Outgunned on NGAD, Lockheed doubles down on F-35
This month, multiple media sources reported that Lockheed Martin CEO Jim Taiclet announced that the defense giant will not challenge the US Air Force's decision to award the US$20 billion Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter contract to rival defense contractor Boeing.
The company said it plans to integrate technologies from its unsuccessful NGAD bid into upgraded versions of its F-35 and F-22 fighters.
During an earnings call, Taiclet said Lockheed aims to deliver '80% of sixth-generation capability at 50% of the cost' by transforming the F-35 into a fifth-gen-plus fighter. Enhancements will include stealth, passive infrared sensors and advanced tracking and missile systems — some already in development under the F-35 Block 4 upgrade.
Lockheed executives said the company intends to export some of these improvements, subject to US government approval. With a projected global fleet of 3,500 F-35s, Lockheed hopes its upgraded jets will offer a cost-effective alternative to the yet-undefined, potentially multi-hundred-million-dollar NGAD aircraft.
The NGAD decision, announced in March 2025 by US President Donald Trump, leaves Lockheed temporarily sidelined from all publicly known advanced fighter programs. The US Air Force confirmed Boeing offered the 'best overall value' for NGAD.
Naval News mentions in a March 2025 article that under the Next Gen 2.0 OML Coating Program, the F-35 would receive a new mirror coating designed to improve maintainability and survivability, critical for the harsh corrosive maritime environment involved in aircraft carrier-based operations.
Further, David Cenciotti and Stefano D'Urso mention in an August 2022 article for The Aviationist that the mirror coating could hide the F-35 from infrared search and tracking (IRST) systems or protect the aircraft from low-power lasers.
In terms of propulsion upgrades, John Tirpak mentions in an October 2024 article for Air & Space Forces Magazine that the F-35 Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) is intended to increase the durability and life expectancy of the F-35's Pratt and Whitney F135 engines, which has suffered in recent years due to increased and new equipment installed on the aircraft.
Tirpak notes that the ECU upgrade supports the cooling, performance and electrical power requirements for the F-35's Block 4 upgrade.
While the F-35 is different from most US fighters as it was designed with an Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) IRST system from the start, the Advanced Electro-Optical Targeting System (A-EOTS) upgrade offers improved resolution, multi-spectral range, greater reliability and reduced costs per operating hour.
In addition to A-EOTS, TWZ reported in January 2023 that the new AN/APG-85 radar, which is most likely a gallium nitride (GaN)-based system, could drastically increase the F-35's radar range and resolution and support more dynamic electronic warfare tactics.
Combined with the Distributed Aperture System (DAS) that provides F-35 pilots a 360-degree view through the aircraft, the A-EOTS + AN/APG-85 + DAS combination can give the aircraft a substantial 'see-first shoot-first' advantage.
New armaments, such as the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), could give the F-35 a substantial range and lethality upgrade over the legacy AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) in US military service, though much of the secretive weapon's capabilities are classified, as stated by TWZ in a February 2025 article.
However, integration constraints mean upgrades will be evolutionary, not revolutionary – the F-35 must work within the physical and technical bounds set years ago. For example, the US Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) FY2024 Annual Report mentions that integrating the Technology Refresh-3 (TR-3) avionics upgrade, essential for Block 4 mission capabilities, has encountered substantial hardware and software issues.
According to the report, these problems forced the program to delay the delivery of aircraft equipped with TR-3, resulting in newly produced planes being placed in long-term parking due to inadequate mission systems software performance.
It says the F-35's existing TR-2 architecture's constraints compounded these issues, limiting the scope of feasible enhancements and highlighting inherent limitations established by legacy design choices.
The Asia Live mentions that some analysts say sixth-generation fighters involve fundamental design changes that can't be replicated by upgrading existing platforms, such as the F-35.
According to the report, these include airframe shapes for better stealth, adaptive engines for optimized performance and a 'digital first' architecture designed with AI integration from the ground up.
In addition to those challenges, the F-35's reliability issues, if not addressed, would leave upgrades pointless. The US DOT&E FY2024 Annual Report says that the US F-35 fleet falls short of several reliability requirements defined in the Joint Strike Fighter Operational Requirements Document (JSF ORD).
It states that in FY23, the F-35A, F-35B and F-35C did not meet key thresholds for mean flight hours between critical failures (MFHBCF), which measures how often serious failures occur that prevent mission completion or compromise flight safety.
Additionally, the report mentions that trends in the mean time to repair (MTTR) and mean corrective maintenance time for critical failures (MCMTCF) have shown little improvement, indicating ongoing difficulties in maintaining aircraft readiness.
Lockheed Martin's push to retrofit the F-35 with some sixth-generation technology could make it a viable alternative for other upcoming sixth-generation aircraft.
For instance, the UK's Future Combat Air System (FCAS) received a red rating in the country's Annual Report on Major Projects 2023-2024. According to the report, a red rating means the success of the project appears to be unachievable, with major issues appearing unmanageable or unresolvable.
Further, in an April 2023 article for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Justin Bronk mentions that the UK-Italy-Japan Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) is unlikely to produce a product more competitive than the F-35.
The GCAP is a component of the UK's FCAS. The former is an international collaboration, while the latter is a UK initiative that aims to leverage its partners' technology and industrial expertise for advancement.
While Bronk points out that the F-35 is far from a perfect program, decades of US expertise and investment in state-of-the-art sensors, weapons, electronic warfare, stealth, constant upgrades and retrofitting have produced undeniable results.
He mentions that every air force that has tested the F-35 versus European or US competitors picked the F-35, as its ability to operate in contested airspace is unparalleled. Bronk assesses that if the GCAP is built in the 2030s, it would not compete with current-generation F-35s.
However, Lockheed Martin's evolutionary approach towards the F-35 program may not be sufficient against adversaries who prefer technology leapfrogging. Even with 3,500 F-35s eligible for the fifth-generation-plus upgrade, China may have already flown prototype sixth-generation fighters and could be gearing up for serial production, making such improvements too slow, too little and too late.
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AllAfrica
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The digital escort fraud: another major Pentagon security failure
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AllAfrica
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Seth Jones writes in a January 2023 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the US defense industrial base remains optimized for peacetime and lacks resilient supply chains. Jones warns that this situation leaves the US unprepared for a protracted conflict, such as a Taiwan contingency against China, where early depletion of high-end munitions could prove disastrous. He stresses that in a potential US-China war over Taiwan, the US could expend up to 5,000 high-end, multi-million-dollar long-range missiles—including the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), Harpoon anti-ship missile and Tomahawk cruise missile—within the first three weeks of conflict. 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Given the capability gap between high-end PGMs like the $3.2 million per unit LRASM and more affordable systems such as the Red Wolf, Stacey Pettyjohn and others argue in a January 2025 article for the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) that the US must urgently implement a high-low PGM mix to deter China. They argue that China's People's Liberation Army's (PLA) rapid expansion and increasingly coercive maneuvers have outpaced the US's Indo-Pacific posture, exposing a strategic mismatch in both capability and scale. They point out that while high-end weapons are critical for penetrating advanced defenses and executing high-value missions, they are constrained by cost, availability and replenishment lag. Conversely, they state low-cost autonomous systems can be produced more rapidly and in greater numbers to bolster mass and sustain combat effectiveness over time, though they lack the capability of high-end systems. However, Pettyjohn and others caution that the US DoD's risk-averse acquisition culture and absence of a clear operational concept integrating both tiers exacerbate these challenges. Explaining the roots of this problem, Shands Pickett and Zach Beecher write in a June 2025 article for War on the Rocks that a widening rift between traditional prime contractors and non-traditional tech entrants is fracturing the US defense-industrial base. Pickett and Beecher note that primes, known for delivering large-scale, complex systems, are criticized for being slow, risk-averse and too focused on legacy programs. In contrast, they state that non-traditionalists bring agility and innovation, rapidly developing capabilities using commercial best practices. Yet Pickett and Beecher note that these firms often struggle with integration into mission systems and scaling for full-rate production. They liken this incompatibility to clashing software languages, resulting in technical debt, mission gaps and an industrial ecosystem fragmented and ill-suited to modern threats. While low-cost missiles can help close the gap in munitions volume, their strategic value hinges on effective integration, operational clarity and industrial readiness. Without structural reforms to US acquisition practices and production infrastructure, affordable mass may fall short of delivering meaningful deterrence in a high-end conflict with China.
