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Ukraine demands clarity as US downplays halt to arms shipments as war with Russia escalates
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky (L) meets with US President Donald Trump on the sideline of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in The Hague. File Image / AFP
US officials on Wednesday downplayed a White House announcement that Washington was pausing some weapons shipments to Ukraine, after the war-battered country was caught off-guard and appealed for clarity.
Ukraine is contending with some of Russia's largest missile and drone attacks of the three-year war, and a halt to the provision of munitions – especially for air defense – would be a significant blow to Kyiv.
'The Department of Defense continues to provide the president with robust options regarding military aid to Ukraine, consistent with his goal of bringing this tragic war to an end,' Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell told journalists Wednesday.
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State Department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce meanwhile told reporters that 'this is not a cessation of us assisting Ukraine or of providing weapons. This is one event, and one situation, and we'll discuss what else comes up in the future.'
The White House had said Tuesday that it is halting some key weapons shipments to Ukraine that were promised under the Biden administration, without providing details on which weapons programmes were affected.
It said the decision was taken after a review of US defense needs and of its military assistance to foreign countries.
Moscow revelled in the decision, saying that it could bring the end of the war closer.
Politico and other US media reported that missiles for Patriot air defence systems, precision artillery and Hellfire missiles are among the items being held back.
But the State Department's Bruce said Wednesday that 'the president has also indicated his remaining commitment regarding Patriot missiles,' Bruce said, referring to an air defense system that has played a key role in defending against Russian attacks.
Kyiv has long feared halts to US aid after Donald Trump returned to the White House in January, having criticised the tens of billions of dollars in support and weapons sent by his predecessor, Joe Biden.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said in an evening address that Kyiv and Washington were clarifying details on supplies.
'Continued American support for Ukraine, for our defence, for our people is in our common interest,' he said.
The Ukrainian foreign ministry summoned John Ginkel, the deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Kyiv, in a rare diplomatic move that is usually reserved for foes and rivals, not vital allies, indicative of the uncertainty about what the cuts would mean for Kyiv.
Under Biden, Washington spearheaded Western support for Ukraine, with Congress having approved more than $100 billion in aid, including $43 billion in weaponry.
Trump instead has pushed the two sides into peace talks, including in phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin – who rejected pleas for a ceasefire and demanded that Ukraine cede more territory if it wants Moscow to halt its invasion, which was launched in 2022.
'Consistent pressure'
Trump has refused to announce new aid packages and Kyiv has been corralling Washington's European allies to step up their support.
Kyiv remains 'seriously dependent' on US arms supplies, a high-ranking source in the Ukrainian military told AFP.
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'Europe is doing its best, but it will be difficult for us without American ammunition,' the source added.
A May report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said that Europe 'had only made limited progress' in strengthening its defence industries.
But it said that 'continued US aid remains extremely important for Ukraine's long-term effectiveness on the battlefield.'
In Moscow, the Kremlin said that reducing weapons deliveries to Kyiv would help end the conflict.
'The fewer the number of weapons that are delivered to Ukraine, the closer the end of the special military operation,' Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in response to a question by AFP, using Russia's term for its more than three-year-long offensive.
Escalating drone attacks
Russia ramped up attacks on Ukraine in June, launching nearly twice as many missiles and more than 30 percent more drones than in May, according to an AFP analysis of Ukrainian air force data.
Kyiv was in June subjected to at least four fatal attacks that left more than 40 people dead. Its residents are worried that a cessation of US aid would leave the capital even more vulnerable.
'We had gotten used to seeing America as a country of values, a country that defends democracy,' Igor Stambol, a Kyiv resident, told AFP.
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'But there is hope that they will remember their values,' the 36-year-old added.
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