Defence doesn't just need more money. It needs wholesale reform

Telegraph

02-06-2025

Today saw the unveiling of the much awaited Strategic Defence Review. Commissioned nearly a year ago and presented by an independent panel including Lord Robertson, Fiona Hill, and General Richard Barrons it has been a long time coming and the crescendo of speculation and rumours is now at an end.
Which is a shame really because the review itself is something of a disappointment. It's long, well written, insightful in places and contains some interesting strategic guidance.
The problem is it lacks foundations. Defence doesn't just need more money. It needs a root and branch overhaul of the systems, infrastructure and mindset that underpins it. These are largely absent from this document at a time in which they are needed more than ever.
The SDR was designed to: 'determine the roles, capabilities and reforms required by UK defence to meet the challenges, threats and opportunities of the twenty-first century, deliverable and affordable within the resources available to defence within the trajectory to 2.5 per cent. The Review will ensure that Defence is central both to the security, and to the economic growth and prosperity, of the United Kingdom'.
But what drafting it has shown, almost from the off, is the gulf between what the Ministry of Defence thinks it needs to achieve this last sentence and the 2.5 per cent the Treasury thinks it can afford to do so. The Prime Minister, despite making 'defence the central organising principle of government', has not arbitrated to the extent required to resolve this difference.
The current promise of '2.5 per cent by 2027', an increase in 0.2 per cent, is not enough to do anything but paper over the cracks caused by 30 years of underinvestment. Only now is the Defence Secretary talking in terms of '3 per cent by 2034' which by many, myself included, is too little too late. Unless this is resolved, the SDR remains window dressing. A document that doesn't articulate and then balance Ends, Ways and Means is not a strategy; it's a think piece.
The Hague summit later this month will be key. Many countries attending are now talking openly in terms of a rapid 'increase to 3.5 per cent on defence and a further 1.5 per cent on broader security measures'. We can not pretend to hold any sort of a leadership position on defence if we don't move in the same direction, and fast.
The usual, 'by the end of next Parliament', or 'when economic conditions allow' will show that we are still not serious and our allies who are already prioritising this spending over their own domestic needs will not be impressed.
It has also been noticeable during the build-up to today that the ministry has done that thing it occasionally does when the pressure is on, to forget that there are actual military people at the other end of these decisions – the pesky armed forces getting in the way of the politics of Defence again. The respective heads of service consequently have been given very little time to explain to their teams why not much is going to change.
The content itself is based around 'five defence pillars'. The first is a move to 'war-fighting readiness' with suitable robust accompanying rhetoric about lethality and deterrence. Second can be summarised as 'Nato first (but not Nato only)'.
From a navy perspective this clearly means focussing on the North Atlantic, protection of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) and the nuclear deterrent, but does not rule out global deployments such as the one HMS Prince of Wales is currently undertaking.
The third describes how defence is an 'engine for growth', but here there is a clear munitions and land bias. Shipbuilding – something that could contribute massively – barely features.
If you just take the Harland and Wolff yard in Belfast, they are about to start building the Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ships that our carriers so badly need, but progress is painfully slow.
After this they will build the Multi Roll Support Ship that will underpin our Commando Force – this has been discussed for four years now and nothing has happened and now can't because of the FSS backlog. Finally, many years from now, they will move on to building more fleet tankers. But where are these orders, what is the timeline and where is the imperative to accelerate it?
Where is the ambition and drive that the industry needs to thrive and expand in accordance with this 'engine for growth'? This is almost an exemplar of the whole thing; loads capability and revenue potential and yet seemingly no one with the leadership or levers to get on with it.
Fourth is the requirement to innovate, largely driven by the lessons from Ukraine. If you have any dealings with Small and Medium Enterprises trying to get business in the MOD, you will know that we have created very nearly the worst business environment possible for these engines of UK excellence and change.
Our speed of drone production is woeful and has to change if we want to just keep up, much less excel. SMEs hoping this document would unlock funding and a new framework into which they could plug will be disappointed.
The fifth and final pillar is about national resilience and a whole-of-society approach to national security. If getting the public to care about resilience means they in turn care about defence enough to make it votable, then we should drive hard for that.
From a naval perspective there are no real surprises. There is a reiteration of the importance of the sea to our survival as an island nation followed by a section on the importance of the nuclear deterrent, CUI protection (both data and energy) and how fast the threat to that is changing.
There is a push to 'uncrewed where possible, crewed where necessary', how that could affect carrier operations in the future and how AI will improve our Maritime Domain Awareness, which is so important around the UK, Baltic and High North.
Nuclear powered attack submarines get a boost with an aspiration for the Aukus tri-lateral agreement to eventually provide us with twelve of these behemoths. This might be the single line in the report that best reflects the strategic nature of what is now required.
Twelve would be an excellent operational outcome but requires a huge uplift in expenditure that would include a second build line at Barrow. Great, but none of that is happening at 2.5 per cent. Likewise, the aspiration to increase to 25 frigates and destroyers.
With the Type 31 about to start flying off the shelf, what does the overall surface ship breakdown look like between current and future destroyers (the stalled Type 83 programme), the anti-submarine Type 26 and the general purpose Type 31 frigate.
Whatever happened to the Type 32 – does this get reborn or should we just keep building the Type 31 and export the ones we don't need. What about icebreakers, mine warfare support and patrol vessels. Start totting that lot up and you can see why many of these questions were dodged.
The review discusses exports which is an area where the UK is increasingly being seen as a good ally (insert 'as the US wobbles' if you wish).
Away from the navy there are a couple of interesting sections. The plan to grow the army is commendable until you realise we are talking about going from 73,000 to 76,000, at which point it feels performative, particularly as they continue to lose soldiers at a rate of about 300 a month. Growing the Army is an excellent idea, but we need to make it meaningful.
There is a very interesting section on the possibility of acquiring a fleet of F-35As for the RAF. I argued here not long ago that this would be a good way to bridge the gap that is appearing between the ageing Typhoon and the 6 th Generation Tempest fighter. Nice to see it being aired as an option in the SDR. Even more interesting is the idea that these jets could be part of a tactical nuclear strike option.
As a country I think we need this, but the financial, legal and operating complexities inherent in using the F-35 as the solution makes your eyes water.
In terms of overall defence and security architecture, this review is but one part. I have mentioned the Hague summit later this month which may or may not alter the headline figures. We also know that the investment decisions required to make this a costed strategy will be deferred to a Defence Investment Plan due in the autumn.
If there is optimism to be drawn from this SDR it is to see it as part of a whole, but given how hard we have found cohering just the defence part in a timely fashion, I shall remain sceptical until proven wrong.
Overall this SDR reminds me of a cake. A nice looking one with some pretty icing and the promise of some candles tomorrow. The problem is, the defence cake doesn't really need more icing, it needs a new pedestal, more base ingredients and if not new chefs, at least a wholly new approach to baking.
The risk aversion and lack of accountability that has plagued defence decision making in recent decades is not addressed. Neither is the treasury-led sense that defence is tomorrow's problem, certainly when compared to other domestic priorities. If you're a glass half full type, the review should be seen as part of a whole, but let's see. And at least the Treasury isn't visibly eating the cake like in previous reviews.
But there is no escaping the fact that everyone in Europe thinks the defence paradigm has now changed sufficiently to force through more money and new ways of working. We have between now and the Hague summit to show that it has here too, or we will be left behind, lose defence credibility and most importantly, be less safe.
Tom Sharpe OBE served for 27 years as a Royal Navy officer, commanding four different warships. He specialised first as a Fighter Controller and then as an Anti Air Warfare Officer