U.K. distances new spy chief from 'Nazi' grandfather
The British government has distanced the incoming head of its foreign intelligence service from her grandfather following reports he was a Nazi spy known as "the butcher".
Blaise Metreweli will, in the autumn, become the first woman to lead MI6 in its 116-year-old history, the British government announced earlier this month.
The Daily Mail newspaper reported this week that her grandfather Constantine Dobrowolski defected from the Soviet Union's Red Army to become a Nazi informant in the Chernigiv region of modern-day Ukraine.
The newspaper said German archives showed Dobrowolski was known as "the Butcher" or "Agent No 30" by Wehrmacht commanders.
"Blaise Metreweli neither knew nor met her paternal grandfather," a Foreign Office spokesperson said in a statement.
"Blaise's ancestry is characterised by conflict and division and, as is the case for many with eastern European heritage, only partially understood.
"It is precisely this complex heritage which has contributed to her commitment to prevent conflict and protect the British public from modern threats from today's hostile states, as the next chief of MI6."
The Daily Mail said Dobrowolski had a 50,000 ruble bounty placed on him by Soviet leaders, and was dubbed the "worst enemy of the Ukrainian people".
He also sent letters to superiors saying he "personally" took part "in the extermination of the Jews", the newspaper added.
The head of MI6 is the only publicly named member of the organisation and reports directly to the Foreign Minister.
Ms. Metreweli, 47, will be the 18th head of MI6. Like her predecessors, she will be referred to as "C", not "M" as the chief is called in the James Bond film franchise.
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Time of India
24 minutes ago
- Time of India
NATO's 5% pledge: Rearming the West or rebalancing the world
In an era where geopolitical boundaries are blurred and warfare has morphed from trenches to tech, NATO 's recent commitment to invest 5% of GDP annually in defence by 2035 sends a thunderous signal—not just to adversaries, but to allies questioning the alliance's strategic relevance. The Hague Summit Declaration, adopted by 32 member states, marked a pivotal moment in transatlantic security thinking. The question now is whether this is a forward-looking strategy or a reactionary bulwark clinging to the past paradigms. At the core of the declaration lies an emphatic reaffirmation of Article 5—the principle that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all NATO members. However, the real headline is the proposed ramp-up in defence and security-related spending: 3.5% of GDP earmarked for traditional defence infrastructure and capabilities, and an additional 1.5% for resilience, critical infrastructure protection, and innovation. This is a fundamental reset of NATO's budgetary posture, reflective of a world no longer anchored to the certainties of post-Cold War peace. The strategic rationale behind this move is evident in the literature. From Russia's protracted war in Ukraine to hybrid warfare tactics deployed through cyberattacks, misinformation campaigns, and economic coercion, the threats facing the Euro-Atlantic region are no longer just physical; they are systemic. However, the implications of NATO's new doctrine stretch far beyond Europe. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Perdagangkan CFD Emas dengan Broker Tepercaya IC Markets Mendaftar Undo By including Ukraine's security under the umbrella of NATO's own, the alliance is signalling that Kyiv's stability is no longer peripheral—it is central to the European defence architecture. Although the declaration stops short of directly naming Russia as an aggressor, it unequivocally categorises it as a long-term threat. The political calculus here is clear: to maintain unity among diverse member states while advancing a credible deterrent posture. However, pledging 5% of GDP—especially in times of economic uncertainty, rising public debt, and shrinking fiscal room—will not be without domestic blowback. For many European countries, where defence budgets have long played second fiddle to social spending, the pivot will require not only financial reallocation but also political will. The path to 2035 will be fraught with parliamentary debates, economic trade-offs, and inevitable scrutiny from taxpayers questioning the utility of militarisation during peacetime. Live Events That said, NATO's blueprint smartly distinguishes between "hard power" and 'soft shield' spending. By allocating up to 1.5% for cyber defense , critical infrastructure, industrial innovation, and civil preparedness, the alliance acknowledges the multidimensional nature of modern warfare. Drones, AI, satellite technologies, and quantum encryption will define future battles. This is NATO's attempt to future-proof itself. Another compelling aspect of the declaration is its call to dismantle internal defence trade barriers and catalyse transatlantic industrial cooperation. The subtext? Europe's dependence on American defence systems must evolve into a mutual technological collaboration. With U.S. domestic politics becoming increasingly isolationist and polarised, especially in light of looming electoral uncertainties, Europe has no choice but to shoulder more of the strategic burden of NATO. The timing of this declaration cannot be ignored. This occurs at a time when questions are being raised about the longevity of American leadership and the cohesion of Western alliances. Populist politics, migration crises, climate-induced conflicts, and digital disruptions are redrawing the map of security concerns. In this light, NATO's 5% commitment is as much about deterrence as it is about staying relevant. However, for all its ambition, the declaration raises a philosophical question: can militarised investment alone secure peace in a world where most battles are fought in cyberspace, legislatures, and courtrooms? While NATO shores up its arsenal, adversaries weaponize currency systems, manipulate public opinion through AI-generated propaganda, and infiltrate supply chains. In such a scenario, defence must be defined not only by missiles and manpower but also by legal resilience, technological agility, and economic fortitude. In its closing remarks, the summit's declaration looks ahead—to Türkiye in 2026 and Albania thereafter. Symbolically, this eastward shift in NATO meeting venues reflects a changing strategic frontier. The frontlines are no longer confined to the Fulda Gap but extend into the Black Sea, Indo-Pacific, and digital cloud networks connecting us all. Ultimately, NATO's 5% pledge is more than just a budgetary item. It is a test of collective resolve in a fractured global order. If implemented wisely—with strategic clarity, equitable burden-sharing, and an eye on emerging threats—it could become a blueprint for securing liberal democracies in a multipolar, volatile world. But if the focus remains confined to tanks and treaties while ignoring the algorithmic and institutional battlefields of the 21st century, NATO risks building a fortress for yesterday's war The author is Department of Commerce, Assistant Professor and Research Supervisor, St. Thomas College (Autonomous), Thrissur, Kerala
Economic Times
28 minutes ago
- Economic Times
NATO's 5% pledge: Rearming the West or rebalancing the world
Live Events (You can now subscribe to our (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel In an era where geopolitical boundaries are blurred and warfare has morphed from trenches to tech, NATO 's recent commitment to invest 5% of GDP annually in defence by 2035 sends a thunderous signal—not just to adversaries, but to allies questioning the alliance's strategic relevance. The Hague Summit Declaration, adopted by 32 member states, marked a pivotal moment in transatlantic security thinking. The question now is whether this is a forward-looking strategy or a reactionary bulwark clinging to the past the core of the declaration lies an emphatic reaffirmation of Article 5—the principle that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all NATO members. However, the real headline is the proposed ramp-up in defence and security-related spending: 3.5% of GDP earmarked for traditional defence infrastructure and capabilities, and an additional 1.5% for resilience, critical infrastructure protection, and innovation. This is a fundamental reset of NATO's budgetary posture, reflective of a world no longer anchored to the certainties of post-Cold War strategic rationale behind this move is evident in the literature. From Russia's protracted war in Ukraine to hybrid warfare tactics deployed through cyberattacks, misinformation campaigns, and economic coercion, the threats facing the Euro-Atlantic region are no longer just physical; they are systemic. However, the implications of NATO's new doctrine stretch far beyond including Ukraine's security under the umbrella of NATO's own, the alliance is signalling that Kyiv's stability is no longer peripheral—it is central to the European defence architecture. Although the declaration stops short of directly naming Russia as an aggressor, it unequivocally categorises it as a long-term threat. The political calculus here is clear: to maintain unity among diverse member states while advancing a credible deterrent pledging 5% of GDP—especially in times of economic uncertainty, rising public debt, and shrinking fiscal room—will not be without domestic blowback. For many European countries, where defence budgets have long played second fiddle to social spending, the pivot will require not only financial reallocation but also political will. The path to 2035 will be fraught with parliamentary debates, economic trade-offs, and inevitable scrutiny from taxpayers questioning the utility of militarisation during said, NATO's blueprint smartly distinguishes between "hard power" and 'soft shield' spending. By allocating up to 1.5% for cyber defense , critical infrastructure, industrial innovation, and civil preparedness, the alliance acknowledges the multidimensional nature of modern warfare. Drones, AI, satellite technologies, and quantum encryption will define future battles. This is NATO's attempt to future-proof compelling aspect of the declaration is its call to dismantle internal defence trade barriers and catalyse transatlantic industrial cooperation. The subtext? Europe's dependence on American defence systems must evolve into a mutual technological collaboration. With U.S. domestic politics becoming increasingly isolationist and polarised, especially in light of looming electoral uncertainties, Europe has no choice but to shoulder more of the strategic burden of timing of this declaration cannot be ignored. This occurs at a time when questions are being raised about the longevity of American leadership and the cohesion of Western alliances. Populist politics, migration crises, climate-induced conflicts, and digital disruptions are redrawing the map of security concerns. In this light, NATO's 5% commitment is as much about deterrence as it is about staying for all its ambition, the declaration raises a philosophical question: can militarised investment alone secure peace in a world where most battles are fought in cyberspace, legislatures, and courtrooms? While NATO shores up its arsenal, adversaries weaponize currency systems, manipulate public opinion through AI-generated propaganda, and infiltrate supply chains. In such a scenario, defence must be defined not only by missiles and manpower but also by legal resilience, technological agility, and economic its closing remarks, the summit's declaration looks ahead—to Türkiye in 2026 and Albania thereafter. Symbolically, this eastward shift in NATO meeting venues reflects a changing strategic frontier. The frontlines are no longer confined to the Fulda Gap but extend into the Black Sea, Indo-Pacific, and digital cloud networks connecting us NATO's 5% pledge is more than just a budgetary item. It is a test of collective resolve in a fractured global order. If implemented wisely—with strategic clarity, equitable burden-sharing, and an eye on emerging threats—it could become a blueprint for securing liberal democracies in a multipolar, volatile world. But if the focus remains confined to tanks and treaties while ignoring the algorithmic and institutional battlefields of the 21st century, NATO risks building a fortress for yesterday's warThe author is Department of Commerce, Assistant Professor and Research Supervisor, St. Thomas College (Autonomous), Thrissur, Kerala
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First Post
an hour ago
- First Post
How Trump's strike has escalated Iranian nuclear threat
Does Iran have the elements needed for a bomb and will it assemble one after the Israeli-US humiliation? The answer is buried deeper than Iran's under-construction deepest nuclear facility near Natanz read more If enriched to 93 per cent, uranium can be used to make nukes. The US, Israel and European powers fear that Iran can enrich uranium to that level and make nuclear bombs. Representational Image - Reuters 'Tonight, I can report to the world that the strikes were a spectacular military success. Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.' — Donald Trump, US President, June 21, 2025 One of the several catchphrases that has stuck with Donald Trump's boastful, maverick and reckless persona is 'Nobody knows more about or does [anything] better than me.' Evidently, he knows more about Iran's plan to manufacture nukes, how the three nuclear plants were 'obliterated' by the B-2s and why WMDs are 'the last thing on their [Iran's] mind right now' regardless of what US intelligence concluded earlier and now. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Mr Know-it-all is also infamous for his erratic U-turns. After the US bombing, he warned Iran of direst consequences if it retaliated. However, after Iran's all-bluff-and-bluster response, Trump concluded it wanted to end the conflict. 'CONGRATULATIONS WORLD, IT'S TIME FOR PEACE!' he posted on Truth Social and announced a ceasefire to the '12 Day War' between Iran and Israel. Trump's about-turns are meant to mislead and hide his real intentions. On June 25, he exposed himself. Initially, he said that a nuclear pact with Iran was 'not necessary'. 'I don't care if I have an agreement or not.' A few hours later, he told the media, 'We may sign an agreement; I don't know,' after saying that the US and Iran would negotiate next week—though Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei wasn't aware of it. Now, it has emerged that Trump was using a carrot-and-stick policy to force Iran to negotiate. Trump's Middle East (West Asia) envoy Steve Witkoff and Gulf allies, including Qatar, talked with Iranians secretly even as Israeli strikes continued and after the ceasefire. A day before the US attack, Witkoff and Gulf partners secretly discussed at the White House starting talks with Iran. Of the several preliminary proposals, one is helping Iran access $20-$30 billion to build a civilian-energy-producing nuclear programme, relaxing sanctions and unfreezing $6 billion in restricted Iranian funds on one condition—no uranium enrichment. However, three important questions that remain unanswered will reset the US-Israel-Iran dynamics. First, what is the extent of damage to Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan nuclear plants? STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Second, where is the 400-plus kg of enriched uranium, and will Iran stop enrichment? Third and most important, will Iran, with its pride wounded, manufacture a nuke(s)? Iran's nuclear facilities destroyed or survived? Seven B-2 bombers dropped 12 GBU-57A/B bunker buster bombs (13,600 kg each) on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and two on Natanz nuclear facilities. Meanwhile, a US submarine fired 30 BGM-109 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles at Isfahan nuclear facilities. Latest Maxar Technologies satellite imagery (June 24) and a leaked Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)—the Pentagon's military intelligence arm—five-page classified preliminary report contradicted Trump's claim of obliteration of Iran's three N-plants. At Fordow (80 metres underground), six large craters were visible, and its tunnel entrances looked apparently collapsed. A large building apparently used to control ventilation for the underground hall was damaged but not collapsed. New Maxar satellite imagery reveals fresh damage at Iran's Fordow nuclear site from Israeli airstrikes on June 23, 2025. The images show craters and destruction to access roads, tunnels, and support buildings. — Open Source Intel (@Osint613) June 25, 2025 STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD At Natanz (enrichment halls buried 20-40 metres), two craters over the underground facility were visible. Earlier, images showed destruction of the substation, main power building and emergency supply. At Iran's Natanz enrichment facility, two craters right above the undergound buildings housing centrifuges that were visible after US strikes on 22 June have now been covered with dirt. Before: 22 June After: 24 June 📷@Maxar — Shayan Sardarizadeh (@Shayan86) June 24, 2025 At Isfahan, several large industrial buildings housing essential laboratories and a uranium conversion facility around the suspected research reactor site were destroyed, and the entry to the tunnel to the underground infrastructure was damaged and blocked. Before the Tomahawks hit the plant, Israel had bombed it twice. Pics of the Isfahan Site Above ground structures visibly extent of the below ground damage is unknown currently — Tony (@Cyberspec1) June 23, 2025 Secretary of State and NSA Marco Rubio said that Isfahan's uranium conversion facility was 'wiped out'. However, extensive damage on the ground doesn't mean the heavily fortified underground facilities at the three sites were destroyed. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi said, 'As for the assessment of the degree of damage underground [Fordow]… Neither we nor anybody else could be able to tell you how much it has been damaged.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Moreover, the DIA report—leaked to CNN, The New York Times (NYT), The Washington Post and several others—stated that the US bombing set back Iran's nuclear programme by less than six months, not years or decades, and some of the centrifuges remain intact. Democratic senator Mark Kelly (Arizona), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee who reviewed the DIA report, told reporters, 'It's one thing if it's a building above ground and you can tell if you knocked the building down, and you have a better chance of getting good imagery of it. Underground it's really hard.' The report unnerved a defensive Trump administration. A session to brief Congress on the strike was postponed. Later, the White House decided to limit sharing of classified information with the Senate and the House. Trump blasted 'fake news' CNN, which first reported about the DIA assessment, and 'failing' NYT as 'scum' for teaming up 'to demean one of the most successful military strikes in history'. 'The nuclear sites in Iran are completely destroyed!' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Trump claimed that the Iranian nuclear programme had been set back by 'decades'. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, who said that the report was 'preliminary' and a 'low-confidence' assessment, alleged that CCN and others were trying to 'make the president look bad when this was an overwhelming success'. Rubio slammed the leakers as 'professional stabbers', while Witkoff termed the leak 'treasonous' and 'outrageous'. Soon after Trump and his top aides dismissed the DIA report, CIA director John Ratcliffe and the DNI, Tulsi Gabbard, rushed to the president's defence. Without providing evidence, Ratcliffe issued a statement saying that 'new intelligence from a historically reliable and accurate source' indicated that 'key Iranian nuclear facilities were destroyed and would have to be rebuilt over the course of years'. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Gabbard, who under Trump's pressure flipped recently on her March assessment that Iran wasn't pursuing a nuke, seconded Ratcliffe. 'Iran's nuclear facilities have been destroyed,' she tweeted. New intelligence confirms what @POTUS has stated numerous times: Iran's nuclear facilities have been destroyed. If the Iranians chose to rebuild, they would have to rebuild all three facilities (Natanz, Fordow, Esfahan) entirely, which would likely take years to do. The… — DNI Tulsi Gabbard (@DNIGabbard) June 25, 2025 Even Grossi, citing satellite images and the vibration caused by the GB-57A/B, said later that the Fordow centrifuges were 'no longer operational'. However, at The Hague NATO summit, Trump and Hegseth indirectly admitted to the uncertainty about the bombing's impact. 'The intelligence was very inconclusive. … It could've been very severe. That's what the intelligence suggests,' Trump told journalists at the summit. While Hegseth described the damage as 'moderate to severe'. Even Grossi later changed his version, saying, '…to what degree there is annihilation or total destruction, I can only tell you there is very considerable damage. There are other nuclear sites in Iran that were not affected.' The Pentagon indirectly confirmed at a press briefing on June 26 that the three facilities weren't obliterated. Hegseth and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Dan only mentioned Fordow and referred questions about the damage to the intelligence agencies. Without offering any intelligence, Hegseth defended Trump's obliteration claim. Even Israel's damage assessment raises questions. Initially, intelligence officials told CNN on Wednesday that the nuclear programme was set back by two years. However, one Israeli source told ABC News that the outcome at Fordow was 'really not good'. Another source said, 'Anyone who says it was a failure is pushing in the wrong direction. Anyone who says it was 100% obliterated is also pushing in the wrong direction.' In what was music to Trump's ears, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Baghaei told Al Jazeera on June 25, 'The nuclear installations have been badly damaged—that's for sure'. However, there's a huge difference between damage and destruction. N-enrichment, missing stockpile & resumption Iran's nuclear enrichment is the core of the problem, triggering Western alarm all these years and resulting in the Israeli and US attacks. Natural uranium has two isotopes: U-238 (99.3 per cent) and U-235 (around 0.7 per cent). Only U-235 is useful for powering nuclear reactors or making nukes. To remove U-238 and increase the concentration of U-235, natural uranium is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas and fed into centrifuges. These machines spin at a high speed and separate U-235, which is extracted in highly concentrated form. The process is called nuclear enrichment. Enriched uranium can be used both as fuel for power plants and for making nuclear bombs. Only 3.67 per cent enriched uranium is needed for nuclear power plants. However, Iran, which has always said that its N-programme is only meant for civilian use, has been enriching uranium for years to 60 per cent. If enriched to 93 per cent, uranium can be used to make nukes. The US, Israel and European powers fear that Iran can enrich uranium to that level and make nuclear bombs. In the early 2000s, the IAEA found traces of highly enriched uranium at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility, the main enrichment site. Though Iran halted enrichment, it resumed in 2006, triggering years of international sanctions. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) capped enrichment at 3.67 per cent and asked Tehran to drastically reduce its uranium stockpile and phase out the centrifuges. In 2018, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and called for a new deal. Subsequently, Iran stopped complying with the JCPOA, removed IAEA surveillance and monitoring equipment and started enriching 149 kg of uranium up to 3.67 per cent using advanced centrifuges like the IR-6 and IR-9. According to the IAEA, the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control's Iran Watch and the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), in 2019, Iran breached the stockpile limit and had 213 kg of 3.67 per cent enriched uranium and 160 kg of 4.5 per cent. In 2020, the stockpile of 3.67 per cent enriched uranium was 215 kg and 2,228 kg of 4.5 per cent. By 2021, Iran's stockpile of 2 per cent enriched uranium was 560 kg, 5 per cent 1,622 kg, 20 per cent 114 kg and 60 per cent 18 kg. In 2022, Iran ramped up enrichment with more centrifuges. Two per cent enriched uranium was 1,845 kg, 5 per cent was 1,030 kg, 20 per cent was 386 kg and 60 per cent was 62 kg. In 2023, the IAEA found traces of 83.7 per cent enriched uranium at a nuclear facility. Two per cent enriched uranium was 1,217 kg, 5 per cent was 2,218 kg, 20 per cent was 567 kg and 60 per cent was 128 kg. By 2024, the stockpile of 60 per cent enriched uranium neared 180 kg, with the US saying that Iran could produce a nuke in one or two weeks. Two per cent enriched uranium was 2,191 kg, 5 per cent was 2,595 kg, 20 per cent was 839 kg and 60 per cent was 182 kg. Till May this year, Iran had 2,221 kg of 2 per cent enriched uranium, 5,509 kg of 5 per cent, 275 kg of 20 per cent and 408.6 kg of 60 per cent. In 2022, Iran removed the IAEA's surveillance and monitoring equipment. One year later, the West was alarmed when the IAEA found 83.7 per cent enriched uranium particles in samples taken at Fordo in January 2023. Whether Iran intends to produce one nuke or several is dependent on the stock of 60 per cent enriched uranium. The biggest concern is the untraceable 408.6 kg stockpile of 60 per cent enriched uranium. Iran has around 20 nuclear facilities. There's a high possibility that the enriched stockpile was already dispersed before the strikes. Grossi confirmed it saying that the stockpile at Isfahan was last seen by the IAEA a week before the Israeli attacks. Before the US bombing, a Pentagon intelligence assessment speculated that Iran may have removed the stockpile from Fordow. Even the DIA report indicates the same. Two Israeli officials told NYT that intelligence suggested Iran had moved equipment and a part of the stockpile from Fordow. The US is still in denial mode about Iran moving the stockpile. At the press briefing with Caine, Hegseth said, 'I'm not aware of any intelligence that I've reviewed that says things were not where they were supposed to be, moved or otherwise.' For Iran, enrichment is non-negotiable. At The Hague summit, Trump said that he would bomb Iran again if it restarted enrichment. However, Iran's deputy foreign minister for political affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi told Germany's national television Das Erste that Iran will continue enrichment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 'No one can tell us what we should or should not do…' A close aide of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told AFP that the 'game is not over'. The rubble blocking the entrances to the tunnels to the underground chambers can always be cleared, damaged nuclear facilities repaired and centrifuges replaced to resume enrichment. June 24 satellite imagery shows Iran has already started repairing the Natanz plant. The two craters are covered with dirt, many roads above the complex have been cleared by heavy machinery, and a few temporary structures have been erected at one of the impact sites. New satellite imagery from June 24 of the Natanz Nuclear Site in Central Iran appears to show efforts underway to potentially repair the facility, with two holes seen on June 22 after the strikes by the U.S. Air Force, believed to have been created by GBU-57A/B MOP (Massive… — OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) June 25, 2025 Mohammad Eslami, the head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, earlier said, 'Plans for restarting (the facilities) have been prepared in advance, and our strategy is to ensure that production and services are not disrupted.' Iran proved over the years that it could rebuild its nuclear facilities despite damage. For example, the 2009 US-Israel Stuxnet cyber attack on Natanz disabled one-fifth of the centrifuges. Iran installed more advanced centrifuges, with 19,000 in operation before the Israeli strikes. Iran's deepest N-underground facility intact The most concerning development in the Iranian N programme is the ongoing construction of a new centrifuge assembly facility 150 metres deep near Natanz. The IAEA was supposed to inspect the site on the first day of the Israeli strikes, but it was cancelled. Satellite imagery taken between October 25, 2022, and January 15, 2024, showed construction and excavation at the tunnel complex under Mt. Kolang Gaz La, south of the Natanz plant. According to a March 25, 2024, , Iran has constructed tunnels and is working on underground rooms that could contain enrichment halls. In our latest story, I break down some of the recent construction at the Natanz nuclear facility, #Iran. Using satellite images, we identify likely new tunnel entrances for an apparent new underground facility. — Christoph Koettl (@ckoettl) December 9, 2020 ISIS concluded that four tunnel entrances were largely complete as of October 2022 while the main western tunnel entrance continued to be strengthened and reinforced. According to ISIS, the site is 'slated to hold a new, large, advanced centrifuge assembly facility that replaces the Iranian Centrifuge Assembly Centre destroyed in an attack in July 2020'. 'In fact, the tunnel complex is more deeply buried than the Fordow underground enrichment plant with more entrances and no apparent ventilation shaft, making it harder to destroy than Fordow and certainly harder than a surface facility.' Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the Washington-based Foundation for Defence of Democracies (FDD), a nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy, said, 'The time is quickly running out as Iran moves into a zone of nuclear immunity to deny the regime permanent use of this deadly site.' FDD senior adviser Richard Goldberg said, 'If Tehran is allowed to complete this facility and move its enrichment infrastructure inside, we will enter a new and potentially irreversible era of the Iranian nuclear threat.' A wounded Iran and a nuclear bomb The Israeli and the US strikes have shattered Iran's image of a West Asian power and invincibility. Iran is reduced to issuing only threats and fake victory claims against Israel and the US. Iran's weak response to the US bombing and its amenability to the ceasefire exposed the reality of its threats. Almost all of the 14 missiles Iran fired at Qatar's US-run Al-Udeid Air Base—evacuated days earlier—after giving hours of warning was a face-saving exercise. Iran responded in a similar fashion to the US assassination of IRGC's Quds Force commander Major General Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 and the Israeli elimination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July 2024. However, the dangerous events in West Asia in the last several days wouldn't have unfolded if Iran had nuclear bomb(s). The attacks jolted Iran. It wasn't developing a nuke. It's still an NPT member. It cooperated with the IAEA to a large extent despite Trump exiting JCPOA. Yet, it was attacked. After the humiliation, Iran might clandestinely develop a nuclear bomb to negotiate from a position of strength and prevent such massive military strikes. Nuclear weapons are the highest form of deterrence. Some hard-line voices inside Iran have been calling for manufacturing a nuke to deter Israel and the US. Foreign minister Abbas Araghchi told Qatar's Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 'I think that our view on our nuclear programme and the non-proliferation regime will witness changes, but it is not possible to say in what direction.' In March, when Trump threatened to bomb Iran, Khamenei's adviser and former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani said, 'If at some point you (the US) move towards bombing by yourself or through Israel, you will force Iran to make a different decision.' Iran has also hinted at quitting the NPT. During the Israeli strikes, Baghaei told reporters that 'such a proposal [Bill] is just being prepared'. On June 22, Araghchi told reporters in Istanbul that the 'NPT is not able to protect' Iran. 'So, why a country like Iran or other countries interested to have a peaceful nuclear energy should rely on NPT?' In the latest sign of Iran's changing stance and defiance, Parliament has approved a bill to suspend cooperation with the IAEA. Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf slammed the IAEA for putting Iran's 'international credibility up for sale' and added that Iran will 'move at a faster pace with the country's peaceful nuclear programme'. The big question is how much time Iran needs to produce a nuke. According to the IAEA, Iran has enough material to produce at least 10 nuclear bombs if it enriches its 60 per cent stockpile to 93 per cent. Iran can produce one nuke in 2.5 days, 5 in 11 days, 9 in 21 days, 11 in 30 days, 15 in 2 months, 19 in 3 months, 21 in 4 months and 22 in 5 months. However, producing weapons-grade uranium (WGU) is one thing, and building a deliverable nuke is another. According to nuclear experts, Iran would take months or a year to build a deliverable nuke. Only advanced metallurgy and engineering can machine WGU into the core of an atom bomb. The IAEA reports only mention the increase in 60 per cent enriched uranium and the number of centrifuges, not atomic purification, engineering, manufacturing and testing. Besides, Iran would need to test the complete warhead rigorously and explode the bomb underground. A March 2024 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that Iran 'has not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons'. The CRS mentioned former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley's March 2023 testimony in which he said that Iran would need 'several months to produce an actual nuclear weapon'. Even the IAEA reports 'suggest that Iran does not yet have a viable nuclear weapon design or a suitable explosive detonation system'. Echoing the assertion of nuclear experts, CRS said that Iran 'may also need additional experience in producing weapons-grade HEU metal for use in a nuclear weapon, which is first cast and machined into suitable components for a nuclear core'. If Iran has a secret and advanced nuclear programme and wants to manufacture a nuke, it wouldn't have hidden the components at Fordow, Natanz or Isfahan. Only 20 kg of 93 per cent enriched uranium is enough for making one nuke. The 408.6 kg of untraceable enriched uranium could have been transported in a minitruck to any unknown place. Does Iran have the elements needed for a bomb, and will it assemble one after the humiliation? The answer is buried deeper than Iran's under-construction deepest nuclear facility near Natanz. The writer is a freelance journalist with more than two decades of experience and comments primarily on foreign affairs. He tweets as @FightTheBigots. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not reflect Firstpost's views.
