Understanding Russia's Taliban gauntlet

The Hindu

6 days ago

On July 3, 2025, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced the recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) government, representing the culmination of Russia's recent overtures toward the Taliban. This followed the decision to upgrade diplomatic ties and officially accredit the Taliban's new ambassador, Gul Hassan, to Moscow. Now that the IEA flag is flying over the Afghan Embassy in Moscow, questions remain about the rationale behind Russia's choice to legitimise the Taliban regime.
A change, two decades later
Moscow's eagerness to cultivate diplomatic relations with the Taliban government stands in stark contrast to Russia's approach to the IEA's first iteration from 1996 to 2001. At that time, the Taliban were seen as hostile towards Russia. Moscow did not acknowledge their government and was forced to wind down its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan in 1997. Further, Russia provided military assistance to the Northern Alliance and helped its Central Asian allies stabilise the situation along the Afghan border against the terrorist threat.
Complicating matters further, the Taliban, in 2000, recognised the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as an independent state and urged the Muslim world to declare a holy war on Russia to force it to stop its counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya. With an estimated 2,500 Chechen militants undergoing training in Taliban-controlled territories, Moscow considered launching 'preventive strikes' on terrorist camps in Afghanistan.
In this context, it was unsurprising that Russia joined forces with the United States to adopt the United Nations' sanctions against the Taliban and provided logistical support to the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom, which was launched after 9/11. In 2003, the Taliban were included in the Russian list of terrorist organisations.
As the international counter-terrorism mission in Afghanistan reached an impasse and the U.S. began to consider withdrawal, Moscow established unofficial contacts with the Taliban through its closer engagement with Pakistan in the early 2010s. This enabled Russia to protect its security interests in Afghanistan (with a focus on ensuring the safety of Russian citizens), collaborating against the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) and combating drug trafficking.
Additionally, in a balance act between the Afghan government and the Taliban, Russia stepped up its diplomatic efforts to position itself as a venue for resolving the Afghan crisis. Despite being blacklisted by the UN and outlawed in Russia, the Taliban representatives were invited to participate in the Moscow Format and intra-Afghan conferences, as Russia attempted to increase its own regional influence and edge the U.S. out from Afghanistan.
With the Taliban's takeover of Kabul in August 2021, even as many other countries evacuated diplomatic personnel amid the lingering turmoil, the Russian Embassy in Kabul remained in operation — Moscow remained confident that the Taliban are capable of putting things in good order. Despite Russia's good rapport with the Taliban's dispensation, the persistent instability in Afghanistan has severely compromised its security interests, with terrorist attacks against the Russian Embassy in Kabul in September 2022 and the Crocus City Hall in Moscow in March 2024, purportedly carried out by the IS-K. There has been no meaningful progress in the economic projects either, though the Russian authorities continue to harbour hopes that Afghanistan will emerge as a conduit for Russian exports to South and Southeast Asia.
The basis
Russia's official recognition of the IEA government reflects Moscow's conviction that the Taliban are 'an objective reality' and the only political force capable of controlling power in Afghanistan. This is further reinforced by the perception of the Taliban as Russia's 'allies in countering terrorism', which seemingly laid the foundation for their de-listing in April 2025. It should be noted though that the Russian Supreme Court only suspended the ban on the Taliban activities, and the grouping is still on the Russian unified federal list of terrorist organisations. This suggests that the Russian security apparatus is not fully convinced by the Taliban's track record in combating terrorism, leaving scope to reverse the decision if the alliance with the Taliban proves to be a false dawn.
The IEA's recognition is a symbolic gesture that does not bring Russia any immediate benefits and does not guarantee any upgrade to Moscow's position in Afghanistan or the wider region. While some Russian officials are insisting on supporting the Taliban, including 'arming them', it remains to be seen how far Moscow is willing to go and whether the joint fight against the IS-K will yield tangible results.
As Russia has set a precedent by recognising the IEA, some Central Asian states and even China may well follow suit, especially given that the Taliban's expectations of their partners will certainly increase. Moscow's free pass to the Taliban regarding the inclusivity of their government, as well as women's and minority rights, may become a new template for other regional players who will prioritise pragmatism over value-based approach.
Ties with India
India will unlikely be seriously affected by the Russian move. New Delhi has fostered its own incremental improvement in diplomatic ties with the Taliban, having recently found common ground with them on the issue of terrorism in Kashmir. It is likely that New Delhi will keep up diplomatic communications, trade and humanitarian cooperation with the IEA, without deviating from its stance on the legitimacy issue. Engagement without formal recognition still seems to be the likely trajectory of India's Afghanistan policy.
Harsh V. Pant is Vice President, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi. Aleksei Zakharov is Fellow, Eurasia, Observer Research Foundation