logo
Sanjaya Baru writes: After Op Sindoor, lessons from Manmohan and Vajpayee governments on communication

Sanjaya Baru writes: After Op Sindoor, lessons from Manmohan and Vajpayee governments on communication

Indian Express11 hours ago
Several experts and analysts have commented on poor, even faulty, messaging in the conduct of Operation Sindoor — before, during and after the operation. What were the faults? Before the operation began, it was not made clear that India would only target terrorist camps across the border and the Line of Control (LoC). While this was the stated objective of the government, there was no such clarity in the media on the nature of the Indian response to the Pahalgam attack. This raised expectations within India on what the Indian Armed Forces would do and subsequently contributed to disappointment at home. Bombastic claims by senior ruling party leaders about occupying Pakistan-occupied Kashmir did not help.
Second, during the conflict, there was no communication within India and to the international community as to what was actually happening and what India's objectives were. Third, after the conflict ended, there was confusion on (a) the reasons for the ceasefire; (b) terms of the ceasefire and; (c) the nature of future red lines. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's statement that Operation Sindoor has not ended and is merely on hold has raised more questions than provide answers.
Statements made overseas by the Chief of Defence Staff and by an Indian defence attache on the political guidelines within which the armed forces operated have added to this problem of mixed messaging. All this gives the impression that the military and civil leadership are not on the same page in their messaging on Operation Sindoor. Against this background, several analysts have drawn attention to the need for better 'strategic communication'.
The funny thing is that the subject of 'strategic communication' has been discussed time and again within and outside the government and certainly within the national security establishment. Yet, it seems few lessons have been learnt from past experience. I have myself lectured on this subject, based on the experience during the Kargil War, more than once at the National Defence College. It is instructive to recall what had happened at that time.
After hostilities began in the Kargil region, an army spokesperson was providing regular briefings to the media. The Kargil War was the first conflict in South Asia during which private Indian television wished to travel to the battle zones and cover events live. They were inspired by the example set by CNN during the first Gulf War in 1990. The then convenor of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), the late K Subrahmanyam, felt that better and more professional media management was needed. It may be recalled that Subrahmanyam, the guru of strategic policy analysts, had spent the 1990s in newspaper offices, first at the Business and Political Observer and later at The Times of India, and had a good grasp of how the media thinks and acts.
At his instance, the NSAB constituted a media advisory sub-committee chaired by Subrahmanyam and including N N Vohra (a former defence secretary), J N Dixit (a former foreign secretary and later the National Security Advisor), Major General Afsar Karim and myself (I was then Editor, The Financial Express). Our first recommendation to the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra was that rather than an army officer, a diplomat adept at such communication should do media briefings on a daily basis. The then joint secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs in-charge of external publicity, the late Raminder Singh Jassal, was tasked to conduct the daily briefings.
Raminder was a talented and skilled diplomat, with good media handling skills and a sound understanding of India's strategic aims and objectives.
The NSAB media sub-committee would meet every day at 11 am in the room of the then-deputy NSA Satish Chandra. The minutes of our meeting would be communicated to the NSA who would then brief Jassal. The daily media briefings played an important role in shaping both domestic understanding and expectations from the conflict and global appreciation of India's strategy and tactics. Global opinion turned decisively in India's favour with the United States supporting the Indian view on Kashmir for the very first time. President Bill Clinton endorsed the idea implicit to the Simla Agreement that the LoC would be the de facto boundary between India and Pakistan.
It was on the basis of the conduct and outcome of the Kargil War that its main architect, General Pervez Musharraf, began to engage India. Regrettably, though, the Musharraf visit to India and his meeting with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at Agra in July 2001 proved a failure and the progress expected did not materialise. It was then left to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to take the baton forward.
In September 2004, when Prime Minister Singh decided to engage President Musharraf, he was advised by most of his senior officials not to undertake such a risky exercise so early in his term in office. He not only began a conversation but invited President Musharraf to Delhi in April 2005. Once again, the national security and diplomatic establishment was concerned about the political fallout of the meeting. In Agra, the Indian media was seen as being better briefed by the Pakistan delegation than by the Indian side. It was felt Musharraf had been let off too easily with senior editors being charmed by the general.
Prime Minister Singh tasked me to develop a media strategy for the Musharraf visit. With the support of senior officials in the Prime Minister's Office, I conducted several closed-door media briefings to different groups of journalists and analysts. This helped shape expectations of the visit and the visit went off without any embarrassment for the country or the PM.
There would be other such past episodes that others involved in media management would know. There are some very competent officers in the Indian Information Service as well as in the defence establishment. If media messaging is handled professionally, the country would be better served. It is the over-the-top, highly dramatised, purely ideological and sensational reporting by several media establishments during Operation Sindoor that has damaged Indian reputation and credibility.
As many around the world have commented, pro-Modi media outfits have done more harm than good for India's image and case vis-a-vis Operation Sindoor. Responsible and professional coverage, including putting out authentic information in time would have served the national interest better. What has further weakened the Indian case is the fact that the media that did the greatest damage to the country's reputation is viewed as being pro-government. Credible strategic communication requires a credible medium.
The writer was member, National Security Advisory Board of India, 1999-2001 and media advisor to the Prime Minister of India, 2004-08
Orange background

Try Our AI Features

Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:

Comments

No comments yet...

Related Articles

‘Incorrect' that India lost Rafale ‘jets' during Operation Sindoor, says defence secretary
‘Incorrect' that India lost Rafale ‘jets' during Operation Sindoor, says defence secretary

Scroll.in

time9 minutes ago

  • Scroll.in

‘Incorrect' that India lost Rafale ‘jets' during Operation Sindoor, says defence secretary

It is incorrect to say that multiple Rafale jets of the Indian Air Force were shot down by Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, Defence Secretary RK Singh told CNBC-TV18 on Monday. Singh refused to answer a question regarding the losses the Air Force suffered during the initial phase of the four-day conflict, the news channel reported. 'You have used the term Rafales in the plural, I can assure you that is absolutely not correct,' Singh told CNBC-TV18. 'Pakistan suffered losses many times over India in both human and material terms and more than 100 terrorists.' The defence secretary also reiterated that the government had given the Indian military operational freedom during the conflict. 'No political constraints on our armed forces and they have full operational freedom in conflict,' he said. This came following a remark by Captain Shiv Kumar, India's defence attaché to Indonesia, on June 10 that the Indian Air Force had lost fighter jets to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor on May 7 because of the ' constraint given by the political leadership'. 'Suppression of enemy air defences and destruction of enemy air defences is very very important…' Kumar said. 'I may not agree…that India lost so many aircraft, but I do agree we did lose some aircraft.' He added: 'And that happened only because of the constraint given by the political leadership to not attack the military establishment or [Pakistani] air defences'. Kumar had said that the tactics were changed after the loss and 'we went for their military installations'. The defence attaché had made the comments during a seminar analysing the India-Pakistan conflict at a university in Jakarta. He made the statement in response to Pakistan's claim of having downed six aircraft, including three Rafales. The claims made by Islamabad have not been independently verified. On Sunday, the Associated Press quoted French Air Force chief General Jérôme Bellanger as saying that he had seen evidence pointing to the Indian Air Force having lost just three fighter jets: a Rafale, a Su-30MKI and a Mirage 2000. A controversy had erupted after the video of Kumar's remarks surfaced online on June 28. Following this, the Indian embassy in Jakarta had said that the Navy officer had only pointed out that India's armed forces serve under ' civilian political leadership ', unlike some neighbouring countries. 'It was also explained that the objective of Operation Sindoor was to target terrorist infrastructure and the Indian response was non-escalatory,' it added. The Indian embassy also said that Kumar's remarks were 'quoted out of context' and 'the media reports are a misrepresentation of the intention and thrust of the presentation made by the speaker'. Kumar's statement had come more than a month after Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan's May 31 comments that were seen by some as an acknowledgement of the Indian Air Force having lost aircraft during the operation. Chauhan had told Bloomberg that what was important was 'not the jet being down, but why they were being down'. 'Why they were down, what mistakes were made – that are important,' Chauhan told Bloomberg. ' Numbers are not important.' He had also said that Pakistan's claims of having shot down six Indian Air Force fighter jets was 'absolutely incorrect'. Tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad escalated on May 7 when the Indian military carried out strikes – codenamed Operation Sindoor – on what it claimed were terrorist camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The strikes were in response to the terror attack in Jammu and Kashmir's Pahalgam, which killed 26 persons on April 22. The Pakistan Army retaliated to Indian strikes by repeatedly shelling Indian villages along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. At least 22 Indian civilians and eight defence personnel were killed in the shelling. India and Pakistan on May 10 reached an 'understanding' to halt firing following the four-day conflict.

Why judiciary stares at potential first impeachment of a high court judge
Why judiciary stares at potential first impeachment of a high court judge

India Today

time12 minutes ago

  • India Today

Why judiciary stares at potential first impeachment of a high court judge

(NOTE: This article was originally published in the India Today issue dated July 14, 2025)In the complex world of Indian politics, where decisions are often made behind closed doors, parliamentary affairs minister Kiren Rijiju is on a sensitive mission. He is working to gather support from leaders across party lines for what could be a landmark moment in India's judicial history—the first impeachment of a high court judge, Justice Yashwant story that began with a fire in the judge's outhouse now transcends a simple corruption scandal. It lays bare the fault lines between India's judiciary and executive, exposing tensions that have simmered since the nation's founding. Dark clouds are gathering over the capital in more ways than one, and as the monsoon session of Parliament approaches, the case raises profound questions about evidence, process and power. Who watches the watchers when the watchers themselves stand accused? And what happens when the machinery of accountability becomes a weapon in institutional warfare? THE FIRE THAT LIT A THOUSAND QUESTIONS March 14, 2025, began as an ordinary Friday for the residents of Tughlaq Crescent, Delhi's tree-lined avenue housing judges and diplomats. Justice Varma, then serving on the Delhi High Court, was away in Bhopal with his wife. His daughter Diya remained at the No. 30 official residence, a sprawling bungalow. The household staff went about their routines, the CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) guards maintained their posts, and nothing suggested that this night would alter the trajectory of Indian approximately 11:35 pm, Diya heard what she later described as an explosion. Racing toward the sound with household staff, she discovered flames erupting from a locked storeroom situated near the servants' quarters, separated from the main residence by a boundary wall. Neither the CRPF personnel nor the guards stationed at the main gate initially responded, a detail that would later fuel conspiracy the Delhi Fire Services arrived, breaking open the padlocked door with the help of security personnel, they encountered a scene that defied explanation. Station officer Manoj Mehlawat's spontaneous exclamation, captured on a firefighter's phone video, gave the case its most memorable soundbite: 'Mahatma Gandhi mein aag lag rahi hai (Mahatma Gandhi is on fire)'. The reference was unmistakable: stacks of 500-rupee notes bearing Gandhi's image lay burning on the floor, some charred, others half-consumed by fire brigade's divisional officer, Suman Kumar, would later testify that he had 'never seen anything like it' in his career. Multiple witnesses, including firefighters and police personnel, described currency notes piled up to one and a half feet high. Yet what happened next, or rather, what didn't happen, would prove equally significant. The Delhi Police took no action to secure evidence. No seizure memo was prepared, no panchnama drawn up. Not a single currency note was preserved for forensic examination. By dawn, the burnt cash had vanished, reportedly removed by persons unknown while the crime scene lay unguarded. News of the midnight fire might have remained buried in routine police logs had not someone—the identity remains unknown—leaked the information to the media days later. The story exploded across news channels as the image of currency burning at a judge's residence struck at something fundamental in public Supreme Court's institutional machinery responded with uncharacteristic speed. Within days, then Chief Justice of India, Sanjiv Khanna, requested a preliminary report from Delhi High Court chief justice D.K. Upadhyaya, who said that 'the entire matter warrants a deeper probe'. The SC collegium, in an extraordinary meeting, proposed Varma's immediate transfer to his parent high court in Allahabad, a clear signal the judiciary was distancing itself from potential Varma's actions, or lack thereof, on his return to Delhi on March 15 would later become central to the case against him. He did not visit the burnt storeroom immediately. He filed no police complaint about what he would later claim was a conspiracy to frame him. He accepted his transfer to the Allahabad HC without protest. To his critics, this behaviour suggested guilt. To his defenders, it reflected the shock and confusion of a man blindsided by events beyond his March 22, CJI Khanna constituted a three-member committee including Justices Sheel Nagu (Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana HC), G.S. Sandhawalia (Chief Justice of Himachal Pradesh HC) and Anu Sivaraman of the Karnataka HC to conduct an 'inhouse inquiry'. Their 64-page report, submitted on May 3, reads like a judicial indictment. The committee found that 'cash/money was found in the storeroom' based on 'direct and electronic evidence'. More damningly, they concluded that access to this room was under the 'covert or active control of Justice Varma and his family members'. Through what they termed 'strong inferential evidence', they determined that Varma's most trusted staff, private secretary Rajinder Singh Karki and domestic helpers, had removed the burnt cash in the early hours of March allegedly instructed firefighters not to mention currency in their reports. The storeroom was cleaned the next day, destroying potential evidence. When questioned, household staff claimed ignorance but the committee found these denials unconvincing when weighed against the independent testimony of fire and police significantly, the committee addressed Justice Varma's defence, or lack thereof. His claim that the storeroom was accessible to outsiders was contradicted by security personnel who testified that the area was always locked and monitored. His failure to report a conspiracy, if he truly believed one existed, struck the committee as the other side, Justice Varma's objections went beyond mere procedure. The committee, he noted, had already framed its inquiry around three presumptive questions: How does he account for the money in the room? What was its source? Who removed it? These questions, Varma argued, assumed that the money he claimed never belonged to him was his. Also, the committee's fact-finding mandate meant it operated without the safeguards of a proper judicial inquiry, no examination of witnesses on oath, no rules of evidence, no formal procedures to check the testimony's veracity. 1. Panel took stock of 55 witness testimonies, forensic examination of videos/ photos, as well as triangulation of electronic and call records to come to its findingsadvertisement2. Multiple visuals of charred currency retrieved. In one video, a fire officer is heard saying, 'Mahatma Gandhi mein aag lag rahi hai bhai,' referring to the image on the Rs 500 notes3. Varma's private secretary Rajinder Karki led clean-up after the blaze, raising concerns about deliberate tampering. Karki talked to Justice Varma at 1:23 am on March 15, the window when evidence may have been removed4. Varma's daughter Diya initially admitted knowing about the burnt cash on March 15, later attempted to retract statement5. Hard disk of CCTV camera monitoring storeroom is missing. Panel concluded that if footage supported his claims, Varma had ample time to produce it to prove his innocence6. When questioned by the CJI, Justice Varma could not account for the origin/ownership of the cash allegedly found at his premises QUESTIONS OVER THE INVESTIGATIONWhen CJI Khanna, acting on the committee's report, advised Varma to resign within 48 hours, the judge's response was unequivocal. His letter of June 6 rejecting this advice struck notes of both defiance and despair. 'To accept such advice would imply my acquiescence to a process and outcome that I respectfully consider to be fundamentally unjust,' he nothing illustrates the case's irregularities more starkly than what investigators chose not to investigate. Former law minister Kapil Sibal, reviewing the case, identifies gaps that seem less like oversights and more deliberate omissions. No forensic examination determined the fire's cause. Justice Varma's claim of an explosion was dismissed without investigation. The CCTV cameras monitoring the storeroom, potentially the most crucial evidence, had mysteriously stopped working, their data irretrievably lost by the time investigators sought it. The committee noted this failure but drew no adverse inference, instead blaming Justice Varma for not preserving footage even though he had 10 days to do so and prove his Delhi Police's conduct raised even more questions. Here were law enforcement officers witnessing evidence of a serious crime, yet they took no action. When questioned later, the officers claimed that they were told by superiors that 'higher-ups are involved' and they should take no further action. This investigative paralysis extended to the committee itself. While acknowledging police conduct as 'slipshod', they declined to probe deeper, stating it was 'not part of their remit'. They made no attempt to trace where the cash originated, whether it was genuine or counterfeit, or how it came to be in the storeroom. The amount itself remained a matter of speculation; media reports suggested Rs 15 crore, but no official count was ever IMPEACHMENT PUZZLEAs Parliament prepares for Justice Varma's impeachment, the process itself has become contentious. Under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, impeachment follows a prescribed route: MPs submit a motion, the speaker or chairman admits it, a three-judge panel investigates, and only if found guilty does Parliament debate and vote. This statutory process includes crucial safeguards, including right to legal representation and evidence taken on minister Rijiju has suggested the government views this case as 'slightly different', hinting they might bypass the statutory inquiry since an inhouse committee has already submitted a report. This approach has alarmed constitutional experts. As Indira Jaising, who participated in India's first (unsuccessful) impeachment proceedings against an SC judge in 1991, warned, conflating the inhouse procedure with statutory requirements 'undermines Justice Varma's right to a fair procedure' and violates the law government's selective urgency becomes more apparent when contrasted with another pending impeachment. Since December 2024, 55 Rajya Sabha MPs have sought action against Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav of the Allahabad HC for alleged inflammatory communal remarks at a Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) event. Six months later, Vice-President and RS chairman Jagdeep Dhankhar claims he's still verifying signatures. Meanwhile, Dhankhar wrote to the CJI asking him not to proceed with an inhouse inquiry against Justice Yadav, yet he now champions swift action against Justice Varma based solely on such an inquiry. THE DEEPER GAMEThe impeachment drama is also set to become a test case in the ongoing struggle between India's judiciary and the Modi government. Since the SC struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) in 2015, declaring it unconstitutional for giving the executive too much power over judicial appointments, tensions have escalated. The government has chafed at the collegium system, where judges appoint judges, viewing it as unaccountable. Various ministers and even V-P Dhankhar have publicly criticised judicial overreach and called for greater executive oversight. The Varma case provides potent ammunition. Here's a judge with unexplained cash, and the judiciary's own investigation found him guilty. What better argument for external oversight?Yet the implications run deeper. Some experts say that by accepting an inhouse report as grounds for impeachment, by bypassing statutory safeguards, the government could set precedents that fundamentally alter judicial independence. Today's weapon against allegedly corrupt judges could become tomorrow's tool for removing inconvenient Varma himself represents a puzzling target. Colleagues describe him as brilliant, particularly in tax law. No whispers of impropriety marked his career. His judgments have reflected careful reasoning rather than ideological bias. Meanwhile, the fundamental mysteries remain unresolved. Whose money was burning that night? How did it arrive in a locked storeroom? The fire's cause stays unexplained. The judge mentioned an explosion while fire officers doubted the short-circuit theory. Yet no forensic examination occurred. The missing CCTV footage that might have shown who accessed the storeroom has also gaps matter because they transform what should be a search for truth into an exercise in presumption. The committee's logic that Varma must be guilty because he couldn't prove his innocence, inverts fundamental principles of justice. As Sibal observed, 'Under which principle of criminal law can you find somebody guilty on a presumption?'Justice Yashwant Varma will likely enter history as India's first successfully impeached judge. But his removal may prove a pyrrhic victory for those seeking judicial accountability. Also, more fundamental questions of systemic judicial corruption remain unanswered. The case underscores the urgent need for structural judicial reforms that eliminate the possibility of unaccounted cash lying hidden in a judge's A JUDGE IS IMPEACHED (Photo: Arun Kumar) In India, a judge of the Supreme Court or a high court can be removed through impeachment, which involves a specific process outlined in the Constitution and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. Here's a breakdown of the process:1) Initiation: A motion for impeachment can be initiated in either the Lok Sabha (at least 100 members must sign) or the Rajya Sabha (at least 50 members must sign). In case of Justice Varma, the motion has already been admitted in Parliament2) Investigation: The presiding officer (speaker of the Lok Sabha or chairman of Rajya Sabha) can refer the motion to a three-member committee for investigation. This committee typically includes the Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice, and a distinguished jurist. In case of Justice Varma, the Supreme Court's three-member inquiry committee has already recommended his impeachment. There is no clarity if Parliament will go by this recommendation or form a committee of its own to probe the allegations against Justice Varma3) Parliamentary Approval: If the committee finds the judge guilty, the report is presented to the respective House. For the motion to be successful, it must be passed by a special majority (two-thirds of those present and voting, and a majority of the total membership) in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha. The monsoon session of Parliament is likely to see debate and voting on Justice Varma's impeachment.4) Presidential Order: If both Houses pass the motion with the required majority, it is sent to the President, who then issues an order for the judge's removalSubscribe to India Today Magazine- EndsMust Watch

How did Tahawwur Rana help David Headley identify key 26/11 targets in Mumbai?
How did Tahawwur Rana help David Headley identify key 26/11 targets in Mumbai?

First Post

time13 minutes ago

  • First Post

How did Tahawwur Rana help David Headley identify key 26/11 targets in Mumbai?

Tahawwur Hussain Rana, the Pakistani-origin Canadian national and key accused in the 26/11 terror attacks on Mumbai, has revealed some crucial details about the operation to authorities. Rana was extradited to India from the United States in April after the US Supreme Court dismissed his review petition. But what did Rana say? How did he help plan the attacks? read more Tahawwur Hussain Rana, the Pakistani-origin Canadian national and key accused in the terror attacks on Mumbai was extradited to India from the United States in April. Tahawwur Hussain Rana has revealed some crucial details about the 26/11 attacks on India. The Pakistani-origin Canadian national and key accused in the terror attacks on Mumbai was extradited to India from the United States. This came after the US Supreme Court dismissed his review petition. Rana, 64, was a childhood friend of David Coleman Headley aka Daood Gilani, who masterminded the attacks at the best of LeT chief Hafeez Saeed. Rana was brought to India on a special flight in April. He has since been questioned by Indian authorities including the National Investigation Agency and intelligence officials. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD He is in judicial custody till July 9. The Mumbai Police is preparing to arrest Rana as soon as he is done being questioned. But what has Rana revealed to the authorities? Let's take a closer look: What Rana revealed Rana during questioning revealed that he completed an MBBS course in 1986 from Pakistan's Army Medical College in Rawalpindi. Rana claimed that he was commissioned into the Pakistan Army as a captain in Quetta. Rana said he was assigned to Sindh, Balochistan, Bahawalpur, and Siachen-Balotra – all sensitive regions. However, during his stint in Siachen, he developed pulmonary edema. This condition, which results in fluid building up in the lungs, caused him to miss duty. Rana said he agreed to help Headley in exchange for his army records being expunged. Tahawwur Rana said David Headley held at least three terrorist training sessions with the LeT between 2003 and 2004. ANI Rana claimed he was a trusted agent of the Pakistan Army and was even sent to Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War on a secret mission. He said that the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) was initially formed as a spy network and continues to function that way. Rana said Headley held at least three terrorist training sessions with the LeT between 2003 and 2004. How did Rana help plan 26/11? It is well known that Headley had travelled to many cities in India including Mumbai, Delhi and Pune prior to the attacks. Headley had claimed to be representing a firm called the Immigrant Law Centre. the setting up of this company – which was a front for the terror group – and also for the firm doing financial transactions. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Rana said that he assisted Headley in identifying key targets of the 26/11 attacks. Rana said he came to India in November 2008 before the attacks and rented a room at a hotel in Powai. Rana said the attacks were carried out with the assistance of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Representational image. Reuters Rana claimed to have conducted reconnaissance of several areas in Mumbai including Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus ahead of the attacks. However, he then headed to Beijing via Dubai. Rana said he helped Headley travel to India by concocting a fake identity for him. Rana, however, asked about the forged documents the terrorists used to enter India, blamed the Indian Embassy. Rana said the attacks were carried out with the assistance of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He has claimed to know several officials accused in the attacks including Sajid Mir, Abdul Rehman Pasha, and Major Iqbal. Headley after the attacks told Rana that the Indians 'deserved it'. Rana has been charged with criminal conspiracy, waging war against the government of India, murder and forgery and under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Rana could get life in prison or even face the death penalty. Pakistan had distanced itself from Rana even as he was being extradited. 'Tahawwur Rana has not renewed his Pakistani documents in the last two decades. His Canadian nationality is very clear,' the Pakistan Foreign Office said in a statement. With inputs from agencies

DOWNLOAD THE APP

Get Started Now: Download the App

Ready to dive into a world of global content with local flavor? Download Daily8 app today from your preferred app store and start exploring.
app-storeplay-store