Wolf at the door. Europe must now show that it can follow through on its pledges to boost military spending and step up its support for Ukraine — Novaya Gazeta Europe
Carl Bildt
Former Swedish prime minister and foreign minister
Three urgent priorities are set to strain Europe's public finances over the next few years. The first — and most obvious — is defence. The push to boost military spending is primarily a response to Vladimir Putin's aggression, compounded by US President Donald Trump's relentless criticism of America's NATO allies. Together, these pressures have made strengthening Europe's defence posture a strategic necessity.
The second, and arguably more urgent, priority is to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. If Ukraine's defences were to collapse, a revanchist Russia would likely go on a rampage. Ensuring that Ukraine can continue to defend itself will require European governments to go beyond their existing defence-spending commitments.
And lastly, there is the lengthy process of producing the European Union's next multiyear budget, which will cover the period from 2028 to 2034. The European Commission has already presented its proposal, but the real challenge lies ahead, as member states and the European Parliament must go through internal negotiations before agreeing on the final numbers.
Supporting Ukraine through the war and the country's eventual reconstruction will also require a substantial financial commitment.
The commission's proposal includes increased funding for security, global commitments, and competitiveness, as well as additional support for Ukraine. Although these priorities have been widely supported, the reallocation of resources needed to fund them has been the subject of fierce debate. It is safe to say the commission is headed for a bruising political showdown before a consensus is reached.
Despite the intensity of these budgetary battles, the commission's proposed budget amounts to just 1.26% of the combined gross national income (GNI) of the EU's 27 member states. While that is up from 1.13% today, the net increase is relatively modest once debt-servicing costs from the bloc's post-pandeemic borrowing spree are factored in.
When it comes to defence, however, the numbers are far more significant. Across Europe, defence budgets have grown by roughly one third in recent years, with most of NATO's European members spending around 2% of their GDP or nearing that benchmark.
But even that is no longer enough. At the June NATO summit in The Hague, members pledged to spend 3.5% of GDP on defence by 2035, with an additional 1.5% earmarked for loosely defined defence- and security-related investments. The extra 1.5% appears designed to appease Trump, who has repeatedly called for European allies to boost military spending to 5% of GDP. Much of this additional spending is expected to rely on creative accounting rather than actual new funding.
Supporting Ukraine through the war and the country's eventual reconstruction will also require a substantial financial commitment. While estimates vary, $100 billion per year, for example, would amount to just over 0.4% of the combined GDP of the EU and the United Kingdom — significant but far from unmanageable.
At some point within the 2028-35 budget window, the cost of rebuilding Ukraine will need to be addressed. Some studies have estimated the cost of reconstruction at around $500 billion, though this figure includes areas that may remain under Russian control for the foreseeable future. Much will also depend on whether security guarantees and the prospect of Ukraine's EU accession can foster an environment conducive to large-scale private investment.
Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a glide bomb strike in Kharkiv, northern Ukraine, 25 July 2025. Photo: EPA/SERGEY KOZLOV
Of course, new demands may emerge, placing additional strain on Europe's finances. Several European governments, for example, have already slashed development aid or diverted part of it to support Ukraine. While this may have been a necessary short-term response to Russia's invasion, its long-term consequences remain unclear.
Currently, only Norway, Sweden, and Denmark meet the United Nations target of allocating 0.7% of GNI to development assistance. Following the Trump administration's dramatic foreign-aid cuts and the shutdown of the US Agency for International Development, there is a strong case for Europe to fill the void. A more desperate world will be more volatile and less secure, making development a strategic imperative as well as a moral one.
Meeting all of these commitments will not be easy, especially for governments already grappling with high deficits and rising public debt. My guess is that northern European countries will reach NATO's 3.5%-of-GDP defence spending target well before 2035, while southern European countries — with the exception of Greece — will likely fail to meet it. With France, Italy, and Spain all heading for elections by 2027, the political appetite for the spending cuts needed to increase defence budgets will likely remain limited.
There is a stark contrast between NATO's swift approval of large spending pledges and the EU's wrangling over far smaller amounts.
This trend is already evident in the distribution of aid to Ukraine. In the first four months of 2025, the Nordic countries contributed $6.8 billion, the UK provided $5.3 billion, and Germany put up $760 million, while Spain and Italy gave only a fraction of those amounts.
The irony is that the EU member states often labelled as 'frugal' are the ones actually willing to provide funding to advance the bloc's agreed-upon priorities. Meanwhile, the less frugal countries prefer to call for more borrowing, even though they have limited room to do so themselves.
These tensions are now driving the intensifying battle over Europe's finances. There is a stark contrast between NATO's swift approval of large spending pledges and the EU's wrangling over far smaller amounts. Whatever the outcome, the coming fiscal fight will test how able and willing Europe's leaders are to confront the serious security challenges ahead.
This article was first published by Project Syndicate. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe
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Novaya Gazeta Europe
11 hours ago
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
Wolf at the door. Europe must now show that it can follow through on its pledges to boost military spending and step up its support for Ukraine — Novaya Gazeta Europe
'Money makes the world go around,' sings the showgirl Sally Bowles in Cabaret, the iconic musical set against the backdrop of the Weimar Republic's decadence. Money will certainly shape Europe's future, as political leaders across the continent are forced to make painful decisions about how to allocate public funds in an increasingly unstable world. Carl Bildt Former Swedish prime minister and foreign minister Three urgent priorities are set to strain Europe's public finances over the next few years. The first — and most obvious — is defence. The push to boost military spending is primarily a response to Vladimir Putin's aggression, compounded by US President Donald Trump's relentless criticism of America's NATO allies. Together, these pressures have made strengthening Europe's defence posture a strategic necessity. The second, and arguably more urgent, priority is to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. If Ukraine's defences were to collapse, a revanchist Russia would likely go on a rampage. Ensuring that Ukraine can continue to defend itself will require European governments to go beyond their existing defence-spending commitments. And lastly, there is the lengthy process of producing the European Union's next multiyear budget, which will cover the period from 2028 to 2034. The European Commission has already presented its proposal, but the real challenge lies ahead, as member states and the European Parliament must go through internal negotiations before agreeing on the final numbers. Supporting Ukraine through the war and the country's eventual reconstruction will also require a substantial financial commitment. The commission's proposal includes increased funding for security, global commitments, and competitiveness, as well as additional support for Ukraine. Although these priorities have been widely supported, the reallocation of resources needed to fund them has been the subject of fierce debate. It is safe to say the commission is headed for a bruising political showdown before a consensus is reached. Despite the intensity of these budgetary battles, the commission's proposed budget amounts to just 1.26% of the combined gross national income (GNI) of the EU's 27 member states. While that is up from 1.13% today, the net increase is relatively modest once debt-servicing costs from the bloc's post-pandeemic borrowing spree are factored in. When it comes to defence, however, the numbers are far more significant. Across Europe, defence budgets have grown by roughly one third in recent years, with most of NATO's European members spending around 2% of their GDP or nearing that benchmark. But even that is no longer enough. At the June NATO summit in The Hague, members pledged to spend 3.5% of GDP on defence by 2035, with an additional 1.5% earmarked for loosely defined defence- and security-related investments. The extra 1.5% appears designed to appease Trump, who has repeatedly called for European allies to boost military spending to 5% of GDP. Much of this additional spending is expected to rely on creative accounting rather than actual new funding. Supporting Ukraine through the war and the country's eventual reconstruction will also require a substantial financial commitment. While estimates vary, $100 billion per year, for example, would amount to just over 0.4% of the combined GDP of the EU and the United Kingdom — significant but far from unmanageable. At some point within the 2028-35 budget window, the cost of rebuilding Ukraine will need to be addressed. Some studies have estimated the cost of reconstruction at around $500 billion, though this figure includes areas that may remain under Russian control for the foreseeable future. Much will also depend on whether security guarantees and the prospect of Ukraine's EU accession can foster an environment conducive to large-scale private investment. Ukrainian rescuers work at the site of a glide bomb strike in Kharkiv, northern Ukraine, 25 July 2025. Photo: EPA/SERGEY KOZLOV Of course, new demands may emerge, placing additional strain on Europe's finances. Several European governments, for example, have already slashed development aid or diverted part of it to support Ukraine. While this may have been a necessary short-term response to Russia's invasion, its long-term consequences remain unclear. Currently, only Norway, Sweden, and Denmark meet the United Nations target of allocating 0.7% of GNI to development assistance. Following the Trump administration's dramatic foreign-aid cuts and the shutdown of the US Agency for International Development, there is a strong case for Europe to fill the void. A more desperate world will be more volatile and less secure, making development a strategic imperative as well as a moral one. Meeting all of these commitments will not be easy, especially for governments already grappling with high deficits and rising public debt. My guess is that northern European countries will reach NATO's 3.5%-of-GDP defence spending target well before 2035, while southern European countries — with the exception of Greece — will likely fail to meet it. With France, Italy, and Spain all heading for elections by 2027, the political appetite for the spending cuts needed to increase defence budgets will likely remain limited. There is a stark contrast between NATO's swift approval of large spending pledges and the EU's wrangling over far smaller amounts. This trend is already evident in the distribution of aid to Ukraine. In the first four months of 2025, the Nordic countries contributed $6.8 billion, the UK provided $5.3 billion, and Germany put up $760 million, while Spain and Italy gave only a fraction of those amounts. The irony is that the EU member states often labelled as 'frugal' are the ones actually willing to provide funding to advance the bloc's agreed-upon priorities. Meanwhile, the less frugal countries prefer to call for more borrowing, even though they have limited room to do so themselves. These tensions are now driving the intensifying battle over Europe's finances. There is a stark contrast between NATO's swift approval of large spending pledges and the EU's wrangling over far smaller amounts. Whatever the outcome, the coming fiscal fight will test how able and willing Europe's leaders are to confront the serious security challenges ahead. This article was first published by Project Syndicate. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe
Balkan Insight
3 days ago
- Balkan Insight
Will Russia attack beyond Ukraine?
July 24, 2025 - Valerii Pekar - Articles and Commentary Damaged buildings after Russian shelling and rocket attacks in Bakhmut. Photo: Dmytro Larin / Shutterstock The answer to the question posed in the title of this article depends on how you assess the current international situation. Do you consider Russian aggression in Ukraine a local war or the first act of a global war? Do you have full confidence that the United States will immediately come to the rescue? Do you consider NATO's level of deterrence against Russia to be sufficient? Are you sure you understand Russia's goals and strategies? Are there vulnerabilities in the current system that invite an aggressor? Lately, we have been hearing that Russia will be ready to attack Europe around 2030, and by then the continent needs to be fully prepared and rearmed. But is Russia obliged to wait for such a moment of European readiness? After all, it is appropriate to strike at the moment of least readiness. Why not now? To understand this, we need to answer three questions: What is Russia's strategic goal? How has war changed? And how can Russia use the new nature of the war to achieve its goal? As I wrote in a previous article, in the new world of the 'right of force', American, Russian and Chinese interests coincide. They would all like to see Europe divided and weak, incapable of making strong joint decisions. They want a Europe that is not an independent centre of power but only a set of markets in which they can trade profitably. This leads to steps that can even be seen as a certain American-Russian rapprochement. Thus, the Russian strategic goal is not to seize a part of European territory as was expected during the Cold War. It would be enough now to sow panic and chaos; create a humanitarian crisis; generate refugee flows; and collapse and overthrow governments. This could create a domino effect that could bring radical Eurosceptics to power, destroy European unity and (last but not least) cut support to Ukraine. To understand how this could happen, we need to look at the face of modern war. The new face(s) of war The nature of modern warfare has changed radically over the past three years. While the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 looked like the Second World War, radical innovations since then (some of the most important were mentioned here) have changed the battlefield every few months. This has influenced not only tactics but also strategies. And generals (in a phrase attributed to Churchill) are always preparing for the last war. One of the typical delusions is that the war in Ukraine is a 'poor country's war' that is forced to use a large army, while NATO can wage a 'rich country's war' with a small professional army and high-precision weapons. This concept from the days of Operation Desert Storm is outdated. As one of the leading Ukrainian military experts, Taras Chmut, says, 'You don't need to have the best equipment. You need to have sufficient equipment in enough quantities.' At the same time, war is not only high-tech, but also multi-domain. More than ever before, it includes other types of confrontation, in addition to kinetic engagement. It now covers the economic, humanitarian, diplomatic, political, demographic, cyber, information, psychological and cognitive (semantic) spheres alongside other domains. The third important feature of war is the significant expansion of the amplitude of operations. In addition to clearly hostile actions, modern war includes (and Russian military doctrine emphasizes) so-called liminal operations. These involve activities that are not obviously (at least initially) hostile until they achieve their goals, or those that, in the opinion of the other side, do not cross the threshold of reaction. Examples include the appearance of militants in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014 who initially seemed unserious. Following this, recently we have seen the repeated infringement of the Polish border by missiles and drones (seemingly by accident); the inexplicable death of American soldiers in Lithuania; the recent fires involving military equipment in Germany and Belgium; a fire affecting telecommunications networks in Poland; and the dangerous use of electronic warfare in the Baltics. Finally, the fourth important feature of war is that it is taking place for the first time in the postmodern world, which affects all other dimensions. I will only list the most important theses here: The emergence of cognitive (semantic) warfare to the fore, with the main battlefield becoming consciousness itself and what people think. A full-fledged reflection of war in the media and social networks in real time, which completely changes the perception of war within societies. The active use of fakes aimed at the creation of an alternative reality for the opponent and third parties: it does not matter what has happened, what is important is what is said about events. Post-heroic societies that do not approve of mass mobilization, despite the fact that war still requires huge armies. From the point of view of European security, the question arises whether the continent's countries are ready for such a war — high-tech, multi-domain, liminal, postmodern. This means that there must be readiness of not only armies, but societies. Russian strike Most likely, we should not expect a Russian strike as a ground operation, featuring powerful tanks and motorized columns aimed at Baltic countries or the Polish-Lithuanian Suwałki corridor. Instead of this, just imagine an attack on Poland that combines: massive missile and drone attacks on energy, infrastructure and logistics facilities (by the way, drones can be marked as Ukrainian); cyber-attacks on government and infrastructure facilities; a navigation collapse due to the large-scale use of electronic warfare; sabotage and terrorist groups creating sudden 'ecological' and man-made disasters; the destabilization of society (already heated) through social networks; the use of a 'fifth column' and 'useful idiots'; crowds of thousands of Middle Eastern refugees released across the Belarusian border. I am not saying that everything will necessarily be like this. I just want to emphasize that the war could be completely different from the one Europe is preparing for. And such a war requires significantly fewer resources than a Second World War-style one, resources which are available in Russia today. In such a situation, the key issue is not the quantity and quality of weapons, but the readiness of the political and military leadership to react quickly. It is also important to assess the readiness of society to take balanced, mature and responsible actions. Dear reader, ask yourself: what would the political leadership of your country do in such a case? Will governments be at a loss, not knowing how to respond? And what would you and your family do personally? Conclusion The increasingly frequent statements by Russian representatives that Russia is not going to attack Europe sounds like a wake-up call for European politicians. Russia will neither wait for European readiness nor attack where it has long been expected. It will also not use the strategic approaches of the Second World War. This raises a number of questions that go beyond the military dimension. Relevant issues now include the unity and cohesion of societies; control of the domestic information space; the ability of NGOs to support governments and societies in moments of extraordinary challenges; and the preparedness of political leaders to make decisions in a pre-threshold liminal war. Learning the lessons of Ukraine, for which Ukrainians paid with their own blood, is recommended here. Purchasing tanks and armoured vehicles is not enough to oppose a Russian strike. They will not even leave the hangars. Superbly trained and brave soldiers will have no targets to acquire with this equipment. There will be no more wars like February 2022. Europe has all the necessary resources to defend itself. The problem is that governments and societies do not see that war is already on their doorstep. They do not understand that Russia should not be deterred or stopped but defeated. Some will say I am causing panic. I already heard this in early February 2022. Valerii Pekar is a chairman of the board of the Decolonization NGO, the author of four books, an adjunct professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a former member of the National Reform Council. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. geopolitics, Russian invasion of Ukraine
Novaya Gazeta Europe
16-07-2025
- Novaya Gazeta Europe
With a pinch of salt. What Trump's decision to send more weapons to Ukraine will mean for the war — Novaya Gazeta Europe
At face value, Donald Trump's announcement about his plans on Russia and Ukraine look like a major policy change. Speaking from the Oval Office on 14 July, where he had been meeting with NATO secretary general Mark Rutte, the US president said he would send 'top-of-the-line-weapons' to help Kyiv and — unless a ceasefire deal is agreed inside a 50-day time limit — the US would impose secondary sanctions on any countries dealing with Russia. David Hastings Dunn Professor of International Politics, University of Birmingham But while this represents a significant departure from Trump's previous approach, it's more of a step back towards the policy approach of his predecessor Joe Biden than the U-turn that some commentators are claiming. For months Russia has stepped up its bombardment of Ukraine, buoyed by the fact that neither the US Congress nor the White House has authorised any new military aid to Kyiv. Moscow would have been aware of this lack of US action and its missile and drone attacks against Ukraine have aimed to run down the stocks of air defence missiles supplied by Biden while paying lip service to the idea of peace negotiations. For Trump the penny appears finally to have dropped as to what was happening. His frustration and disappointment in Putin is what has finally led to him calling this out. According to Trump, Putin 'fooled a lot of people — Clinton, Bush, Obama, Biden — he didn't fool me. At a certain point talk doesn't talk, it's got to be action.' The decision to send new supplies of defensive — and potentially even longer-range offensive missiles — to Ukraine, even if the Europeans pay for them, is an important signal to Russia. But so too is the threat of tariffs of 100% on countries such as India and China that sustain the Russian economy by buying its oil and gas at knockdown prices. What has not changed, however, is the goal of Trump's policy towards the war in Ukraine. The US senate, led by Lindsay Graham, the influential Republican senator for South Carolina, has been itching to pass these secondary sanctions for months. Now that the Trump administration appears to have adopted this plan it is a significant policy instrument to pile the pressure on Russia. The change in Trump's approach may also mean that the €6.9 billion of frozen Russian assets in the US, and €192 billion in Europe, could be released to aid Ukraine, which would provide a ready means to pay for the US arms transfers. What has not changed, however, is the goal of Trump's policy towards the war in Ukraine. While the Biden administration called out the illegality of Putin's unprovoked aggression and called for the restoration of Ukrainian sovereignty, Trump is merely calling for a ceasefire. Trump may say he is 'disappointed' with Putin, but he has not labelled him as the aggressor. In fact at one point he was blaming Ukraine for the invasion. And, significantly, he has not demanded that Russia give up the 20% of Ukraine that it currently illegally occupies. The US president is also silent on what the US would commit to in terms of security and stability for Ukraine after the fighting stops. This is a much bigger question than Ukraine's NATO membership. America's European allies in NATO regard some sort of stability force on Ukrainian territory as necessary to deter any future Russian aggression. Whether or not US troops would be involved, and all the signs are that they would not, some sort of US security back-stop or guarantee is still seen in Europe as key to its success, as would be US logistical and intelligence support for its operation. Another aspect of the change in Trump's policy is the long lead time that Russia has been given to come to the table. A lot of Ukrainian civilians are likely to die during this period if the intense bombardment continues. On the battlefield, 50 days would give the Russians an extended window during a renewed summer offensive to make further territorial gains inside the occupied provinces. So Trump's proposals have to be viewed through the prism of his propensity to set deadlines that are then pushed back multiple times, as with the on-again, off-again tariffs, which have given Trump the nickname Taco — 'Trump always chickens out' — on Wall Street. Trump is seen by many as both inconsistent in his threats and unpredictable as to where policy will eventually settle. Russian senator, Konstantin Kosachev, was certainly taking this view when he told the BBC after Trump's announcement that, 'if this is all Trump had to say about Ukraine today, then so far it's been much ado about nothing'. This sentiment was shared by the Russian stock market which rose 2.7% in the aftermath of Trump's announcement. Analysts had expected much worse, so the long delay in the prospect of anything actually happening was clearly seen as a long way off and potentially subject to change or cancellation. Trump is seen by many as both inconsistent in his threats and unpredictable as to where policy will eventually settle. The fact that Trump told BBC Washington correspondent Gary O'Donoghue that while he was 'disappointed' with Putin, he was 'not done with him', and his clear reluctance to act quickly and decisively in sanctioning Russia, should be seen as an important counterpart to the apparent policy shift. Like so many things with the 47th US president, it's important not to react to the media appearances or the headlines they provoke, without also paying attention to the policy actions of his administration. This article was first published by The Conversation. Views expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of Novaya Gazeta Europe.
