How a country that helped Israel get nuclear weapons junked its own nukes

India Today

2 days ago

It began with a rescinded invite. In 1955, Israel was all set to attend the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, a landmark summit of newly independent Asian and African nations, which would be the beginning of the India-propelled Non-Aligned Movement. The invitation was quietly withdrawn after then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, under pressure from Egypt, Pakistan, and other Arab states, snapped his support. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was stunned.advertisementThe Bandung moment marked more than just a diplomatic slight. It exposed newly formed Israel's isolation in the postcolonial world, a world increasingly shaped by Third World solidarity and Arab-led opposition to Zionism. Rejected by India, shut out of African-Asian unity, and encircled by hostile neighbours, Israel pivoted west and south. Its search for allies would lead to a shadowy and strategic nuclear partnership with an unlikely friend: apartheid South Africa.While Israel had technology, South Africa had uranium. And for a brief period in Cold War history, both had the same goal: survival.
South Africa wasn't the only or the first country that Israel clandestinely cooperated with for nuclear weapons. It was France that supported Israel's nuclear programme first. However, the cooperation with South Africa – in the 1970s – is interesting because the country went on to junk its nuclear weapons while Israel emerged as an undeclared nuclear power.advertisementIsrael's nuclear programme is an interesting study against the backdrop of its 12-day war with Iran, which was triggered after the Jewish nation targeted Iranian nuclear sites. Israel faces existential threats from the regime of Ayatollah Khamenei, and has worked for decades to deny Iran nuclear warheads.Israel also stands out among the nuclear powers because it never conducted a nuclear test at home. That's where the South African collaboration comes in. The "Double Flash" of 1979, detected by the US off South Africa, was suspected to have Israeli participation and had all the hallmarks of a nuclear explosion.SUEZ CRISIS AND THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMMEThe Double Flash must have been a sign of the maturing of Israel's nuclear programme, because its N-programme is almost as old as the country itself.For PM Ben-Gurion, nuclear capability was not just a defence priority, it was a moral and existential imperative.Haunted by the Holocaust and aware of Israel's precarious position in a hostile region, he saw atomic power as a safeguard against complete annihilation, writes Sasha Polakow-Suransky in The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa.Established in 1952, the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was led by Ernst David Bergmann, who declared that a nuclear bomb would ensure Jews were "never again led as lambs to the slaughter", reflecting the post-Holocaust drive for strategic deterrence.advertisementIsrael's IAEC was set in secret and began quietly scouting for uranium. It recruited Jewish scientists from abroad, forged academic ties, and laid the technical and ideological groundwork for its nuclear programme.But it was the 1956 Suez Crisis that turned Israel's ambition into reality.France, grateful for Israel's role in the joint invasion of Egypt, became a crucial partner, not just diplomatically, but technologically, writes Polakow-Suransky in his book.HOW FRANCE PASSED ON NUCLEAR KNOW-HOW TO ISRAELIn a secret agreement, France provided Israel with the nuclear know-how, materials, and equipment necessary to build a reactor. French engineers helped design and construct the facility at Dimona in the Negev Desert, officially a research centre, but one that housed a hidden underground plutonium reprocessing plant, according to a report by The Guardian.Construction began in 1958, shrouded in secrecy even within France's own atomic agency. The assistance included reactor blueprints, uranium fuel, and a separate heavy water supply routed via Norway.Israel adopted a policy of nuclear opacity, amimut, refusing to confirm or deny its capabilities.advertisementThis was the same time that US inspectors were allowed into Dimona, but the visits were choreographed. Lead inspector Floyd Culler reported fresh plaster on the walls that later turned out to conceal elevator shafts to the secret reprocessing facility, The Guardian report added.Despite growing American suspicions, US pressure waned under President Richard Nixon.
In 1969, Israeli PM Golda Meir and US President Richard Nixon agreed upon silence on Israel's nuclear status.
In 1969, Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir struck a quiet understanding: no public nuclear tests or declarations from Israel, and no pressure from Washington to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty.By the time of the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel had assembled two or three crude nuclear devices, ready as a last resort. They were never used, but the nuclear threshold had already been crossed, silently, irreversibly.WHY ISRAEL, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA TEAMED UPIn the 1960s and 70s, Israel and apartheid South Africa had a secretive but powerful alliance.Though vastly different in identity, one a Jewish state born from the ashes of genocide, the other a white supremacist regime enforcing racial domination. As traditional allies distanced themselves, the two turned toward each other.advertisementIsrael's military prowess, especially its swift victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, impressed South African leaders. When France, after a change in leadership, imposed an arms embargo on Israel after 1967, Pretoria stepped in with spare parts for Mirage fighter jets.Israel and South Africa were united by a sense of siege, strategic necessity, and deepening global isolation. One of their earliest connections was nuclear.Israel had the technology but lacked uranium. South Africa had uranium but lacked the technical expertise.In 1962, South Africa sent Israel 10 tons of yellowcake uranium. By 1965, this flow was formalised in a deal that dodged international oversight.Over the decade, South Africa helped Israel quietly amass 500 tons of uranium. In return, Pretoria gained access to Israeli nuclear know-how. Officially, both insisted their nuclear programmes were peaceful, but in secret, each pursued weapons.The Yom Kippur War in 1973 marked a decisive shift: while 20 African nations severed relations with Israel, South Africa extended support.In 1974, South Africa even tested a basic nuclear device, likely with Israeli help.advertisementBy then, Pelindaba had become South Africa's main nuclear research centre. Its adjacent Y-Plant at Valindaba, built with covert assistance and drawing on earlier Israeli collaboration, began producing weapons-grade uranium by 1978. The enriched uranium was used to assemble six nuclear bombs by the mid-1980s.
Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, located near Cape Town, began construction in 1976 and became operational in 1984. (Image: AFP)
DID ISRAEL OFFER WARHEADS, MISSILE TO SOUTH AFRICA?In 1975, Israeli Defence Minister Shimon Peres met secretly in Zurich with South African Defence Minister PW Botha.This meeting suggested a far deeper level of trust between the two countries.South Africa, under growing international pressure and eager to secure a nuclear deterrent of its own, sought to purchase Israeli Jericho missiles, which were believed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads, according to a report by The Guardian.Declassified South African documents later revealed that Peres had hinted the "correct payload" could be made available "in three sizes", a phrase widely interpreted as a veiled offer of nuclear warheads.A memo by senior official RF Armstrong confirmed Pretoria's belief that this was a nuclear offer, and a draft agreement was drawn up, complete with a clause stating it must never be disclosed under any circumstances.But the deal fell through. The exact reasons remain uncertain: the cost may have been too steep, or Israeli leaders may have feared the international consequences if the deal ever came to light. Peres would later deny offering nuclear weapons.Still, the Zurich meeting remains striking. Even without a final handshake, it showed how two pariah states—bound by secrecy, ambition, and fear—were willing to step into the shadows of nuclear diplomacy.US SATELLITE DETECTED MYSTERIOUS DOUBLE FLASHOn 22 September 1979, the US Vela 6911 satellite detected a mysterious double flash over the South Atlantic near South Africa, widely seen as a nuclear test signature. No country claimed responsibility, but suspicion quickly fell on apartheid South Africa and Israel.A US enquiry led by physicist Jack Ruina concluded the flash might have been natural or a sensor glitch, but many intelligence officials and independent experts disagreed. CIA analysts believed it was likely a covert joint test by Israel and South Africa.Declassified documents suggest both had motive and capability.South Africa had a working bomb design; Israel, already nuclear-capable, had never officially tested it. Their past nuclear cooperation, South African naval presence in the area, and perfect weather conditions only deepened suspicion.Though never confirmed, the Vela Incident is widely viewed as evidence of secret nuclear collaboration between two isolated regimes operating far from global scrutiny.WHY SOUTH AFRICA GAVE UP NUCLEAR WEAPONSSouth Africa's decision to dismantle its nuclear programme and sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1991 was not just historic, it was layered with strategic calculation, moral posturing, and political foresight.It was the only instance in which a state developed nuclear weapons independently, then gave them up entirely, voluntarily, and transparently, writes Sasha Polakow-Suransky in his book.Though Ukraine too gave up its nuclear stockpile as a barter for independence, those were Soviet-era weapons and not self-developed.South Africa's arsenal, six fully built bombs and a seventh under construction, had been assembled during the height of apartheid, amid fears of Soviet expansion, Cuban involvement in Angola, and domestic insurgency. For the white minority government, nuclear weapons were never meant for battlefield use; they were strategic bargaining chips, meant to signal strength and deter external threats.But by the late 1980s, with the Cold War winding down and the apartheid regime losing legitimacy, the weapons began to look less like protection and more like a political trap.There was also a deep anxiety within the ruling elite about the future: what if these weapons fell into the hands of the African National Congress (ANC) after the democratic transition? Dismantling the programme before handing over power allowed the apartheid government to retain control over the legacy of the weapons, and perhaps even rewrite its final chapter on its own terms.International pressure played its part too. South Africa was still under economic and military sanctions, and rejoining the global economy required a clean break from the secrecy and militarism of the past.In 1991, it became a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By 1993, President FW de Klerk confirmed what had long been rumoured -- that South Africa had nukes. Klerk also declared that the country didn't have any now.Israel took no such step and operates the Dimona reactor, built in the desert with French help. The Jewish nation is believed to possess at least 90 nuclear warheads, with stockpiles of fissile material sufficient to build many more.Estimates from the Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation and the Nuclear Threat Initiative suggest the true arsenal could even be far larger than publicly acknowledged.South Africa, which collaborated with Israel, gave up its nuclear weapons while the Jewish nation holds on to them. For a period in history, their secret pact, one with uranium, the other with know-how, helped shape one of the world's most opaque nuclear programmes.- EndsTune InTrending Reel