Isn't it Time for Us Arabs to Rationally Think of the Future?
When a nation's options are narrowed by dramatic developments, it is left with two choices: gloating or denial...
Both affirm that this nation has resigned itself to a life on the margins of history.
We Arabs currently constitute a strong majority in West Asia and North Africa. Our territories are home to some of the world's most significant natural resources; they are by most of the ancient world's seas, and are part of the most important trade and civilization routes known to humanity.
After the First World War, as borders and the balance of power were shifting, ideologies shaped the equations of the next phase in the "game of nations," and it had been assumed that we would keep up with the transformations.
We should have noticed, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which had spanned most of the Arab region, from Iraq to the Algerian-Moroccan border, that new interests, circumstances, and priorities had emerged. However, neither we nor others managed to grasp these shifts in time. That is why the Second World War erupted, changing things and setting new rules for the game.
As for us Arabs, we failed to process the implications of partitioning the Levant and the Nile Valley or what was happening in the Maghreb!
We failed to grasp how the Balfour Declaration would change things on the ground, especially in the context of a global Cold War that divided the world into two camps. The conflict among the old European colonial powers, and later between them and the two rising giants - the United States and the Soviet Union - accelerated the Global South toward independence, and gave rise to "Third World socialism," beginning with China.
Iran, for its part, underwent a remarkable transformation as Britain and Russia jockeyed for influence. In 1925, officer Reza Pahlavi overthrew the Qajar dynasty and established the Pahlavi state. He ruled until 1941, when the Russians and the British removed him because of suspicion that he had been sympathetic to Nazi Germany, replacing him with his son Mohammad.
The son, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, understood the rules of the game with the major powers. He played well for a few years, before choosing to align with the United States and his difficult neighbor, Atatürk's Türkiye, during the Cold War.
Despite their ancient rivalry, Türkiye shared with Pahlavi's Iran not only a commitment to secularism, but also a desire to join the West, as seen with the "Baghdad Pact." Likewise, Atatürk's Türkiye coexisted, for a while, with Zionist Israel, whose establishment fueled anti-Western sentiment in more than one Arab country.
As we know, military juntas began emerging in the 1950s. The Soviet bloc backed their revolutionary policies. Thus, the rift widened, first within the Arab world itself, and second, between the Arab world and the "regional triad" that supported and was supported by the West: namely, Iran, Türkiye, and Israel.
This state of affairs continued until Pahlavi's secular Iran was ousted by Khomeini's "clerical revolution", and until Atatürk's secularism in Türkiye was undermined by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who aspired to combine "caliphate rule" and Turkish nationalism. As for Israel, once defined by the Histadrut and cooperative socialism, it has become a model of racist, theocratic fascism.
Currently, the Israeli-Iranian war, and Türkiye's silent, calculated role in the Fertile Crescent, seem to have caught the Arabs offguard. They find themselves powerlessly watching their region being "reassembled" before their very eyes.
And today, the most that some of them - those who have conveniently forgotten the rabid belligerence of Benjamin Netanyahu - can do is gloat out of childish spite. Is cheering the army that destroyed Gaza and killed its children, merely out of spite toward Iran, not a reflection of paralysis and an utter disregard for the future?
Conversely, denial has become a comfortable refuge for segments of the Iranian regime's support base, who turn a blind eye to its actions.
Here, I claim that our duty is to think in terms of other - plausible this time - options. Personally, I am convinced that defeating Israel is virtually impossible: it is nothing more than a front for the United States. Until Washington is persuaded that aligning fully with Tel Aviv is not inevitable, the Israeli fascists and their allies will continue to choose America's "leaders" and drag the US into fighting their wars.
Incidentally, the "marriage of convenience" between hardline Christian fundamentalists and Jewish communities was consolidated by Evangelicals like the pastor Jerry Falwell, founder of the Moral Majority movement, and extremist Jewish right-wing groups - both economically and religiously - toward the end of the Cold War amid Ronald Reagan's rise.
At the time, their greatest common denominator was hostility to the Soviets and the global Left. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as Samuel Huntington observed, they were united by their hatred of "political Islam." This tactical alliance reached its peak with the emergence - or fabrication - of ISIS-like movements.
Now, these movements are about to expire. Meanwhile the fundamental contradictions - theological and ethnic - between the two opposing camps of arrogant extremists, Jewish and Christian, are surfacing, with each claiming a monopoly over religious truth, virtue, and salvation.
Recognizing this fact, proceeding accordingly, and examining the implications and consequences would be a thousand times more useful than indulging in the negative, foolish reactions of a bygone past that will never return!
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Arab News
14 hours ago
- Arab News
Sacrificing tomorrow's survival in favor of today's foreign exchange
Countries in the Mediterranean appear trapped in a calculated, self-inflicted crisis. Those on southern shores systematically drain finite-capacity aquifers to cultivate luxury exports for foreign consumers, while simultaneously surrendering their food security to volatile global grain markets. This is not environmental misfortune but an engineered outcome of decades of policy choices prioritizing export revenues and external interests over national water resilience and domestic sustenance. The sheer magnitude of this engineered dependency defies sustainability. Consider Egypt, for instance, which is already categorized as a water-scarce country. It holds the dubious distinction of being the planet's single largest importer of wheat, spending billions in precious foreign currency simply to secure the basic flour it needs for its state-subsidized bread, a cornerstone of social stability consumed by millions daily. Yet, simultaneously, Egypt ranks among the world's Top 12 exporters of citrus fruits, potatoes, strawberries, and cotton. Each of these crops demands a staggering amount of irrigation in an environment where every drop of water is contested. Exporting a single tonne of strawberries or a bale of Egyptian cotton effectively ships thousands of precious cubic meters of the nation's dwindling water reserves, primarily to European supermarkets. What emerges is a financial calculus that reveals a profound distortion; the collective annual revenue generated by these 'high-value' agricultural exports falls drastically short of covering the colossal, ever-increasing bill for imported wheat. This gap is further widened by population growth and the immense fiscal burden of bread-subsidy programs, which are essential, yet unsustainable, props for fragile social contracts. It is a pattern replicated across other parts of the Mediterranean's southern shores. Morocco, for instance, in the midst of persistent droughts severe enough to mandate water rationing in urban areas, paradoxically functions as a mega-exporter of water-thirsty tomatoes, citrus, melons, berries, and avocados. Its primary trading partner for this exchange is Europe, eerily perpetuating an extractive dynamic disguised as free trade. Meanwhile, lucrative profits flow to private exporters and satisfy European consumer demand for off-season luxury produce, but the true cost is borne by depleted aquifers and communities facing shrinking water quotas. Similarly, Jordan, drawing down the shared Al-Dissi aquifer that is under the strain of scarcity, channels high-quality groundwater into growing peaches and nectarines, again for export. A common trend begins to emerge in which water-thirsty goods are prioritized over achieving relative domestic food sovereignty. Israel has even managed to take things a step further. Jerusalem not only leverages its prowess and contested control over land and water resources to dominate high-value fruit exports to supportive European markets. Capitalizing on an ongoing 'avocado boom,' while exerting near total control over the food supplies of subjugated neighboring territories, it essentially weaponizes sustenance and robs surviving Gazans of the ability to achieve food and water security on their own terms. So why do states persist in these self-destructive exchanges, given the region's acute water distress amid the worsening effects of climate change? It is a slow-bleed crisis in which the most vulnerable are the first to pay as aquifer levels fall and soaring bread prices rip up social contracts. Hafed Al-Ghwell Firstly, follow the water — and the money. The conversion of arid landscapes into export-oriented plantations did not happen spontaneously; it was engineered through decades of deliberate policy shifts. Beginning in the 1970s and accelerating into the 1980s, international financial institutions imposed structural adjustment programs that demanded the privatization of state assets, the dismantling of farming subsidies, and wholesale reorientation toward foreign exchange generation. This created an agricultural aristocracy: large-scale agribusinesses and politically connected landowners who secured preferential access to subsidized water and prime land. In Egypt, while smallholders faced crippling energy price hikes for irrigation pumps following subsidy cuts mandated by the International Monetary Fund, forcing many to abandon farming, elite exporters flourished by cultivating water-guzzling strawberries bound for European supermarkets, using state-subsidized infrastructure. This contrasts sharply with the diffuse, long-term societal cost of depleted aquifers and a staggering national food import bill. Egypt's annual wheat expenditure alone dwarfs the collective revenue from its famed citrus and potato exports. Today, exporters form a potent lobby, thereby ensuring policies continue to prioritize their water-intensive cash crops over staples for local consumption, directly undermining national food resilience. Secondly, a dangerous technological fatalism appears to have invaded the region's policy-setting circles. Wealthier countries have conjured a myth of infinite hydrological adaptation through massive, energy-intensive seawater desalination projects. This creates a convenient illusion for leaders in less affluent, and increasingly parched, countries that future megaprojects will absolve them from the need to confront the unsustainable water exports of today. This partly explains why drought-stricken Morocco continues to expand its water-thirsty avocado orchards. And, why Jordan continues to extract water from non-renewable aquifers at rates far exceeding the ability to replenish, to supply farms growing fruit for export while clinging to hopes of large-scale desalination, despite lacking the fiscal capacity or sources of sustainable energy to deploy it meaningfully. Such cognitive dissonance is jarring, since present-day policymakers actively accelerate water depletion for short-term export gains, while banking on unaffordable or ecologically questionable technologies to bail them out later. This 'magical thinking' ignores a harsh arithmetic: the energy cost and environmental footprint of desalinating seawater for basic survival would be exponentially higher than the water that is effectively, and recklessly, exported today in every tonne of off-season berries or citrus fruit. The end result is a system that functions as a slow-motion crisis transfer, extracting irreversible natural capital from the South to subsidize stability and abundance in the North. European consumers gain year-round access to affordable luxury: Moroccan winter strawberries retailing for €2.50 ($3) a kilogram in Parisian supermarkets; Israeli avocados shipped to Dutch tables; all irrigated with water sourced from aquifers that might require millennia to replenish. Simultaneously, Southern Mediterranean elites and transnational agribusinesses secure reliable profits. Moroccan tomato exporters and Egyptian cotton magnates operate with state-subsidized water allocations that distort true resource costs. Meanwhile, the ecological and economic foundations of water-stressed countries undergo systematic erosion. Fossil aquifers are drained. Local food systems atrophy as once-thriving milling industries across Iraq, Syria and Palestine have collapsed, forcing 'Fertile Crescent' countries to become flour importers despite their proximity to the historical heartlands of wheat. Water flows perpetually uphill toward power and capital. The true cost of this — which can be measured in depleted water reserves, escalating import bills, lost agricultural resilience, and the deepening vulnerability of the majority — is borne by the populations and the very ecological stability of these countries. Each tonne of exported citrus uses 560 cubic meters of irreplaceable Egyptian groundwater. Each hectare of Moroccan avocados consumes 1.5 million liters a year, while the taps of the local population run dry. It is a system that sacrifices tomorrow's survival in favor of today's political quietism and foreign exchange — a slow-bleed crisis in which the most vulnerable are the first to pay as aquifer levels fall, deserts advance and soaring bread prices rip up social contracts. Addressing this requires a dismantling of the political economy that privileges water exports over conservation and local nourishment — a task that demands much more courage than simply investing in the next desalination plant.


Arab News
2 days ago
- Arab News
Middle East must prioritize diplomacy over conflict
The Middle East stands at a crossroads as tensions between Iran and Israel escalate, marked by the recent Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and Iran's retaliatory ballistic missile barrages. This exchange signaled more than a military skirmish; it heralds a transformative phase in regional geopolitics, challenging the balance of power and raising urgent questions about stability. This article explores the conflict's dynamics, its regional and global implications, and proposes a path toward diplomacy and coexistence, drawing on historical insights and balanced perspectives. The conflict's latest chapter began with Israel's targeted strike on Iran's Fordow nuclear facility, a move that signaled a bold escalation in its strategy against Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran's vast geography allows it to disperse strategic assets, complicating defense but enabling resilience. Israel, conversely, benefits from compact, fortified defenses but faces vulnerabilities due to its concentrated infrastructure. Iran's missile response showcased its capacity to project power, underscoring a rebalanced military equation. Such tit-for-tat attacks risks spiraling into broader conflict, with significant human and economic costs. Israel's economy, for instance, faces daily losses estimated at half a billion dollars during intense operations. While both sides demonstrate military prowess, escalation threatens regional stability, underscoring the need for de-escalation to prevent further devastation. The 12-day conflict exposed strategic disarray in Israel and the US. In Israel, public support for the military action against Iran was strong, with 82 percent of its Jewish citizens backing the operations, according to polls. Yet, 70 percent of respondents, including 88 percent of Palestinian citizens, expressed concern over the war's economic and social toll, reflecting a nuanced public sentiment. In the US, political divisions complicated the response. A CNN poll indicated 56 percent of Americans opposed its strikes on Iran, with 60 percent fearing heightened threats to US security. Democrats (88 percent) and independents (60 percent) largely opposed military action, while Republicans (82 percent) generally supported it. This lack of consensus weakens coordinated policy, amplifying regional uncertainty. Escalation threatens regional stability, underscoring the need for de-escalation to prevent further devastation Dr. Turki Faisal Al-Rasheed Saudi Arabia offers a counterpoint, advocating for stability through diplomacy. Recognizing that military solutions, such as destroying Iran's nuclear capabilities, could ignite further chaos, the Kingdom prioritizes regional alliances and dialogue. This approach contrasts with Israel's reliance on force under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose strategy intertwines national security with political survival amid domestic challenges. George Modelski's long cycle theory provides context, framing global leadership as cyclical, with hegemonic powers rising and declining over roughly 100-year periods. The US, the current hegemon arguably since 1914, faces declining influence as challengers emerge. This shift influences Middle Eastern dynamics, where Iran and Israel vie for regional dominance amid a multipolar global order. Similarly, Ibn Khaldun's 14th-century cyclical theory likens states to living organisms, rising through triumph and declining through internal decay. In this conflict, Iran's resilience and Israel's vulnerabilities reflect these cycles, suggesting that internal cohesion and strategic foresight will determine their trajectories. The strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities tested the regime's resilience. Bolstered by national identity and complex ethnic ties, Iran differs from Iraq's post-2003 collapse. The regime's durability suggests that external pressure alone is unlikely to topple it. Former CIA Director Leon Panetta has warned that targeting Iran risks a regional war, citing Iraq's invasion as a cautionary tale. Iran's response could ultimately escalate tensions, potentially unifying its factions around a nuclear agenda. Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard, notes that while Iran's conventional military was weakened by the sustained Israeli strikes, the nuclear program's long-term setback is limited. Hard-liners advocating for a bomb may now gain influence, diminishing prospects for negotiated enrichment limits. Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations theory frames Western dominance as rooted in organized violence; a lens critics argue justifies aggression against the Islamic world. The West's history of colonial exploitation and modern conflicts, from Iraq to Palestine, fuels regional distrust. Media exposure of the limited Gaza aid and continued arms support for Israel despite global protests reinforces this narrative. While Western dissent exists, its impact remains limited, underscoring the challenge of altering entrenched policies. Saudi Arabia's model of coexistence offers a blueprint, emphasizing cooperative frameworks to ease tensions Dr. Turki Faisal Al-Rasheed In the Arab world, a nihilistic outlook attributing setbacks to external conspiracies often overshadows internal governance failures. Overcoming this requires embracing justice and strategic management to build resilient societies. The Middle East's future hinges on prioritizing diplomacy over conflict. Historical interventions, like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, demonstrate that military victories are fleeting and destabilizing. Saudi Arabia's model of coexistence offers a blueprint, emphasizing cooperative frameworks to ease tensions. Addressing humanitarian crises, such as Gaza's plight, is critical to reducing regional friction. Israel must reassess its reliance on force, while Iran should engage in good-faith negotiations to reintegrate globally. A collective pause in hostilities on all fronts could pave the way for dialogue, fostering a new Middle Eastern order rooted in mutual respect. The Arab world must counter defeatist narratives by focusing on internal strengths, justice, governance and resource security. As the adage warns, 'when nations change, guard your head.' Strategic caution, including securing food, water and energy, is essential amid transformative shifts. The Iranian-Israeli conflict marks a pivotal moment for the Middle East, where competing visions of security and stability collide. While Israel and the US lean on military might, Saudi Arabia's diplomatic approach offers a viable alternative. History warns that wars complicate rather than resolve disputes. By embracing dialogue and addressing internal weaknesses, regional powers can forge a stable, cooperative future, break the cycle of conflict and build a new era of coexistence. • Dr. Turki Faisal Al-Rasheed is an adjunct professor at the University of Arizona's College of Agriculture, Life and Environmental Sciences, in the Department of Biosystems Engineering. He is the author of 'Agricultural Development Strategies: The Saudi Experience.' X: @TurkiFRasheed


Asharq Al-Awsat
2 days ago
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Syrians in Libya Struggle to Escape ‘Exile in Limbo'
About seven months ago, a group of 25 Syrian youths, including minors, set off from Libya on an irregular migration journey toward Europe. Only four made it back alive. The rest drowned in the Mediterranean. The tragedy, which left a deep mark on Syrian communities both in Libya and abroad, has drawn renewed attention to the large and diverse Syrian population now living in the North African country, some fleeing the war in Syria under former President Bashar al-Assad, others settled there long before. Syria's presence in Libya is far from monolithic. It spans businessmen, migrant laborers, families who settled during the rule of Muammar Gaddafi, and former fighters now working as mercenaries. Many also see Libya as a temporary stop on the perilous path to Europe. For most, Libya is not the destination but a gateway. The recent drowning of 21 Syrians in the Mediterranean was not an isolated tragedy, but part of a pattern of loss that has haunted the community for years. Reports from local and international migration watchdogs have documented repeated drownings and arrests of Syrians at sea, with many captured by Libya's coastguard and detained in overcrowded jails. Despite the risks, many Syrians have managed to adapt to life in Libya, integrating into local communities and participating in its economy. Yet numerous challenges persist, particularly for undocumented workers and those living without valid residency papers. Many report facing discrimination, abuse, and difficult working conditions. As thousands of Syrian refugees across the Middle East prepare to return home amid improving conditions and relaxed restrictions, Syrians in Libya remain stuck, unable to stay, and unable to leave. 'We're caught in the middle,' said one Syrian resident in Tripoli. 'We can't endure much longer, but we also can't afford to go back.' Many Syrians in Libya say they are increasingly vulnerable to exploitation, including passport confiscation and harassment by armed groups and criminal gangs operating with impunity. Several Syrian residents told Asharq Al-Awsat they are facing rising unemployment, frequent kidnappings, and demands for ransom by militias. For those who now wish to return to Syria, doing so has become financially prohibitive due to hefty fines for visa violations. Steep Penalties for Overstaying Under a revised Libyan immigration law enacted on March 14, 2024, foreigners who overstay their visas or residency permits are charged 500 Libyan dinars - around $90 - per month. The regulation adds a significant burden for many Syrians whose legal documents have expired and who lack the resources to renew them or pay the fines required to exit the country legally. Due to the political division in Libya since 2014, no official statistics exist on the number of foreign residents. However, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) reported in 2020 that approximately 14,500 Syrian refugees and asylum seekers were living in Libya. Ten years after arriving in Libya, Ahmed Kamal Al-Fakhouri says he is now trapped, unable to afford life in the country or the high costs of leaving it. 'They've imposed fines on us that are beyond reason - nearly $1,500 per person,' said Fakhouri, a restaurant worker in Tripoli, echoing a growing outcry among Syrians in Libya burdened by mounting penalties and legal uncertainties. 'Sometimes, I can't even afford a day's meal.' Fakhouri fled Derna after the deadly floods of August 2023 and resettled in Tripoli. 'I saw death with my own eyes,' he told Asharq Al-Awsat, describing the trauma of losing his home. 'Now we're living in misery. We want the world to hear our voice - we want to go back to our country.' Libya hosts thousands of Syrians, including doctors, engineers, university students, and day laborers who fill the country's markets in search of work to support their families. Yet many say they now find themselves stuck, facing visa penalties they can't afford and no clear path home - even as the fall of Assad's regime renews hopes for return. 'Exit Tax' Burdens Families While Libya's labor ministries have issued no formal statement on the matter, members of the Syrian community say they are being charged an "exit tax" calculated based on their overstay period. No official decree has been published, but testimonies suggest the fees are acting as a de facto barrier to departure. Following Assad's ouster, many Syrians are reconsidering return, describing exile as a 'prison,' but are deterred by the financial burden of settling overstays. Asharq Al-Awsat reached out to both of Libya's rival labor ministries to clarify policies affecting Syrians and the reported fines for expired documents, but received no response. Zekeriya Saadi, another Syrian living in Tripoli, has publicly called on authorities in both eastern and western Libya to cancel the exit tax and allow those wishing to return to Syria to do so. 'In these unbearable conditions, it's unreasonable to ask refugees to pay such high fees just to leave the country,' he said. 'This tax is a major obstacle, it exceeds our capacity, especially given our financial hardships.' Saadi said most Syrians in Libya are low-income families without stable jobs. 'Many are at risk of eviction, kidnapping, or exploitation. Leaving has become a matter of survival,' he said. 'How can a displaced person be treated like a tourist or a wealthy expat?' He urged Syria's Foreign Ministry to take a clear stance and negotiate with Libyan authorities for fee exemptions and coordinated return efforts, while also working to protect Syrians who remain in the country. Passport Problems Bar Education Beyond financial barriers, expired passports are also stranding Syrians in legal limbo. Many have lost access to services, and the issue is now affecting the next generation. According to Syrian media reports, education officials in Misrata barred at least 100 Syrian children from enrolling in public schools because their parents' passports had expired, highlighting how bureaucratic obstacles are deepening the crisis for displaced families.