Ordinance issued to regulate virtual assets
President Asif Zardari signed the Virtual Assets Regulatory Authority Ordinance 2025, which would come into force immediately all over the country. The head office of the authority would be in Islamabad, but its regional offices could be established anywhere.
The ordinance says that the Vara will have the status of a corporate body, hence, it will be able to hold property, makes purchases and sales and enter into contracts. according to the ordinance, it will also be able to file cases, according to the ordinance.
Vara is empowered to issue, suspend or revoke licences for virtual assets and service providers; make regulations for the supervision and regulation of virtual assets; take steps to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, with powers of investigation, disciplinary action and imposing fines.
According the ordinance, a board will run the affairs of Vara. The board would have a chairman of the board and two members from the Finance Ministry and the Law Ministry. It could include more members as advisers. The term of office of the chairman and non-official members will be three years.
The ordinance says that no person would provide services related to virtual assets without a licence issued by Vara. It adds that fine could be imposed if someone found offering those services without a licence.
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