Shifting to Asia, Rubio meets Quad and talks minerals
By Shaun TANDON
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio met Tuesday with counterparts from Australia, India and Japan, shifting focus to Asia after a tenure so far marked by crises elsewhere and domestic priorities.
Rubio had welcomed the foreign ministers of the so-called Quad on January 21 in his first meeting after President Donald Trump's inauguration, seen as a sign that the new administration would prioritize engagement with like-minded countries to counter China.
Since then, much of Rubio's attention has been on the Middle East, with the United States bombing Iranian nuclear sites in support of Israel; on Ukraine, as Trump unsuccessfully seeks a ceasefire in Russia's invasion, and on boosting Trump's domestic priorities such as mass deportations of migrants.
Welcoming the three foreign ministers, Rubio did not directly mention military concerns over China but said he sought cooperation among business and on raw materials -- also key goals for the Trump administration.
Rubio told them he was focused on "diversifying the global supply chain of critical minerals -- not just access to the raw material, but also access to the ability to process and refine it to usable materials."
"It's critical for all technologies and for all industries across the board," Rubio said, voicing hope for "real progress" on the issue within the Quad.
China holds major reserves of several key minerals including the vast majority of the world's graphite, which is crucial for electric vehicles.
Beijing has sought to impose restrictions as leverage, as the United States in turn curbs its access to semiconductors and as Trump wields the threat of punishing tariffs on both friends and foes.
Trump is expected to travel to India later this year for a summit of the Quad.
The four-way partnership was first conceived by late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who saw an alliance of democracies around China -- which has repeatedly alleged that the Quad is a way to contain it.
Trump has long branded China as the top U.S. adversary, but since returning to office has also saluted his relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Both the Indian and Japanese foreign ministers said that they wanted the Quad to focus on a "free and open Indo-Pacific" -- a phrasing that is a veiled allusion to opposing Chinese dominance in Asia.
"We're all committed to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific," Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said.
"It is essential that nations of the Indo-Pacific have the freedom of choice, so essential to make right decisions on development and security," he said.
Jaishankar also made clear that India would raise its strikes last month against Pakistan in response to a major attack on mostly Hindu civilians in Indian-administered Kashmir.
"India has every right to defend its people against terrorism, and we will exercise that right. We expect our Quad partners to understand and appreciate that," he said.
Despite shared concerns on China, the Quad members have differed on other hotspots. India has maintained a historic relationship with Russia despite the invasion of Ukraine.
Both India and Japan also have historically warm relationships with Iran, whose nuclear sites the United States bombed in June in support of an Israeli campaign.
© 2025 AFP
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