Latest news with #ColdWar
Straits Times
an hour ago
- Politics
- Straits Times
Conscription, once buried, returns to the debate at a turning point in Germany's defence arrangement
Apart from efforts to attract volunteers, the idea of reinstating conscription – suspended in 2011 – is now in the spotlight. PHOTO: SERGEY PONOMAREV/NYTIMES Conscription, once buried, returns to the debate at a turning point in Germany's defence arrangement – The Bundeswehr seems to be everywhere in Germany these days – on posters, sandwich wrappers, in television adverts and across social media. The German military sends personalised postcards to hundreds of thousands of 16 and 17-year-olds and promises 'exclusive experiences' and 'up-close impressions' at open days aimed at enticing them to sign on. Since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 in what Germany calls its Zeitenwende – a historic turning point – the military has launched a major image campaign. The reason is simple: Far too few young Germans are volunteering for service. Apart from efforts to attract volunteers, the idea of reinstating conscription – suspended in 2011 – is now in the spotlight at a time when the German military budget is set to rise significantly in the coming years. At its recent summit, Nato acceded to US President Donald Trump's demand that European allies vastly increase defence spending to 5 per cent of their respective gross domestic product (GDP) from the erstwhile 2 per cent expectation. Seen as a Cold War relic at the time, Germany's conscription system was suspended in the wake of professionalisation trends across Nato and a waning perception of immediate military threat, particularly from Russia. The Bundeswehr was streamlined, and defence policy pivoted towards international missions and soft power. By the time of its suspension, mandatory service had already been reduced to just six months and applied to only a fraction of eligible recruits. Questions about both the duration and fairness of the draft process undermined its legitimacy, leading to its indefinite suspension. Things changed, however, when Moscow annexed Crimea and occupied the Donbas in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and then unleashed a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia is now again a security threat, with the German military short of funds, arms and troops. Moreover, the US, with Mr Trump's appeasement approach towards Russian President Vladimir Putin, is no longer a reliable ally. Germany has committed the funds towards beefing up its military but needs to address the shortage of fighting men. 'We need conscription again,' said Lieutenant-General Alfons Mais, Germany's army chief, at the Munich Security Conference in February. 'Our goals can't be achieved otherwise.' One of those goals, set by Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, is for the Bundeswehr to grow to 260,000 troops from the current 182,000 within a decade, ready for high-intensity warfare. This would bring the Bundeswehr to around its strength at the turn of the 21st century, when it had about 250,000 troops, but still short of the more than 500,000 at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s. Mr Pistorius is currently banking on a revamped voluntary service model to reverse the Bundeswehr's recruitment shortfall. Under the new initiative, set to begin in the latter half of 2025, all 18-year-old men will receive a questionnaire to assess their willingness and fitness for military service. Those who express interest may be called in for further screening, with the goal of gradually increasing the number of full-time soldiers and reservists. The programme offers several incentives: Recruits can earn a monthly base salary starting at around € 1,800 (S$2,700), receive free accommodation, healthcare and training, and are given pathways to civilian careers within the Bundeswehr system. However, Mr Pistorius has made it clear that if the voluntary route fails to meet Germany's ambitious personnel goals, he will not hesitate to push for a return to mandatory conscription. 'If we don't succeed voluntarily, we will have to consider other steps,' he warned at an interview in May, signalling a significant cultural shift in Germany's post-Cold War defence policy. Germany projects that its defence expenditure would more than double from € 62.4 billion in 2025 to € 152.8 billion by 2029. Of the eventual 5 per cent of its GDP invested in defence, Chancellor Friedrich Merz aims to spend 1.5 per cent on dual-use infrastructure and 3.5 per cent directly on the Bundeswehr. To unlock this funding, the new German government had pushed through a constitutional amendment enabling significant new borrowing – underscoring the urgency and importance of this policy change. Dissent among politicians Against the backdrop of the broader debate on national defence, it is perhaps of little surprise that many observers are rubbing their eyes in disbelief. Is it really Germany – of all countries, the one responsible for two world wars in the last century – that is now setting out to build one of the most powerful armies in Europe once again? A group of Social Democrats led by former parliamentary leader Rolf Mutzenich recently published a paper protesting against the massive increase in defence spending, while rejecting the stationing of US long-range weapons on German soil. They also called for a renewed policy of cooperation with Russia, harking back to the generally cooperative relations between Germany and Russia in the two decades after the Cold War. The Social Democratic Party is part of the current ruling coalition led by Mr Merz's Christian Democratic Union. 'This paper is a denial of reality. It exploits the people's understandable desire for an end to the terrible war in Ukraine,' Mr Pistorius, himself a Social Democrat, said in June in an interview with the German Press Agency. Russia's invasion of Ukraine is perceived by most European states as an existential threat. 2022 pushed the German political class – and much of Europe's as well – into making a long-overdue U-turn, expanding defence spending to rebuild the long-neglected armed forces of Europe's largest economy. That rebuilding will not be easy. Speaking shortly after Mr Putin's Ukraine invasion began, Lt-Gen Mais had said the Bundeswehr stood 'more or less bare' after years of austerity and had only limited options in the face of Russia. That reality, he confirmed at February's Munich Security Conference, has not fundamentally changed. 'We're not in a good place,' he added. 'We're suffering from the loss of equipment sent to Ukraine and from painfully slow structural reform.' Challenges of rapid change To now quickly scale up the army and increase troop numbers would require new infrastructure. This is because dozens of military bases have closed, with barracks turned into residential housing. All 52 local conscription offices were shut down in 2012 – replaced by slimmed-down career centres and advisory hubs tailored to the reduced ambition. Mr Paul Wohlfahrt, 27, a reservist in the mountain infantry, is sceptical of such rapid German military expansion plans. 'Before we even talk about conscription, we need the infrastructure in place,' he told The Straits Times. 'Even now, not every soldier has a bed or a room – many go home to sleep. So where are we going to house new recruits?' He claims that numerous applicants have already been turned away due to a lack of capacity. While the Bundeswehr is tight-lipped about such claims, there are a number of reports on this, including one from public service broadcaster ZDF quoting internal papers of the reservists' association as saying that it is 'critical of the fact that interested reservists are now being put off for so long'. Mr Wohlfahrt completed his service in 2016/17 and has regularly taken part in reserve exercises since. He believes making voluntary service more attractive would be a better path than reintroducing conscription. 'If I have to wait six to twelve months for a response after applying, I'll just take a job in the private sector,' he said. Mass deficit But increasing troop numbers is only one part of the challenge. The Bundeswehr must also decide what kind of force it wants to be: a territorial army capable of defending Germany from attack, a high-tech military focused on drones and cyber warfare – or both. 'Only what is physically present in Central and Eastern Europe can deter an enemy,' Mr Hans-Peter Bartels, a former parliamentary commissioner for the German armed forces, said earlier in 2025, referring to the importance of having tanks and troops on the ground. 'Germany has to provide mass. And right now, that's missing.' His remarks underscore the urgency of building not just capability, but also visible presence – boots on the ground, tanks in the field. To ramp up production of military equipment and weapons, Germany's defence companies seeking to increase capacity are looking to cooperate with the country's languishing car industry. German army recruiters set up a tent and an armoured vehicle at a go-kart race in Germany on May 25. PHOTO: SERGEY PONOMAREV/NYTIMES It was reported in March that Rheinmetall, Germany's largest arms producer, was repurposing two plants making automotive parts to manufacture defence equipment. In early 2025, Hensoldt, a radar and sensor specialist, took over some workers from Continental when the car parts maker closed one of its plants in the town of Wetzlar. Recently, Germany's largest carmaker Volkswagen signalled that it would be ready to offer industrial expertise and strategic consultancy to support military vehicle manufacturers. The nuclear question There is also the issue of nuclear deterrence, given that Russia is a nuclear-armed power. Germany's and Europe's security situation has become more precarious because Mr Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on whether America would honour Nato's collective defence clause – Article 5 – in the event of an attack. His appeasement approach towards Mr Putin, along with America's ambiguous stance on Ukraine , has sowed further doubt. So what would European security look like without the US and without the American nuclear umbrella? While Britain has explicitly placed its nuclear forces at Nato's disposal, France has deliberately kept its nuclear forces, the so-called 'Force de Frappe', under national command and not part of Nato's nuclear planning group. But even if France were willing, would its stockpile of roughly 300 warheads suffice as credible deterrence? Within Germany, public sentiment has shifted noticeably since Russia's invasion of Ukraine. While pacifist instincts remain strong among many Germans, recent polls indicate growing support for national defence efforts. A YouGov/dpa survey from 2024 showed that more than half of the population favours reintroducing some form of conscription, particularly among older Germans , although support remains lower among the 18-29 age group. Nevertheless, the war has left a mark on younger Germans as well: There is a visible uptick in interest in defence-sector careers, especially in technical and logistical roles. Companies like Rheinmetall and Airbus Defence report increased applications, and more young professionals view work in security-related fields as both meaningful and future-oriented. Mr Wohlfahrt believes that there is a rising sense of urgency among Germans that having an operational defence is of the essence. 'Step by step, soldiers are realising that change is under way. It may be slow, but at least something is happening,' he said. Markus Ziener is a professor at Media University Berlin and writes on political and security issues. Join ST's Telegram channel and get the latest breaking news delivered to you.
Chicago Tribune
3 hours ago
- Entertainment
- Chicago Tribune
Biblioracle: Remembering the writers Frederick Forsyth and Edmund White
When a writer of note and particular importance dies, I often like to write a column of tribute exploring the writer's work and the influence it had on my life and my thinking. These are not proper obituaries, but more of a personal remembrance of a connection with someone whom I've never met but has still had some indelible effect on my life. Sadly, I could do these pieces just about every week. Though maybe this isn't sad. To be able to say that so many writers have been meaningful to you is not a horrible thing. Sometimes I consider doing a column about a particular writer but decide that my connection isn't quite sufficient to carry a full installment, and I move on. But there have been two recent deaths of writers who did very different things in their work and that I encountered at two very different times in my life who now feel strangely paired. Frederick Forsyth, one of the great political/spy thriller writers of all time, died June 9 at the age of 86. In the early '70s, Forsyth had one of the great consecutive runs of commercial fiction, releasing 'The Day of the Jackal,' 'The Odessa File,' and 'The Dogs of War' all between 1971 and 1974. These tales of Cold War intrigue often folded in real-life figures — the plot of 'The Day of the Jackal' revolves around an assassination plot of then-French president Charles de Gaulle — and read like someone tapped into a trove of top-secret files. I read these novels in the back of the car as a tween/young teen, escaping from the tedium of a family road trip into a world of daring and intrigue. What did I know about secret geopolitical machinations? Nothing, but the books were thrilling, and few have topped him when it comes to the thriller genre. Forsyth's later work was marred by an overt preoccupation with right-wing politics, but I cannot forget the first adult writer I ever read. I came to the work of Edmund White, who died on June 3 at the age of 85, via a writer who was influenced by him, Garth Greenwell. Greenwell's quasi-trilogy 'What Belongs to You,' 'Cleanness' and 'Small Rain' delivers powerful stories of gay life in contemporary America written with a frankness that breaks through what I can only describe as my own ignorance rooted in my straight, white male experience of the world. Greenwell has described White as a kind of progenitor who made his subsequent work possible, and I became curious about his progenitor. I went back to start White's own semi-autobiographical quasi-trilogy of 'A Boy's Own Story,' 'The Beautiful Room Is Empty' and 'The Farewell Symphony' and it was like being introduced to The Beatles after you'd first heard Nirvana. 'A Boy's Own Story' is an amazing experience as White unfolds the life of a 15-year-old narrator (at the opening) just as he comes to understand and misunderstand his homosexuality. This is the 1950s in the Midwest and the boy feels that his own deepest desires are taboo and therefore attempts to deny them. But these desires cannot be denied. Told retrospectively when the narrator has emerged into adulthood, we feel both external and internal turbulence of the narrator's life. At the same time, White also shows that his view of the world, colored by his sexuality, is a kind of superpower that reveals self-knowledge hidden from most people. I doubt I'll ever run out of writers who have something fresh to reveal to me about the world. I'm grateful to have encountered these two. John Warner is the author of books including 'More Than Words: How to Think About Writing in the Age of AI.' You can find him at Book recommendations from the Biblioracle John Warner tells you what to read based on the last five books you've read. 1. 'Hang on St. Christopher' by Adrian McKinty 2. 'The Dragon Republic' by R.F. Kuang 3. 'Not Your China Doll: The Wild and Shimmering Life of Anna May Wong' by Katie Gee Salisbury 4. 'The Light Eaters: How the Unseen World of Plant Intelligence Offers a New Understanding of Life on Earth' by Zoë Schlanger 5. 'A Serial Killer's Guide to Marriage' by Asia MackayI have just the book for Rosary. The first in a series of witty, unconventional mysteries, 'Everyone in My Family Has Killed Someone' by Benjamin Stevenson. 1. 'Tom Clancy: Defense Protocol' by Brian Andrews 2. 'Battle Mountain' by C.J. Box 3. 'Perfect Storm' by Paige Shelton 4. 'The Medici Return' by Steve Berry 5. 'Den of Iniquity' by J.A. JanceI'm going to lean into the thriller, though a mystery would work too: 'The Gray Man' by Mark Greaney. 1. 'Never Flinch' by Stephen King 2. 'Framed' by John Grisham and Jim McCloskey 3. 'Lost City of the Monkey God' by Douglas Preston 4. 'Rabbit Moon' by Jennifer Haigh 5. 'Middletide' by Sarah CrouchFor Sue, I'm recommending a book by one of the three authors I covered last week, 'Dare Me' by Megan Abbott. Get a reading from the Biblioracle Send a list of the last five books you've read and your hometown to biblioracle@
Japan Forward
9 hours ago
- Politics
- Japan Forward
Immigration in Japan: Rethinking Refugee Protection in a Changing World
このページを 日本語 で読む The Refugee Convention, specifically the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, was established in the aftermath of World War II. Its primary aim was to protect civilians fleeing from the Eastern Bloc to the West. Born out of the Cold War, the convention's origins continue to shape how "refugee" is defined today. At the time, the focus was clear. In communist states, individuals were often persecuted for their political or religious beliefs. To counter that behavior, the convention aimed to provide legal protection for those targeted by authoritarian regimes. Last in the series. Read the series: Immigration in Japa n Since then, however, the nature of global displacement has dramatically evolved. Today's international community faces crises not only along ideological lines but across divides between the Global North and South, and even within the Global South itself. Conflicts driven by ethnic tension, poverty, and inequality have triggered civil wars, lawlessness, and mass atrocities. Many have fled in search of safety. Others have left not because their lives were immediately endangered, but to escape poverty, disaster, or systemic discrimination in hopes of building a better future. As global challenges have shifted from Cold War-era ideological divides to the complex realities of North-South and South-South tensions, the original framework of the Refugee Convention has become increasingly difficult to apply. It was designed to protect those fleeing political persecution under authoritarian regimes. For the most part, that did not include those escaping fragile governance, chronic instability, or daily insecurity. At the same time, it's overly simplistic and unjust to dismiss everyone in these circumstances as mere economic migrants and deny them protection outright. In response, new systems have begun to emerge under terms like "complementary protection." These frameworks are meant to assist individuals fleeing indiscriminate violence, conflict, or systemic collapse — even if they don't strictly qualify as refugees under the original convention. Japan is among the countries starting to adopt such measures. Looking ahead, political repression, armed conflict, economic collapse, and natural disasters will continue to force people from their homelands. Across borders, there remains a shared moral instinct, a sense that we should help those in need. But when it comes to the concrete questions of how to help and through what systems, the world is still feeling its way forward. On March 28, 2025, central Myanmar was struck by a powerful magnitude 7.7 earthquake. Around the same time, a high-rise building under construction collapsed in Bangkok — a tragedy still fresh in public memory. I extend my sincere condolences to all those affected and pray for their swift recovery. What stood out to me in the aftermath was a striking detail: many of the workers at the collapse site were from Myanmar. A behavioral study by the Media Intelligence Group (MI Group) estimates that there are currently 6.8 million Myanmar nationals working in Thailand. Of these, only about 1.85 million have valid work permits. In other words, over 67% of Thailand's roughly 2.7 million foreign workers are from Myanmar. And the vast majority of them are undocumented. Rohingya refugees from Myanmar cross a bamboo-made bridge during an ongoing heatwave in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, May 2, 2024. (@Reuters) Roughly five million Myanmar nationals are working in Thailand without legal status. If one of them is killed or injured in a workplace accident, like in the recent building collapse, there's often no registration, no records, and no protections. They vanish without a trace, unrecognized by any official system. In the case of Myanmar-Thailand migration, this undocumented status often results from informal land crossings. Japan, by contrast, requires all entrants to pass through official ports or airports, making irregular entry less common. Still, once someone overstays their visa or fails to obtain proper residency, they too become undocumented. I believe Japan should not accept foreign workers under such conditions. Anyone living here should hold a valid residence status — not only to ensure access to emergency support and legal protections, but also to earn the trust of both Japanese society and fellow foreigners. Japan's system should help those in need obtain and maintain legal status, not fall through the cracks. At the same time, Japan must take a hard look at the immigration and refugee policy failures seen in many Western countries. There are people who don't qualify as refugees under the convention but are fleeing instability, poor governance, or systemic failure. We should recognize their hardship and create mechanisms that offer fair access to information, assistance, and opportunities. However, reliance solely on international organizations like UNHCR or the International Organization for Migration to manage refugee and migration issues is not ideal. Japan should strengthen its own efforts through agencies like the Japan International Cooperation Agency. By focusing on international cooperation, technical assistance, and financial aid, Japan can help developing countries build the conditions that allow people to thrive at home, surrounded by family and community, in peace and stability. April 30, 2025, marked 50 years since the end of the Vietnam War. It was a moment that evoked memories of the harrowing refugee crisis that followed. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the exodus from Indochina shocked the world. Between two and three million "boat people" fled Vietnam alone. In an era before the internet or mobile phones, they were driven by fear, misinformation, and desperation, setting out into the sea with nothing but hope for survival. A Helicopter offloads evacuees onto the US Navy aircraft carrier USS Midway (CVA-41) during the evacuation of South Vietnam. ("Operation Frequent Wind") in April 1975. A boy who fled his country at the age of ten would now be 60. Rescued by Japan, he became a citizen more than three decades ago. Today, he runs his own company and actively supports students and technical interns from his homeland. He is one of many who now serve as living bridges between Japan and Vietnam. Foreign workers come with different hopes and plans. Some aim to stay briefly, earn money, and return home. Others dream of reuniting with family and building a permanent life in Japan. Whatever their path, we must ensure they can live here legally — in a society built on mutual respect and shared effort. Author: Fusako Yanase In addition to being an expert on immigration, Yanase is a best-selling author and former Honorary Chair of the Certified NPO Association for Aid and Relief, Japan. このページを 日本語 で読む
AllAfrica
15 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
‘Special relationship': preparing Britain and America for new era
The Council on Geostrategy has just launched 'The 'special relationship': preparing Britain and America for a new era' at a roundtable hosted by the US Embassy in London. This paper focuses on the alliance in a time of immense change and we tasked ourselves with providing an honest, non-emotive read out of the state of the alliance, focusing on converging or diverging interests – and not values. Here are our big three take-aways. 1. We still have many convergences: the US and UK broadly agree that the economic trading order has hurt their economies and led to de-industrialization, but they are unclear as to the future direction. Is a Bretton Woods II needed or a G7/D-10 that creates a group of like-minded economic powers as occurred during the Cold War? Certainly, the US has decided on its trajectory and is moving out on that trajectory, but the UK remains uncertain… 2. We have a long-term divergence in terms of theatre priority, the shift of US focus to the Indo-Pacific has been taking place since 2011, when the Pivot was first announced. The UK should not be surprised. This divergence is, we feel, manageable through the framework that the two theatres are 'interconnected' and that what China and Russia each do in those separate theatres impacts both. This is already true in Ukraine and may become true in other areas. 3. We are more concerned about a divergence in threat priority. For many years, the UK has 'muddled through' on China and though the Strategic Defense Review, National Security Strategy, and China Audit all point to a shift in approach, there are strong indicators that this government – like those preceding it – is being careful to manage relations with Beijing carefully as it is seen as a driver for growth. The US shift on Moscow is also of concern to London, which is skeptical of an attempt at a 'reverse Kissinger' in which the US, to counter China, aligns with Russia. We have made a series of recommendations for both sides – particularly on defense industrial cooperation where we see great potential. You may download the full report here. The executive summary follows: Context: While historical foundations and ties have helped to reinforce the 'special relationship' between the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US), it was common geopolitical interests which bound the two nations together. Chief among these has been to prevent others from dominating the most industrialised and productive regions of Eurasia. As a result, both countries have co-constructed the prevailing international order. Their strength, determination and foresight after the Second World War created alliances and institutions which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the enlargement of that order and the offshoring of manufacturing have empowered adversaries while weakening UK and US strategic industries. Geopolitical changes, especially growing Russian and Chinese aggression, as well as political and strategic changes in Britain and America, have led to fresh questions being asked about the future of the special relationship. Questions this report addresses: What were the fundamental interests which brought the UK and US together, and do they remain cogent? How can the two reinforce convergent interests while simultaneously managing divergent interests? How can policymakers within the two countries redefine the alliance for a new era of geopolitics and revision of the international order? Key findings: In the 2020s, areas of converging interests include: Accepting limits on globalization: This convergence is currently implicit rather than explicit, though both countries recognise the need to rectify the negative impacts which globalisation has had on their own economies and societies. Rising to the geopolitical challenge: Both countries express aspirations of leadership and have shown the will to address systemic challenges, although to differing degrees in their respective theatres. Rebuilding the defense industrial base: Both nations have identified an urgent need to rebuild production capacity and invest in future technologies. Areas of diverging interests include: Theater priority: For the first time in decades, there is a strong possibility that the UK and US will prioritise different regions, with Britain focused primarily on the Euro-Atlantic and America on the Indo-Pacific, though both also retain an interest in the Middle East. Threat precedence: The UK's stance towards the People's Republic of China (PRC) frustrates Washington, while London worries about a softer US approach towards Russia. Cooperation preference: The two countries are somewhat divided on their approach to multilateral institutions, including on climate change and trade arrangements. These areas of divergence notwithstanding, Britain and America have made similar diagnoses of the geopolitical problems they face, even if they are starting to focus on them from different directions. The two nations also share clarity of purpose in many areas: they require closer and continued strategic dialogue to realign growing divergences. One problem, particularly for the UK, is that while US power has surged ahead, the UK, like many other allies, has fallen behind. Britain has a special interest in strengthening itself – economically, diplomatically and militarily – otherwise its voice will weaken in Washington. However, each country is likely to remain the other's most powerful ally well into the 21st century. This necessitates closer cooperation. While the US has other important allies and partners, none of these look set to be more powerful than the UK by the early 2030s, especially if British naval and deterrence capabilities are regenerated. Recommendations: To repurpose the special relationship, the UK and US should: Create a new vision of the future of the international order: Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Review the level of rival co-option occurring in existing geoeconomic organisations in order to create new ones where necessary, to deal with trade abuses and to coordinate sanctions more effectively; Explore ways of establishing a new geoeconomic order, designed to reinforce the prosperity and resilience of free and open countries, which seeks to limit the ability of adversaries to compete at the geoeconomic level; Strengthen the alignments between the UK and US scientific and technological bases to generate collaboration on regulations for emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Quantum technologies, behind which like-minded partners can follow. Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should: Plan for a modulated multi-theatre posture: There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Work together – and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – to create a clear timeline for the move of key US assets from Europe to the Indo-Pacific theatre over the next five to ten years. The aim should be to allow the UK and other allies to replace those assets in an orderly manner, rather than during a geopolitical emergency in the future; Prepare for the UK to provide leadership and enhanced deterrence in Europe; Reinforce UK support for US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in the Indo-Pacific; Develop strategic dialogues on the most pressing issues to foster alignment on key national priorities; Forge a better understanding of how and where both nations could contribute to a simultaneous multi-front crisis if one were to materialise. There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain's primary theatre, the two governments should: Coordinate military production: There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should: Commit to spend at least 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence by 2030, with 3.5% on military capabilities and 1.5% on strategic infrastructure, as per the recommendation of Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO; Ensure that there is clear direction and prioritisation for transatlantic defence industrial collaboration; Prioritise rare earth metal supply chain cooperation; continued PRC control over this vital supply chain is simply not sustainable for future UK-US military industrial expansion and operations; Support efforts which contribute to leadership in critical technologies; Build up the production and co-production of munitions at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels; Cooperate more on co-sustainment, particularly to enable British shipyards to support the US Navy. There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should: William Freer is a research fellow in national security at the Council on Geostrategy in London. John Hemmings, PhD, is deputy director (geopolitics) at the Council on Geostrategy. James Rogers is co-founder (research) at the Council on Geostrategy.
CTV News
18 hours ago
- Business
- CTV News
Former PM Harper says military spending can address Arctic infrastructure gap
Former prime minister Stephen Harper delivers the keynote address at a conference on Wednesday, March 22, 2023 in Ottawa. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Adrian Wyld OTTAWA — Former prime minister Stephen Harper says the best way to build much-needed infrastructure in the Arctic is through military spending. Speaking at an Arctic security conference in Iqaluit on Friday, Harper said leveraging military spending can build roads and runways to create supply chains and lower the cost of living. Canada has committed to NATO's new military spending target of five per cent of GDP and federal officials have spoken in recent years about linking northern infrastructure to defence spending. Harper said the threats Canada faces offer an opportunity to develop the region, much as the Second World War and the Cold War led to rapid development of northern infrastructure. Harper said this visit to Iqaluit is his first since leaving office. Harper prioritized northern development as prime minister and made annual trips to the region. This report by The Canadian Press was first published June 27, 2025 Nick Murray, The Canadian Press
