TikTok reorganizes US operations as Trump 'deal' still up in the air
YIFAN YU and CISSY ZHOU
PALO ALTO, California/HONG KONG -- TikTok is restructuring its U.S. operations, including revamping its trust and safety team and its e-commerce arm TikTok Shop, as the popular social media app waits for clarity on a deal to sell its American business that President Donald Trump indicated was close.
The ByteDance-owned platform has undergone a major overhaul of its trust and safety and TikTok Shop teams, including layoffs in multiple U.S. offices, according to two people familiar with the matter. The layoffs are partly a reorganization in preparation for the spin-off of TikTok's U.S. operations, and partly an internal adjustment after TikTok Shop failed to reach certain performance goals, the people said.
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The Diplomat
2 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Is the US About to Establish a Military Base in Thailand?
In my April column for The Diplomat, I argued that Thailand has downplayed the defense dimension in its tariff negotiations with the United States, so as to dodge tough questions of strategic alignment. And so, 'the moment defense becomes overt in talks with Trump could be the moment Thailand finds itself dangerously cornered.' That gloomy reality is materializing, with Thailand's tariff rate remaining unaltered at 36 percent despite the Pheu Thai government having spent 97 million baht ($2.99 million) on lobbyists, and the state-owned energy conglomerate PTT Group having inked a 20-year agreement with Glenfarne Alaska LNG to import 2 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas annually. Murmurs about security-related concessions are growing louder. But, contrary to my anticipation of arms deals, the buzz centers around the establishment of a U.S. base within the Phang Nga Naval Base on Thailand's southwestern coast. That the buzz refuses to fade regardless of repeated denials from Thai officials reflects two contradictory trends, which are sharpened by today's U.S.-China showdown. On the question of the U.S. basing rights in Thailand, American persistence competes with unyielding Thai resistance. Thailand's stance is not only shaped by its pursuit of strategic equilibrium, but also by its first-hand experience. The heyday of the Thailand-U.S. alliance during the Vietnam War saw a massive American military stationing across seven key bases on Thai soil. The number of U.S. troops in Thailand was 46,300 in 1969, and 27,000 in 1975, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office. While the gradual troop reduction was America's doing, the catalyst for the Thai government to formally request that U.S. combat forces pack up and leave was domestic discontent. The problems around hosting the garrisoned presence of another nation are succinctly captured by the late Thanat Khoman, Thailand's esteemed diplomat and one of ASEAN's founding fathers. These include the erosion of sovereignty, direct or indirect interference in domestic politics, and the disruption of social stability, from psychological unease to the economic shocks triggered by sudden inflows and pullouts of foreign funds. Because these problems are structural in nature, even the closest, friendliest ally with shared objectives can still leave a negative footprint. One might assert further that the closer the alliance, the easier it is to overlook the problems for the host country, particularly the psychological imprint. A case in point is the U.S. deployment of the chemical herbicide Agent Orange to destroy jungle cover and crops in Vietnam. Its long-lasting health implications for the Vietnamese population and American veterans are well-recognized, rightfully so. Presumed exposure among U.S. veterans stationed in Thailand are also acknowledged. The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs specifically acknowledges compensation consideration for veterans serving 'on or near the perimeters' of U.S. bases in Thailand between 1961 and 1975, which suggests that Thai civilians living around those bases should not be ignored in the broader discourse. Yet, to date, there appears to be no real policy or research focused on the possible exposure of Thai civilians. Since the relatively smooth U.S. withdrawal in 1976, Thailand has not hosted a permanent American or other foreign military presence. All U.S. military activities in Thailand – while still substantial, with greater depth and wider scope than Thailand's military engagement with other nations – are now joint or rotational on a case-by-case basis. Uncle Sam has not been discouraged, though, and the prospect of American basing at Thailand's U-Tapao air base is a recurring discussion. An offshore military base in Thai waters is another area of U.S. interest. The request to establish one reportedly dates back to 1997. The reason for the U.S. interest is simple: Thailand's ideal geographical location. A gateway to mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand is a springboard for U.S. power projection into continental Asia, which is currently lacking. Given that U.S. ground-based cruise and ballistic missiles have a reported range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, shots fired at maximum capacity from central or eastern Thailand could threaten all of China's southern provinces (Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong) and the western Xinjiang Region. Furthermore, America's maritime dominance would be underpinned by Thailand's close proximity to both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The rumored U.S. push to secure an institutionalized foothold on Thailand's southwestern coast is most straightforwardly understood in the context of the intensifying competition in the Indian Ocean. The regional littoral power India, and distant powers China and Russia, are all ramping up their naval presence – the latter two in apparent accordance with the classic Mahanian thinking on sea power. Although America has a forward naval presence on Diego Garcia, it is quite a distance away. American access to Singapore, meanwhile, is limited and takes place on a rotational basis under an agreement that runs through 2035. Through Thailand's Phang Nga Naval Base, then, the U.S. would have a firmer hold near the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. If ever greenlit, a formalized U.S. access to Phang Nga would likely follow the Singapore model. When it comes to Phang Nga, however, Thailand's apprehension goes beyond geopolitical balance and deep-seated sensitivities. Phang Nga is effectively a sister province of Phuket, bound by geographical proximity and a shared economic trajectory, from tin mining in the past to today's tourism. Phang Nga's internationally known resort zone, Khao Lak, is just a 30-minute drive away from the naval base in question. It must also be highlighted that Phang Nga, Phuket, and another neighboring province, Krabi, are undergoing a wellness-focused transformation under the national development agenda. An established foreign military presence in the area is at odds with that development priority. To cite Thanat Khoman once again, 'the criteria for allowing foreign forces to remain should rest on the national interests of the host country, or at least on the concord between the former and those of the foreign party.' The answer to the first criterion is clear, but the second one is murky considering that Thailand remains a formal U.S. ally. Perhaps unnoticed by many, there exists no mutual defense treaty between Bangkok and Washington. Instead, the Thai-U.S. defense alliance draws symbolic significance from the 1954 Manila Pact, which created the now-defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The alliance is reinforced by subsequent bilateral documents: the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communiqué, the Joint Vision Statements of 2012 and 2020, and the 2022 United States-Thailand Communiqué on Strategic Alliance and Partnership. None of these has binding provisions for basing rights. Ultimately, there is neither legal compulsion nor interest – and thus no political will – on Thailand's part to host an institutionalized U.S. military presence. More viable and desirable ways to boost the Thailand-U.S. alliance would be to expand military education and training, to co-develop or support indigenous defense capabilities, and to focus on strengthening a number of existing joint exercises, whether in bilateral or multilateral formats. The fact that there is no good outcome for Thailand on the trade front makes it even more unlikely that the ruling government would concede basing rights as part of its negotiations with the U.S. While a 36 percent tariff stands to devastate Thai exports and growth rate, Thailand offering zero tariffs on U.S. imports risks opening the floodgates to overwhelming inflows of American goods. This, combined with the already high influx of Chinese goods, will kill Thai-made products. The trickier business is determining the position of the Trump administration, which, on the one hand, has been relentless in bending others to its will. On the other hand, however, setting up a new base in Thailand seems to go against the administration's cost-saving agenda, especially as Trump himself has shown little interest in Southeast Asia. All things considered, an American base in Thailand remains a distant prospect.
Tokyo Weekender
2 hours ago
- Tokyo Weekender
Japan and US Agree on ‘Massive' Trade Deal
In a long-anticipated announcement, US President Donald Trump revealed a new trade agreement with Japan on Tuesday, calling it a 'massive' win for both countries. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba confirmed the news the next morning. He welcomed the deal, saying it was 'the lowest figure to date among countries with a surplus with the US.' The deal marks a significant shift in bilateral trade, but not without costs for Japan. While the agreement eases immediate trade tensions, Japan made several high-value concessions in exchange for relatively limited tariff relief. List of Contents: Tariff Relief at a Price Strategic Gains Amid Uneven Terms Related Posts Tariff Relief at a Price At the heart of the deal is a tariff rollback: Japanese carmakers, who had been bracing for 25% duties, will now face a 15% rate. Ishiba described the deal positively, but the reduced tariff still represents a significant burden compared to previous trade terms. In contrast, a recent US-UK agreement set a 10% cap for a limited number of British vehicles. The US made no firm commitments beyond the tariff reduction. Japan, on the other hand, agreed to invest $550 billion into American industries such as AI, semiconductors, shipbuilding and clean energy, designed to deepen bilateral ties but also ease Washington's economic security concerns. Strategic Gains Amid Uneven Terms The deal also includes assurances that Japan will not be treated unfavorably in future US tariffs on sensitive goods, such as pharmaceuticals and advanced technology. On agriculture, Japan also agreed to buy more US rice within its existing 770,000-ton import quota. Japan's chief negotiator, Economic Revitalization Minister Ryosei Akazawa, concluded the final round of talks in Washington this week. 'Mission accomplished,' he posted on X after meeting with US officials. Markets welcomed the news. The Nikkei 225 jumped over 1,300 points , passing the 41,000 mark for the first time in a year, with automakers leading the surge. Despite concerns about fairness, the agreement is Japan's 'best compromise at this stage,' Shigeto Nagai from research firm Oxford Economics told BBC News . Discover Tokyo, Every Week Get the city's best stories, under-the-radar spots and exclusive invites delivered straight to your inbox. By signing up, you agree to our Privacy Policy . Related Posts Shigeru Ishiba Denies Rumors He Will Resign at the End of August Trump Hits Japan and South Korea With 25% Tariffs Sanseito, Explained: The Alarming Rise of Japan's Far-Right Movement
The Diplomat
5 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Trump Announces Trade Deal With Philippines, Small Reduction in Tariff Rate
The U.S. leader said that Washington would apply a 19 percent tariff on Philippine imports, while Manila has agreed to remove all of its tariffs on American goods. U.S. President Donald Trump has announced a new 19 percent tariff rate for imports from the Philippines, after a meeting with visiting President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. at the White House. Trump made the announcement in a post on his Truth Social media platform after the meeting with Marcos, calling the Philippine leader a 'very good and tough negotiator.' 'It was a beautiful visit, and we concluded our Trade Deal, whereby The Philippines is going OPEN MARKET with the United States, and ZERO Tariffs. The Philippines will pay a 19% Tariff,' Trump wrote. 'In addition, we will work together Militarily.' Marcos arrived in Washington on Sunday for a three-day trip during which he also met with Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as well as with U.S. business leaders investing in the Philippines. Speaking to reporters with Marcos, the U.S. leader announced that the two countries were 'very close to finishing a trade deal – a big trade deal, actually.' Trump's announcement comes after he claimed to have finalized similar deals with Vietnam, which negotiated a rate of 20 percent, and Indonesia, whose tariff is now set at 19 percent. (The White House yesterday released more details on the Indonesia agreement, although elements of the agreement with Vietnam have reportedly yet to be finalized.) According to an undated draft of the Philippines-U.S. Agreement on Reciprocal Trade obtained by The Diplomat, the Philippines has agreed to remove nearly all of its tariffs and non-tariff barriers on U.S. imports, including quotas and import licensing requirements, and to bolster intellectual property protections. 'These commitments,' the draft agreement states, 'are intended to enhance reciprocity between the Parties by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers in the territory of the Philippines and increasing alignment between the United States and the Philippines on economic and national security matters.' The U.S. had a goods trade deficit of $4.9 billion with the Philippines last year, according to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. As with the two previous agreements with Indonesia and Vietnam, a higher tariff rate will apply to any goods that are deemed to have been transshipped to the U.S. via the Philippines from any third country (i.e. China). The draft agreement states that the 19 percent rate will not apply in the event that a certain percentage of a good 'originates from certain countries not party to this Agreement.' Neither the exact local content threshold nor the tariff on transshipped goods were finalized in the draft, although Trump announced that the rate for Vietnam has been set at 40 percent. (How transshipped goods are to be identified and verified, and by whom, is yet to be determined in any of these cases.) The draft agreement also contains a number of provisions relating to economics and national security. It states that the Philippines will cooperate with Washington 'to regulate the trade in national security sensitive technologies and goods through existing multilateral export control regimes, align with all unilateral export controls in force by the United States, and ensure that its companies do not backfill or undermine these controls.' The agreement also states that the Philippines 'shall adopt and effectively enforce provisions to combat transshipment and other practices to evade or circumvent duties' and that the U.S. 'shall work with the Philippines to streamline and enhance defense trade.' Most notably, the draft states that the U.S. has the right to terminate the agreement if the Philippines 'enters into a new bilateral free trade agreement or preferential economic agreement' with any 'country of concern.' In light of all of these concessions, and its status as a longstanding and 'ironclad' U.S. security ally, it is surprising that the Philippines was unable to secure a greater reduction in the tariff rate. The 19 percent tariff was marginally lower than the 20 percent threatened by Trump in a letter to Marcos earlier this month, but higher than the 17 percent announced in Trump's 'liberation day' tariff announcement in April. It is also notably worse than the 15 percent rate that Trump announced today with Japan, another U.S. ally. The response on Philippine social media has reportedly been unfavorable to Marcos, with many users calling the Philippine leader 'weak' and stating that the risks of the U.S.-Philippine alliance have not been properly counterbalanced by greater U.S. concessions. In a post on X, Renato Reyes Jr., a member of the left-wing Makabayan political coalition, described the agreement as 'a grossly lopsided 'deal' which is really more of an imposition rather than the outcome of any negotiations' and called on the Marcos administration to 'fully disclose' its terms. The national security analyst Justin Baquisal wrote on X that while it remains to be seen whether these political talking points hurt Marcos' political prospects, 'the lack of better treatment for US allies vs non-aligners (esp compared to the original Liberation Day margins) is not doing anybody favors.' 'Most Reliable Ally' Marcos is the first Southeast Asian leader to visit the White House since the beginning of Trump's second term, a reflection of the warmth of the relationship between the two allies. Speaking to reporters at the start of the meeting in the Oval Office, Marcos described the U.S. as his country's 'strongest, closest, most reliable ally,' while Trump praised the Philippine leader, describing him as coming from a 'great family' with a 'great family legacy.' (Marcos' father, Ferdinand E. Marcos, ruled the Philippines through fear and force for more than two decades, including 14 years under Martial Law.) Aside from the trade issue, security and defense were also on the agenda during the Marcos-Trump meeting. Security cooperation between the two nations has increased markedly in recent years as a result of China's growing maritime power and ambition. During Marcos' three years in office, Beijing has increased the frequency and intensity of its incursions into Philippine-claimed waters, which it claims under its expansive 'nine-dash line' claim, resulting in a string of dangerous encounters between the two nations' coast guards. Under Marcos, the Philippines has opened more of its military facilities to a rotational U.S. presence under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, and increased military exercises and joint patrols. The visit did not witness the signing of any new defense cooperation initiatives, but in their meetings with Marcos, both Hegseth and Rubio reaffirmed that the U.S. will come to the Philippines' defense under the Mutual Defense Treaty if its forces, ships and aircraft come under an armed attack, including in the South China Sea – an assurance that has been consistently made since the first Trump administration. Marcos told Hegseth that the assurance of mutual defense 'continues to be the cornerstone' of the U.S.-Philippines relationship and thanked the U.S. for support 'that we need in the face of the threats that we, our country, is facing.' Speaking alongside Trump, Marcos said that 'we are essentially concerned with the defense of our territory and the exercise of our sovereign rights,' adding, 'Our strongest, closest, most reliable ally has always been the United States.' As the AFP news agency reported, Trump 'devoted much of the appearance to attacks on his Democratic predecessors Biden and Barack Obama.' In a possibly significant aside, Trump address relations with China, saying that he would 'probably' visit the country 'in the not-too-distant future.' While taking credit for 'untilt[ing]' the Philippines away from China (the shift in Manila's policy took place under the Biden administration), he said that the Philippines was independent in its dealings with Beijing. 'Do whatever you need to do,' Trump told Marcos, the Associated Press reported. 'But your dealing with China wouldn't bother me at all.'
