and slow self-destruction that can exert a powerful influence on society, culture, and identity. This becomes particularly evident in Kurdish societies through examples such as tribal rivalries, where various clans form strategic or economic alliances with power elites or even oppressors - collaborations viewed by other Kurds as betrayal, further weakening solidarity. Religious and confessional tensions also play a role: Alevis, Yazidis, Sunnis, and Shiite each carry their own histories of persecution, which frequently give rise to competing narratives of memory and identity. And then there is the divide between diaspora and homeland: Kurds living abroad often develop a more politicized form of Kurdish identity, while those who remain face direct repression that makes open engagement difficult. All these fault lines can produce a changed personality structure, profoundly affecting feelings of security, self-confidence, and communal belonging. Identification with the aggressor One of the most complex psychological mechanisms arising from sustained oppression is identification with the aggressor. Members of an oppressed group may adopt the patterns, values, and behaviors of their oppressors in response to exclusion. This can involve denying their own language, culture, or religion to escape stigma; embracing the aggressor's ideology to break free from the victim role or to gain social advantage; or even enacting violence against other minorities or within their own community in the oppressors' likeness. Such identification intensifies tensions within the Kurdish community, pitting those who align with the aggressors against those who cling to resistance and cultural self-assertion. In extreme cases, some Kurds in prison have switched sides, torturing fellow inmates, while tribes or individuals have taken up arms alongside the oppressors. Fueled by deep frustration and anger towards their own identity, they at times outdo their enemies in brutality. This dynamic unleashes a destructive, self-destructive rage. On the societal level, it can erupt in violent clashes, factional fights, or a general readiness for violence. Psychologically, it partly expresses a desperate search for agency - an attempt to cease being a victim by finding any outlet for pent-up helplessness. Breaking the cycle and fostering a confident identity To achieve genuine societal and cultural processing, it is essential first to create spaces where collective memory can be actively honored and reflected upon. Public debates, artistic initiatives, and memorial sites enable transgenerational trauma to be understood not merely as an individual burden but as a shared societal legacy. Developing a common narrative allows Kurds to tell their own history and forge a new, positive identity. Education and empowerment play a parallel role. Promoting Kurdish language and culture strengthens self-esteem and nurtures historical awareness. When schools and universities address not only the major genocides but also the complex roles of different groups vis-à-vis past regimes, they create room for critical engagement and the dismantling of internalized victim stances. Dialogue is another key. Within the Kurdish community and with other ethnic and religious groups in the region, moderated forums must give voice to all groups from religious group to cultural and young activists, and other stakeholders alike. Only when these dialogue spaces are sustained with resources and political backing can genuine understanding emerge. Finally, international acknowledgment of past crimes is indispensable. Lasting reconciliation requires states to stop denying or downplaying historic atrocities and to officially name them through truth commissions, memorials, and, where appropriate, legal proceedings. Such measures increase pressure on those responsible to offer reparations and public apologies. Only this thorough reckoning can pave the way to a self-determined, solidarity-based coexistence. Conclusion The shifts in the Kurdish personality structure, shaped by victimhood, divisions, tribal loyalties, and, not least, identification with aggressors, are not static conditions but the outcome of a long history of oppression and resistance. Overcoming such collective traumas is a complex endeavor requiring the interweaving of individual and societal interventions. Prospects for the future arise where education, political participation, and psychosocial initiatives advance in tandem. Recognizing historical responsibilities and cultivating a culture of remembrance are the starting points for breaking destructive victim or perpetrator dynamics. Ultimately, only a critical engagement with the past and an inclusive vision for the future can heal the inner fractures that continue to stand in the way of peace, autonomy, and self-determination in the Kurdish context - especially at a time of great upheaval in the Middle East, when transcending historical ruptures is vital to becoming an equal partner in the region. Dr. Jan Ilhan Kizilhan is a psychologist, author and publisher, an expert in psychotraumatology, trauma, terror and war, transcultural psychiatry, psychotherapy and migration. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Rudaw Net
41 minutes ago
- Rudaw Net
The 12-day war and silent transformations of western Asia
Also in Opinions Kurds in the mirror: The psychology of oppressed people A decade into the Iraq-Kurdistan Region salary crisis: A deeper look behind the numbers The birth of mental health care in Mesopotamia Washington, London agreements: future prospects for Erbil-Baghdad oil, gas relations A+ A- The 12-day Israel–Iran war stands as one of the most consequential events of the first quarter of the 21st century, with the potential to reshape both the economic landscape and the political-security dynamics of western Asia. Much like the Six-Day Arab–Israeli War of 1967, which extended beyond mere territorial occupation, the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel was not solely about missile exchanges and nuclear ambitions. Beyond the overt military dimensions, the war was also aimed at strategically distancing Tehran from its deepening ties with China and Russia, while simultaneously curbing the expansion of the pan-Shia movement led by Iran. In this sense, the conflict served a role analogous to that of the 1967 war, which effectively halted the rise of the pan-Arab movement spearheaded by Gamal Abdel Nasser and supported by Moscow. Regardless of whether it is referred to as Operation Rising Lion, True Promise, or Midnight Hammer, it is evident that this war is quietly transforming the regional landscape. Syria appears to be entering a new phase aimed at establishing the foundations of governance, while the regional influence of both Turkey and the Gulf states is expanding. In parallel, the issue of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) disarmament has progressed into a new stage, influenced by the broader consequences of the conflict. The war has turned Iraq and the Kurdistan Region into arenas for two major regional rivalries. On one front, these areas have become a battleground for military competition between Iran and Israel, a dynamic that has pushed Iraq's internal situation to the edge of crisis where unknown drones have emerged as key players in shaping the security environment. On another front, Iraq is increasingly becoming a site of strategic contention between Turkish and Iranian interests. Additionally, the war - and even the anticipation of it - has compelled Turkey to quietly engage in a discourse aimed at redefining its nation-state identity, particularly through the rhetoric of Turkish–Kurdish brotherhood. Simultaneously, within Iran, a growing debate between the ultra-conservative faction and other elements of the political elite reflects yet another dimension of the war's subtle but enduring influence - an influence that appears likely to persist. Iraq between the hammer of war and the anvil of rivalry Iraq's current situation appears increasingly precarious as the country approaches elections under the shadow of both ongoing regional conflict and intensifying geopolitical rivalry - developments that may, as in previous instances, prove decisive for its future. In relation to the recent war, Iraq has formally protested the violation of its airspace sovereignty. However, this issue is only one dimension of a broader and more complex set of challenges. On the day the conflict ended, two of Iraq's radar systems were destroyed, and in the days that followed, unidentified drones have emerged as a growing security concern, appearing in areas ranging from Kirkuk to Sulaimani and Duhok. The Iraqi government is currently conducting investigations to determine the origins of these incursions. While some have speculated that the Islamic State (ISIS) may be responsible, this theory does not align with the group's current limited military and organizational capabilities. In reality, only three regional actors possess the capacity to conduct such drone operations across the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk: Turkey, Iran and its affiliated 'resistance' groups, and Israel. At a time when the world is closely monitoring PKK disarmament negotiations, it is unlikely that Turkey would risk undermining the process, especially since the nature and targets of the drone activity do not suggest Turkish involvement. Both Iran and Israel remain highly sensitive to the strategic positioning of the Kurdistan Region and Iraq more broadly. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the Kurdistan Region adopted a stance of silent neutrality during the recent conflict. However, this neutrality has failed to satisfy either Iran or Israel, each of which interprets the Region's posture through its own security and strategic lens. Whether war resumes or not, the Kurdistan Region's geographic and strategic location renders it critically important to the offensive and defensive calculations of both parties. At this stage, the identity of the actors behind the drone incidents remains unknown. Nonetheless, the prevailing interpretation is that these incidents constitute strategic signaling - intended more as a message than as direct acts of aggression or destruction. The ambiguity surrounding these developments underscores the fragile and volatile security environment in which Iraq now finds itself - caught between the hammer of regional warfare and the anvil of great-power rivalry. Another point is that the possibility of Iraq being caught up in war due to the balance of power in the region is always open, because Iraq is important to Iran to protect its last regional bastion, but it's also important to Israel to keep a gateway to reach Iran open and prevent a problem from forming through Iraq. It seems that in the future, beyond security and military matters, Iraq will increasingly become a field of economic competition and influence between Turkey and Iran, and this will translate into political tension. Iran has increasingly focused on developing its economic relations with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. In 2020, Iran's trade volume with Iraq did not reach $6 billion, while Turkey positioned itself at around $17 billion. Since then, it has continuously tried to turn toward the Iraqi market, and in 2024 it reduced its gap with Turkey. Iran's economic losses after the fall of Bashar al-Assad are estimated at around $30-50 billion. It is estimated that the 12-day war also cost it between $24 and 35 billion. If international sanctions are to return by October 18, then it must grip the Iraqi market with teeth and claws, as it seems like the last resort for its economy. Mohsen Rezaee, former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, once said that we cannot fight wars for countries while their benefits go to other countries. A double-six for Turkey and the Gulf, and an opportunity for Syria The recent conflict has elevated the regional prominence of both Turkey and the Gulf states. For these actors, the simultaneous weakening of Iran and Israel constitutes a strategic gain - akin to a 'double six' in backgammon - provided that the hostilities remain confined within the borders of the two principal belligerents. At the same time, both Turkey and the Gulf countries are vying with Oman for the opportunity to host prospective negotiations between Iran and the United States, if such talks prove feasible. From Turkey's perspective, the Iran–Israel war represents the weakening of two of its major regional competitors. However, had the conflict intensified or triggered sudden political upheaval in Iran, it could have posed a direct threat to Turkish security. Despite this risk, the war appears to have drawn Turkey and the United States into closer alignment. The US ambassador in Ankara has publicly stated that Turkey might be readmitted into the F-35 fighter jet program. Additionally, Turkey was reportedly one of the few countries briefed by the United States shortly before Israel launched its attack. It appears that Turkey has played - and possibly continues to play - a role in the diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. This includes mediating between Iran and the United States, as well as between Hamas and the US. In the event that an agreement is reached between Syria's Ahmed al-Sharaa faction and Israel, it would signify a potential normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel. Such a reconciliation would not only alleviate long-standing political and security concerns, but also facilitate more stable and reliable access to the Syrian market - particularly significant given the recent partial lifting of US sanctions on Syria under the Trump administration. The aftermath of the war has also encouraged Sharaa to move closer to Israel, thereby strengthening his position and increasing his chances of consolidating political authority in Syria. This shift could signal broader transformations in the geopolitical dynamics of the region. The issue of PKK disarmament During the recent conflict, discourse emerged in both Turkey and among individuals affiliated with the PKK regarding the possibility of replicating the Syria–Rojava scenario in Iran. This comparison references the context in which the Assad regime handed over control of Kurdish-populated areas to Kurdish political parties and forces (the Democratic Union Party, PYD, and the People's Protection Units, YPG). However, this analogy is fundamentally flawed and arises from a misreading of Iran's internal situation and the nature of the Kurdish question within its borders. Assad's primary motivation for withdrawing from northeast Syria (Rojava) and reaching an accommodation with the PKK was tactical rather than ideological. He sought to place a human shield between his regime and Turkish-backed opposition groups. This maneuver enabled him to avoid direct conflict while anticipating that he could eventually reclaim those areas, given that the Kurdish forces lacked geographical depth and the region's topography was unsuitable for sustaining prolonged military resistance. In essence, Assad's strategy was to sacrifice Kurdish forces for short-term security gains, and even at the lowest point of his regime's power, he remained unwilling to formally recognize Kurdish identity. Replicating this strategy in Iran is not feasible. Any armed group that establishes a presence in the Zagros Mountain chain would be extraordinarily difficult to dislodge due to the region's formidable terrain and strategic depth. Furthermore, these mountainous zones - along with the Alborz Mountains, Iran's eastern deserts, and its southern maritime borders - form a critical geopolitical triangle. Compromising any of these strategic regions would unravel the country's military equilibrium and expose Tehran and the Iranian heartland to substantial vulnerability. As such, no rational political regime would willingly accept such a risk. Nonetheless, the war appears to have yielded a significant strategic gain for Turkey, particularly in the context of the PKK disarmament issue. It is increasingly likely that the PKK's expectation of garnering enhanced regional support has diminished. It has long been an open secret that PKK disarmament has not aligned with Iran's strategic interests, primarily due to security considerations. Since 1992, the PKK's presence along the borders has served, intentionally or otherwise, as a stabilizing force in terms of border security. Simultaneously, Turkey has historically feared that Iran might attempt to impose a Syrian-style situation on its own territory. However, in the aftermath of the 12-day conflict, Ankara appears to be approaching this matter with increased confidence and a sense of strategic ease. In a notable recent development, the president of Turkey authorized the release of a Kurdish prisoner previously incarcerated for PKK membership. This act may signify an initial step toward advancing the broader process of PKK disarmament. The international community now awaits a symbolic gesture from the PKK, which, if forthcoming, could encourage the Turkish state to implement additional legal reforms anticipated by the end of the autumn. While this process is likely to face fluctuations and setbacks, recent remarks by Devlet Bahceli - leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) - acknowledging the concept of Kurdish–Turkish brotherhood represents a rare political recognition of Kurdish identity from a figure associated with Turkish nationalism. Historically, Turkish presidents such as Turgut Ozal and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have made similar overtures. The current leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), Turkey's largest political party, has also echoed this sentiment. Collectively, these developments suggest a gradual shift that may contribute to redefining the Turkish nation-state identity. On the other side, the PKK, under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan, has likewise moved away from territorial demands, signaling a significant transformation in its approach to the Kurdish issue. Iran: From geopolitical confrontation to domestic political discourse The rise to power of the Islamic Republic in Iran represented not merely a domestic political shift but a profound geopolitical transformation. It disrupted a key pillar of the regional order previously led by the United States and its Western allies. That order, anchored by strategic alliances with NATO-member Turkey, Israel, the Gulf states, and the Shah of Iran, began to fracture with the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Iran ceased to be a US ally, and between 1980 and the early 1990s, at least five significant armed groups emerged, three of which posed direct security challenges to both Turkey and Israel. Despite these developments, the West and the United States were not overly concerned at the time. On one hand, they retained the capability to manage and contain the threats posed by these groups. On the other hand, Iran's external relations with adversaries of the West had not yet matured into strategic partnerships that could undermine US interests. However, this began to change after the 2000s and particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Iran's regional influence expanded significantly. While Iranian officials framed this shift as part of an 'Islamic Awakening,' its adversaries labeled it the 'Shia Crescent.' In parallel, Iran advanced its military capabilities - especially in the domain of missile and drone technology - and, more critically, began to quietly abandon its long-held foreign policy doctrine of 'Neither East nor West.' This strategic reorientation was underscored by Iran's 25-year cooperation agreement signed with China in 2021 and its 20-year agreement with Russia adopted in 2025. Iran's provision of drones to Russia, coupled with ongoing discussions about supplying ballistic missiles to Moscow, further signaled Tehran's deepening alignment with Eastern powers. These developments, combined with the events of October 7, marked a significant turning point from the perspective of the United States and Europe. In their view, Iran had effectively become an 'Eastern' power - an alignment that may well have been one of the underlying motivations for the 12-day war. In the aftermath of the conflict, the discourse among Iranian diplomats has shifted toward efforts aimed at preventing a renewed outbreak of war. However, skepticism remains high among military officials regarding the sustainability of the fragile ceasefire currently in place. The future trajectory of regional stability will likely hinge on the positions adopted by China and Russia. Should Tehran, buoyed by support from these allies, resume uranium enrichment or distance itself from negotiations and compromise with Europe and the United States, the prospect of renewed conflict could resurface. The wars have a bilateral impact on the nature of states' policies - they either lead to some kind of opening or make them more closed. In the shadow of discussions about the possibility of war and non-war, there is now a heated debate between the ultra-conservative wing and other groups in power over domestic and foreign policy that seems likely to continue for a while. Ziryan Rojhelati is director of the Rudaw Research Center. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
Shafaq News
3 hours ago
- Shafaq News
Kirkuk's living archive: The man behind the books
Shafaq News – Kirkuk Within the storied streets of Kirkuk— the Iraqi city once known as 'Arrapha' for its ethnic mosaic and deep history —Bakr Latif Hussein, now in his sixties, has built more than a bookstore. In a quiet corner of this diverse city, he guards a literary trove with books in Kurdish, Arabic, Turkmen, and English—each title a thread in Kirkuk's fading cultural tapestry. His journey began decades ago on the sidewalk outside Rafidain Bank, where he sold books from a modest stall on Al-Jumhuriya Street. Over time, that humble display grew into one of Kirkuk's most beloved literary havens. 'Books aren't just paper,' he told Shafaq News. 'They are part of a person's soul. Despite the digital flood, paper holds a magic that keeps us tied to our intellectual core.' Hussein still opens his doors daily, undeterred by shrinking foot traffic or the dominance of screens. His mission was never about profit—it has always been about purpose. He remembers the grinding years of the 1990s, when economic sanctions 'devoured green and dry alike,' and many intellectuals were forced to sell their books just to survive. Still, he recalls 2003 as a hopeful turn: books became more affordable, printing technology improved, and Iraq reconnected with global knowledge sources. 'But that revival didn't last,' he reflected. The rise of ISIS in 2014 dealt a brutal blow to Iraq's cultural life, especially in Kirkuk. Then came the events of October 17, 2017, when federal forces entered the city and Kurdish political parties withdrew—a shift that, according to Hussein, 'changed the atmosphere' and led to a steep decline in Kurdish and even Arabic book sales. 'Kirkuk holds nearly two million people,' he noted, 'but you'd struggle to find even 20,000 genuine readers. That's heartbreaking. This city once lit the way for poets and thinkers—it gave us the legendary Kirkuk Literary Group.' Yet hope lingers in small moments. Turkmen families, he observed, are the most devoted to encouraging reading among children. 'They see books as a way to pull kids away from screens and improve their mental well-being. Kurdish families follow, then Arabs.' Even in quiet seasons, the ambitious man continues his work without complaint. 'We may not sell like we used to,' he said, 'but we still offer hope and thought—and that's worth more than any profit.' To many of his customers, he is more than a bookseller. 'For over a decade,' said Hawkar Mohammed, a Kurdish language teacher and loyal visitor, 'I've come not just for books, but for the spirit of the place. It's not a shop—it's Kirkuk's soul. A living archive that remembers its thinkers and dreamers.' He marvels at Hussein's uncanny ability to match readers with the right book. 'Sometimes I visit just to talk, but after ten minutes, I leave with two or three titles. His passion reawakens yours.' In a world of constant noise, the elderly bibliophile remains steady—a guardian of Kirkuk's cultural memory, and a quiet beacon for those still drawn to the written word.
