Climate Finance Needs a Conductor
institutions, faced with mounting pressure to prove their efficiency and cost-effectiveness, are reassessing their operations.
But today's climate-finance challenges demand more than introspection; they call for structural change, decisive action, and – above all – coordinated leadership.
Climate finance is currently delivered through a broad array of institutions: multilateral bodies like the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the newly established Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD); multilateral development banks (MDBs); and an ever-expanding network of philanthropic, national, and regional initiatives. Each was created to fill a perceived functional or political gap. Collectively, however, they form a sprawling and often unwieldy arrangement.Institutional sprawl creates two major challenges.
First, it fosters unhealthy competition. Many of these institutions draw on the same pool of donors, serve similar recipient countries, and have overlapping mandates. The result is a bureaucratic maze and high transaction costs, with recipient countries often spending more time navigating the system than accessing its benefits. As a 2024 report by the G20's climate-finance working group warned, fragmented and inefficient access mechanisms are among the most significant obstacles to effective climate action.
Second, and paradoxically, this competition also leads to inertia, because institutions, protective of their respective niches, become increasingly reluctant to depart from established practices. While differences in size and financial terms should enable climate funds and MDBs to serve distinct, complementary roles, in practice their policies and portfolios often converge. The FRLD is a striking example. When the need for a dedicated mechanism to address loss and damage became urgent, no existing institution was equipped – or willing – to take the lead, so a new entity had to be established.But competition for resources and inertia regarding evolving challenges are only part of the issue.
The deeper challenge lies in fragmented governance. Despite repeated calls to improve coordination, meaningful alignment remains elusive, largely because climate-finance institutions operate under fundamentally different governance structures. The GCF, GEF, FRLD, Adaptation Fund, and Climate Investment Funds all report to separate governing bodies, each with its own mandate and varying degrees of alignment with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). MDBs answer to their shareholders, while bilateral and philanthropic organisations are driven by domestic or private agendas.
As a result, no single body is capable of overseeing or steering the entire system.Fragmentation doesn't just hinder strategic planning; it also distorts access. Each institution has its own rules, timelines, and application requirements, creating a patchwork of uncoordinated and inconsistent processes. Recipient countries must navigate multiple systems, often with limited institutional capacity, making access to climate finance burdensome and uneven.
A recent synthesis report report by the GCF's Independent Evaluation Unit underscores the need for structural reform, finding that climate finance tends to flow to countries that already have access to traditional development financing. While this may seem intuitive, it is also deeply troubling. The implication is that countries with greater institutional capacity and experience with complex funding mechanisms are better positioned to secure climate finance, leaving the world's most vulnerable regions systematically underserved.If there is a broad consensus that access should be faster and simpler, why does it remain so difficult to achieve? The answer is that facilitating climate finance is not just a technical challenge.
As the GCF synthesis report notes, real progress requires more than procedural tweaks. It calls for governance structures tailored to the specific needs of fragile and capacity- constrained countries, sustained investment in institutional capacity, and an equitable distribution model.In addition to creating inefficiencies, fragmented governance deepens inequality. Without sufficient specialisation, a willingness to break with the status quo, and a dose of institutional innovation, climate finance will continue to flow to countries with stronger institutions and fuller project pipelines.
What climate finance urgently needs is a coordinating mechanism, coalition, or platform with the authority to review the current architecture and guide institutions toward more specialised, complementary roles – much like a conductor bringing harmony to an otherwise disorganised orchestra. And this is the fundamental challenge: the absence of a decision-making platform tasked with steering the evolution of climate finance architecture.
While the G20 has made climate finance a top priority and addressed several issues related to the broader financial architecture, its limited membership means it lacks universal representation. The UNFCCC can direct funds within its own financing mechanism, but it is slow-moving and lacks the mandate to regulate MDBs and other actors. Similarly, the UN Environment Assembly may not have the necessary speed, scope, or reach to lead this effort effectively.
The upcoming Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) is a rare opportunity to address the institutional sprawl that impedes effective climate action. As a UN initiative, it offers both legitimacy and universal participation. While not a climate summit, it is one of the few platforms where climate finance intersects with broader questions of development, debt, and institutional reform.
The FfD4 draft outcome document rightly urges international policymakers to prevent the further proliferation of climate funds, calling for greater integration among existing mechanisms. But it may need to go further by offering clear guidance on how the various components of climate finance can work together more effectively. Even if FfD4 does not resolve these questions, it could still play a pivotal role in identifying the coordinating force needed to ensure the coherence of climate finance.

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The Wire
a day ago
- The Wire
Climate Finance Needs a Conductor
As the multilateral order comes under growing strain, several trends are becoming increasingly clear. International development assistance and climate finance appear to have peaked, even as global needs continue to evolve. At the same time, international institutions, faced with mounting pressure to prove their efficiency and cost-effectiveness, are reassessing their operations. But today's climate-finance challenges demand more than introspection; they call for structural change, decisive action, and – above all – coordinated leadership. Climate finance is currently delivered through a broad array of institutions: multilateral bodies like the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the newly established Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD); multilateral development banks (MDBs); and an ever-expanding network of philanthropic, national, and regional initiatives. Each was created to fill a perceived functional or political gap. Collectively, however, they form a sprawling and often unwieldy sprawl creates two major challenges. First, it fosters unhealthy competition. Many of these institutions draw on the same pool of donors, serve similar recipient countries, and have overlapping mandates. The result is a bureaucratic maze and high transaction costs, with recipient countries often spending more time navigating the system than accessing its benefits. As a 2024 report by the G20's climate-finance working group warned, fragmented and inefficient access mechanisms are among the most significant obstacles to effective climate action. Second, and paradoxically, this competition also leads to inertia, because institutions, protective of their respective niches, become increasingly reluctant to depart from established practices. While differences in size and financial terms should enable climate funds and MDBs to serve distinct, complementary roles, in practice their policies and portfolios often converge. The FRLD is a striking example. When the need for a dedicated mechanism to address loss and damage became urgent, no existing institution was equipped – or willing – to take the lead, so a new entity had to be competition for resources and inertia regarding evolving challenges are only part of the issue. The deeper challenge lies in fragmented governance. Despite repeated calls to improve coordination, meaningful alignment remains elusive, largely because climate-finance institutions operate under fundamentally different governance structures. The GCF, GEF, FRLD, Adaptation Fund, and Climate Investment Funds all report to separate governing bodies, each with its own mandate and varying degrees of alignment with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). MDBs answer to their shareholders, while bilateral and philanthropic organisations are driven by domestic or private agendas. As a result, no single body is capable of overseeing or steering the entire doesn't just hinder strategic planning; it also distorts access. Each institution has its own rules, timelines, and application requirements, creating a patchwork of uncoordinated and inconsistent processes. Recipient countries must navigate multiple systems, often with limited institutional capacity, making access to climate finance burdensome and uneven. A recent synthesis report report by the GCF's Independent Evaluation Unit underscores the need for structural reform, finding that climate finance tends to flow to countries that already have access to traditional development financing. While this may seem intuitive, it is also deeply troubling. The implication is that countries with greater institutional capacity and experience with complex funding mechanisms are better positioned to secure climate finance, leaving the world's most vulnerable regions systematically there is a broad consensus that access should be faster and simpler, why does it remain so difficult to achieve? The answer is that facilitating climate finance is not just a technical challenge. As the GCF synthesis report notes, real progress requires more than procedural tweaks. It calls for governance structures tailored to the specific needs of fragile and capacity- constrained countries, sustained investment in institutional capacity, and an equitable distribution addition to creating inefficiencies, fragmented governance deepens inequality. Without sufficient specialisation, a willingness to break with the status quo, and a dose of institutional innovation, climate finance will continue to flow to countries with stronger institutions and fuller project pipelines. What climate finance urgently needs is a coordinating mechanism, coalition, or platform with the authority to review the current architecture and guide institutions toward more specialised, complementary roles – much like a conductor bringing harmony to an otherwise disorganised orchestra. And this is the fundamental challenge: the absence of a decision-making platform tasked with steering the evolution of climate finance architecture. While the G20 has made climate finance a top priority and addressed several issues related to the broader financial architecture, its limited membership means it lacks universal representation. The UNFCCC can direct funds within its own financing mechanism, but it is slow-moving and lacks the mandate to regulate MDBs and other actors. Similarly, the UN Environment Assembly may not have the necessary speed, scope, or reach to lead this effort effectively. The upcoming Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) is a rare opportunity to address the institutional sprawl that impedes effective climate action. As a UN initiative, it offers both legitimacy and universal participation. While not a climate summit, it is one of the few platforms where climate finance intersects with broader questions of development, debt, and institutional reform. The FfD4 draft outcome document rightly urges international policymakers to prevent the further proliferation of climate funds, calling for greater integration among existing mechanisms. But it may need to go further by offering clear guidance on how the various components of climate finance can work together more effectively. Even if FfD4 does not resolve these questions, it could still play a pivotal role in identifying the coordinating force needed to ensure the coherence of climate finance.


Mint
2 days ago
- Mint
Pralhad Joshi: The International Solar Alliance has shone a path to clean energy
In April, India reached 224 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy capacity, with 108GW representing solar exclusively. Of this solar capacity, 105GW was added in the last decade. It accounts for a third of total additions in the Global South. This rise can be attributed to the fact that India, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has a clear policy and regulatory framework for private sector-led investments in solar energy. India's efforts to make solar energy accessible and desirable have been decisive. The Solar Energy Corporation of India instilled confidence in the private sector by ensuring transparent solar bidding and timely disbursement of subsidies. Also Read: Trump's solar panel tariffs deal climate action a severe blow Due to growing demand, technological advancement and the implementation of auction as well as reverse auction mechanisms, solar energy tariffs have fallen 69% between 2014 and 2024, with the lowest bid price reaching ₹2.00 per kilowatt hour. While solar installations have grown, local manufacturing has also been promoted. India's module-making capacity has reached 80GW and cell manufacturing capacity 25GW. With rapid growth in renewables, India has an opportunity to steer a solar energy revolution in the Global South and lead by example. In 2024, India hosted the Voice of Global South Summit in which 123 countries participated. These countries are at various stages of market maturity and stand to benefit by embracing India's experience. India has always spoken for developing nations, like in the G20, where India ensured the membership of the African Union. This proactive stance on the global stage is guided by the virtues of collaboration and cooperation enshrined in the 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' (One World, One Earth, One Family) motto that we follow. The International Solar Alliance (ISA) launched by India under Prime Minister Modi and France at CoP-21 in Paris has consistently advocated solar-led energy transitions. 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The ISA is operationalizing a catalytic finance mechanism: the Global Solar Facility, beginning with the Africa Solar Facility, a $200 million fund that is expected to leverage more than 20 times that financing through a mix of risk mitigation and blended finance instruments. The aim is to create a platform through a leading Africa-based fund manager selected competitively to offer de-risking instruments. For instance, in Nigeria, the ISA's proposed support of junior equity will assist the Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority and Africa 50 in providing funds to electrify more than 10 million Nigerian homes. The second pillar focuses on capacity building through the Solar Technology Application Resource-Centre (STAR-C), the ISA's network of national centres of excellence operational in 10 countries and expanding to 16 by the end of 2025. With support from partners such as France, Denmark and the EU, this initiative is expanding to a Global Capability Centre, which will integrate India's digital expertise to help partner countries leapfrog ahead in digital technology. The SolarX Startup Challenge, already supporting 50 early-stage companies across Africa, India and the Asia-Pacific, is hosting its third edition in the Latin America and Caribbean region. The ISA is also working on a digital platform to democratize technical solar knowledge across the globe. The third pillar strengthens regional and country-level engagement through tailored interventions in various countries. The ISA is anchoring its work in large-scale regional platforms such as the proposed Small Island Developing States Platform, which will aggregate demand data to enable solar deployment. One Sun One World One Grid, another key platform, prioritizes regional integration across continents to optimize the need for energy storage in countries. At the country level, the ISA will work with governments to implement comprehensive solar strategies and support key projects. This approach is backed by the newly- established Multi-Donor Trust Fund. The fourth pillar focuses on technology policy and roadmaps, helping countries adopt emerging solar technologies best suited to their energy transition needs, with guidance offered on technology prioritization, national implementation plans and policy frameworks. The Alliance is also deepening its work on supply-chain assessments, new technologies like green hydrogen, circularity and environmental sustainability by developing roadmaps for solar photovoltaics and battery waste management. Also Read: Sumant Sinha: Nuclear energy is a crucial piece in the puzzle of climate action These pillars reflect a focused, integrated and future-facing ISA, while aligning more closely with the evolving needs of its member countries. India's solar revolution provides a model for nations across the Global South, demonstrating that a clean energy future is achievable with political will, aspiration, legislation and collaboration. However, cooperation—particularly between developed and developing countries—will be essential for progress. The ISA is uniquely positioned to speed up this change because of the trust placed in it by its members and signatories, upon whom it looks as equal partners—and as co-architects of a just and sustainable clean- energy world order. The author is president of the ISA Assembly and the Union minister of new and renewable energy.


Indian Express
24-06-2025
- Indian Express
Climate finance: India takes lead in cornering developed nations
In a small but important victory in climate negotiations, developing countries led by India have managed to force a reopening of discussions on the obligations of developed nations to 'provide' finance, and not just make efforts towards 'mobilising' financial resources, for climate action. The issue of climate finance was sought to be settled last year at the COP29 meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan, where developed nations had agreed to mobilise a sum of at least USD 300 billion per year from 2035. The figure is three times the amount that developed countries are currently obligated to raise, but well short of the USD 1.3 trillion a year that is the assessed minimum requirement of the developing countries. At the ongoing annual climate talks in Bonn, Germany, a formal 'consultation' was held on the issue Monday after developing countries made a united pushback, seeking inclusion of a dedicated agenda item to discuss the obligation of the developed countries under the 2015 Paris Agreement to provide financial resources to the developing countries. The Paris Agreement obligates the developed nations to both 'provide' finance (Article 9.1) as well as 'take the lead in mobilising climate finance' (Article 9.3). The two are related but independent obligations. One does not replace, or take precedence over, the other. The promise to mobilise USD 300 billion a year from 2035 sidesteps the obligation under Article 9.1. The developing countries had been extremely dissatisfied with last year's outcome in Baku, with India calling the USD 300 billion amount 'abysmally poor'. Later, India had also said that it would be forced to temper the ambition of its future climate action if adequate amounts of climate finance was not provided for. In the run-up to the Bonn climate talks, which began last week, India enlisted the support of other developing countries in demanding that a separate agenda item be opened to discuss the implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. The demand has been met with strong opposition from the developed nations who argued that the matter was already being addressed through various existing strands of negotiations on climate finance which made a new and standalone agenda item unnecessary. The issue shut down the talks for two days last week. Held as a compromise, the formal 'consultation' on Monday saw country after developing country highlighting the failure of the developed nations to deliver on their finance commitments. Expressing deep concern at the lack of adequate financial resources being made available, India said the inability of the developed nations to fulfil their obligations was resulting in an erosion of trust. It said Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement was not just a moral imperative, but a legal obligation and a commitment flowing directly from Article 4.3 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 1992 framework convention, the overarching international agreement that sets down the broad principles for global fight against climate change, makes it mandatory for the developed countries, in Article 4.3, to 'provide new and additional financial resources' to meet the 'agreed full costs' incurred by developing countries in taking climate action. The formal consultation will result in a 'report' that would be placed before a similar meeting during the COP30 climate conference that is scheduled to be held in Belem, Brazil towards the end of the year. The developing countries are hoping that at Belem they would manage to force the creation of a separate workstream to discuss the implementation of Article 9.1. While that may be some distance away, the developing countries can have the satisfaction of bringing climate finance back under the spotlight, and forcing a discussion that developed nations are generally averse to get into.