Trans-Afghan peace train pact puts trade over turmoil
This agreement marks a significant milestone in efforts to strengthen regional connectivity and economic integration by linking Central Asia with South Asia through a strategic rail corridor.
The planned route will pass through Termez in Uzbekistan, Mazar-i-Sharif and Logar in Afghanistan and enter Pakistan via the Khyber Pass, ultimately connecting to Pakistani seaports.
All three countries reaffirmed their commitment to peaceful cooperation, enhanced trade and shared regional prosperity. The railway is envisioned to facilitate both passenger and freight services while supporting bilateral, regional and transit trade.
The Trans-Afghan Railway, initially proposed in 2018, is projected to span over 700 kilometers across Afghanistan and drastically reduce transport time from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea from several weeks to just a few days.
Upon successful completion, the railway is expected to carry up to 20 million tons of cargo annually, establishing a vital trade corridor between Central Asia and seaports. This would significantly lower shipping costs, enhance trade efficiency and provide Afghanistan with much-needed transit revenue.
The project has drawn interest from international stakeholders, including Russia, Iran and financial institutions, though political instability and funding gaps, especially within Afghanistan have posed challenges.
Nonetheless, the recent trilateral agreement signals renewed momentum and a strong political will to move the project forward. Afghan officials have welcomed the development as a critical step toward regional economic integration, emphasizing that improved infrastructure could contribute to long-term stability and development in Afghanistan.
UAP Trans-Afghan Railway project holds profound strategic significance for all of Eurasia, promising to transform the region into a hub of trade, connectivity and cooperation. By linking Central Asia to Pakistan's southern ports, the corridor will not only facilitate access to global markets but also play a pivotal role in Afghanistan's economic recovery and integration.
The trilateral collaboration between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan signals a shared vision for regional prosperity, where economic interdependence can help ease political tensions, foster trust and promote long-term stability.
As the railway progresses, it is expected to generate thousands of jobs, spur infrastructure development and stimulate key sectors such as agriculture, textiles, construction and logistics.
Uzbekistan's commitment to expanding trade ties and enhancing the role of the Termez International Trade Center further underscores the project's potential to become a cornerstone of regional growth and peacebuilding.
As part of the next phase of the UAP Railway Project, the three partner nations have agreed to establish a Tripartite Coordination Committee to oversee technical studies, finalize financing models, and manage the overall implementation of the US$4.8 billion project, targeted for completion by 2027.
More than just a physical infrastructure initiative, the railway is envisioned as a 'bridge of trust,' reshaping trade routes, unlocking the region's vast economic potential, and fostering political goodwill.
Afghan Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi hailed the agreement as a 'significant milestone' in regional diplomacy, highlighting the deepening cooperation that also led to the recent restoration of full ambassadorial-level ties between Kabul and Islamabad.
Although not formally part of the agreement, China has quietly supported the initiative, viewing it as a complementary extension of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its involvement underscores both Beijing's commitment to regional connectivity and the diminishing role of India in post-2021 Afghanistan.
The UAP Railway aligns closely with Pakistan's strategic objective of transforming itself into a vital trade and transit hub connecting Central Asia, China and the Middle East.
With growing cooperation with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, Pakistan is creating new geopolitical space to rebalance its regional posture. This shift enables Islamabad to focus its geopolitical bandwidth more effectively on pressing challenges along its eastern front, particularly its complex relationship with India.
The strengthening of western ties through economic corridors not only boosts Pakistan's regional standing but also contributes to long-term stability by integrating fractured economies, reducing mutual mistrust, and promoting shared prosperity across the broader Eurasian region.
Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, during his second visit to Kabul in three months, also held high-level talks with Afghanistan's acting leadership, including Prime Minister Mullah Hassan Akhund, Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani.
The meetings underscored the growing momentum in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, with both sides reaffirming their shared commitment to peace, trade, and regional connectivity. Emphasis was given to sustained cooperation to unlock economic opportunities and ensure long-term prosperity across the region.
In his discussions with the Afghan leadership, Dar emphasized the importance of addressing key issues, including security, border management, and transit cooperation, stressing that resolving these matters was vital for realizing the full potential of regional integration.
The reaffirmation of earlier commitments, including those made in April 2025, reflected a mutual desire to maintain high-level engagement and strengthen bilateral ties in pursuit of common goals.
In a nutshell, the UAP Railway Project represents more than just a transport initiative; it is a blueprint for regional transformation through economic integration, strategic cooperation, and mutual trust.
While the recent thaw in Pakistani-Taliban relations has provided fresh momentum to expedite progress on the railway, the fragile nature of this détente amid ongoing cross-border militant activity remains a key challenge.
Nevertheless, if the current truce between Islamabad and Kabul holds, it could mark a turning point, bringing the three nations significantly closer to realizing a project that promises to reshape trade routes, stimulate economic growth and solidify their roles as vital transit hubs.
By investing in connectivity and sustaining political engagement, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan are laying the groundwork for a more stable, prosperous and interconnected Eurasian region where infrastructure serves not only economic goals but also peacebuilding and regional trust.
Saima Afzal is an independent and freelance researcher specializing in South Asian security, the Middle East, Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific. Her work focuses on geopolitical developments, strategic affairs and regional conflict dynamics.
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