Egypt, Italy FMs discuss Gaza crisis, Nile water security in phone call
Foreign ministry spokesman Tamim Khallaf said Abdelatty briefed his Italian counterpart on Egypt's efforts to reach a Gaza ceasefire, ensure the flow of humanitarian and relief aid, and alleviate the suffering of Palestinians amid the grave Israeli violations in the enclave.
Tajani expressed full appreciation for Egypt's role in mediating a ceasefire and facilitating humanitarian aid access. He also voiced support for the planned Gaza early recovery and reconstruction conference, which Egypt intends to host once a ceasefire is achieved, confirming Italy's participation.
The two ministers agreed to maintain close coordination in the coming period to intensify efforts aimed at securing a ceasefire and guaranteeing the delivery of aid to Gaza.
Khallaf said that the call also touched on the broader situation in the Horn of Africa, noting that both sides emphasized continued coordination between the two countries, underpinned by strong relations at the leadership level.
Abdelatty also raised Egypt's concerns regarding the Nile River and national water security, outlining Egypt's position that shared water resources must be managed in line with international law.
He called for cooperation based on consensus and mutual benefit to serve the interests of all Nile Basin countries.
He also rejected unilateral actions in the Eastern Nile region and asserted that Egypt would take all necessary measures guaranteed by international law to protect its vital national interests.
On Libya, the two ministers discussed the importance of holding simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections as soon as possible. They also stressed the need to dismantle militias and ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces, fighters, and mercenaries as essential steps toward achieving stability and curbing illegal migration.
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