France projects Indo-Pacific power ambition in Singapore with carrier strike group
Singapore signals the aim of Paris to project itself as an Indo-Pacific power as China's military activities loom over the region, according to observers.
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As part of its five-month mission that will conclude in April, the flotilla, which includes the 261-metre nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, a multi-mission destroyer, an air defence destroyer and a force replenishment ship, has called in countries including the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.
Defence analysts told This Week in Asia that the French, who have overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific, have been displaying greater interest in the region in recent years owing to China's assertiveness in the waterways.
Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow at the Lowy Institute's Southeast Asia programme, said: 'The elephant in the room is China. China's naval modernisation and expansion, along with its behaviour, threaten the Indo-Pacific waterways, and freedom of air and maritime traffic.'
China has been ramping up drills in the Pacific, with reports of simultaneous exercises last month across multiple locations, including the Gulf of Tonkin, Taiwan's southwest coast, and international waters near Australia and New Zealand.
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Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.
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