Satellite images show China's most advanced H-6 bombers on disputed Paracel Islands in South China Sea
H-6 bombers fitted with anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles
Presence signals advanced capability amid regional tensions
HONG KONG, May 28 — Satellite imagery shows China landed two of its most advanced bombers in the disputed Paracel islands in the South China Sea this month — a gesture that some analysts described as Beijing's latest signalling of its growing military capabilities to rivals.
The deployment marks the first time the long-range H-6 bombers have landed on Woody Island in the Paracels since 2020, and the movement of the now upgraded aircraft comes amid tensions with the Philippines, operations near Taiwan and ahead of the region's biggest defence forum this weekend.
'China's long-range bombers don't need to be on the Paracels so it does appear to be omni-directional signalling by Beijing — against the Philippines and against the US and other things that are going on,' said Collin Koh, a defence scholar at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
French President Emmanuel Macron is due to open the three-day Shangri-La Dialogue forum in Singapore with a speech on Friday while US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth will outline the Trump administration's approach to the region on Saturday.
A British aircraft carrier is expected in the South China Sea on a rare deployment next month, diplomats say.
Satellites captured two H-6 planes flying over the hotly disputed Scarborough Shoal, also in the South China Sea, just ahead of Hegseth's visit to the Philippines in late March, when he reaffirmed the United States' 'ironclad commitment' to its treaty ally.
Regional diplomats and analysts say deployments of the jet-powered H-6 are closely scrutinised, given the way its Cold War-era airframe has been modernised to carry anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles, while some of the planes are capable of launching nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles.
A potential threat to US bases in the region, H-6 bombers were deployed in wargames around Taiwan in October, and in July flew close to the US mainland for the first time. Neither China's defence ministry nor the Philippines' maritime and national security council immediately responded to Reuters' requests for comment.
China's occupation of the Paracels is disputed by Vietnam, whose foreign ministry also did not immediately respond for comment.
Chinese H-6 bombers are parked on the tarmac of an airfield on Woody Island, in the disputed Paracel archipelago, which is known in China as Xisha Islands, South China Sea, May 19, 2025. — Maxar Technologies handout pic via Reuters
Soviet design
Echoing the development of the US B-52, the basic H-6 dates back to 1950s Soviet designs but it remains China's most advanced long-range bomber having been re-fitted with improved engines and modern flight systems along with its state-of-the-art weaponry.
Images provided to Reuters by Maxar Technologies show two H-6 bombers on a runway on Woody Island on May 19.
Another Maxar image on the same date show two Y-20 transport aircraft and an KJ-500 early warning plane — an aircraft that is seen as vital to China being able to control and secure increasingly complex air and sea operations.
Some analysts said the planes may have first arrived on May 17 and been present until May 23.
Ben Lewis, founder of open source data platform PLATracker, said they thought it was unlikely that the H-6s would be deployed long-term on Woody Island or be permanently based there.
'The ability to cycle forces through the bases, especially higher level assets like the H-6, provides the PLA with a force protection mechanism,' he said, referring to China's People's Liberation Army.
China's Southern Theatre Command, which covers the South China Sea, maintains two regiments of the bombers, according to the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies.
The bombers are generally kept at heavily fortified bases on the Chinese mainland, where they would have more protection in a conflict from US attacks in conflict scenarios.
The US maintains jet fighter wings in Japan, including on its forward deployed aircraft carrier, and on Guam, which is also home to B-52s.
China claims sovereignty over nearly all the South China Sea, including areas claimed by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.
A 2016 ruling by an international arbitral tribunal found Beijing's sweeping claims had no basis under international law, a decision China rejects. — Reuters
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The long-standing global climate storyline, in which developed countries push developing ones to accelerate action, may well be rewritten in reverse In Shanghai, Sun raised similar doubts about the long-term viability of Washington's pivot to fossil fuels, which he said 'cannot serve as a long-term energy solution for the US'. He said this was mainly because of the growing environmental impacts of fracking, the urgent need to address climate change, and the inevitable policy shifts driven by changes in political leadership. 'As for nuclear fusion, while the technology pathway is viable, its commercialisation is still a long way off,' he said, adding that construction of new nuclear power projects or the restart of previously halted ones in the US had long been plagued by delays, cost overruns and cancellations. Sun also cautioned against overstating the importance of the new legislation, pointing out that there were 'significant hurdles in advancing re-industrialisation'. 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In contrast, fusion, due to capital intensive and its dependency on specialised infrastructure, would probably remain a centralised power source, he said. Columbia University's Moerenhout rejected the notion that fossil fuels were simply a place holder until nuclear fusion became viable, noting that the technology remained a distant, expensive gamble that was often hyped by those with vested interests. 'It's not illogical to think fusion may eventually produce electricity commercially – but that day isn't coming in the next decade,' said Moerenhout, who described the legislation as a 'mixed bag'. In his view, small modular reactors are 'much closer to economic competitiveness than fusion', though they would still need real-world deployment to prove their viability. And while fusion and small modular reactors may hold long-term promise, meaningful cost reductions were already happening in proven technologies such as renewables and smart grid technologies, Moerenhout said. 'If you want to see where the biggest cost reductions for reliable electricity are happening, it's in clean energy [like] wind, solar, in demand-side management, smart meters, and so forth ... There the cost reductions are real. They're clear. They're visible. They're already happening.' - SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
