Putin, Macron divided over how to deal with war in Ukraine
The Elysee presidential palace said Macron expressed his country's unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty and integrity. He called for a ceasefire as soon as possible and the launch of negotiations between Ukraine and Russia for a solid and lasting settlement of the conflict.
The Kremlin quoted Putin as saying that the Ukraine conflict was a direct consequence of the policies pursued by Western countries, which had been ignoring Russia's security interests for years and creating an anti-Russia staging ground in Ukraine.
The Russian presidential office said that as conditions for a peaceful settlement, Putin demanded the elimination of the root causes of the Ukraine crisis and it should be based on the new territorial realities.
It is believed that Putin also demanded Ukraine give up its aspiration to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He is also thought to have reiterated Russia's call for the recognition of the unilaterally annexed four Ukrainian regions as its territory.
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Japan Times
44 minutes ago
- Japan Times
Europe's climate resolve faces big test as EU unveils 2040 goal
The heat wave searing Europe is making a compelling case for one of the most ambitious climate targets ever set by Brussels. Many in the European Union, however, have yet to be convinced. The European Commission, the EU's executive branch, will on Wednesday propose a binding law to slash emissions by 90% by 2040 as part of its overarching goal to reach climate neutrality by the middle of the century. While that shows the bloc is still up for the fight against global warming, it's been forced to offer various "flexibilities' to help countries meet the target. With U.S. President Donald Trump withdrawing from the landmark Paris Agreement for a second time, there's pressure on Europe to take the initiative. But the region's leaders are also distracted: ramping up defense spending, engaging in a trade war with Washington and trying to defend historic industries being squeezed by high energy prices. As the stage is set for months of hard bargaining, here's what's at stake: The goal The 2040 target has been delayed for months as Wopke Hoekstra, the EU's climate commissioner, toured capitals to drum up support for a 90% net emissions-cutting goal that scientists say is the minimum for the bloc to meet its climate obligations. He also needed to await the outcome of key elections in Germany and Poland. The message he received was clear: without sufficient flexibilities and a number of so-called enabling conditions — like investing in power grids — Hoekstra would not secure a majority in the European Parliament, nor the weighted majority of countries in the EU council that he needs to back the target. "We don't see a majority in parliament nor council for any 2040 target without flexibility,' said Peter Liese, a lawmaker for the center-right European People's Party, the largest group in parliament. "Finally Europe will create the enabling conditions to actually reach any 2040 target.' The solution Hoekstra's solution rests on countries being able to use cheaper United Nations-administered international carbon offsets to meet around 3% of the 2040 target. Yet it's unclear how exactly that will work, especially after a previous experiment with international credits under the Kyoto Protocol proved to be a disaster. What we know from the draft document is that, unlike previous attempts, they will not enter into the EU's Emissions Trading System and they'll only be allowed from the second half of the decade. Host countries that provide credits must also have their own climate ambitions in line with the Paris Agreement goal to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Doubts remain, however, over whether there will be enough high quality credits available, and how much they'll cost. The Article 6 U.N. rules, finalized last November, will also probably need to be phased out before mid-century because the EU's 2050 climate neutrality goal doesn't allow their use. Political hurdles The 2040 target will only enter into force following negotiations with the EU's 27 member states and the parliament. There are already tensions over the level of ambition and how quickly an agreement needs to be reached. A group of EU leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron, raised the issue of the target at a leaders summit in Brussels last week, highlighting the need to ensure that decarbonization and competitiveness go hand in hand. Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala rejected the 90% cut outright, calling for a realistic goal. It would only take France and a few smaller member states to derail the 2040 target. Things aren't much easier in the European Parliament, where the largest group, the EPP, is split over how aggressively the EU should pursue its climate goals. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who comes from the center-right group, is walking a tightrope to keep her centrist coalition intact: the socialists and liberals are demanding she stick to her green agenda, or risk losing the support of her two biggest allies in the assembly. International obligations Part of the reason the commission says it needs to put forward its 2040 goal now is so that it can submit an updated 2035 climate plan, known as a Nationally Determined Contribution, or NDC, to the U.N. by September. Countries are due to meet in Brazil for COP30 two months later to discuss how far off course the world still is. The commission wants to derive its 2035 goal by drawing a line between 2030 and 2040, which would equate to an emissions cutting ambition of around 72.5%. The challenge is that the NDC requires unanimous approval by member states, so any lingering doubts could force the EU to put forward a weaker goal, potentially damaging the bloc's reputation as a climate leader.
Japan Times
2 hours ago
- Japan Times
As trade deadline approaches, Japan must draw lines
According to conventional wisdom, a strong national leader will force a weak one, or one with less popular support, to buckle in tough negotiations. By that logic, U.S. President Donald Trump has the whip hand in trade talks with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. Yet, Ishiba has held out, resisting U.S. pressure to sign a quick deal, a position that is strengthened, ironically, by Ishiba's weakness. The prime minister cannot afford to make concessions as the July 20 Upper House election approaches. His spine is stiffened by the failure of the U.S. to make clear its demands and the U.S. president's record of ripping up deals that even he negotiated. Clarity and trust are the essential prerequisites of successful negotiations. Neither exists today. Japan was worried about Trump's return to the White House, fearful that the bilateral relationship would suffer given the 45th and 47th president's long-time animus toward Japan and the absence of a 'Trump whisperer,' former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Yet, in January, Trump described the partnership as 'a friendship like few others,' certain that 'the cherished alliances between our two countries will continue to flourish long into the future!' Sensing opportunity, Ishiba hurried to Washington to meet Trump, a move that some considered unseemly and perhaps unwise, but the resulting summit was a success. When Trump announced that he would impose blanket 10% tariffs on all trade partners, with still greater sanctions on specific sectors like autos, auto parts, steel and aluminum, Japan was one of the first countries to begin negotiations on a deal, its faith in the relationship yielding confidence that an agreement was possible. Since then, Ryosei Akazawa, Japan's chief tariff negotiator, has visited Washington regularly, sometimes weekly, in search of a deal. Despite seven rounds of talks, periodic claims that an agreement was imminent and impressive efforts by Japan to court the mercurial U.S. president — at one point, Akazawa wore a 'Make America Great Again' cap while meeting Trump — the two countries remain at loggerheads. In the last round, held late last month, Akazawa failed to even meet Scott Bessent, U.S. treasury secretary and chief U.S. negotiator, or U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. Worse, when the talks adjourned Trump unloaded on Japan, complaining that the country was 'spoiled' and took no U.S. rice or automobiles. Talking to reporters, he wasn't sure if a deal with Japan was possible, saying 'I doubt it. ... They're very tough.' Trump said that he would be sending Japan 'a letter,' or notice of his intent to impose tariffs on its goods, which would mark 'the end of the trade deal.' In an interview, Trump warned that Japan would 'pay a 25% tariff on your cars,' and later comments hinted it could be as high as a 35% levy. Japan responded with silence. While the current deadline for a deal is July 9, Bessent has indicated that an extension might be possible. There are reports that Akazawa may make yet another trip to Washington for another round of talks. One of the questions he needs answered is what purpose U.S. tariffs serve. If they are intended to raise revenue that facilitates the restructuring of the U.S. tax system, which would imply that they are permanent, then the parameters of a deal are much changed. An agreement is difficult when one side doesn't understand the facts. The charge that Japan imports no U.S. rice is false, as agriculture minister Shinjiro Koizumi explained. 'Rice imports from abroad, including from the U.S., had increased 120 times from a year earlier.' If Japanese consumers don't buy U.S. automobiles, it isn't because of tariffs — this country imposes no levy on imported passenger cars — but because American automakers don't build vehicles that Japanese want. Koizumi was right to call Trump's comments an 'obvious misunderstanding of the facts.' Autos are central to any eventual resolution of this dispute. Trump insists that his 25% tariff, imposed in March, is nonnegotiable. Japan wants it gone. The U.S. may believe that Japan will be squeezed by its tariffs. And, in fact, exports to the U.S. dropped by 11% year on year in May, with automobile exports down 24.7%. Automakers have been working to avoid passing on the tariff costs, but they are reaching the limits at which they can squeeze their supply chains. Japanese automakers have increased production in the U.S., which is one of Trump's objectives. Any eventual resolution is more likely to reflect larger political and economic considerations than the specific terms of any document. Fearful of some of the consequences, Trump has been criticized for failing to follow through on his threats and the prospect of an economic slowdown in the U.S. — the perpetual warning of economists when they evaluate his trade policy — could force him to back off again. Trump has also been promising deals for so long and has achieved such meager results — only agreements with Vietnam and the U.K., while a purported pact with China remains unclear — that his administration might settle for something with Japan that is more symbolic than real. If Trump believed that Ishiba would readily submit to his demands, he was mistaken. That error is understandable. The U.S. is central to Japan's economy and critical to its security but the leverage that affords the U.S. president is limited. Growing numbers of Japanese voters oppose gross concessions. One poll shows more than half of voters believe Japan should not make a deal even if it hurts the bilateral relationship. Only 15% agree to concessions to avoid additional tariffs. Most worrisome now is a growing sense among the Japanese public that the U.S. is no longer a reliable partner. After all, in 2019, Trump and Abe released a joint statement after signing a trade pact that said 'While faithfully implementing these agreements, both nations will refrain from taking measures against the spirit of these agreements and this Joint Statement.' Yet here we are again. American credibility is also diminished by constant calls for ever-more defense spending, first to 2% of gross domestic product, then 3% and now 5%. It is not surprising, then, that another recent poll showed that only 22% either greatly (3%) or somewhat (19%) trust the U.S., while 68% somewhat (46%) or entirely (22%) distrust it. An agreement is difficult in these circumstances. Still, it is possible. And Japan has cards to play. It could pledge to increase purchases of crude oil, natural gas and agricultural products to help balance trade accounts. While these are ultimately private sector decisions, the Japanese government could also encourage companies to invest in the U.S. This shouldn't take much effort since it is already occurring. But Japan must also draw lines. While this country needs a good working relationship with the U.S., it must not be at any cost. This country has national interests to protect. They include a thriving security partnership, a stable and growing economy and a rules-based international order. Indulging a mercurial if not arbitrary U.S. president is not among them, especially if it threatens those other concerns. The Japan Times Editorial Board
Japan Times
3 hours ago
- Japan Times
In the Trump era, how much should countries really be spending on defense?
What percentage of gross domestic product should a country be spending on its defense? That question has continued to be at the center of debates on defense, with NATO allies recently committing to increase the target from 2% to 5%. The White House has since stated that 5% should be the standard for all of America's allies. Voices around the globe are arguing the pros and cons of such a target. In truth, the 'percentage of GDP' approach is a political one, not a practical one. The actual debate is far more complex and includes alliance management issues that have existed for as long as there have been military alliances. The percentage of GDP standard stems from a core issue in alliance management: How do you ensure that everyone is contributing their fair share to the security relationship? Certainly, no country wants to do all the heavy lifting in fulfilling commitments, so there must be some quantifiable measure for contributions to ensure fairness. But the reality is that no two alliances are the same. This may seem obvious for alliances defined by different treaties such as the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea, but it also applies within multinational alliances like NATO. Poland and the Baltic states have vastly different circumstances with the Russia-Ukraine war raging next door than say, Luxembourg, which is nestled comfortably between the much larger and militarily robust nations of France and Germany. So, how does one measure contributions between countries like Luxembourg and Poland? Is it the number of military operations in which their soldiers participate? Is it the number of bases provided for allied use or the amount of money provided to alliance institutions and initiatives? These are questions with complicated answers and it is impossible to apply a universal rubric for every ally, so years ago, it became popular to use the percentage of GDP standard. In other words, a universal measure for alliance contributions would be how much a country is spending on its own defense proportional to its economy. This became a formal standard for NATO in 2014 during the Wales summit in which they declared that all NATO allies would aspire to 2% of GDP for defense spending. With the most recent summit in the Netherlands, the standard is now 5%. In principle, this seems like a fair approach. But as useful as it is as a political benchmark, this method has its flaws. First of all, what qualifies as 'defense spending' that would count on the stat sheet? Is this everything that touches the military in some way, including retirement pay, veterans administration and military recreation facilities? Is there a distinction between research and development for new capabilities and maintenance of older weapon systems? Does infrastructure construction count if it may support allied operations? Would it be fair if one country included certain items on the cost sheet that the other did not? With the new 5% standard, NATO allies are creating at least some distinction in this debate. In practice, the allies are to spend 3.5% on conventional defense spending, while 1.5% can be on defense-related expenditures. These are still broad categories that will raise some questions. For example, Italy, which only reports 1.49% of GDP spending on defense, has a long way to reach NATO's new 5% standard. Italian lawmakers have proposed solving the problem by reclassifying a new €13.5 billion ($15.9 billion) bridge between the mainland and Sicily as a defense-related expenditure because it could potentially be used for NATO operations. This is just one example of many that will surely emerge as the allies contemplate implementation of the new standard. The second issue is that the percentage of GDP approach assumes that all security alliances are predicated on the same types of tradeoffs. They are not and the utility of those tradeoffs differ based on geography and threats. Even the U.S. recognizes this, with its publication on multinational operations listing seven areas of partner-nation contributions. One is the provision of combat forces and the rest are noncombat in nature, including diplomatic support; financial support; basing, access and overflight support; logistics, lift and sustainment; stabilization and reconstruction support; and governance and ministerial support. Several of these noncombat contributions have no direct tie-ins with an ally's defense spending or even defense-related spending, but it still represents a contribution to the security relationship. So, as an observer trying to make sense of the current debate, it is important to dive deeper than simply looking at percentages. We need to understand the specific tradeoffs within each alliance and the utility that different partners bring. Where does Japan fit into this debate? In 1976, then-Prime Minister Takeo Miki institutionalized the percentage of GDP standard by declaring that he would cap defense spending at 1%. This ceiling remained in place for decades, but while Japan has since eclipsed the 1% figure, there is renewed criticism from some American policy circles. This is nothing new, as Japan has received criticism for free riding in its relationship with the United States long before the current administration. One of the core arguments is that Japan relied on America to deal with its tough security issues so that it could focus primarily on the meteoric economic rise the country enjoyed in the postwar decades. As the logic goes: Less money spent on defense meant more money for growing the economy. There are a couple of flaws in that argument. It ignores the fact that there were plenty of policy actors in the United States in the postwar years who were wary of a rearmed Japan, meaning the notion of an equal military partner in the Self-Defense Forces would have been antithetical to their preferences. Another flaw is that Japanese military contributions to the alliance was a core expectation in the security relationship. When the two countries signed their alliance treaties in 1951 and 1960, the central tradeoff was that the United States would provide for the security of Japan and, in return, Japan would provide basing and access for U.S. forces. This served both governments well. Naturally, the alliance evolved over time and with that evolution came to the realization that there needed to be newly defined roles, missions and capabilities between the two allies. Those were codified in the Japan-U.S. Guidelines on Defense Cooperation, the most recent version of which was published in April 2015. The guidelines clearly lay out the expectations that each ally has for the other, meaning that any substantive debate over defense spending really starts from there. In this case, the question is less about what percentage of GDP either ally is spending on its defense, but rather if they are resourced, trained and equipped to meet the expectations established in their negotiated guidelines. Of course, politics being politics, the percentage of GDP figure will continue to garner headlines and drive public debates. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has expressed his intent to focus those debates on meaningful issues related to readiness and capabilities. But with an ally urging Japan to do more for security and a domestic populace demanding the Ishiba administration do more for a lagging economy, success in the defense spending debate is far from guaranteed. Michael MacArthur Bosack is the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served in the Japanese government as a Mansfield fellow.
