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Oman Is Supporting The Houthis: It Should Be Held To Account

Oman Is Supporting The Houthis: It Should Be Held To Account

Khabar Agency09-03-2025
A showdown may be brewing in the Middle East. Judging from the rhetoric of both Hamas and Israel, the ceasefire in Gaza is likely to collapse. Should war return, there is a high likelihood that the Iran-backed Houthi terrorist group in Yemen will also get back into the action. If past is prologue, the Houthis will fire ballistic missiles at Israel, while simultaneously targeting U.S. warships and international maritime vessels in the Red Sea.
With conflict looming, the Trump administration must begin to consider its options. This is a White House that says it wants to avoid war. One non-kinetic option is to put pressure on the Sultanate of Oman to shutter its Houthi headquarters.
The Sultanate provides sanctuary for Houthi officials, including the group's chief negotiator and de facto foreign minister, Mohammed Abdul Salam. These individuals operate freely under the protection of the regime in Muscat.
The Biden administration wrestled with how to deal with this problem in recent years. In the end, the policy was to tread lightly, maintaining a strong defense partnership with Muscat. As of 2022, U.S. military sales to Oman totaled $3.5 billion. Since 2016, the United States has approved $613 million in Direct Commercial Sales exports, including small arms, ammunition, and military electronics.
But these transactions are small, all things considered. This prompts the question: Why would the United States handle Oman with kid gloves?
Until now, the United States has bought into the narrative, posited by Oman, that the government in Muscat hosts the Houthi leadership to help find a solution for the Yemeni Civil War. One of the group's leaders, Ali Al Houthi, has reinforced this narrative, stating that 'direct dialogue with the United States is impossible and can only occur through their negotiating team in Muscat.'
Yet, there is no evidence that this channel has served to benefit the United States. Even as this channel remained open, the Houthis emerged as the first ever terrorist group to maintain ballistic missile capabilities. This is a dangerous dynamic to normalize.
Similarly, the Houthi aggression directed at American vessels in the Red Sea region marked the greatest volume of threats faced by the U.S. Navy since World War II. Meanwhile, the Houthis have shut down most maritime traffic in the Red Sea for more than a year. The corridor accounts for roughly 12 percent of global maritime trade.
This simply cannot continue.
The Omanis are obviously aware of these challenges, and they have done nothing to rein in the terrorist group that operates on their soil. Instead, Omani officials have praised the Houthis. The state-backed Grand Mufti of Oman, Ahmad al-Khalili, lauded the Houthis' piracy. Khalili also praised Hamas for its attacks against Israel. Although the grand mufti does not speak officially for the Omani government, his statements are influential. As a tribute, some of Hamas' fighters adorned Omani flags on their chests during a recent hostage release.
An official from the Omani Foreign Ministry condemned U.S. and British strikes against the Houthis in January, 2024.
Omani rhetoric is only part of the problem. Since 2015, Oman has provided the Houthis with a corridor for weapon smuggling, and access to the international financial system. In 2017, UAVs used by the Houthis entered Yemen through Oman. In 2018, a UN panel noted that Burkan-2H missiles arrived in Yemen most likely through the Omani land route. Oman was also the smuggling route for cash and gold destined for the Houthis during that period, and there is nothing to suggest that this smuggling has halted. Last year, advanced military equipment including drone-support systems and radar-jamming devices were seized at the Sarfayt crossing in Al-Mahra province in Yemen. These devices were likely intended to support Houthi drone attacks against vessels in the Red Sea.
The Omani banking system is no less of a problem. The country's banks are full-fledged participants in the U.S.-led international financial system. This affords the Houthis officials based there the ability to send and receive funds—including in U.S. dollar denominations—with fewer complications.
Amid all of this, Iranian emissaries regularly visit Muscat to meet with their Houthi proxies. These meetings are probably operational in nature, with Iranian military figures providing intelligence and targeting data to their Yemeni allies.
As recently, on February 11, Oman's top military officer, Vice Admiral Abdullah Al Raisi, met with Iran's military chief Major-General Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran. The two discussed strengthening defense cooperation amid rising regional tensions. Raisi is also set to attend a forthcoming defense exhibition and meet with commanders from Iran's navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Admittedly, Oman understands that there would be costs in defying Iran. It is a weak country that cannot afford to tussle with the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism. However, as much as there is risk for Oman, there is also reward. The two countries jointly control the Strait of Hormuz, a key global chokepoint through which over 40 percent of the world's crude oil flows. Maintaining friendly ties with Tehran is, therefore, a strategic and long-term priority for Muscat.
Omanis are also quick to remind their critics that it has played a central role in advancing America's Iran agenda when asked. It hosted the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal discussions during Obama's presidency and later facilitated negotiations between the Biden administration and Tehran in 2023. A Senate report from 2018 confirmed that Omani banks, at the behest of the Obama administration, helped Iran gain access to its foreign reserves after the 2015 nuclear deal came into effect.
None of this grants the country a free pass for hosting the Houthis or their Iranian patrons. Oman cannot have it both ways—it cannot benefit from American friendship and assistance while enabling a crisis in the Middle East. The time has come to call out Oman's double game and consider punitive measures.
The recent designation of the Houthis by the Trump administration as a Foreign Terrorist Organization creates a legal basis for such steps. The United States has a clear predicate for calling upon Oman to shut down the Houthi headquarters operating on its soil and to jettison the Houthi leaders who have been based there. If Oman refuses, the United States should consider imposing sanctions on individuals and entities in Oman that support the Houthis. Failure to act after that should spur a full rupture in U.S.-Oman relations.
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