
A calculated gesture? The release of Siarhei Tsikhanouski and the future of the Belarusian democratic forces
Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya often campaigned for her husbands release. Photo taken in Vilnius in May 2025 by Michele Ursi / Shutterstock
The symbolism and strategy behind the release
In June 2025, the Belarusian authorities announced the release of fourteen political prisoners, including Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a 2020 presidential election candidate and husband of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. While international observers cautiously welcomed the gesture, the release is less a sign of a regime in retreat than a carefully choreographed diplomatic performance by Alyaksandr Lukashenka's government. Tsikhanouski's imprisonment in 2020 had become a catalyst for the largest protest wave in Belarus's modern history, and his sudden freedom comes at a time when the regime faces mounting geopolitical pressures and persistent domestic unrest.
Tsikhanouski's release is profoundly symbolic but equally strategic. His name has become synonymous with the Belarusian struggle for democratic change, and his incarceration was a rallying point for opposition forces. Yet, the timing and selectivity of his release reveal the regime's intent to manage perceptions and extract maximum advantage from every concession. Lukashenka's government has long weaponized political prisoners as bargaining chips, releasing them not out of genuine reformist impulses but to signal flexibility to the West while maintaining an iron grip on power. This pattern, documented by the Viasna Human Rights Centre and extensively reported by such media outlets as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Belsat, underscores that releases are always conditional and instrumental to the regime's broader strategy. Importantly, while some political prisoners are freed, the regime continues to detain many others, underscoring that these gestures do not signal a systemic change in repression.
Aliaksandr Klaskouski, one of the leading Belarusian political analysts, has illuminated how Lukashenka's regime has cultivated a deliberate construction of an ongoing narrative of existential threat to justify repression and consolidate power. Klaskouski argues that the selective release of prisoners like Tsikhanouski fits this framework. After all, it is a controlled concession designed to project an image of magnanimity without ceding real authority or undermining the regime's grip on society.
Geopolitical calculations and diplomatic signalling
Understanding this latest gesture requires situating it within Belarus's complex geopolitical position. The regime remains heavily dependent on Moscow's economic and security support but is increasingly aware of the risks of international isolation and sanctions. By releasing selected prisoners, Minsk attempts to signal a willingness to engage diplomatically, particularly with the United States and the European Union, without undermining its strategic alliance with Russia. This delicate balancing act reflects Lukashenka's broader survival strategy: to maintain authoritarian control while exploiting geopolitical rivalries to extract concessions and reduce external pressure. The release of the American lawyer and political activist of Belarusian origin Yury Ziankovich in April 2025, a move widely interpreted as a signal to Washington, and the subsequent discreet visit made by a US envoy in May, laid the groundwork for the June releases and exemplified this calculated approach.
Some commentators note that these amnesties are often timed around symbolic dates, such as the Day of National Unity, to project an image of national reconciliation and regime generosity. Yet, they also argue that these gestures are carefully staged performances rather than genuine reforms, requiring public expressions of gratitude from those released and accompanied by ongoing repression. The 'revolving door' nature of political imprisonment in Belarus – where releases are balanced by new arrests – ensures continued control and intimidation. This strategy allows the regime to deflect international criticism while testing western willingness to engage diplomatically without demanding substantive change.
Selectivity and opposition dynamics
Valer Karbalevich, another prominent Belarusian political analyst, has emphasized that the choice to release Tsikhanouski but keep other high-profile prisoners detained is a deliberate tactic to sow uncertainty within opposition ranks while maintaining leverage over international interlocutors. The regime's selectivity in prisoner releases is particularly telling. While Tsikhanouski and several foreign nationals – citizens of Poland, Latvia, Japan, Estonia and Sweden – were freed, other prominent detainees remain imprisoned. Among them is Andrzej Poczobut, the Belarusian journalist of Polish ethnicity and a minority activist whose continued detention has become a major irritant in Minsk's relations with Warsaw. The refusal to release Poczobut signals the regime's unwillingness to appear weak in the face of Polish pressure, even as it seeks to unsettle the opposition by freeing Tsikhanouski.
Equally revealing is the regime's choice to release Tsikhanouski but not other high-profile political prisoners such as Viktar Babaryka or Maria Kalesnikava. Babaryka, the former banker and presidential hopeful, commands broad appeal among the urban middle class and is seen as a technocratic alternative to Lukashenka. His continued imprisonment reflects the regime's fear of empowering a figure capable of rallying both domestic and elite support, potentially threatening Lukashenka's narrative of indispensability. Kalesnikava, by contrast, has emerged as a symbol of uncompromising resistance. Her defiant stance during her arrest and imprisonment has inspired both domestic activists and international supporters. Releasing her could reinvigorate the protest movement's moral core and international visibility. By contrast, Tsikhanouski's political profile is closely linked to his wife Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's leadership in exile, making his release a calculated move to introduce uncertainty within the opposition without immediately strengthening its organizational capacity or international standing. This selective clemency underscores the regime's ongoing strategy of dividing and weakening the opposition by manipulating the fates of its most influential figures.
Opposition reactions and Tsikhanouski's intentions
Within the democratic forces, Tsikhanouski's release has generated a mixture of relief and apprehension. Since becoming free, Tsikhanouski has publicly affirmed that he has no intention of interfering with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's leadership of the democratic movement in exile, emphasizing the importance of unity in the face of ongoing repression. He has also expressed a firm commitment to advocating for the release of 'many, if not all' political prisoners, signalling that his focus will be on supporting detainees and their families while helping to rebuild opposition networks inside Belarus. Though cautious about outlining a direct political role or challenging existing leadership structures, Tsikhanouski's renewed presence injects both hope and uncertainty into the landscape of the opposition, a dynamic the regime is likely to exploit.
Some experts have already stressed that only sustained multilateral pressure and coordinated international advocacy can transform prisoner releases from mere symbolic acts into meaningful progress. The international community must resist the temptation to reward Lukashenka's calculated concessions and instead focus on comprehensive strategies that confront systemic repression and bolster Belarusian civil society
Between gestures and genuine change
The release of Siarhei Tsikhanouski is undeniably a moment of relief for many within Belarus and the international community. Yet, this gesture should not be mistaken for a genuine opening or a sign of the regime's willingness to embrace democratic reform. Instead, it fits squarely within Lukashenka's long-standing playbook of managing opposition and international pressure through carefully calibrated concessions designed to maintain his grip on power.
By freeing Tsikhanouski but continuing to detain other key figures, the regime is not only manipulating perceptions abroad but also sowing discord within an opposition usually characterized by unity, which has been one of its few sources of resilience. This selective leniency risks fracturing the opposition's effectiveness at a critical juncture, playing into the regime's hands. Moreover, the ongoing repression of hundreds of political prisoners underscores that the fundamental structures of authoritarian control remain intact.
From my perspective, the international community must recognize this release for what it is: a tactical move rather than a breakthrough. Western governments should welcome humanitarian progress but remain vigilant against allowing Lukashenka to use such gestures as leverage to weaken sanctions or legitimize his regime. The opposition, meanwhile, faces the urgent task of reaffirming its unity and strategic coherence to resist the regime's divide-and-rule tactics.
Ultimately, in Belarus, freedom remains a contested and weaponized concept. The release of political prisoners like Tsikhanouski offers a glimpse of hope but also a reminder of the regime's enduring capacity for manipulation. Meaningful change will require sustained pressure, principled solidarity, and a refusal to be placated by symbolic gestures alone.
Hanna Vasilevich holds a Doctoral Degree in International Relations and European Studies. Her research interests include state ideology and propaganda, identity issues, inter-ethnic relations, linguistic diversity as well as diaspora and kin-state relations.
New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below.
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, belarus, political prisoners, Sviatlana Tsikhanouksaya
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Balkan Insight
4 days ago
- Balkan Insight
A calculated gesture? The release of Siarhei Tsikhanouski and the future of the Belarusian democratic forces
July 25, 2025 - Hanna Vasilevich - Articles and Commentary Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya often campaigned for her husbands release. Photo taken in Vilnius in May 2025 by Michele Ursi / Shutterstock The symbolism and strategy behind the release In June 2025, the Belarusian authorities announced the release of fourteen political prisoners, including Siarhei Tsikhanouski, a 2020 presidential election candidate and husband of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. While international observers cautiously welcomed the gesture, the release is less a sign of a regime in retreat than a carefully choreographed diplomatic performance by Alyaksandr Lukashenka's government. Tsikhanouski's imprisonment in 2020 had become a catalyst for the largest protest wave in Belarus's modern history, and his sudden freedom comes at a time when the regime faces mounting geopolitical pressures and persistent domestic unrest. Tsikhanouski's release is profoundly symbolic but equally strategic. His name has become synonymous with the Belarusian struggle for democratic change, and his incarceration was a rallying point for opposition forces. Yet, the timing and selectivity of his release reveal the regime's intent to manage perceptions and extract maximum advantage from every concession. Lukashenka's government has long weaponized political prisoners as bargaining chips, releasing them not out of genuine reformist impulses but to signal flexibility to the West while maintaining an iron grip on power. This pattern, documented by the Viasna Human Rights Centre and extensively reported by such media outlets as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Belsat, underscores that releases are always conditional and instrumental to the regime's broader strategy. Importantly, while some political prisoners are freed, the regime continues to detain many others, underscoring that these gestures do not signal a systemic change in repression. Aliaksandr Klaskouski, one of the leading Belarusian political analysts, has illuminated how Lukashenka's regime has cultivated a deliberate construction of an ongoing narrative of existential threat to justify repression and consolidate power. Klaskouski argues that the selective release of prisoners like Tsikhanouski fits this framework. After all, it is a controlled concession designed to project an image of magnanimity without ceding real authority or undermining the regime's grip on society. Geopolitical calculations and diplomatic signalling Understanding this latest gesture requires situating it within Belarus's complex geopolitical position. The regime remains heavily dependent on Moscow's economic and security support but is increasingly aware of the risks of international isolation and sanctions. By releasing selected prisoners, Minsk attempts to signal a willingness to engage diplomatically, particularly with the United States and the European Union, without undermining its strategic alliance with Russia. This delicate balancing act reflects Lukashenka's broader survival strategy: to maintain authoritarian control while exploiting geopolitical rivalries to extract concessions and reduce external pressure. The release of the American lawyer and political activist of Belarusian origin Yury Ziankovich in April 2025, a move widely interpreted as a signal to Washington, and the subsequent discreet visit made by a US envoy in May, laid the groundwork for the June releases and exemplified this calculated approach. Some commentators note that these amnesties are often timed around symbolic dates, such as the Day of National Unity, to project an image of national reconciliation and regime generosity. Yet, they also argue that these gestures are carefully staged performances rather than genuine reforms, requiring public expressions of gratitude from those released and accompanied by ongoing repression. The 'revolving door' nature of political imprisonment in Belarus – where releases are balanced by new arrests – ensures continued control and intimidation. This strategy allows the regime to deflect international criticism while testing western willingness to engage diplomatically without demanding substantive change. Selectivity and opposition dynamics Valer Karbalevich, another prominent Belarusian political analyst, has emphasized that the choice to release Tsikhanouski but keep other high-profile prisoners detained is a deliberate tactic to sow uncertainty within opposition ranks while maintaining leverage over international interlocutors. The regime's selectivity in prisoner releases is particularly telling. While Tsikhanouski and several foreign nationals – citizens of Poland, Latvia, Japan, Estonia and Sweden – were freed, other prominent detainees remain imprisoned. Among them is Andrzej Poczobut, the Belarusian journalist of Polish ethnicity and a minority activist whose continued detention has become a major irritant in Minsk's relations with Warsaw. The refusal to release Poczobut signals the regime's unwillingness to appear weak in the face of Polish pressure, even as it seeks to unsettle the opposition by freeing Tsikhanouski. Equally revealing is the regime's choice to release Tsikhanouski but not other high-profile political prisoners such as Viktar Babaryka or Maria Kalesnikava. Babaryka, the former banker and presidential hopeful, commands broad appeal among the urban middle class and is seen as a technocratic alternative to Lukashenka. His continued imprisonment reflects the regime's fear of empowering a figure capable of rallying both domestic and elite support, potentially threatening Lukashenka's narrative of indispensability. Kalesnikava, by contrast, has emerged as a symbol of uncompromising resistance. Her defiant stance during her arrest and imprisonment has inspired both domestic activists and international supporters. Releasing her could reinvigorate the protest movement's moral core and international visibility. By contrast, Tsikhanouski's political profile is closely linked to his wife Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's leadership in exile, making his release a calculated move to introduce uncertainty within the opposition without immediately strengthening its organizational capacity or international standing. This selective clemency underscores the regime's ongoing strategy of dividing and weakening the opposition by manipulating the fates of its most influential figures. Opposition reactions and Tsikhanouski's intentions Within the democratic forces, Tsikhanouski's release has generated a mixture of relief and apprehension. Since becoming free, Tsikhanouski has publicly affirmed that he has no intention of interfering with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya's leadership of the democratic movement in exile, emphasizing the importance of unity in the face of ongoing repression. He has also expressed a firm commitment to advocating for the release of 'many, if not all' political prisoners, signalling that his focus will be on supporting detainees and their families while helping to rebuild opposition networks inside Belarus. Though cautious about outlining a direct political role or challenging existing leadership structures, Tsikhanouski's renewed presence injects both hope and uncertainty into the landscape of the opposition, a dynamic the regime is likely to exploit. Some experts have already stressed that only sustained multilateral pressure and coordinated international advocacy can transform prisoner releases from mere symbolic acts into meaningful progress. The international community must resist the temptation to reward Lukashenka's calculated concessions and instead focus on comprehensive strategies that confront systemic repression and bolster Belarusian civil society Between gestures and genuine change The release of Siarhei Tsikhanouski is undeniably a moment of relief for many within Belarus and the international community. Yet, this gesture should not be mistaken for a genuine opening or a sign of the regime's willingness to embrace democratic reform. Instead, it fits squarely within Lukashenka's long-standing playbook of managing opposition and international pressure through carefully calibrated concessions designed to maintain his grip on power. By freeing Tsikhanouski but continuing to detain other key figures, the regime is not only manipulating perceptions abroad but also sowing discord within an opposition usually characterized by unity, which has been one of its few sources of resilience. This selective leniency risks fracturing the opposition's effectiveness at a critical juncture, playing into the regime's hands. Moreover, the ongoing repression of hundreds of political prisoners underscores that the fundamental structures of authoritarian control remain intact. From my perspective, the international community must recognize this release for what it is: a tactical move rather than a breakthrough. Western governments should welcome humanitarian progress but remain vigilant against allowing Lukashenka to use such gestures as leverage to weaken sanctions or legitimize his regime. The opposition, meanwhile, faces the urgent task of reaffirming its unity and strategic coherence to resist the regime's divide-and-rule tactics. Ultimately, in Belarus, freedom remains a contested and weaponized concept. The release of political prisoners like Tsikhanouski offers a glimpse of hope but also a reminder of the regime's enduring capacity for manipulation. Meaningful change will require sustained pressure, principled solidarity, and a refusal to be placated by symbolic gestures alone. Hanna Vasilevich holds a Doctoral Degree in International Relations and European Studies. Her research interests include state ideology and propaganda, identity issues, inter-ethnic relations, linguistic diversity as well as diaspora and kin-state relations. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. Alyaksandr Lukashenka, belarus, political prisoners, Sviatlana Tsikhanouksaya


Balkan Insight
5 days ago
- Balkan Insight
Will Russia attack beyond Ukraine?
July 24, 2025 - Valerii Pekar - Articles and Commentary Damaged buildings after Russian shelling and rocket attacks in Bakhmut. Photo: Dmytro Larin / Shutterstock The answer to the question posed in the title of this article depends on how you assess the current international situation. Do you consider Russian aggression in Ukraine a local war or the first act of a global war? Do you have full confidence that the United States will immediately come to the rescue? Do you consider NATO's level of deterrence against Russia to be sufficient? Are you sure you understand Russia's goals and strategies? Are there vulnerabilities in the current system that invite an aggressor? Lately, we have been hearing that Russia will be ready to attack Europe around 2030, and by then the continent needs to be fully prepared and rearmed. But is Russia obliged to wait for such a moment of European readiness? After all, it is appropriate to strike at the moment of least readiness. Why not now? To understand this, we need to answer three questions: What is Russia's strategic goal? How has war changed? And how can Russia use the new nature of the war to achieve its goal? As I wrote in a previous article, in the new world of the 'right of force', American, Russian and Chinese interests coincide. They would all like to see Europe divided and weak, incapable of making strong joint decisions. They want a Europe that is not an independent centre of power but only a set of markets in which they can trade profitably. This leads to steps that can even be seen as a certain American-Russian rapprochement. Thus, the Russian strategic goal is not to seize a part of European territory as was expected during the Cold War. It would be enough now to sow panic and chaos; create a humanitarian crisis; generate refugee flows; and collapse and overthrow governments. This could create a domino effect that could bring radical Eurosceptics to power, destroy European unity and (last but not least) cut support to Ukraine. To understand how this could happen, we need to look at the face of modern war. The new face(s) of war The nature of modern warfare has changed radically over the past three years. While the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 looked like the Second World War, radical innovations since then (some of the most important were mentioned here) have changed the battlefield every few months. This has influenced not only tactics but also strategies. And generals (in a phrase attributed to Churchill) are always preparing for the last war. One of the typical delusions is that the war in Ukraine is a 'poor country's war' that is forced to use a large army, while NATO can wage a 'rich country's war' with a small professional army and high-precision weapons. This concept from the days of Operation Desert Storm is outdated. As one of the leading Ukrainian military experts, Taras Chmut, says, 'You don't need to have the best equipment. You need to have sufficient equipment in enough quantities.' At the same time, war is not only high-tech, but also multi-domain. More than ever before, it includes other types of confrontation, in addition to kinetic engagement. It now covers the economic, humanitarian, diplomatic, political, demographic, cyber, information, psychological and cognitive (semantic) spheres alongside other domains. The third important feature of war is the significant expansion of the amplitude of operations. In addition to clearly hostile actions, modern war includes (and Russian military doctrine emphasizes) so-called liminal operations. These involve activities that are not obviously (at least initially) hostile until they achieve their goals, or those that, in the opinion of the other side, do not cross the threshold of reaction. Examples include the appearance of militants in eastern Ukraine in the spring of 2014 who initially seemed unserious. Following this, recently we have seen the repeated infringement of the Polish border by missiles and drones (seemingly by accident); the inexplicable death of American soldiers in Lithuania; the recent fires involving military equipment in Germany and Belgium; a fire affecting telecommunications networks in Poland; and the dangerous use of electronic warfare in the Baltics. Finally, the fourth important feature of war is that it is taking place for the first time in the postmodern world, which affects all other dimensions. I will only list the most important theses here: The emergence of cognitive (semantic) warfare to the fore, with the main battlefield becoming consciousness itself and what people think. A full-fledged reflection of war in the media and social networks in real time, which completely changes the perception of war within societies. The active use of fakes aimed at the creation of an alternative reality for the opponent and third parties: it does not matter what has happened, what is important is what is said about events. Post-heroic societies that do not approve of mass mobilization, despite the fact that war still requires huge armies. From the point of view of European security, the question arises whether the continent's countries are ready for such a war — high-tech, multi-domain, liminal, postmodern. This means that there must be readiness of not only armies, but societies. Russian strike Most likely, we should not expect a Russian strike as a ground operation, featuring powerful tanks and motorized columns aimed at Baltic countries or the Polish-Lithuanian Suwałki corridor. Instead of this, just imagine an attack on Poland that combines: massive missile and drone attacks on energy, infrastructure and logistics facilities (by the way, drones can be marked as Ukrainian); cyber-attacks on government and infrastructure facilities; a navigation collapse due to the large-scale use of electronic warfare; sabotage and terrorist groups creating sudden 'ecological' and man-made disasters; the destabilization of society (already heated) through social networks; the use of a 'fifth column' and 'useful idiots'; crowds of thousands of Middle Eastern refugees released across the Belarusian border. I am not saying that everything will necessarily be like this. I just want to emphasize that the war could be completely different from the one Europe is preparing for. And such a war requires significantly fewer resources than a Second World War-style one, resources which are available in Russia today. In such a situation, the key issue is not the quantity and quality of weapons, but the readiness of the political and military leadership to react quickly. It is also important to assess the readiness of society to take balanced, mature and responsible actions. Dear reader, ask yourself: what would the political leadership of your country do in such a case? Will governments be at a loss, not knowing how to respond? And what would you and your family do personally? Conclusion The increasingly frequent statements by Russian representatives that Russia is not going to attack Europe sounds like a wake-up call for European politicians. Russia will neither wait for European readiness nor attack where it has long been expected. It will also not use the strategic approaches of the Second World War. This raises a number of questions that go beyond the military dimension. Relevant issues now include the unity and cohesion of societies; control of the domestic information space; the ability of NGOs to support governments and societies in moments of extraordinary challenges; and the preparedness of political leaders to make decisions in a pre-threshold liminal war. Learning the lessons of Ukraine, for which Ukrainians paid with their own blood, is recommended here. Purchasing tanks and armoured vehicles is not enough to oppose a Russian strike. They will not even leave the hangars. Superbly trained and brave soldiers will have no targets to acquire with this equipment. There will be no more wars like February 2022. Europe has all the necessary resources to defend itself. The problem is that governments and societies do not see that war is already on their doorstep. They do not understand that Russia should not be deterred or stopped but defeated. Some will say I am causing panic. I already heard this in early February 2022. Valerii Pekar is a chairman of the board of the Decolonization NGO, the author of four books, an adjunct professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School and Business School of the Ukrainian Catholic University, and a former member of the National Reform Council. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. geopolitics, Russian invasion of Ukraine


Balkan Insight
15-07-2025
- Balkan Insight
A post-Soviet mafia wreaked havoc for Iran. Who will be its next client?
July 15, 2025 - Alexander Neuman - Articles and Commentary Lower Manhattan, where a court in the United States Southern District of New York convicted two Eastern European mobsters of plotting to kill a dissident on behalf of Iran. Photo: Shutterstock In March, a Manhattan jury convicted two mobsters – one Georgian and one Azerbaijani-Russian – for attempting to murder an Iranian activist and American citizen in New York. A third member, the triggerman, was arrested in July 2022 near the would-be victim's doorstep with an AK-47 assault rifle and testified as a government witness. Two months later, the United Kingdom arrested four Iranian nationals , for the first time, for targeting regime opponents in the UK. Iran has shown the clearest pattern of state operatives hiring local criminals for overseas assassinations. But the nexus of crime and resurgent hybrid war also concerns other adversaries of the West – Russia, China and North Korea. It even involves strategic partners like India, leading some security scholars to predict a 'fifth wave' of global organized crime. The embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Knightsbridge, London. The British Foreign Office summoned the Iranian ambassador after the UK government arrested four, and charged three, Iranians for National Security Act violations. Photo: Spanning Iran, the Caucasus, Central Europe and the United States, the Manhattan murder-for-hire case is unique in revealing two trends: how states use irregularly arrived organized criminals in the West, and the enduring relevance of Soviet-style organized crime in great power competition. The subversive threat According to the US charges, the plot originated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization, a state security agency on the US Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list since 2019. An IRGC-IO general hired Rafat Amirov, an Azerbaijani and Russian citizen in Iran and a Russian mafia group member, to the sum of 500,000 US dollars. Their job was to kill Masih Alinejad, a New York-based Iranian-American journalist. Khalid Mehdiyev, who arrived with false documents in the United States, illegally bought an AK-47 to complete the job. In the UK case, three defendants also arrived by irregular means. The attempted murder-for-hire followed previous attempts by 'Iranian intelligence officials and assets' to kidnap the journalist for rendition. The outcome exemplifies the tradeoffs of outsourcing state violence to transnational criminals. First, it enables political subversion for states with reduced operating capacities in the target country. Pariahs like Iran and North Korea have a minimal diplomatic presence in the West. In the United States, they lack embassies and consulates to provide cover and immunity from prosecution for intelligence officers. Russia has been similarly hamstrung following a wave of diplomatic expulsions in 2018, which followed the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal by Russian GRU military intelligence operatives in Salisbury, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The pattern in point is the string of arson attacks in Poland, Lithuania and the United Kingdom in 2024 by Ukrainian, Romanian and other non-Russian citizens who, according to European intelligence agencies, were hired by Moscow. Since 2024, Poland has shuttered two Russian consulates, while Czechia and France publicly attributed previous sabotage attempts to the Kremlin's GRU military intelligence agency. The director of Britain's domestic security agency, MI5, has warned of Russia's mission to 'generate mayhem on British and European streets'. On May 7th, the head of the UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) Richard Horne said that Moscow is 'waging acts of sabotage, often using criminal proxies in their plots'. Both leaders are surely investigating Russian links after the Crown Prosecution Service charged two Ukrainians and one Romanian national in connection to arson attacks targeted at Prime Minister Keir Starmer. These actions still have unexplained motives. While there is no public evidence that Russia's sabotage and assassination campaign has successfully reached North America yet, Iran's clearly has, showing an enduring threat. Another advantage of recruiting criminals is low cost, which has been presented in detail in Tehran's case thanks to US prosecutors. Iran spent only 30,000 US dollars on an advance payment to assassinate Alinejad. At the same time, Mehdiyev testified that success would result in a bounty of 160,000 US dollars. This is likely much cheaper than Iran organizing its own logistics, with western security services highly vigilant when it comes to the Iranian threat. Additionally, no Iranians were at risk of arrest. Diplomatic blowback was also rather quiet overall. Several levels of outsourcing helped obscure Iran's role – Mehdiyev was even told that the operation was Baku's 'gift' to Iran. Even a figment of deniability can prevent western governments from retaliating for subversive acts. Compared to state operators, criminals also have disadvantages, starting with poor professionalism. One mafia enforcer in New York proposed burning down Alinejad's house instead of killing her. And Mehdiyev, despite having around a decade's experience in violent crime, likely had no surveillance or covert action training on par with Russian or Iranian intelligence. His attorney argued that he wanted to 'scam' the Iranians without killing Alinejad. The defendants ultimately helped the authorities by taking convenient selfies with their mob tattoos. Rafat Amirov, an Azerbaijani-Russian citizen and resident of Iran, with his birthday cake. The eight-pointed stars symbolize his status as a 'vor v zakone' (thief in law). Screenshot from US Department of Justice, United States of America v. Rafat Amirov, Polad Omarov and Khalid Mehdiyev indictment. The Soviet connection The Russian crime group, identified as the 'Thieves-in-Law' ( Vory v Zakone ) in court documents, passed instructions through Polad Omarov, a Georgian citizen extradited from Czechia, down to Mehdiyev, who joined the group as a teenager in Azerbaijan before illegally entering the US. The hitman claimed to follow orders from a vor or oğru (thief in Russian and Azeri, respectively) leader in an Azerbaijani prison. He also noted that they adhered to the correct criminal lifestyle, which involves never cooperating with governments. Polad Omarov, a Georgian citizen who resided in Slovenia and Czechia and passed Iranian targeting information from Rafat Amirov to the hitman and sports a vor v zakone tattoo. Screenshot from US Department of Justice, United States of America v. Rafat Amirov, Polad Omarov and Khalid Mehdiyev indictment. These traditions show the surprising continuity of Soviet criminal culture and operating methods. The term vory v zakone originates in the Soviet Union's gulag system. The superpower's collapse in 1991, amid liberalized capital and border controls around the world, was 'the single most important event' for the expansion of globalized crime in the next two decades. The British journalist Misha Glenny gives an effective world tour of these developments in his 2008 book. The American security scholar Phil Williams described the Soviet collapse, globalization and neoliberalism as triggers for the 'third wave' of organized crime – the first originated in 'hotspots' like Sicily, and the second went global with narcotics after the Second World War. Mark Galeotti described this new shift in the 2000s through discussion of the legendary, tattooed vory , who transformed into 'hybrid gangster-businessmen' with little concern for traditions. Evidently, the vory are still relevant. Eurasian crime groups (calling them Russian is too narrow) have become intertwined with waves of diaspora emigration after the Soviet collapse and established functional outposts in key entryways like New York, Istanbul and Dubai. Moreover, the transnational criminals abroad clearly have ties at home that complicate their willingness to cooperate with host governments. Mehdiyev did not testify until the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) helped relocate his mother from Azerbaijan to the US and he was granted the 'golden ticket' of a legalized stay. However, this tool is becoming more precarious amid the rise of populist movements and anti-immigration agendas across North America and Europe. Khalid Mehdiyev, an Azerbaijani citizen residing in Yonkers, New York, who appeared at Alinejad's doorstep with an AK-47. Screenshot from US Department of Justice, United States of America v. Rafat Amirov, Polad Omarov and Khalid Mehdiyev indictment. No rules, no boundaries Transnational criminal groups remain a low-cost, but also low professionalism, policy option for great power adversaries of the West. They have been used time and again by Russia and Iran with few evident reasons to stop this practice. This has several implications for western law enforcement, domestic security services, and diplomatic policymakers. First, the line between national security and domestic crime will continue to deteriorate and is unlikely to be restored any time soon. Pariah states' co-option of criminals – especially immigrants – will further securitize immigration and policing debates, as recently seen in Poland, Germany and the UK's asylum policy restrictions. The Trump administration has also used the Alien Enemies Act to deport alleged Venezuelan cartel members, some of whom could now potentially end up in Kosovo. At the same time, national security organizations may lose valuable leverage in investigating and prosecuting transnational criminal networks working for great power competitors if western governments restrict asylum options for informants and their families, like Mehdiyev's 'golden ticket'. This risk will worsen amid the deteriorating international taboo against refoulement, or the forced return of asylum seekers to countries where they will be in danger. This especially has implications for great power competition when police states are concerned, like in the cases of Uyghurs in China or anti-war activists in Russia. Western authorities may have good reasons to deny asylum cases, but scandalous denials may influence future potential informants to ask: 'is that what you might do to me?' Lastly, western foreign ministries should consider this criminal/state nexus in their calculus for diplomatic limitations on great power competitors. With recent meetings in Istanbul and Riyadh, the United States is in talks with Russia about restoring diplomatic operations, having closed its consulates in San Francisco, Seattle, and annexes in New York and Washington. Governments like Hungary and Slovakia, and European populist parties elsewhere, would also like to see closer diplomatic ties with Russia. Such restorations will be a small but important factor in an eventual war settlement in Ukraine. The West should remember that, if opened, these facilities are more likely to be staffed by professional operators than mafia hitmen taking selfies with mob tattoos. Alexander Neuman holds an MA in International Security and a BA in International Politics and Russian and Eurasian Studies from George Mason University. He is also a former visiting student at the University of Warsaw and an alumnus of New Eastern Europe's Think Tank School. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. 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