Pacific defence pact would organise core coalition to combat China: Ely Ratner

Hindustan Times

5 days ago

As the Quad foreign ministers wrapped up their meeting, former US assistant secretary of defence for Indo-Pacific affairs Ely Ratner pitched for a new Pacific defence pact that will organise a core coalition of countries to combat China in the Indo-Pacific. In an interview with HT, Ratner argued that the Quad is not prepared for high-intensity military operations in the Indo-Pacific, and stressed that India should allow more foreign military to operate in and around the country to boost interoperability with key partners. He also said that India should expand its area of focus to the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, where China's policies pose the threat of serious instability. Edited excerpts: Ely Ratner argued that the Quad is not prepared for high-intensity military operations in the Indo-Pacific. (X/elyratner)
You recently made the case for the creation of a new Pacific defence pact. What does that mean? Why exactly does it matter?
The place to start is the principal objective of the United States, which is to secure a free and open Pacific. That's an objective that's shared broadly among countries throughout the region. There is a recognition of the threat from China, which is increasingly building up the ability to revise the regional security order in ways that better meet its authoritarian interests. One of the most important questions in U.S. foreign policy through its defence strategy is how do we strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific such that China does not go in the direction of trying to revise the geopolitical order in a way that could have catastrophic consequences. My perspective is that the U.S. requires somewhat of an evolution from the traditional American approach with its alliances. Throughout most of the 20th century, and into the 21st century, you had the hub and spoke model with America at the centre and with bilateral alliances. Now, you have a more networked architecture. Given the scale of the challenge posed by China, my view is that the United States should consider leading a more formal Pacific defence pact that would bring a select set of allies together to make the whole greater than the sum of the parts. This pact would be able to integrate planning, command and control, and exercises and operations in a way that would make that collective power much more effective. And the countries that I've proposed starting are the United States, Australia, Japan and the Philippines.
Why these specific countries? Some have compared your proposal to plans for an Asian NATO. Also, how do you see countries like India fitting into this proposal?
So the idea of a Pacific defence pact is not meant to replace other bilateral and multilateral security arrangements already present in the region. Nor would it displace existing regional institutions like ASEAN. This would coexist and overlap with other initiatives. In terms of this proposed grouping, the difference between it and NATO would be that the latter is a pan-regional organisation. That does not really apply to the Pacific defence pact since there are a number of major regional countries like India and South Korea in Southeast Asia that may not necessarily align with the grouping at this time. That being said, the idea of a Pacific defence pact could expand to include other countries that share a similar threat perception from the People's Republic of China. South Korea would be one key country in this regard. When it comes to India, in the future, there may be opportunities to cooperate in a less formal way through observer status or ad-hoc participation in exercises. I worked the India account at the Pentagon for several years. My sense was very much that India values its 360-degree approach to diplomacy and values its independence in foreign policy matters. But if India did want to join such a Pacific defence pact, I think other countries would welcome India with open arms.
You've said that the Quad doesn't have a very strong defence and security focus. Why is that? Will the Trump Administration push a stronger security focus going ahead?
I think the United States has been open to the Quad taking on a greater security role. During the Biden administration, we saw the Quad working more on maritime defence and domain awareness. And of course, we've seen cooperation on security through the Malabar defence exercises. But as for why the Quad doesn't have a greater security focus, the reason is that at particular points in time, other partners like Japan, Australia and India for their own particular reasons - often because of their ties to China - have been hesitant to expand the Quad's security agenda. So the focus has been on issues like providing public goods for the region. I have been encouraged by some of the recent developments I have seen. There are a lot of opportunities for the Quad to do more on security and defence. The way for that to move forward is not just for the foreign ministers to meet and discuss, and the militaries to exercise together. The defence establishments and policy arms of their defence ministries should be working much more together in the Quad format.
Is the Quad ready to handle a security contingency with China at this time?
Well, the Quad was born out of a response to a humanitarian disaster, and some of those activities the Quad has developed work well today. I think when it comes to higher-end military cooperation, the Quad still lacks the number of abilities that we would want to be able to operate seamlessly in a high-intensity format. Many of the things that exist among America's East Asian allies do not exist in the Quad format. For instance, on the question of force posture and reciprocal access, it would be important over time for Australia, Japan, and the United States to have more reciprocal access agreements with India, such that those countries may be able to operate in and around facilities in India. The Indian military would also be able to operate around foreign military facilities. There have been some efforts with regard to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, but nothing comprehensively exists. India opening up a broader consideration of opportunities for foreign militaries to operate in and around India would allow for new types of military cooperation and deterrence as well. So force posture is one aspect of things. A second would be just on actual military planning. The Quad would need much closer efforts to try to coordinate planning among the four countries to know what kinds of roles and missions they would need to take on during a crisis or contingency to be able to operate effectively. There are a number of areas where these capabilities are non-existent or still underdeveloped. I think the efforts on maritime security do hold promise where the four countries can develop the ability to synchronise their operations in real-time. All of that should be on the table and I think those are the kinds of activities that the Quad should be aspiring for.
That said, how satisfied are you with the state of the U.S.-India defence relationship at this point?
Well, obviously, there's incredible growth. I think there's still strong momentum in the U.S.-India bilateral relationship. We have had some of the conversations and discussions that I was describing earlier related to border issues with China. We've obviously had an experience of ways in which we can collaborate from a capability perspective, a technology perspective and other areas related to these crises and difficulties on the India-China border. We've also had discussions on China's naval operations in the Indian Ocean. But neither of those relates to higher-end crises or contingencies with China. And neither of these conversations are being had in close coordination with the Japanese and Australians. And these conversations are also not related to possible contingencies in East Asia. So the bottom line is that there is incredible growth in India-US defence relations in getting some foundational defence agreements done and advancing defence industrial cooperation. But there are two or three areas that I think could see more growth. One is to be thinking more about how these industrial-based corporations that we're working on together are translating directly into operational cooperation. Sometimes, you can get stuck with technology-sharing cooperation agreements, and that's important because what they need to do is to be focused on the actual implementation with militaries operating together and using these new technologies. I think the second point would be to talk about India integrating more deeply with other partners in the Indo-Pacific region. The third point, from my perspective, is that it is important for India and America to work more together on the South China Sea and on possible contingencies related to issues like Taiwan in East Asia. At this time, India's defence conversations with the United States are, rightly so, related to the Indian Ocean, which also includes the East Coast of Africa and the Middle East. I understand that India is thinking about its periphery, its borders and the maritime threats from China. But when you think about the Indo-Pacific as a whole, the principal sources of instability are in the South China Sea and over the Taiwan Strait. And at this point in time, the US-India defence relationship is not really focused on these areas. It is too limiting to make the sole objective of India-U.S. defence relations simply supporting India's position and hegemony in South Asia. It needs to do more as a net security provider contributing to deterrence in the East Asia littoral. I would also point out that if China manages to achieve its objectives in the Pacific and the South China Sea, then it will truly have encircled India. So India has a very large interest in ensuring that maritime corridors in that region remain open. I would call for India and America to do more work on that front.
To what extent does India's existing store of Russian defence equipment create challenges, if any, for the kind of India-US defence cooperation that you're proposing?
It is a problem, but it's one that India, for its own reasons, has been addressing by reducing its reliance on Russian equipment. So what I see is that India's efforts towards indigenisation, as well as its partnership with the United States and Europe and other Indo-Pacific powers have helped diversify its defence relationships. So the trend lines are definitely moving in the right direction. But there are some areas like undersea domain awareness as well as air defence where India operating Russian equipment does create technology security – as well as interoperability - challenges for India and the United States to work together. So the US perspective is that while acknowledging that India cannot simply turn off the supply of Russian equipment, reducing reliance on Russia will widen the aperture and scope of US-India defence cooperation.