Sanjaya Baru writes: After Op Sindoor, lessons from Manmohan and Vajpayee governments on communication

Indian Express

a day ago

Several experts and analysts have commented on poor, even faulty, messaging in the conduct of Operation Sindoor — before, during and after the operation. What were the faults? Before the operation began, it was not made clear that India would only target terrorist camps across the border and the Line of Control (LoC). While this was the stated objective of the government, there was no such clarity in the media on the nature of the Indian response to the Pahalgam attack. This raised expectations within India on what the Indian Armed Forces would do and subsequently contributed to disappointment at home. Bombastic claims by senior ruling party leaders about occupying Pakistan-occupied Kashmir did not help.
Second, during the conflict, there was no communication within India and to the international community as to what was actually happening and what India's objectives were. Third, after the conflict ended, there was confusion on (a) the reasons for the ceasefire; (b) terms of the ceasefire and; (c) the nature of future red lines. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's statement that Operation Sindoor has not ended and is merely on hold has raised more questions than provide answers.
Statements made overseas by the Chief of Defence Staff and by an Indian defence attache on the political guidelines within which the armed forces operated have added to this problem of mixed messaging. All this gives the impression that the military and civil leadership are not on the same page in their messaging on Operation Sindoor. Against this background, several analysts have drawn attention to the need for better 'strategic communication'.
The funny thing is that the subject of 'strategic communication' has been discussed time and again within and outside the government and certainly within the national security establishment. Yet, it seems few lessons have been learnt from past experience. I have myself lectured on this subject, based on the experience during the Kargil War, more than once at the National Defence College. It is instructive to recall what had happened at that time.
After hostilities began in the Kargil region, an army spokesperson was providing regular briefings to the media. The Kargil War was the first conflict in South Asia during which private Indian television wished to travel to the battle zones and cover events live. They were inspired by the example set by CNN during the first Gulf War in 1990. The then convenor of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), the late K Subrahmanyam, felt that better and more professional media management was needed. It may be recalled that Subrahmanyam, the guru of strategic policy analysts, had spent the 1990s in newspaper offices, first at the Business and Political Observer and later at The Times of India, and had a good grasp of how the media thinks and acts.
At his instance, the NSAB constituted a media advisory sub-committee chaired by Subrahmanyam and including N N Vohra (a former defence secretary), J N Dixit (a former foreign secretary and later the National Security Advisor), Major General Afsar Karim and myself (I was then Editor, The Financial Express). Our first recommendation to the then National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra was that rather than an army officer, a diplomat adept at such communication should do media briefings on a daily basis. The then joint secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs in-charge of external publicity, the late Raminder Singh Jassal, was tasked to conduct the daily briefings.
Raminder was a talented and skilled diplomat, with good media handling skills and a sound understanding of India's strategic aims and objectives.
The NSAB media sub-committee would meet every day at 11 am in the room of the then-deputy NSA Satish Chandra. The minutes of our meeting would be communicated to the NSA who would then brief Jassal. The daily media briefings played an important role in shaping both domestic understanding and expectations from the conflict and global appreciation of India's strategy and tactics. Global opinion turned decisively in India's favour with the United States supporting the Indian view on Kashmir for the very first time. President Bill Clinton endorsed the idea implicit to the Simla Agreement that the LoC would be the de facto boundary between India and Pakistan.
It was on the basis of the conduct and outcome of the Kargil War that its main architect, General Pervez Musharraf, began to engage India. Regrettably, though, the Musharraf visit to India and his meeting with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee at Agra in July 2001 proved a failure and the progress expected did not materialise. It was then left to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to take the baton forward.
In September 2004, when Prime Minister Singh decided to engage President Musharraf, he was advised by most of his senior officials not to undertake such a risky exercise so early in his term in office. He not only began a conversation but invited President Musharraf to Delhi in April 2005. Once again, the national security and diplomatic establishment was concerned about the political fallout of the meeting. In Agra, the Indian media was seen as being better briefed by the Pakistan delegation than by the Indian side. It was felt Musharraf had been let off too easily with senior editors being charmed by the general.
Prime Minister Singh tasked me to develop a media strategy for the Musharraf visit. With the support of senior officials in the Prime Minister's Office, I conducted several closed-door media briefings to different groups of journalists and analysts. This helped shape expectations of the visit and the visit went off without any embarrassment for the country or the PM.
There would be other such past episodes that others involved in media management would know. There are some very competent officers in the Indian Information Service as well as in the defence establishment. If media messaging is handled professionally, the country would be better served. It is the over-the-top, highly dramatised, purely ideological and sensational reporting by several media establishments during Operation Sindoor that has damaged Indian reputation and credibility.
As many around the world have commented, pro-Modi media outfits have done more harm than good for India's image and case vis-a-vis Operation Sindoor. Responsible and professional coverage, including putting out authentic information in time would have served the national interest better. What has further weakened the Indian case is the fact that the media that did the greatest damage to the country's reputation is viewed as being pro-government. Credible strategic communication requires a credible medium.
The writer was member, National Security Advisory Board of India, 1999-2001 and media advisor to the Prime Minister of India, 2004-08