Pakistan used Turkish drones, with civil airliner as shield. India then hit its radar station
The drone intrusion was described by the government Friday as an action to gauge Indian air defence systems and gather intelligence.
New Delhi: Pakistan used 300-400 Turkish drones to infiltrate Indian air space at 36 locations along the length and breadth of the western borders, and used a civil airliner as a shield to prevent a quick hit back Thursday evening, the Indian government has said.
'The Indian armed forces shot down many of these drones, using kinetic and non-kinetic means. The possible purpose of such large-scale aerial intrusions was to test air defence systems and collect intelligence.'
Colonel Qureshi added, 'Forensic investigation of the wreckage of the drones is being done. Initial reports suggest that they are Turkish Asisguard Songar drones.'
Wing Commander Singh announced that late Thursday night, an armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicle of Pakistan attempted to target the Bathinda military station, which was detected and neutralized.
'In response to the Pakistani attack, armed drones were launched at four air defence sites in Pakistan. One of the drones was able to destroy an AD (air defence) radar. Pakistan also carried out artillery shelling across the Line of Control using heavy-calibre artillery guns and armed drones… which resulted in some losses and injuries to Indian army personnel. The Pakistan army also suffered major losses in Indian retaliatory fire,' she said.
(Edited by Mannat Chugh)
Also Read: Sirens, shelling & a morning of eerie silence: My longest night in Poonch in wake of Op Sindoor
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