Soviet stockpiles won't last forever. Will the Russians have enough artillery for new major offensive campaigns in Ukraine?

Yahoo

26-05-2025

An insider told The Economist that Vladimir Medinsky, head of the Russian delegation, stated during the talks in Istanbul that Russia was ready for a protracted war. To illustrate his point, he referenced the Great Northern War between Russia and Sweden, which lasted 21 years. One of its most famous episodes was Peter the Great's order to dismantle church bells and melt them down for artillery, which was in short supply.
Today, artillery is again in short supply, but since the Great Northern War, the technology for producing artillery barrels has, to put it mildly, changed a tad. Therefore, the Russians must now supply it to the front, not through Peter the Great's methods but by tapping into their Cold War stockpiles.
As with tanks, these stockpiles are not endless. Meanwhile, Russia's production of new artillery and barrels appears unable to keep up with the demands of the front and the rate of losses.
Moscow's difficulties in bringing new artillery systems into service do not mean that Russian forces will stop firing any time soon or that Ukraine is on the verge of victory.
However, artillery is a cornerstone of Russian offensive tactics. Understanding the state of Russian artillery production is essential for assessing its actual ability to ramp up or at least sustain the current pace of the offensive in the medium to long term, which is an important bargaining chip for Moscow at the negotiating table.
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Although most of the damage at the front is now being inflicted by first-person view drones, the role of artillery in combat has not diminished. In fact, its importance has grown. Artillery performs not only conventional fire support tasks but is also integrated into the reconnaissance-strike tandem network, delivering precision strikes on targets detected by tactical drones.
Thanks to its range, power and ability to operate in all weather conditions, artillery remains a crucial element of firepower. Its effective use is key to both deterring and breaking through enemy defences.
Russia possesses one of the largest artillery forces in the world. According to the Military Balance analytical guide, Russia had around 2,500 artillery systems of various types in service before launching the full-scale war against Ukraine. Most of these were highly mobile self-propelled artillery systems (SPAS).
As of early 2024, Russia has increased the number of artillery systems deployed at the front to over 4,700, according to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the world's oldest and the UK's leading defence and security think tank.
Russian forces fire many times more shells per day than Ukrainian defence forces. For example, during the offensive campaign in early 2024, the ratio was approximately eight to one. Although this gap has narrowed as Ukraine has secured ammunition supplies, Moscow's advantage in artillery firepower remains significant.
Russia's dominance in artillery has enabled it to employ a barrage fire tactic, where Ukrainian defensive positions are relentlessly bombarded with heavy fire until they are reduced to tatters.
To achieve this, Russia relies on three key components: operational artillery systems, spare barrels and ammunition. Shells come not only from Russia's own production, which yields over two million large-calibre rounds annually, but also from supplies provided by North Korea and Iran.
Ukraine's Defence Intelligence reported that the regime of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has transferred more than five million large-calibre munitions to Russia since 2023. This has enabled Moscow to sustain an extremely high intensity of artillery fire in Ukraine.
The artillery systems and barrels were mainly drawn from Russia's Cold War-era stockpiles, allowing thousands of howitzers to be rapidly deployed, despite the devastating losses at the front.
Russian MSTA-S self-propelled artillery systems.
Photo: open sources
Lacking comparable numbers of ammunition and howitzers, Ukraine's Armed Forces have focused on counter-battery warfare, i.e. destroying Russian artillery. To achieve this, the Ukrainian military has employed reconnaissance drones, counter-battery radars and Western-standard precision artillery systems, whose superior range and accuracy help offset their smaller numbers.
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In 2023, FPV drones and heavy quadcopters were added to Ukraine's counter-battery arsenal, becoming new and effective tools for destroying Russian artillery.
In response, Russian troops began adapting by enhancing the fortifications and layout of artillery positions, improving camouflage and equipping their vehicles with additional protection, particularly anti-drone meshes. However, they have not found the definitive solution.
As losses among self-propelled artillery mounted, the Russian military increasingly turned to towed artillery, which took a leading role in their arsenal. Towed systems are less detectable by reconnaissance, easier to produce and have proved reasonably effective for positional warfare amid a growing shortage of equipment.
A Russian 122mm D-74 howitzer, produced in 1955, positioned in a battlefield emplacement.
Photo: screenshot from a Russian news report
Oryx, a Dutch warfare research group which tracks equipment losses based on visual evidence, estimates that Russia has lost around 1,500 artillery systems (both self-propelled and towed) so far. In contrast, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reports nearly 28,000 Russian artillery losses. Why such a large discrepancy?
Firstly, losses of artillery are much harder to confirm visually than those of armoured vehicles, meaning many do not appear in OSINT analysts' statistics. Artillery systems are typically positioned far from the front line and are well camouflaged – hidden in forested areas, dug in, or covered with nets – making it difficult to obtain photo or video evidence of their destruction.
Since OSINT resources like Oryx rely solely on open-source visual evidence, they record only those losses that can be identified in photos or videos. In contrast, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have access to a broader range of intelligence tools, particularly radio intercepts, operational data and drone footage, which enable them to confirm Russian losses without needing overt visual proof.
The second factor is the methodology used for counting. Ukraine's General Staff includes mortars in its overall artillery loss figures, as they are formally classified as artillery. Mortars are much smaller and rarely come into the view of drones.
It is clear that Russian artillery losses far exceed the 1,500 visually confirmed, thanks to OSINT analysts who use their own funds to purchase satellite imagery and examine Russian storage facilities. Much of the artillery has remained in the open since the Cold War.
Given the vast gap between new howitzer production and battlefield losses, the Russians have begun to draw heavily on these stockpiles, either refurbishing artillery systems for service or dismantling them for spare parts.
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OSINT analyst Jompy has estimated that in 2022, Russian storage facilities held 22,367 artillery pieces, including 17,197 towed artillery units. By 2024, that number had dropped to 9,325. With six months having passed since then, the stockpiles are likely even smaller now.
At first glance, these warehouses still hold a considerable number of howitzers, with only about 60% used by the end of 2024. However, it's important to remember that not all artillery in reserve is fit for combat use.
The Russians prioritise removing the most repairable equipment from warehouses first, leaving the more problematic pieces for later. This is precisely the approach they are taking with heavy armoured vehicles.
This suggests that much of the artillery in storage facilities is now obsolete or in poor condition. Some systems dating back to World War II are still in the warehouses but cannot be used without lengthy and costly repairs.
Russian artillery storage facility Planovaya as of 2022
Russian artillery storage facility Planovaya as of 2025
This large-scale withdrawal of artillery from warehouses is driven not only by the need to replace losses but also by the exhaustion of barrels.
The thing is that artillery has a limited service life, mainly defined by the lifespan of the barrel – the maximum number of shots it can fire before needing replacement. Consequently, some equipment from storage facilities may be withdrawn solely to replenish these vital consumable parts.
A barrel's service life depends on several factors: the intensity of fire, the quality of maintenance, the condition of the ammunition and the crew's professionalism. For instance, 122mm systems like the D-30 or 2S1 Gvozdika have a service life of around 30,000 rounds, while 152mm howitzers such as the MSTA-S last only a few thousand rounds. The 203mm 2S7 Pion self-propelled artillery systems have a service life of about 500 rounds. These figures are approximate and based on textbooks. Actual service life in combat conditions can vary significantly.
Intensive artillery use causes rapid barrel wear, which reduces firing accuracy, diminishes system effectiveness and even raises the risk of detonation within the barrel. This has increased the demand for reserve howitzers from warehouses, which are either deployed directly or dismantled to repair other units.
An additional factor accelerating the deterioration of Russian artillery barrels has been the use of low-quality ammunition. The Russian military has repeatedly criticised the shells supplied by North Korea. According to Russian soldiers, the poor quality caused barrel ruptures, which not only disabled the equipment but also put crews at risk.
A Russian D-20 howitzer destroyed due to an explosion of a shell supplied by North Korea.
Photo: Russian Telegram channels
A certain artillery deficit is also indicated by the fact that Russian forces have started deploying systems hardly used before 2022. One example is the 130mm M-46 gun, developed in the 1950s. Due to its non-standard calibre for the modern Russian military, its use had been minimal. However, the urgent need to increase artillery firepower has forced the Russians to bring the M-46 back into service. This was made possible mainly by ammunition supplies of the appropriate calibre from Iran and North Korea which allowed this outdated howitzer to be fired.
These are not isolated cases. Artillery pieces and howitzers such as the D-20 and M-46, both manufactured in the 1950s, are increasingly disappearing from satellite images of storage facilities. OSINT researcher HighMarsed reported that as of 2022, there were about 600 M-46 guns at Russian storage facilities, and since then, 380 have been taken away.
Systems developed during World War II have also been spotted at the front. Recent photos have surfaced showing an M-30 122mm howitzer, which was in service in the Soviet military in the 1940s.
A 122mm howitzer M-30 used by Russian forces in Ukraine
In 2024, Sergei Chemezov, head of the Russian state-owned defence conglomerate Rostec, claimed that production and refurbishment of self-propelled artillery in Russia had increased tenfold and towed artillery fourteenfold since 2022. Here again, we encounter the manipulative phrasing of "production and refurbishment", which also encompasses the retrieval of vehicles from Soviet-era warehouses.
The main bottleneck in new artillery production is barrels. They require high-precision heavy machine tools and a number of key components. Setting up such mass production is not an easy task.
According to a rough estimate by the Kiel Institute, Russia produced dozens of new artillery systems each quarter in 2023, reaching capacities of 100 and 112 units in the first and second quarters of 2024 respectively. RUSI estimates that barrel production could reach "hundreds" per year. However, this output is insufficient to cover Russian military losses and the rapid depletion of barrels on the battlefield.
If this estimate is close to reality, it roughly matches the known production volumes of Ukrainian Bohdana self-propelled artillery systems.
It is difficult to objectively assess the volume of Russian howitzer production, as news reports from factories often focus on individual sites without disclosing the overall scale of production.
Several key Russian plants are responsible for producing new artillery systems. These are Plant No. 9, which specialises in manufacturing artillery barrels for 122mm D-30A howitzers and tank guns; Uraltransmash, which produces 152mm MSTA-S self-propelled artillery systems; and Motovilikhinskie Zavody, which operates a complete production cycle for artillery systems such as the 2S1 Gvozdika, 2S3 Akatsiya, 2A36 Giatsint-B, 2S5 Giatsint-S, and Msta-B.
However, a look at the history of Russian artillery production reveals that the country's factories were far from being well-prepared for Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
In the 1980s, during the development of the 152mm MSTA-S, Uraltransmash's existing facilities proved insufficient, leading to plans for a separate Sterlitamak Machine-Building Plant. However, due to internal competition, Uraltransmash's management had instead pushed for creating a new workshop worth RUB 600 million (approximately US$7.5 million) within their existing plant. It remains unclear whether this workshop was ever completed, while the Sterlitamak plant that initially produced the MSTA-S ceased operations in 2013 and was subsequently demolished.
Sterlitamak Machine-Building Plant
Motovilikhinskie Zavody has been in bankruptcy since 2018. This doesn't mean it has completely ceased operations, as Ukrainian drone strikes are targeting it for a reason, though it nonetheless reflects the facility's overall condition.
A Russian MSTA-S at Uraltransmash
Against this backdrop, the appearance of new wheeled artillery systems such as the Malva and Giatsint-K rather than traditional tracked models is interesting. According to Pavel Luzin, an expert on the Russian defence industry, the shift to wheeled chassis stems from a shortage of tracked platforms. For instance, the MSTA-S relies on the T-90 tank chassis, which is also needed for main battle tank production. This competition for resources complicates the mass production of such artillery systems.
A wheeled self-propelled vehicle is a good choice in its own right. Wheeled chassis are significantly easier to manufacture, require fewer costly components than tracked ones, and do not compete with tank production for resources.
However, the mere appearance of these new artillery systems does not indicate a significant increase in barrel production capacity. Firstly, both models only entered mass production in early 2024. Secondly, Andrei Tarasenko, author of a specialised Telegram channel on armoured vehicles, spotted an old barrel from the Giatsint-B mounted on a Giatsint-K, likely taken from storage. This once again highlights the shortage of barrels in Russia.
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A barrel from the Giatsint-B gun with a locking stop used on the Giatsint-K self-propelled artillery system.
Photo: Btvt.info
It is clear that the Ukrainian defence forces will never be able to physically destroy all Russian artillery systems. Russia is attempting to offset losses and barrel wear by somewhat increasing production, continuing to withdraw equipment from warehouses and importing artillery systems from North Korea. The quality of these imports is questionable, but they are present and operational.
Ukrainian forces also struggle with comparable issues, up to and including the use of World War II-era artillery such as American M114 systems. Unlike Russia, Kyiv does not have access to large Soviet-era reserves and remains heavily reliant on external shell supplies. This results in a persistent disadvantage in artillery capability for Ukraine.
However, since 2022, Ukraine has developed a robust and scalable production line for Bohdana self-propelled artillery systems, including both barrels and the machinery needed to produce them. In addition, numerous foreign companies support the Ukrainian military, which provides significantly greater potential for scaling up production.
For example, France supplies 90% of its barrel production to Ukraine. Moreover, Ukrainian long-range artillery, particularly Western-supplied systems, is often superior in quality to its Russian counterparts, which is another crucial factor.
This situation suggests that, over time and with further depletion of Russian stockpiles, Ukraine could eventually achieve at least parity with Russia in terms of artillery firepower. However, this prospect depends on consistent Western ammunition supplies to the Ukrainian defence forces, something that has been called into question for political reasons.
M-46, D-30, MSTA-B and Giatsint-B units being transported after being removed from storage
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To avoid a collapse in its artillery capabilities, Russia will likely have to scale back the intensity of shelling and compensate for the reduced firepower through other means, particularly the use of FPV drones.
The use of fibre-optic drones in Ukrainian territories bordering Russia has increased, said Andrii Demchenko, spokesperson for Ukraine's State Border Guard Service. The situation is the same on the Novopavlivka front, as reported by Viktor Trehubov, spokesman for the Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group.
The growing reliance of Russian forces on FPV drones amid a gradual decline in artillery power should not be underestimated. Ukraine must respond by reinforcing frontline defences with appropriate countermeasures. Meanwhile, the steady depletion of Russia's artillery capabilities must be factored into any assessment of its capacity to mount large-scale new offensives.
It is also important to remember that, at this very moment, thousands of Russian guns remain pointed at Ukrainian defenders, and there is no doubt about the combat readiness of the Russian artillery.
Author: Illia Bolharyn
Translation: Artem Yakymyshyn
Editing: Susan McDonald