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Taliban: Russia's ‘Objective Allies' in its Fight Against the Islamic State

Taliban: Russia's ‘Objective Allies' in its Fight Against the Islamic State

The Diplomata day ago
On the sidelines of the third round of the U.N.-convened Doha Working Group (commonly known as Doha Process) meetings held in the Qatari capital on June 30 and July 1, Russia's Special Presidential Envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov said that Russia should arm the Taliban against the Islamic State. In this context, he further said that 'in this particular case, they are our objective allies, whom we must support to arm them in every sense of the word, so that they successfully suppress all these smallest hotbeds of international terrorism.' He said that Russia must support the Taliban with weapons in order to help them eliminate the terrorist threat in Afghanistan.
Emphasizing the Taliban's role against the Islamic State, he said, 'The Taliban is fighting the Islamic State uncompromisingly and harshly.' Kabulov's remarks demonstrate the shift in Russia's policy toward the Taliban.
This policy shift was further affirmed on July 3 when Russia became the first country to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan.
Moscow has accepted the credentials of a new ambassador of Afghanistan as part of a strategic shift in its Taliban policy to build friendly relations with Afghanistan's Taliban regime, which has been the de facto ruler of the country since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in August 2021. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement that 'We believe that the act of official recognition of the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will give impetus to the development of productive bilateral cooperation between our countries in various fields.'
Such a bold move from Moscow has not come suddenly. Over the past few months, Russia has been gradually moving toward this end. In December 2024, Russia adopted a law to establish the possibility of delisting any organization from the list of terrorist organizations. In March, Russia's Prosecutor General submitted a petition to the Supreme Court to remove the Taliban from the terrorist designated list. That request was approved in mid-April.
Russia's paradigm shift toward the Taliban must be seen from the security perspective, mainly vis-à-vis the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) — an affiliate of the Islamic State, which is active in South and Central Asia, primarily in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and to a certain extent in Pakistan.
In March 2024, the Crocus City Hall music venue near Moscow was attacked by four armed terrorists, resulting in over 150 fatalities and more than 100 injuries. The incident marked the deadliest terrorist attack in Russia in the past two decades. Russian President Vladimir Putin called it 'a barbaric terrorist act.' While the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack, ISKP proclaimed it also without directly claiming responsibility. ISKP is widely believed to have orchestrated the attack, allegedly carried out by citizens of Tajikistan.
Russia is a significant target for the Islamic State, and its affiliates, for several reasons, primarily due to the group's deep animosity toward the country. Many Islamic State jihadists harbor resentment against Russia for its involvement in the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent decade-long occupation. Additionally, Russia's two wars in Chechnya, which occurred in 1994 and 2000, plausibly further fueled anger among jihadists of the Islamic State.
Currently, the heightened hostility toward Moscow is likely a result of Russia's active role against the Islamic State in support of the Syrian regime. With the assistance of Russian airpower, the Assad regime was able to recapture the city of Palmyra in 2017, which had been seized by Islamic State forces. Furthermore, Russia has been actively supporting groups in the Sahel to combat terrorist organizations, including Islamic State affiliates in the region.
Despite these efforts to mitigate the threat posed by the Islamic State, Russia has not been able to eliminate the danger. Just days before the Crocus City Hall incident, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) stated that it had killed Islamic State militants who were allegedly planning a terrorist attack on a synagogue in Moscow. However, the FSB failed to identify or forestall the Crocus City Hall attack, despite warnings from the United States.
There is substantial evidence indicating that ISKP was responsible for the attack. The group maintains an active presence in Afghanistan, and since the Taliban's takeover of Kabul four years ago, its operations have significantly increased. Due to a lack of international cooperation in combating this terrorist organization, the responsibility for fighting ISKP has largely fallen on the Taliban, which views the group as a direct threat to its regime. ISKP has directed much of its hostility toward the Taliban, in turn, prompting the latter to adopt a forceful strategy against it. The Taliban has reportedly succeeded in infiltrating ISKP by targeting its operatives within the country. However, despite these efforts, the Taliban has been unable to prevent the group from attacking other countries, primarily due to its limited counterterrorism capabilities and the various political and economic crises facing Afghanistan since the regime's takeover. Therefore, Russia's support for the Taliban in their fight against ISKP could enhance their capabilities in combating the group.
The growing engagement between the Taliban and Russia can be viewed as a practical partnership. Russia seeks allies to aid in its fight against the Islamic State, with Putin labeling the Taliban as 'allies in the fight against terrorism' in July 2024. On the other hand, the Taliban requires support to sustain their regime in Afghanistan while combating their most significant internal threat, ISKP. In addition to collaborating against a common enemy, Russia's recognition of the Taliban government, which could plausibly lead to other countries following suit, serves as a significant diplomatic boost for the regime. Russia was once an adversary of the Taliban, backing the Northern Alliance, which opposed the Taliban from 1996 to 2001.
However, the Taliban are notorious for not acting against terrorist groups using Afghan soil to attack other countries. Nonetheless, the threat posed by ISKP to their regime provides the Taliban with a compelling reason to combat this particular terrorist group. Russian support could enhance the Taliban's counterterrorism capabilities. It remains to be seen how and when Russia will begin providing support, including weapons, to the Taliban in their fight against the Islamic State, particularly its affiliate, ISKP.
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The ongoing switch from Cyrillic to a Latin-based alphabet in Kazakhstan has been widely presented as a step toward modernization and global integration by Kazakh officials. However, in Russian media, the reform quickly became associated with shifting power, regional realignment, and the enduring legacies of the former Soviet empire. In Kazakhstan, the first discussions about switching the Kazakh language to the Latin script took place in the 1990s. In 2012, then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev resurrected the idea of script reform in his 'Kazakhstan-2050' strategy. In 2017, Nazarbayev signed an official decree to adopt the Latin alphabet by the end of 2025. The official reasoning for Latinization includes strengthening national identity by getting rid of the externally imposed Cyrillic alphabet, streamlining access to global technologies and markets, and restoring the linguistic features of the Kazakh language. 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In this selection, only Russia Today is state-owned; however, all of the referenced media are either state-aligned or exhibit some Kremlin influence in their publishing policies. Although script-related terms such as 'language' and 'alphabet' dominate the word lists of the reviewed media, the existing discourse is broader and includes narratives about identity and geopolitics. References to Russia, Türkiye, and Eurasia suggest that Latinization is frequently framed as a geopolitical act, signaling that Kazakhstan is in the process of choosing between Moscow and a Turkic-Western orientation. Discursive Strategies Most noticeable are conspiratorial and nationalist tropes in the coverage. Aligning with the Kremlin's worldview, outlets frame Latinization as a foreign project aimed at undermining Kazakhstan's unity and its education system. For instance, Regnum reported in 2021 that foreign NGOs and Western 'fifth columns' were plotting to weaken Kazakhstan and warned that the country's education system will be made 'defenceless against the influence of foreign NGOs.' Here, authors invoked a popular conspiracist theme in order to present a mere technical alphabet change as an alien imposition created by external powers. The reviewed piece published by Regnum is titled 'Where Soros Goes, Trouble Follows,' echoing the notorious anti-Semitic conspiracy narratives associated with George Soros. Such narratives place Latinization well outside of ordinary policy discussions but within a concealed project to drive Kazakhstan away from Russia. Furthermore, such emotional article titles contribute to the tabloidization of the topic. Alongside conspiratorial framing, colonial nostalgia is evident. Such a discursive strategy is used to establish Cyrillic and the Russian language as a civilizational legacy. The Russian language and Cyrillic are presented as means which brought 'new knowledge' to Kazakhstan's people. A 2019 Regnum article stated that 'the Russian language was and is spoken by those who brought to these lands new knowledge that made Kazakhstan what we see today.' This narrative not only diminishes the role and achievements of the people of Kazakhstan, but also introduces an 'us vs. them' dichotomy to contrast the Soviet-era modernization ostensibly made possible thanks to Russian and Cyrillic with the allegedly misguided choice to switch to Latin. In a now-deleted Regnum article, Kazakhs were referred to as 'the people of the East,' suggesting a patronizing attitude toward them, who are seen as 'lamenting in their kitchens and yurts,' as stated in another article. This colonial discourse stresses the idea that Cyrillic and Russian are the reasons for Kazakhstan's development, and also signals that the country owes its achievements to the Soviet Union. Other related discursive patterns are ironical in framing and engaging in presupposition. Often, Russian commentators employ a mocking tone when referring to the script reform. Irony and sarcasm are used to present advocates of Latin, evidenced by such titles as 'The Kazakh pyramid of Cheops' and 'Nazarbayev has embarrassed everyone,' while pro-Russian views are framed as self-evident truths. Referring to Nazarbayev as the main supporter of Latinization, one author noted in a 2017 article about the then-Kazakh president's old age and said it is highly doubtful 'if the president lives [until Latiniziation is finalized] despite the achievements of modern gerontology and elite medicine.' Such claims associate the script reform with the will of an individual (Nazarbayev in this case) and create a perception that the Kazakh state would not be able to carry on the reform should the leader change. In a matter-of-fact tone, authors also stressed the message that education in the Russian language is of a higher quality: 'the higher quality of education in Russian is due to objective factors.' Thus, Russian media reinforce the notion that Russian education and language mean better opportunities, and by mocking the supporters of Latinization, it creates a narrative that the script reform is doomed or absurd. Unlike Regnum, which is often openly nationalistic and actively discredits Latinization, such outlets as or use a subtler approach, although with an evident bias. In a 2017 feature, noted that the script reform had been interpreted in many ways: as a breakaway from Russia's cultural sphere, a civilizational choice, or a simple desire for change. At the same time, the sarcastic tone of phrases like 'Play with Fonts' in the article is intended to delegitimize Latinization and create the notion of doubt among the audience. published an overview of Latinization in October 2019. There, the authors compared how Latinization was managed under Nazarbayev and his successor, Tokayev. It was underlined that, unlike his predecessor, Tokayev had not been actively advocating for Latinization but had decided to task specialized bodies to properly plan the transition. The report covered existing challenges associated with the reform, such as public criticism and difficulties in developing an optimal version of the alphabet, and framed Latinization as a bureaucratic challenge. Still, critical undertones are present. Thus, an expert quoted in the text questioned how Latin is supposed to play a civilizational role: 'Japan came close enough to Western civilization using hieroglyphics.' The state-run Russia Today (RT) in 2017 presented a diverse collection of viewpoints concerning Latinization to forecast what political, historical, and social implications the reform could have. Quoting official Kazakh discourse, the article mentioned that Latinization is a necessary step for modernization and the unification of all Kazakhs, including those living abroad. At the same time, it included critical points questioning the economic and cultural rationale behind the reform and doubting the streamlined integration with the Western and Turkic worlds. Transition to Latin is framed as a complex and potentially divisive policy, one which might create generational and cultural ruptures in Kazakh society. Regardless of reassurances from the Kazakh officials, RT expresses the concern that the reform can potentially limit the older generation's access to cultural heritage and raise questions about inclusivity and long-term consequences. More Than Just the Script As it became evident from the analysis, Russian media tends to frame Latinization in terms of regional realignment and loyalties rather than as a linguistic issue. The discourse is more about preserving existing cultural and political boundaries in which Kazakh-Russian relations function. In this context, Latinization becomes an alien imposition and a threat to Cyrillic and its role as a civilizational bridge to Russia and the Russian language. In the end, such discourse can signal Russia's concerns about its influence in Central Asia. Frequent references to Türkiye, China, and the West reinforce the narrative highlighting the geopolitical dimension of Latinization. In this politicized context, it is not a surprise that Russian authorities officially emphasize their intention to ensure Russian minorities' rights 'regardless of where they are located.' This vigilant oversight over Kazakhstan's policy changes is then reflected in the Russian media, in reports which serve as warnings that abandoning Cyrillic could lead to the marginalization of Russia's largest diaspora in Central Asia. What might potentially influence Russian rhetoric on the matter is the increased decolonization discourses in Kazakhstan, which have been reinforced after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Conclusions The battle over Kazakhstan's alphabet reform is much more than a linguistic issue. It is a negotiation process aimed at defining who decides the Kazakh nation's future, writes its history into the language, and how the legacies of the former Soviet empire are presently reproduced. The Russian media echoes the Kremlin's position and frames Latinization not only as a local issue, a matter of Kazakhstan's internal business, but as a sign of shifting power in Central Asia. Media narratives illustrate that language policy discussions have become proxy battlegrounds in the post-Soviet space. While Kazakhstan continues its cautious approach to script reform, Russian media's discursive strategies are a crucial factor that influences regional perceptions. Since Latinization is still ongoing and the Kazakh elite seems determined to carry it out further, Russian media will continue covering it. What is important to remember is that Moscow's view of the script reform in Kazakhstan is as much about Russia's own self-perception as about the Kazakh alphabet. Note: This feature is based on the author's ongoing research of Kazakhstan's script reform. All data and analysis are from the author's original corpus and critical discourse analysis. Quotes are translated from Russian to English.

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