Key Differences Between Lashkar, Jaish, And Tracking Their Global Footprints
Recent intelligence inputs indicate meetings between Hamas leaders and JeM and LeT in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)
Terror groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed exploit Pakistan's territorial ambiguities but differ sharply in ideology, structure, and operational methods, an intelligence note accessed by CNN-News18 reveals.
According to top intel sources, Jaish's ideology comprises Deobandi, Islamism, and Sunnism. It is aligned with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. LeT belongs to the Salafi Ahl-e-Hadith sect, believes in global jihad, and has ties with Hamas.
Jaish is family-run as a mafia-style enterprise, with Maulana Masood Azhar and his brothers controlling the operations. Lashkar has a hierarchy, is less dependent on family, and cadres are selected on merit.
Jaish operations are mainly 'high targets" and it focuses on suicide bombings like the 2019 Pulwama attack.
Lashkar indulges in 'urban attacks" style, like Mumbai 2008 and Pahalgam 2025, where a large number of civilians were killed.
Jaish has limited global footprints in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir. Lashkar is global with the help of charity organisations like Jamaat ud Dawa and has footprints in Europe as well as West Asia.
Jaish has direct connections with Pakistan's spy agency ISI, and sometimes it can operate against the state also, like when it wanted to kill Pervez Musharraf, said sources. Lashkar is close to the Pakistan deep state.
LeT has trained operatives from al-Qaeda, like Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 World Trade Centre bomber. It has also hosted terrorists like 2001 shoe bomber Richard Reid and 2005 London subway attackers.
According to sources, Lashkar recruits from Pakistani diaspora communities in the UK, the US, and Australia. It provided safe houses for al-Qaeda operatives, including those involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
People like David Coleman Headley, involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, exemplify the group's transnational operations.
Post-US withdrawal, LeT shifted its focus to Afghanistan, targeting Indian interests and collaborating with the Taliban.
JeM fighters trained in Afghan camps during the Soviet-Afghan War and maintain alliances with the Taliban. Its cadres fought for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, sharing resources and ideological goals.
JeM receives funding from West Asian donors via charities like Al-Rehmat Trust, while its ideology matches with Deobandi networks in Saudi Arabia, said sources.
Jaish operatives have plotted attacks in Denmark and the UK, leveraging connections with British-Pakistani radicals.
Masood Azhar's early career involved coordinating with al-Qaeda in Somalia and Afghanistan.
JeM's 2001 Indian Parliament attack was jointly executed with al-Qaeda-linked militants, sources said.
Recent intelligence inputs indicate meetings between Hamas leaders and JeM and LeT in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).
Hamas's tactics in Israel have inspired Kashmir-focused attacks, said sources.
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First Published:
May 01, 2025, 19:47 IST
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