Will China Become Iran's Major Defense Partner?
Against this backdrop, China is emerging as a potential, perhaps even desirable, alternative to Russia. Recent commentaries in both Iran and China have made the case for closer defense ties and Iranian purchases of Chinese military hardware. These calls often highlight Pakistan's successful use of Chinese air defense systems during its recent tensions with India.
Given Iran's lost trust in the quality of Russian systems and the urgency of rebuilding its air defense system, is closer China-Iran security cooperation on the horizon? That will depend on how policymakers in Beijing assess the costs and benefits.
Benefits of Increased Defense Cooperation With Tehran
One of the most immediate benefits for China in becoming Iran's defense partner would be the ability to consolidate an alternative energy corridor that bypasses traditional maritime routes. By linking Iraq's energy-rich regions through Iranian infrastructure and onward into Pakistan, China could significantly expand its overland energy security. Such an Iraq-Iran-Pakistan corridor would give Beijing a secure and controllable channel to access Middle Eastern hydrocarbons while simultaneously improving the energy security of its ally, Pakistan. If this corridor develops, it would partially insulate China from volatility in maritime choke points like the Strait of Malacca and the Bab el-Mandeb, providing Beijing with long-sought redundancy in its energy supply chains.
More critically, deepening defense ties with Iran would offer China indirect influence over the Strait of Hormuz. Should China become Tehran's main security partner, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing would be better positioned to moderate Iran's behavior in the event of regional tensions, ensuring that the strait remains open and navigable. This is of paramount importance for China's own economic security as well as those of the Gulf Arab states. Increasing leverage over Tehran's strategic calculus through defense cooperation would thus serve both deterrent and stabilizing functions from Beijing's perspective.
Another core advantage lies in an increased chance of containing Indian influence across Central Asia. Iran's drift away from India began in earnest after New Delhi began adhering to U.S.-led sanctions in 2018 and ceased oil imports from Tehran. The strategic vacuum left by India's retreat has only widened as India has grown closer to Israel – both ideologically, through shared anti-extremism narratives, and practically, via collaborations in defense, cyber, and agriculture. These ties have diminished Iran's value in Indian strategic thinking while India's pro-Israel stance has tarnished its image in the eyes of decisionmakers in Tehran, creating space for Beijing to step in.
If China becomes Tehran's principal defense partner, it would be in a stronger position to frustrate Indian ambitions in Central Asia and the South Caucasus where Iran's geography is pivotal. With deeper Iranian cooperation, moreover, Beijing could synchronize the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) more seamlessly, using Iran as both a transit route and a geopolitical buffer. This coordination could marginalize India's efforts to connect with Central Asia and Afghanistan via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which hinges on Indian investments in Iran's Chabahar port. Should Iran allow China to assume a stake in Chabahar, the INSTC's viability would be fatally undermined. This would be a double blow to India: denied strategic access to Central Asia and outmaneuvered in its attempts to counterbalance China's BRI.
Last but not least, the political trajectory within Iran also favors increased alignment with China. As internal rivalries intensify in Tehran, the most probable outcome is the consolidation of a security state led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This would replicate, in many ways, Pakistan's civil-military hybrid model in which real power resides with the armed forces. For China, this is a familiar and manageable structure. Beijing has spent decades building ties with Pakistan's military elite and would likely find it easier to engage with a similar power structure in Iran. Additionally, such a configuration could facilitate improved Tehran-Islamabad relations, smoothing the path for trilateral cooperation under Chinese patronage.
Risk Factors
While the strategic rationale for China to expand its defense and security partnership with Iran is compelling, it is not without significant complications. Beijing would have to tread carefully, balancing its ambitions with the risk of antagonizing a constellation of other regional and global actors. Iran may be geopolitically useful, but it is also diplomatically toxic. Any overt alignment with Tehran, especially in the security and military domain, risks exposing China to a series of entanglements that could undercut its broader objectives in the Middle East and beyond.
Foremost among Beijing's concerns is the potential impact on its relations with Israel. Although China and Israel do not see eye to eye on a wide range of issues, their economic and technological cooperation has been substantial. China is invested in Israeli infrastructure, including port terminals and tech start-ups, and values Israel as a hub of innovation. A significant expansion of China's military relationship with Iran would be difficult for Israel to ignore – not least because for Israel the main problem is the Iranian regime's ideology and not its nuclear program per se. Ultimately, this could compel Beijing to weigh whether its long-term interests in Israeli technology and investment partnerships are worth jeopardizing for an enhanced, and potentially lucrative, defense procurement based relationship with Tehran.
Another sensitive arena is China's extensive commercial ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These states have become key economic partners for China in sectors ranging from energy to logistics and transport. Close defense ties with Iran could disrupt these relationships especially if perceived as emboldening Tehran's regional adventurism.
However, this risk should not be overstated. Paradoxically, China's closeness with Iran could also enhance its leverage with the GCC states. By acting as a potential mediator or deterrent influence over Iran, Beijing could present itself as an indispensable regional stabilizer capable of assuring Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that Iran will not escalate militarily or cross the nuclear threshold. In this way, China might parlay its ties with Iran into a broader diplomatic capital with Iran's southern neighbors.
A further consideration is the exposure of Chinese state-owned enterprises and private firms to secondary U.S. sanctions. Although China and Iran have collectively developed methods, and indeed networks, to circumvent some sanctions, there remains a legal and reputational risk for companies involved in dual-use technologies or defense exports to Iran. At a time when China-U.S. tensions remain high, particularly around technology and trade, Beijing is likely to consider whether the potential gains from a deeper tie with Iran as a defense supplier are worth the cost of even greater friction with Washington.
Also at play is the distant, but all too real, prospect of a regime change, organically or otherwise, in Iran. Although a popular uprising leading to regime change remains unlikely in the near term, as most Iranians are currently focused on day-to-day survival amid the crisis, public sentiment is volatile. As such, there is a risk that China's investment in the regime could backfire should there be a revolution in Iran.
Conclusion
Despite the favorable geopolitical context that appears to support deeper defense cooperation between Beijing and Tehran, the most likely outcome is a carefully managed and limited relationship rather than a full-fledged defense partnership. The institutional scaffolding for closer cooperation is already in place; the China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in 2021 and their common membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, the implementation of this framework would likely be shaped not by ideological alignment or mutual defense aspirations but by calculation, discretion, and long-term strategic interest on the part of China.
Should China make the political decision to assist Iran in upgrading its defense capabilities, it would seek to do so without assuming the political cost of being seen as Tehran's military backer. Beijing's approach would be pragmatic and quiet. Assistance and sales, whether in the form of air defense systems, cyber tools, surveillance platforms, or drone technologies, will be offered selectively, and in a manner designed to limit visibility and exposure to U.S. sanctions or regional backlash. Chinese companies involved in these arrangements will be insulated through proxies or offshore intermediaries.
This cautious posture, in turn, is driven by China's broader strategic outlook. For Beijing, Iran is neither an ally nor a partner but rather a geopolitical node and a useful check on the United States' desire to pull back from the Middle East. Iran's geographic location, natural resources, and strategic desperation make it a suitable partner for China's ambitions in Eurasian connectivity, regional balancing, and economic expansion. Yet China is acutely aware of the risks of overcommitment in the Middle East. Beijing does not want to become entangled in either regional rivalries or Iran's confrontations with Israel and the United States. To this end, China would likely continue to exploit the ambiguity of its position, keeping defense ties strong enough to benefit from Iran's vulnerabilities but restrained enough to avoid provoking its rivals.
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