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Through Brics, Indonesia offers its vision of inclusivity to the world
Through Brics, Indonesia offers its vision of inclusivity to the world

South China Morning Post

time6 days ago

  • Business
  • South China Morning Post

Through Brics, Indonesia offers its vision of inclusivity to the world

At the 17th Brics summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, some countries – particularly Russia, China and India – arrived wielding formidable influence. With nuclear capabilities, expansive infrastructure and veto power in multilateral bodies, they shape global narratives and push national agendas. Their role in the Brics grouping is that of a core capable of challenging norms and institutions. Advertisement Indonesia , by contrast, does not bring hard power. We are neither a nuclear state nor a technological giant. But Indonesia offers something different as a democratic, non-aligned and populous nation in Southeast Asia. Our unique posture allows influence through moral authority and diplomatic leadership rooted in balance and dialogue. Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto brings an approach rooted in soft power, bridge-building and inclusive diplomacy. Bearing the legacy of the Bandung Conference and Non-Aligned Movement , Indonesia presents itself as a connector between the Global North and South. In advocating South-South cooperation and a fairer international order, Indonesia shows power lies not only in weapons or markets, but also in fostering mutual understanding and collaboration. Indonesia backed its message with 77 priority national projects – including in renewable energy, port development and other infrastructure – for potential financing through the New Development Bank (NDB). Indonesia's Brics engagement aims for real development, not just diplomatic symbolism. These projects reflect a national agenda rooted in sustainability and impact-making. Simultaneously, Indonesia is advancing its gold bullion banks and strengthening its sovereign wealth fund – steps towards financial independence and greater economic resilience. Beyond fiscal tools, these are strategic efforts to reduce dependence on external markets and enhance domestic capacity. Advertisement The leaders' summit declaration aligns with Indonesia's core priorities. Brics called for reforming the UN Security Council and global financial institutions to better represent developing countries, and promoted the expanded use of local currencies, aiming to reduce reliance on the US dollar.

To Be a Bridge Builder: Indonesia's Debut at the BRICS Summit
To Be a Bridge Builder: Indonesia's Debut at the BRICS Summit

The Diplomat

time7 days ago

  • Business
  • The Diplomat

To Be a Bridge Builder: Indonesia's Debut at the BRICS Summit

Jakarta understands the importance of maintaining cooperation with both China and the United States, as demonstrated by Prabowo's attendance at the BRICS Summit and his efforts to negotiate with the Trump administration. On July 6, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto attended the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva welcomed him during his opening speech and congratulated Indonesia on becoming a full member of the organization as of January 2025. Lula emphasized the significance of the summit by referring to BRICS as the heir to the Bandung Conference. In 1955, Indonesia hosted the Asian-African Conference in Bandung to promote independence and solidarity among 29 mostly newly independent and developing countries. Lula asserted that BRICS carries the 'Bandung Spirit' in its quest for a multipolar international order, especially amidst the ongoing collapse of multilateralism, which threatens the autonomy of developing countries as well as international climate commitments and fair trade. Furthermore, as the United States prepares to issue tariff letters to several countries, Prabowo's presence at the BRICS Summit signified Indonesia's aim to strengthen solidarity among the Global South in response to the United States' unilateral tariff measures. On April 2, President Donald Trump announced steep hikes in tariff rates for U.S. trading partners, including a 32 percent tariff on imports from Indonesia. In 2024, the U.S. was one of Indonesia's top trading partners, and Jakarta had a $16.8 billion trade surplus with Washington. Conversely, the U.S. faced a $17.9 billion deficit with Indonesia, making Indonesia the 15th-largest contributor to the U.S. trade imbalance. Trump soon after paused the looming tariffs for 90 days, a measure initially set to expire on July 9; with some administration officials stating in early July that the deadline had been pushed back to August 1. Indonesia, like many other states, attempted to pursue a better deal with the Trump administration, in part by agreeing to a trade pact worth $52.3 billion, which entails an increase in imports of U.S. fuels and investments in the U.S. energy and agricultural sectors, as stated by Chief Economic Minister Airlangga Hartarto. However, it remains uncertain if the negotiations will yield results, as Trump recently stated that he intended to send a 'take it or leave it' letter instead of engaging in 'complicated' negotiations. Indonesia's concern regarding Trump's unilateral tariffs aligns with the views of BRICS, which believe these actions could harm the global economy and undermine the authority and rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Rio de Janeiro Declaration calls for reforming the WTO, stating it is the only multilateral institution with the necessary mandate, expertise, universal reach, and capacity to lead discussions on international trade, including the negotiation of new trade rules. The declaration also advocates for reforming the Bretton Woods institutions to better reflect the growing influence of developing countries in the global economy. By doing so, BRICS positions itself as a platform for multilateralism and a driving force for global governance reform — an initiative that Indonesia is eager to support. Unfortunately, Trump appears suspicious of BRICS. He has threatened to impose an additional 10 percent tariff on any country that aligns itself with what he considers the 'Anti-American policies' of BRICS. The aspirations of BRICS, such as global governance reform and financing in local currencies, are viewed as challenges to American hegemony. Indonesia recognizes the fierce rivalry among major powers and the desire of developing countries for autonomy. In many international fora, Prabowo continues to uphold Indonesia's long-standing policy of an independent and active foreign approach. Amid concerns from scholars about Indonesia leaning toward China, Jakarta understands the importance of maintaining cooperation with both China and the United States. No major power should be excluded from development efforts. Often, Jakarta aims to foster inclusivity in the region. At the 34th ASEAN Summit in 2019, Indonesia steered the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), promoting a regional norm that welcomes contributions from any major power as opposed to the polar opposites of 'Asia for Asians' or concerted effort to encircle China. Indonesia has also actively sought U.S. involvement in developing its nickel industry, which is perceived to be largely influenced by China. Unfortunately, the U.S. has not seized this opportunity, leaving Indonesia with fewer options. Nevertheless, Indonesia remains steadfast in maintaining its impartial stance. During the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Prabowo proposed that Indonesia act as a bridge builder between the Global South and the Global North. This strategy is designed to reduce tensions between developing and developed nations, as Indonesia aims to prevent BRICS from becoming an opposing force that further deepens the divide between these two groups of countries. A recent study published in Foreign Affairs Magazine showed that Indonesia is one of the most effective hedgers among the ASEAN countries. It received a score of 49 on the Anatomy of Choice Alignment Index, where a score of zero indicates complete alignment with China, and a score of 100 signifies full alignment with the United States. The index highlights Jakarta's diplomatic success in maintaining a balance among superpowers, lending credibility to Indonesia's envisioned role as a bridge builder. Indonesia is not sleepwalking into strategic alignment with China. Prabowo's proposal to act as a mediator should be seriously considered to ensure that BRICS contributes to a multipolar order.

How a country that helped Israel get nuclear weapons junked its own nukes
How a country that helped Israel get nuclear weapons junked its own nukes

India Today

time27-06-2025

  • Politics
  • India Today

How a country that helped Israel get nuclear weapons junked its own nukes

It began with a rescinded invite. In 1955, Israel was all set to attend the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, a landmark summit of newly independent Asian and African nations, which would be the beginning of the India-propelled Non-Aligned Movement. The invitation was quietly withdrawn after then Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, under pressure from Egypt, Pakistan, and other Arab states, snapped his support. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was Bandung moment marked more than just a diplomatic slight. It exposed newly formed Israel's isolation in the postcolonial world, a world increasingly shaped by Third World solidarity and Arab-led opposition to Zionism. Rejected by India, shut out of African-Asian unity, and encircled by hostile neighbours, Israel pivoted west and south. Its search for allies would lead to a shadowy and strategic nuclear partnership with an unlikely friend: apartheid South Israel had technology, South Africa had uranium. And for a brief period in Cold War history, both had the same goal: survival. South Africa wasn't the only or the first country that Israel clandestinely cooperated with for nuclear weapons. It was France that supported Israel's nuclear programme first. However, the cooperation with South Africa – in the 1970s – is interesting because the country went on to junk its nuclear weapons while Israel emerged as an undeclared nuclear nuclear programme is an interesting study against the backdrop of its 12-day war with Iran, which was triggered after the Jewish nation targeted Iranian nuclear sites. Israel faces existential threats from the regime of Ayatollah Khamenei, and has worked for decades to deny Iran nuclear also stands out among the nuclear powers because it never conducted a nuclear test at home. That's where the South African collaboration comes in. The "Double Flash" of 1979, detected by the US off South Africa, was suspected to have Israeli participation and had all the hallmarks of a nuclear CRISIS AND THE BIRTH OF ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMMEThe Double Flash must have been a sign of the maturing of Israel's nuclear programme, because its N-programme is almost as old as the country PM Ben-Gurion, nuclear capability was not just a defence priority, it was a moral and existential by the Holocaust and aware of Israel's precarious position in a hostile region, he saw atomic power as a safeguard against complete annihilation, writes Sasha Polakow-Suransky in The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South in 1952, the Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was led by Ernst David Bergmann, who declared that a nuclear bomb would ensure Jews were "never again led as lambs to the slaughter", reflecting the post-Holocaust drive for strategic IAEC was set in secret and began quietly scouting for uranium. It recruited Jewish scientists from abroad, forged academic ties, and laid the technical and ideological groundwork for its nuclear it was the 1956 Suez Crisis that turned Israel's ambition into grateful for Israel's role in the joint invasion of Egypt, became a crucial partner, not just diplomatically, but technologically, writes Polakow-Suransky in his FRANCE PASSED ON NUCLEAR KNOW-HOW TO ISRAELIn a secret agreement, France provided Israel with the nuclear know-how, materials, and equipment necessary to build a reactor. French engineers helped design and construct the facility at Dimona in the Negev Desert, officially a research centre, but one that housed a hidden underground plutonium reprocessing plant, according to a report by The began in 1958, shrouded in secrecy even within France's own atomic agency. The assistance included reactor blueprints, uranium fuel, and a separate heavy water supply routed via adopted a policy of nuclear opacity, amimut, refusing to confirm or deny its was the same time that US inspectors were allowed into Dimona, but the visits were choreographed. Lead inspector Floyd Culler reported fresh plaster on the walls that later turned out to conceal elevator shafts to the secret reprocessing facility, The Guardian report growing American suspicions, US pressure waned under President Richard Nixon. In 1969, Israeli PM Golda Meir and US President Richard Nixon agreed upon silence on Israel's nuclear status. In 1969, Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir struck a quiet understanding: no public nuclear tests or declarations from Israel, and no pressure from Washington to sign the Non-Proliferation the time of the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel had assembled two or three crude nuclear devices, ready as a last resort. They were never used, but the nuclear threshold had already been crossed, silently, ISRAEL, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA TEAMED UPIn the 1960s and 70s, Israel and apartheid South Africa had a secretive but powerful vastly different in identity, one a Jewish state born from the ashes of genocide, the other a white supremacist regime enforcing racial domination. As traditional allies distanced themselves, the two turned toward each military prowess, especially its swift victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, impressed South African leaders. When France, after a change in leadership, imposed an arms embargo on Israel after 1967, Pretoria stepped in with spare parts for Mirage fighter and South Africa were united by a sense of siege, strategic necessity, and deepening global isolation. One of their earliest connections was had the technology but lacked uranium. South Africa had uranium but lacked the technical 1962, South Africa sent Israel 10 tons of yellowcake uranium. By 1965, this flow was formalised in a deal that dodged international the decade, South Africa helped Israel quietly amass 500 tons of uranium. In return, Pretoria gained access to Israeli nuclear know-how. Officially, both insisted their nuclear programmes were peaceful, but in secret, each pursued Yom Kippur War in 1973 marked a decisive shift: while 20 African nations severed relations with Israel, South Africa extended 1974, South Africa even tested a basic nuclear device, likely with Israeli then, Pelindaba had become South Africa's main nuclear research centre. Its adjacent Y-Plant at Valindaba, built with covert assistance and drawing on earlier Israeli collaboration, began producing weapons-grade uranium by 1978. The enriched uranium was used to assemble six nuclear bombs by the mid-1980s. Koeberg Nuclear Power Station, located near Cape Town, began construction in 1976 and became operational in 1984. (Image: AFP) DID ISRAEL OFFER WARHEADS, MISSILE TO SOUTH AFRICA?In 1975, Israeli Defence Minister Shimon Peres met secretly in Zurich with South African Defence Minister PW meeting suggested a far deeper level of trust between the two Africa, under growing international pressure and eager to secure a nuclear deterrent of its own, sought to purchase Israeli Jericho missiles, which were believed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads, according to a report by The South African documents later revealed that Peres had hinted the "correct payload" could be made available "in three sizes", a phrase widely interpreted as a veiled offer of nuclear warheads.A memo by senior official RF Armstrong confirmed Pretoria's belief that this was a nuclear offer, and a draft agreement was drawn up, complete with a clause stating it must never be disclosed under any the deal fell through. The exact reasons remain uncertain: the cost may have been too steep, or Israeli leaders may have feared the international consequences if the deal ever came to light. Peres would later deny offering nuclear the Zurich meeting remains striking. Even without a final handshake, it showed how two pariah states—bound by secrecy, ambition, and fear—were willing to step into the shadows of nuclear SATELLITE DETECTED MYSTERIOUS DOUBLE FLASHOn 22 September 1979, the US Vela 6911 satellite detected a mysterious double flash over the South Atlantic near South Africa, widely seen as a nuclear test signature. No country claimed responsibility, but suspicion quickly fell on apartheid South Africa and Israel.A US enquiry led by physicist Jack Ruina concluded the flash might have been natural or a sensor glitch, but many intelligence officials and independent experts disagreed. CIA analysts believed it was likely a covert joint test by Israel and South documents suggest both had motive and Africa had a working bomb design; Israel, already nuclear-capable, had never officially tested it. Their past nuclear cooperation, South African naval presence in the area, and perfect weather conditions only deepened never confirmed, the Vela Incident is widely viewed as evidence of secret nuclear collaboration between two isolated regimes operating far from global SOUTH AFRICA GAVE UP NUCLEAR WEAPONSSouth Africa's decision to dismantle its nuclear programme and sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1991 was not just historic, it was layered with strategic calculation, moral posturing, and political was the only instance in which a state developed nuclear weapons independently, then gave them up entirely, voluntarily, and transparently, writes Sasha Polakow-Suransky in his Ukraine too gave up its nuclear stockpile as a barter for independence, those were Soviet-era weapons and not Africa's arsenal, six fully built bombs and a seventh under construction, had been assembled during the height of apartheid, amid fears of Soviet expansion, Cuban involvement in Angola, and domestic insurgency. For the white minority government, nuclear weapons were never meant for battlefield use; they were strategic bargaining chips, meant to signal strength and deter external by the late 1980s, with the Cold War winding down and the apartheid regime losing legitimacy, the weapons began to look less like protection and more like a political was also a deep anxiety within the ruling elite about the future: what if these weapons fell into the hands of the African National Congress (ANC) after the democratic transition? Dismantling the programme before handing over power allowed the apartheid government to retain control over the legacy of the weapons, and perhaps even rewrite its final chapter on its own pressure played its part too. South Africa was still under economic and military sanctions, and rejoining the global economy required a clean break from the secrecy and militarism of the 1991, it became a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By 1993, President FW de Klerk confirmed what had long been rumoured -- that South Africa had nukes. Klerk also declared that the country didn't have any took no such step and operates the Dimona reactor, built in the desert with French help. The Jewish nation is believed to possess at least 90 nuclear warheads, with stockpiles of fissile material sufficient to build many from the Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation and the Nuclear Threat Initiative suggest the true arsenal could even be far larger than publicly Africa, which collaborated with Israel, gave up its nuclear weapons while the Jewish nation holds on to them. For a period in history, their secret pact, one with uranium, the other with know-how, helped shape one of the world's most opaque nuclear programmes.- EndsTune InTrending Reel

The Search for the ‘Bandung Spirit'
The Search for the ‘Bandung Spirit'

The Wire

time04-06-2025

  • Business
  • The Wire

The Search for the ‘Bandung Spirit'

Support independent journalism. Donate Now World While Bandung's call for political independence across the colonies has in fact been met, the economic independence and egalitarian development path it advocated are still substantially unrealised. The plenary session during the historic Bandung Conference. Photo: Public domain. Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute Now This April marked the 70th anniversary of the Bandung conference held in Indonesia in 1955, that brought together high-level representatives from 29 countries, most of which had won independence from colonial rule in the wave of decolonisation that accompanied the onset and advance of the Second World War. The 1955 event that is a kind of milestone in global history since the middle of the 20th century was remarkable in many ways. Though a meeting of leaders rather than of people, it did appear to have the enthusiastic support and sanction of the populations that had won political freedom from imperialist domination. The proceedings and the outcome document had a strong anti-colonial flavour, reflected in the declaration that 'colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end'. The reference to 'all manifestations' clearly implied that the challenge was not merely to root out the still present instances of colonial domination, but to stem the onset of neocolonial domination in the then Third World. The conference reflected the mood in Afro-Asian nations. The prevailing sense was that it was imperative to keep imperialism at bay, for which these leaders together committed themselves to and demanded of others recognition of the equality of nations 'large and small', and respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Implicit in this case for the establishment of a democratic international order was the idea that the nation state was the entity that matters and the assertion that national governments were more representative of their peoples than any self-designated international rule-making authority. Class character There were of course differences in the perception regarding the potential and ability of the states in newly independent countries to pursue autonomous development that helped fortify political freedom with economic independence. One the one hand, there were those who held the position that in the post-war world the potential for the development of new autonomous capitalist societies was fundamentally limited even if countries won political independence. Their ability to have a transformative influence, depended on the class character of national governments that came to power at Independence. Only if those states were led by forces representing the interests of the peasantry and the formal and informal working class, as opposed to indigenous industrial capitalists and big landed interests in coalition, that the structural changes needed to create the conditions for more egalitarian development based on indigenous capabilities and domestic markets would be ensured. The victory of Communist led forces in revolutionary wars in China and Vietnam, the continuation in power of governments with an avowedly pro-people development agendas (unlike in some other contexts), and the formation of an uneasy 'socialist bloc' along with the then Soviet Union, seemed to provide support for those advocating this form of transformation. It was not just the state that must be the bulwark against imperialism and the driver of autonomous development, but that state must in the interests of the hitherto exploited and marginalised lead a process of institutional change that attacks land monopoly and non-agricultural asset concentration. But a majority of countries that won Independence during the decolonisation years that followed the Second World War, while coming to power on the basis of mass movements against colonial rule, represented a coalition of landed and industrial interests. Despite declaring intent to pursue a radical programme, they failed in practice to implement much needed land reforms that by breaking down land monopoly and releasing peasant energies, would have dismantled barriers to productivity increase in agriculture, raised mass incomes and raised consumption, and generated the wage goods surpluses needed to support economic diversification away from agriculture. This failure, in ways which we cannot elaborate here, limited the growth of the domestic market and held back autonomous development, as well as left untouched the structural constraints leading to bouts of inflation and periodic balance of payments crises. This was true of countries from which some of the inspiring leaders at Bandung – Indonesia's President Sukarno, India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser for example – came. In time, with the failure of autonomous development in the form of 'import substituting industrialisation', these countries would all drop their progressive agendas and embrace neoliberalism, owning that agenda rather than opposing it as an imposition by neocolonial powers. The core constraint The Bandung cohort did realise that they had responsibilities to their peoples who fought for political freedom, installed them as leaders, and gave them the social sanction to advance the project of autonomous and independent development. The issue they faced was not just that of raising productivity and per capita income but of addressing the asset inequality that would deprive that majority of the benefits of post-independence development. That, in turn, would prevent the emergence of a domestic market needed to support a process of development that would be less dependent on international markets dominated by the developed countries and on the foreign investors whose support would be needed to obtain any foothold in those markets. In sum, the less developed countries would have to pursue more egalitarian strategies with a major or even dominant role for the State, as well as cooperate with each other to create combined markets and realise the scale needed to support the diversification of economic activity. Seven decades after the Bandung conclave, its vision appears to have been only partially realised and does not seem to have the needed purchase among governments who are seen as central to breaking the shackles of global economic inequality. After a brief honeymoon with the ideals that were espoused at Bandung, States in most post-colonial countries lost the will to stand up to imperialism and push ahead with strategies that could have helped them pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. They had failed to deliver on the promises based on which the mass upsurge against imperialism was mobilised, having gone too far to accommodate the demands of powerful, asset owning vested interests and their elite backers. This not only resulted in the persistence to different degrees of inequality, poverty and social deprivation, but also subverted the effort to pursue autonomous and successful development. The result was the loss of support from those advocating or aspiring for national development. Also read: Unchallenged at Home and Abroad: Jawaharlal Nehru's Leadership With the Non-Aligned Movement By the 1970s, governments in most less developed countries were faced with a development impasse. To resolve that, they turned to the surfeit of liquidity that flooded global markets following the rise to dominance of finance starting in the 1980s. Rather than stand up to foreign capital and influence, expand domestic markets, and build domestic capabilities, they embraced neoliberalism in the hope that they can leverage foreign investment and finance to restructure themselves as export engines growing on the basis of markets in countries they had promised to win economic independence from. The result has been heighted vulnerability, extreme volatility, and social retrogression. The exceptions However, the Bandung promise of a pushback against imperialism was kept alive and was rejuvenated by the revolutions in China and Vietnam. Victory in the Vietnam war, the 50th anniversary of which is being celebrated this year, highlighted a model form of the national liberation struggle in Vietnam and marked the completion of the Vietnamese revolution. The synchronisation of that important anniversary with the 70th anniversary of Bandung has partly strengthened the call for a revival of the Bandung spirit. It is true that China and Vietnam too embraced 'reform', expanded the space for private initiative and relied on external markets to accelerate growth. But their success along that path, despite its many adverse consequences, is in no small measure due to the strengths and resilience built during years of 'socialist' development. The idea that the character of the leadership of the national liberation struggle was crucial has an interesting history. It originated in the view articulated at the Sixth Congress of the Communist international in 1928, in the 'Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries'. That view had held that 'When the dominant imperialist power needs social support in the colonies it makes an alliance first and foremost with the dominant classes of the old pre-capitalist system, the feudal type commercial and moneylending bourgeoisie, against the majority of the people.' However, subsequent analyses did not either restrict that kind of alliance only to the colonial period or limit it to one between feudalism and imperialism. Rather, the possibility, especially after the October Revolution, that any attack on feudal land monopoly could develop into a movement against private property itself, was seen to necessitate a compromise between the 'national bourgeoisie' and feudal landlordism in the post-colonial period. As a result, the ability of the post-colonial state, constructed in part by an incipient capitalist class to sustain successful industrialisation, was also seen as limited. What this position went on to argue was that the fall-out of this correlation of forces constrained industrialisation and capitalist development in three ways: (1) It sapped the ability of emerging elites in underdeveloped countries to radically transform agrarian relations, and thereby constrained growth of the domestic market and manoeuvrability of the State; (2) It transformed the underdeveloped countries into a sink for surpluses to finance that process of accumulation; and (3) It subordinated local production and markets to the needs of capital accumulation on a world scale, resulting in growing external vulnerability. The argument was not that capitalist development would not occur, but that such development would be characterised by extreme gradualism, its effects on wage earners and the salariat would be immiserising, and that at all times it would be characterised by the utmost external vulnerability making the pace of development dependent on the access of domestic elites to international capital. The questionable alternative 'models' This view was sought to be skirted subsequently by a very specific interpretation of the successful diffusion of capitalism into two countries with a special history. if we take the post-World War II period (and therefore treat Japan since the Meiji restoration separately), there have been only two countries that have made the developmental transition within a market economy framework, in the sense of having moved from backward to developed-country status: South Korea and Taiwan. Other countries that had made that transition were either part of the Soviet Union and not market economies in any meaningful sense, and China and Vietnam which show some promise of making that transition have a very specific non-market, pre-'market-economy', history. In sum, South Korea and Taiwan are more exceptions rather than the rule. There are some telling similarities between these two that make them exceptional. Externally, South Korea and Taiwan were countries that became 'independent' after having been liberated from Japanese imperialism by the United States, that placed them under occupation. That resulted in a special, even if subordinate relationship with the US and them, strengthened by the fact that these were frontier states in a geopolitics marked by Cold War conflicts. They also served as important rest, recuperation and refuelling bases for American troops during the Vietnam war. Not surprisingly, despite being geographically not too large, as of September 2022 South Korea was host to 73 US military bases. This special relation not only gave the country easier access and special privileges in the markets of the US and its allies, but special access to private international capital markets at a time when developing countries were being shunned by international banks. South Korea was a 'semi-core' rather than 'peripheral' country. It was the periphery of metropolitan capitalism, rather being a peripheral country in global capitalism. The State here mattered not because it was a bulwark against imperialism, but because it was the instrument through which imperialism consciously facilitated their development to establish them as 'frontier states'. Contemporary relevance It is in this background that we must assess the relevance of the Bandung agenda today, when international inequality and the push of capital from the North to the South have locked many less developed countries in a debt trap; when the developed nations refuse to recognise their prime responsibility for redressing the effects of past carbon emissions that triggered the current climate crisis; and, when developed countries turn inward and seek to resolve their domestic problems by shutting out the less developed from presence in their markets. The global majority countries are once again recognising that they need to stand on their own feet, shape autonomous development strategies, and cooperate to strengthen each other. But to pursue that agenda they need to break out of the grip of neoliberalism, enhance domestic policy space and reverse and unravel asset and income inequality to grow local markets. That requires social pressure and transformation. This possibly explains why, though 'Bandung' was a landmark that received popular support in Afro-Asian nations, the 70th anniversary passed with scattered celebrations that were little more than a token recognition of the importance of the occasion. Underlying this absence of the Bandung spirit is the reality that, while Bandung's call for political independence across the colonies has in fact been met, the economic independence and egalitarian development path it advocated are still substantially unrealised. But that makes a case not for dropping the Bandung agenda, but for recognising that there are prerequisite for reviving the Bandung spirit, which has gained a new relevance. However, the changed circumstances also pose new challenges. What the embrace of neoliberalism did was that it set off competition among these poorer countries to win larger shares of the limited world market open to them. Wages were kept down, foreign investors were wooed and developed country governments appeased in order to emerge the winner. Few did, but even when they did the outcome was not adequate to ensure coveted membership of the rich nations club. The result largely was greater dependence, excessive external debt, subordination and extreme vulnerability. Meanwhile, whatever growth occurred largely bypassed the poor. And when the US administration under Trump decided to weaponise tariffs and held out the threat of being shut out of the American markets, governments in even the more 'successful' countries, had to rush to negotiate and offer concessions that are likely to set back development and hurt most those who have been marginal beneficiaries of whatever development has occurred. That weakness explains the muted response to attempts to recall Bandung. It poses a challenge to democratic forces and civil society actors when seeking to revive the spirit of Bandung and realise its ambitions. They must struggle to put in place truly representative governments committed to pursuing the goals that inspired national liberation struggles the world over. C.P. Chandrasekhar is the Global Research Director at International Development Economics Associates (IDEAs). He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Political Economy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and was engaged in teaching and research at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning at Jawaharlal Nehru University for more than 30 years. In commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, IDEAs, Yukthi and Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies have organised a two-day conference in Colombo, Srilanka on June 2 and 3 at the historic venue of the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall, which was the site of the 5th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Read more about it here. This article was originally published on the IDEAs website. The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments. World Musk Slams Trump's 'Big Beautiful Bill' as 'Abomination' View More

France's Macron calls for 'new coalition' between Asia and Europe
France's Macron calls for 'new coalition' between Asia and Europe

Nikkei Asia

time30-05-2025

  • Politics
  • Nikkei Asia

France's Macron calls for 'new coalition' between Asia and Europe

SINGAPORE -- French President Emmanuel Macron on Friday called on Europe and Asia to build a new coalition that upholds global norms and to defend sovereignty in a keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit here. A Europe-Asia alliance can lead to "new coalitions, new agreements" and a resetting of the rules-based order, he said. Citing the Bandung Conference that convened more than 70 years ago among African and Asian countries, Macron said the time for non-alignment has "undoubtedly passed."

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