
Hassan: Jordan Played a Major Role in Containing the Sweida Crisis - Jordan News
Hassan emphasized that Jordan's future is tied to that of the Arab neighborhood, adding, 'The regional repercussions are not easy—there are major transformations around us that are clear to everyone.'

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Jordan News
3 hours ago
- Jordan News
'As-Suwayda'… The Final Laboratory for World War - Jordan News
Whenever the Zionist entity begins to feel cornered, it seeks an outlet—an escape forward. Each time it fails to achieve military decisiveness, it attempts to reshape the conflict by amplifying a particular threat or creating a new theater of operations. Today, as its deterrence erodes in Gaza, Tel Aviv suddenly turns its eyes to southern Syria—specifically, As-Suwayda—placing it under a cloud of suspicion. اضافة اعلان What's striking in recent reports from Israeli media, especially those close to security decision-making circles, is the unmistakable tone of panic. The narrative goes beyond the typical 'Iranian activity,' delving into a scenario of a 'mass infiltration' involving global jihadists, Bedouin tribes, and an Iranian military infrastructure embedded deep within Syria. This is not a sober intelligence assessment, but a carefully crafted narrative echoing the events of October 7, albeit setting the stage for a darker, murkier version of that day from the Zionist perspective. Superficially, the Zionist entity presents this narrative as part of its defensive preparations. But in essence, it signals a dangerous shift in the rules of engagement: from preemptive security measures to the brink of launching a battle that has yet to begin. A state that once responded to emerging threats now seeks to fabricate a theoretical danger as a pretext for striking what remains of Syria's state infrastructure in the south—possibly as a means to deflect from its mounting losses in Gaza and under Iranian strikes. As-Suwayda is not a conventional battlefield. It is a sensitive zone, charged with public anger and civil protest, while simultaneously lacking strong security presence from the Syrian state. This political and security vacuum makes it an ideal environment for engineering a volatile and explosive scenario. There are many players in the south, yet the Zionist entity aims to monopolize the threat narrative and control the moment of action. Hence, it has launched selective operations inside Syrian territory—all under the pretense of 'preventing another October 7.' But the crucial question remains: Is Israel genuinely afraid of a real threat emerging from As-Suwayda and Daraa, or is it preparing to manufacture an enemy tailored to fit this moment? The Zionist fear of southern Syria is not new, but it is now entering a new and dangerous phase. Tel Aviv is no longer content with observing the situation or conducting sporadic strikes—it now seeks to expand the scope of the conflict to towns and villages that have historically not been part of the military confrontation. It is even speaking openly about the possibility of 'armed groups' storming settlements near the Golan Heights—a message primarily aimed at its domestic audience, still traumatized by the breach of Gaza's perimeter, and secondarily at the international community, which may accept such narratives as justification for escalation in Syria. History may not repeat itself with the same details, but the Zionist fear of another October 7 runs deep. It goes beyond the event itself to the existential dread of losing control. What Israel truly fears is not just infiltration through its fences—but infiltration into the minds of its own people, a realization that armies, walls, and warplanes can no longer guarantee security. To those who believe that southern Syria has become an open laboratory for signaling that Syria is finished, I say: they may be surprised to find that beneath its ashes lies burning embers. What is brewing in As-Suwayda—politically and socially—may yet ignite a front unlike Gaza or South Lebanon, but one that carries the seeds of a third world war.

Ammon
3 hours ago
- Ammon
JCC president calls to boost Agricultural cooperation between Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon
Ammon News - The president of the Jordan and Amman Chambers of Commerce has called for the formation of a trilateral agricultural partnership between Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, describing it as a strategic step toward enhancing regional food security and sustainable economic growth. During a meeting held Tuesday evening with the head and members of the Syrian Syndicate of Agricultural Engineers, Senator Khalil Al-Haj Tawfiq, who chairs both chambers, emphasized the need to consolidate the comparative advantages and shared agricultural strengths of the three countries. He said such collaboration would serve as a platform for regional integration in agricultural production and food systems. According to a statement issued Wednesday by the Amman Chamber of Commerce, Al-Haj Tawfiq underscored the importance of developing a joint agricultural calendar between Jordan and Syria. Such a move would help regulate import and export flows and ensure steady supplies of agricultural products across borders. He stressed that agricultural cooperation should go beyond trade in goods to include deeper economic integration, improved supply chain linkages, and expanded technical cooperation between the two countries. This, he said, would allow for broader knowledge-sharing and more efficient movement of goods. President of the Syrian Agricultural Engineers Syndicate, Mustafa Al-Mustafa, expressed appreciation for Jordan's consistent support under the leadership of His Majesty King Abdullah II, and praised existing public-private partnerships between the two countries. He highlighted Syria's interest in expanding cooperation to support its agricultural sector and attract new investment. Al-Mustafa also pointed to Syria's extensive fertile lands as a promising opportunity for joint ventures in both production and agri-investment. He said Syria is open to all initiatives that contribute to reconstruction and development and is committed to providing the necessary facilities to foster stronger economic ties with Jordan. Jordanian Agricultural Engineers Syndicate President Ali Abu Nuqta and Agricultural Materials Syndicate President Saleh Al-Yaseen also stressed the importance of continuous coordination between public institutions and private stakeholders. They noted that joint initiatives would strengthen food security in the region and contribute to long-term sustainability. Jordan, they said, remains ready to provide both technical and logistical support, and to facilitate agricultural investments that advance mutual economic interests and strengthen regional integration. Members of the two chambers highlighted the value of transferring Jordanian expertise in agri-technology, farm management, and marketing to the Syrian sector, particularly in efforts to rehabilitate agricultural supply chains and improve production efficiency. They also pointed to the reopening of the Bab Al-Hawa border crossing between Syria and Turkey as a potential channel for the flow of Jordanian fruits and vegetables into Turkish and European markets. This, they said, would reduce logistics costs, improve competitiveness, and boost exports of Jordanian produce. The meeting concluded with an agreement to organize a Jordanian agricultural delegation to Damascus, including representatives from plant and livestock sectors, fertilizer companies, producer associations, exporters, and professional unions. The two sides also agreed to create a shared digital database of producers, importers, exporters, and agri-investment opportunities in both countries. The aim is to foster joint ventures, expand trade, and restore commercial volumes to pre-crisis levels, while addressing any obstacles to economic cooperation. Petra

Ammon
7 hours ago
- Ammon
Strategic crossroads: Jordan, Israel, and the shifting regional order
The joint press conference held recently in Amman—featuring Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Thomas Barak, and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani—delivered a powerful message about the region's shifting dynamics. It underscored Jordan's deep concern over the tragic events unfolding in Suwayda and, more broadly, in Syria. For Amman, these developments are not merely neighboring conflicts—they are directly linked to Jordan's national security and its evolving regional role. The ongoing unrest in Suwayda, despite a declared ceasefire, remains volatile and laden with strategic implications from a Jordanian perspective. Chief among these is the dangerous shift in Israel's security doctrine—from a defensive posture to one of assertive regional dominance. Israel now aspires to be the region's foremost power, even positioning itself as the sole security enforcer in the Middle East. Israel's agenda in Syria appears to oscillate between two alarming objectives: fragmenting the country into a collection of weak, rival statelets; and establishing a demilitarized, fragile zone in southern Syria—open to regular Israeli military intervention. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly declared his ambition for such a demilitarized zone. More concerning, however, is Israel's attempt to legitimize its military involvement by invoking the protection of the Druze community and engaging with Druze religious leaders such as Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri in Suwayda. Through these moves, Israel is positioning itself as a stakeholder in Syria's internal affairs, laying claim to the right to shape its future—a development with potentially far-reaching consequences for the entire region. From Amman's standpoint, what's unfolding in Suwayda resonates deeply with national security priorities. In a recent closed-door roundtable hosted by the Politics and Society Institute, Jordanian military, intelligence, and policy experts emphasized that the crisis in Suwayda cannot be viewed in isolation from what's happening in Gaza—or even the West Bank. Participants warned that Israel's evolving strategy could soon manifest in dangerous new policies across the region, including in the occupied Palestinian territories. But how does Suwayda connect to the West Bank? To answer this, we must first identify the threats Israel's actions in Syria pose to Jordan. Jordan's primary strategic interest in Syria is preserving the territorial unity of the Syrian state. That depends on the strength of the new political system and its capacity to integrate Syria's diverse communities into a cohesive national framework. Any descent into civil war or political fragmentation would not only destabilize Syria, but also trigger cascading threats across the region—chief among them, to Jordan. These include fresh waves of refugees, a potential ISIS resurgence, border insecurity, disruptions to shared water resources, delays in refugee repatriation, and a spike in cross-border drug smuggling and terrorism. From this vantage point, Israel's strategic direction in Syria constitutes a top-tier threat to Jordan. This threat is compounded by fears in Amman that the Israeli far-right government may seek to establish a pro-Israel Druze enclave in southern Syria—reminiscent of the South Lebanon Army during the Lebanese civil war. Such a development would trigger two deeply concerning consequences: renewed displacement of Syrian populations from Daraa due to worsening conditions, and an Israeli encirclement of Jordan from the north and west—effectively transforming Tel Aviv into a regional juggernaut. This leads us back to the West Bank. Under Israel's current strategic vision, the two-state solution has been effectively abandoned. At the same time, the Trump administration has shown no real interest in reviving peace efforts. On the contrary, Israel appears to be implementing a premeditated plan involving land annexation, the dismantling of the Palestinian Authority, and the transformation of the West Bank into isolated, controllable cantons. What is unfolding in Syria—especially in the aftermath of the October 7 attack and Israel's war on Gaza—and what is brewing in the West Bank, are both manifestations of a dangerous new Israeli strategic doctrine. These developments suggest that no regional actor currently possesses either the political will or the leverage to halt Israeli efforts to forcibly reshape the demographic and geopolitical landscape in line with Netanyahu's long-term vision. If Israel can redraw the map in Syria, it is all the more capable of implementing even more consequential policies in the West Bank and Jerusalem, particularly regarding the Palestinian demographic question—posing a direct challenge to Jordan's core interests. Jordan's problem with Israel, then, is no longer limited to the occupation of the West Bank. It is now inseparably linked to Israel's broader regional ambitions—in Syria, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza. This means that diplomatic tensions and strategic anxieties between Amman and Tel Aviv are steadily intensifying, despite the existing peace treaty. Even more alarming is that Israel no longer seeks to present itself as a vulnerable, security-conscious state. Instead, it is acting as a dominant regional power bent on imposing its agenda and capitalizing on the overwhelming imbalance of power in its favor.