Amelia Earhart statue vanishes from Newfoundland park, leaving town and mayor shocked
ST. JOHN'S – A Newfoundland mayor says his community is shocked and devastated after a life-size statue of pioneering American aviator Amelia Earhart disappeared from a municipal park overnight.
Don Coombs, mayor of Harbour Grace, N.L., says he got a call early this morning saying the cherished bronze statue commemorating Earhart's successful 1932 transatlantic flight was gone.
Though he hasn't seen it yet himself, he says his staff saw surveillance video indicating two people were dropped off in the park just after midnight and were picked up nearly three hours later in a red SUV.
Coombs says Earhart fans and flight enthusiasts from across the globe have been calling him to express their concern and condolences.
Earhart took off from Harbour Grace on May 20, 1932, and landed about 15 hours later in Northern Ireland, becoming the first woman to fly alone across the Atlantic Ocean.
During Elections
Get campaign news, insight, analysis and commentary delivered to your inbox during Canada's 2025 election.
The aviator vanished over the Pacific Ocean nearly five years later during an attempt to become the first female pilot to circumnavigate the globe.
This report by The Canadian Press was first published April 24, 2025.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Japan Forward
2 days ago
- Japan Forward
The Grim Lessons of Guadalcanal: Why Japan Lost Its First Major Battle
このページを 日本語 で読む In 1942, a battle took place between Japanese and American forces on Guadalcanal Island — known in Japan as "Gato"— in the Solomon Islands. It marked the first major retreat by Japan during the Greater East Asian War. Widely seen as a turning point in the conflict, the campaign resulted in over 20,000 Japanese deaths. Roughly 70% of these were caused by starvation and disease following the collapse of supply lines. The island earned the grim nickname "Starvation Island." Japan's loss of sea and air superiority played a critical role in the battle. But the decisive factor in its defeat was the lack of coordination between the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. Both operated under separate commands and often pursued conflicting strategies. Guadalcanal sits along a vital strategic line linking the United States and Australia. Roughly 1,000 kilometers from both Japan's logistics hub in Rabaul and the US base on Espiritu Santo, the island was of critical importance to both sides in the Pacific theater. In July 1942, the Imperial Japanese Navy began constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal. Their aim was to disrupt US-Australia coordination and establish a forward operating base. But on August 7, over 10,000 US Marines landed and seized the airfield. In response, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered a joint counteroffensive by the Army (General Staff Office) and Navy (Naval General Staff). Although the two services agreed to cooperate, they maintained separate chains of command, an arrangement that would prove costly. At the outset, the Imperial General Headquarters severely underestimated the strength of American forces. It dispatched the lightly equipped Ichiki Detachment, just 900 Army troops. Overwhelming US firepower decimated the unit upon arrival. Subsequent reinforcements, including the Kawaguchi Detachment, the 2nd Division, and the 38th Division, were likewise repelled in succession. A key factor behind these repeated failures was the collapse of Japan's supply lines. US forces systematically sank transport ships departing from Rabaul, leaving Japanese troops on Guadalcanal without adequate weapons, food, or medical supplies. "Japan failed to coordinate strategy between the Army and Navy," says Lieutenant Colonel Tatsushi Saito (60) of the National Institute for Defense Studies. "As a result, it couldn't concentrate its combat power," he adds, highlighting the deep communication breakdown between the two services. Lieutenant Colonel Tatsushi Saito of the National Institute for Defense Studies The Army believed that "securing logistics and transporting supplies to the units was a prerequisite for capturing the airfield." Meanwhile, the Navy insisted that "capturing the airfield must come first in order to enable transportation." Within the Combined Fleet, some even argued that attacking the main US fleet was the true priority, and that escorting transport ships fell outside the Navy's proper role. The Guadalcanal campaign proceeded without ever reconciling these conflicting views. It was an internal contradiction that would prove disastrous. By contrast, the US military carried out a fully integrated joint operation in the South Pacific. In addition to leading the campaign, the Navy exercised command over both Marine and Army units. American forces initially faced severe supply shortages, at one point even considering abandoning the island. However, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Supreme Commander in the Pacific, replaced the pessimistic theater commander with Vice Admiral William Halsey. Under Halsey's leadership, the US Navy launched aggressive operations and, aided by superior codebreaking and radar technology, secured control of both the seas and skies. "Setting clear objectives and concentrating forces is a basic tenet of military strategy," notes Saito. The Battle of Guadalcanal exposed critical flaws in Japan's organizational command and inter-service coordination. More than 80 years later, amid rising concerns over a potential Taiwan contingency, reports are that China is closely studying these very lessons. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill made clear during the 1944 Normandy landings that the Navy's mission was to ensure the Army could safely cross the straits. It was also directed to support their landing by all available means and guarantee the timely arrival of reinforcements and supplies, regardless of dangers from the enemy or the sea. The same principle should have applied to the Imperial Japanese Navy. But in the Guadalcanal campaign, it failed to fulfill this vital role. Telling statistics from both the Japanese and American sides highlight the disparity in naval effectiveness during the Guadalcanal campaign. Between August and November 1942, Japanese submarines sank six transport ships while American submarines sank a staggering 62. This tenfold difference underscores how aggressively the US targeted Japan's supply lines and how poorly the Imperial Japanese Navy defended them. In response, Japan resorted to using destroyers, designed for combat, not transport, to ferry supplies under the cover of night. The tactic became known as "Rat Transportation" ( nezumi yuso ), likened to rats stealthily bringing food back to their nest. But the ships' limited capacity meant only small amounts could be delivered at a time. Even when landings succeeded, American air attacks often destroyed the supplies before they could reach frontline troops. One record grimly notes: "Due to insufficient transport capacity […] there were frequent cases of going several days without food […] In mid-December, when landing supplies became particularly difficult, there were periods of starvation lasting five days to a full week." A supply document titled Record of Provisions Unloaded and Delivered on 'G' Island vividly illustrates the desperation on the ground. Japanese troops, isolated in the jungle, endured severe hunger, and their combat effectiveness deteriorated rapidly. By November 1942, discussions of withdrawal had quietly begun within the Imperial General Headquarters. Yet no one dared raise the issue formally, as doing so would amount to admitting the operation had failed. It wasn't until December 26 that the Army officially requested a withdrawal to the Navy. The decision was finally approved at an Imperial Conference held on December 31. On January 4, 1943, the Imperial General Headquarters issued Operation "Ke," a withdrawal plan that was executed in early February after a period of preparation. Nearly three months had passed since the idea of pulling out was first raised. Of the roughly 30,000 Japanese troops who had landed on Guadalcanal, more than 20,000 perished. An estimated 5,000 to 6,000 were killed in combat, while the remaining 15,000 died from starvation and disease. Saito criticizes the delayed withdrawal, noting that decisive action by field commanders was almost nonexistent in the Japanese military. Decisions, he explains, were made bureaucratically by the Imperial General Headquarters, with no clear sense of accountability. "The key," he says, "is acting before troops become a lost cause. Timing is crucial if they are to be preserved as an effective fighting force. That's what a real military organization should understand." "Why did they have to die in such a distant place?" That question struck this writer with force eleven years ago on Guadalcanal Island, some 5,600 kilometers south of Japan. As I walked the jungle paths once trodden by Japanese soldiers struggling to retake the airfield, the weight of that thought only deepened. Despite being called an island, Guadalcanal is vast, about the size of Chiba Prefecture. Its terrain is cloaked in dense jungle, dim even in daylight, and heavy with suffocating humidity. A former soldier who joined the visit recalled, "Back then, we didn't even have maps. We had to hack our way forward with nothing but a compass." Japan's wartime expansion extended not only southward, but also west to Burma (now Myanmar) and north to the Aleutian Islands. The Guadalcanal campaign was largely initiated at the urging of the Imperial Navy. Having constructed an airfield on the island, it used Rabaul as a forward base to protect Truk Island, the Combined Fleet's main stronghold. The Army's decision to commit forces simultaneously to New Guinea and Guadalcanal revealed a troubling lack of strategic focus. Yet the Navy was equally adrift. Many of the same senior commanders who had played roles in the Nomonhan Incident, the outbreak of war with the US, and ultimately Japan's defeat reappeared in the Guadalcanal campaign. Despite repeated failures, they continued to be entrusted with key decisions. More than 80 years later, deep within the jungles of Guadalcanal, the remains of the soldiers who died there still lie where they fell — unrecovered, and unreconciled with history. Author: Shoko Ikeda, The Sankei Shimbun このページを 日本語 で読む
Winnipeg Free Press
3 days ago
- Winnipeg Free Press
TSB report on fatal 2023 B.C. plane crash points to low speed as factor
Investigators with Canada's Transportation Safety Board say it appears a small plane was not going fast enough when it rolled and crashed into trees near the airport in Chilliwack, B.C., killing all three people onboard. A report into the October 2023 crash that killed a flight instructor and two students says investigators could not determine the specific exercise that was being conducted when the Piper PA-34-200 Seneca plane approached the airport, rolled to the right and crash into trees behind a casino. The report says dashcam video from a passing vehicle and the post-accident wreckage examination is consistent with the aircraft entering a 'minimum control speed' roll before the crash. It says rolls happen when there is uneven power between a plane's two engines and the aircraft's speed falls below the minimum required. The report says the investigation did not discover any issues with the flight controls that would have led to the loss of control, or anything mechanical that would have prevented either engine from producing power. Monday Mornings The latest local business news and a lookahead to the coming week. The board's safety message says instructors teaching multi-engine training should make sure they're at a safe altitude and airspeed, given the significant loss of height that can occur in the event of a roll. This report by The Canadian Press was first published June 25, 2025
Vancouver Sun
3 days ago
- Vancouver Sun
Squeal on them: Wild super-porkers on the loose spark public awareness campaign
The question posed by rural Canadians (probably): what do you do about the 30 to 50 feral hogs that run into your yard within three to five minutes while your small kids play? Answer: You squeal on 'em . The Invasive Species Council of B.C. is launching its contribution of a cross-border public awareness campaign on Wednesday, highlighting the real damage that invasive feral pigs cause to ecosystems, farmland and infrastructure. They tear up the ground while searching for roots and bugs to eat, though they will eat just about anything they can get in their mouths. The humorous campaign features pigs in places they shouldn't be — grocery stores, tractors and kitchen cupboards — but underscores its serious message: invasive pigs are a real threat. Wild swine have been a problem in Canada and the U.S. for years, including American fears of Canadian 'Super Pigs' flying south across the border from Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba and running rampant in rural states. '30-50 feral hogs' day is one of the great days in the history of Twitter. With sows capable of having two litters a year, averaging six piglets a litter, they're capable of explosive population growth. Start your day with a roundup of B.C.-focused news and opinion. By signing up you consent to receive the above newsletter from Postmedia Network Inc. A welcome email is on its way. If you don't see it, please check your junk folder. The next issue of Sunrise will soon be in your inbox. Please try again Interested in more newsletters? Browse here. 'We've seen the damage invasive pigs can cause in other provinces, and we have a real opportunity in B.C. to prevent that from happening here,' said Gail Wallin, executive director of the Invasive Species Council of B.C. 'That's why we've launched this campaign — to raise awareness and remind people that their observations matter. Whether you're on the land every day or out for a weekend hike, early reporting of pigs on the land makes all the difference.' It's not just the physical damage that is of concern. Should a disease like African swine fever ever reach the Canadian wild population, the feral population could act as a reservoir and make future outbreaks difficult to contain. That could devastate Canadian pork farm stock. B.C. law requires all farm pigs to be securely fenced. Pigs aren't native to North America, but were introduced from Europe, Asia and North Africa for farming, hunting and as pets. The porkers who went on the lam crossbred with wild boars, with their hybrids — which can range from 75 to 250 pounds — becoming Canada's most destructive large mammal. The problem has been around for decades, when farmers used to raise wild boar. But when the market dried up, many stocks were just set free to roam the country, surprisingly proving resistant to harsh Canadian winters. Watch for their tracks and signs of wallows — large, shallow muddy pits — which they use to cool down in and protect their skin. Use the Invasive Species Council of B.C. website or call their toll-free number 1-888-933-3722 to make a report. Invasive pigs have been seen across B.C., but especially in the Peace River region, east Chilcotin and west of Kamloops.
