Latest news with #China-Iran
Memri
an hour ago
- Politics
- Memri
Chinese Social Media Video on Potential Impact of Iran being Defeated by U.S. and Israel: This Is a Battle China Cannot Afford to Lose
On June 20, 2025, the 'Steel Tooth Brother' account on the Chinese social media platform Xiaohongshu posted a video titled 'If Iran Loses, Will It Have an Impact on China?' In the video, the narrator discussed the critically strategic nature of Iran's location and the importance of the Strait of Hormuz with regard to oil exports, predicting that an Iranian defeat would give the U.S. control over Middle Eastern oil, breathing 'new life' into the U.S. dollar and reshuffling the balance of power in the region. The narrator also said that an Iranian defeat would allow U.S. influence to spread northward and 'entrap' China and Russia, also risking China's Belt and Road Initiative. The narrator suggested that in order to prevent this scenario from unfolding, China must provide Iran with military equipment, use renminbi to settle China-Iran oil transactions, and align closely with Russia on the international stage against the U.S. and Israel. He added: 'This is a battle China cannot afford to lose.'
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First Post
16-07-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Iran situation tense, India asks citizens to consider available exit options
Amid rising tensions in the Middle East, the Indian Embassy in Iran has advised Indian citizens to avoid non-essential travel to Tehran and urged those already in the country to stay alert and consider leaving if needed. read more (File) The S-300 missile system is displayed during Iranian defence week, in a street in Tehran on September 24, 2024. Reuters The Indian Embassy in Iran on Wednesday issued a new advisory urging Indian citizens to think carefully before making any non-essential trips to Tehran, given the growing tensions in the region. In a statement shared on X, the embassy also advised Indians in Iran to stay alert to the latest developments in the Middle East and consider using commercial flights or ferry services if they wish to leave the country. 'In view of the security-related developments over the past several weeks, Indian nationals are advised to carefully consider the evolving situation before undertaking non-essential travel to Iran,' the advisory said. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD More from World Deepening China-Iran ties pose a new challenge for India 'They are also advised to monitor regional news closely and follow updated advisories issued by Indian authorities. Indian nationals already in Iran who wish to leave may use commercial flight and ferry options currently available,' it added. This advisory comes amid heightened tensions in the Middle East, following recent clashes between Iran, Israel, and the United States. Last month, Israel carried out strikes on Iranian nuclear and military facilities under 'Operation Rising Lion,' aiming to disrupt Iran's nuclear program and prevent it from building atomic weapons. In response, Iran launched missile and drone attacks against Israel. The United States supported Israel in the conflict. On June 22, the US conducted its own strikes against Iranian nuclear sites, including facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, as part of 'Operation Midnight Hammer,' using B-2 stealth bombers and bunker-buster bombs.
India.com
08-07-2025
- Politics
- India.com
Days after ceasefire with Israel, Iran receives powerful surface-to-air missile batteries from this country in exchange of..., plans to...
Days after ceasefire with Israel, Iran receives powerful surface-to-air missile batteries from this country in exchange of..., plans to... In a strategic move, Iran has received Chinese surface-to-air missile batteries. This move comes after many of Iran's defensives were destroyed by Israel during their recent 12-day conflict. Interestingly, deliveries of Chinese surface-to-air missile batteries occurred after a de-facto truce was struck between Iran and Israel on 24 June. Was US aware of the move? According to reports, the US's Arab allies were aware of Tehran's efforts to 'back up and reinforce' its air defences and that the White House had been informed of Iran's progress. China is the largest importer of Iranian oil, and the US Energy Information Administration suggested in a report in May that nearly 90 percent of Iran's crude and condensate exports flow to Beijing. For several years, China has imported record amounts of Iranian oil despite US sanctions, using countries such as Malaysia as a transshipment hub to mask the crude's origin. Is this new beginning of China-Iran relationship? The shipments mark a deepening of Beijing's relationship with Tehran and come as some in the West noted that China and Russia appeared to keep a distance from Iran amid Israel's unprecedented attacks. Israel achieved air superiority over Iran's skies during the conflict, destroying ballistic missile launch pads and assassinating Iranian generals and scientists. US President Donald Trump has claimed that Israel and Iran had agreed to a 'complete and total ceasefire' soon after Iran launched a limited missile attack on a US military base in Qatar, retaliating for the American bombing of its nuclear sites.
Express Tribune
02-07-2025
- Business
- Express Tribune
CPEC to CPAEC: aspiration to actualisation
Listen to article If Afghanistan joins CPEC, the entwined destinies of the peoples of Pakistan and Afghanistan could bring socioeconomic development, improve bilateral relations and usher peace and stability in the region. This was the focus of my PhD (2017-2021). Though it seemed unlikely then, but a few developments strengthened the hopes. Firstly, on Sept 8, 2019, in a Pakistan-Afghanistan-China trilateral meeting, construction of Peshawar-Kabul motorway under the banner of China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Plus Cooperation (CAPPC) was agreed to. This aimed at jointly working towards promoting trade and connectivity. It was perceived as a move paving the way for Afghanistan joining CPEC. Second was the signing of China-Iran comprehensive partnership MoU in 2020. Estimated at $400 billion, and spread over 25 years, it encompassed development of Chabahar through which the Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia transportation corridor is to be connected to the wider BRI project. It will help in modernising oil and gas sectors, establishment of industrial zones, military and technological cooperation, and supply of Iranian oil to China on cheaper rates. The recent China-Afghanistan-Pakistan tripartite meeting held at Beijing has rekindled the hopes. Deputy PM Ishaq Dar says that China will help develop Peshawar-Kabul Corridor, and it now seems more likely that Afghanistan will join CPEC in its own best interest. Once Afghanistan decides to join it, CPEC can be renamed as China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Economic Corridor (CPAEC). Whatever the name, the essence lies in joining hands for emancipation of the societies of member states and whole of Eurasia, through enhanced economic collaboration. The BRI, Iran-Afghanistan-Central Asia-China Corridor and CPEAC would complement each other multiplying dividends resulting in job creation, poverty alleviation, women empowerment, environmental protection and improved regional peace and stability. About 94% respondents of the survey conducted for the dissertation agreed to the fact that increased interdependence through BRI-CPEC/CPAEC will engender socioeconomic development as well as peace and stability. Hit by foreign military interventions and internal strife, Afghanistan needs a fast paced socioeconomic development. Quickest solution to this predicament lies in transit trade, followed by development of industrial zones along CPAEC to augment Afghanistan's economic progression. Significance of Pakistan as a conduit for trade by Afghanistan and Central Asia is undeniable. Afghanistan is also an essential channel in this connectivity. Its inclusion in BRI/CPEC will multiply benefits for whole of Eurasia. Professor Arshin Adib Moghadam of SOAS opines that addition of Turkey, Iran and India to BRI and CPEC would make it more advantageous. He believes, "India has a Eurasian DNA, its alliance with the west is unnatural, and it will come back one day." India stands to gain immensely for its trade by East-West connectivity through Pakistan; a truck crossing Torkham or Chaman could reach India within 24 hours. This article suggests complementing traditional statecraft with shared economic growth to optimise the potential of the resource-rich region through interdependence. One of the best examples is the formation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. It was based on French Foreign Minister Schuman's idea that it would "make war not only unthinkable, but materially impossible". The ECSC really helped preclude conflicts in Europe, and laid the foundation of today's EU. Likewise, CPAEC offers requisite constituents to transform the Pakistan-Afghan relationship into a long-term mutually beneficial partnership. The risks, apprehensions, irritants, opposition and attacks on CEPEC/CPEAC by inimical forces are likely to persist. However, Afghanistan, China and Pakistan must not be deterred by these challenges. Inclusivity of the masses in CPAEC projects is the best security guarantee for it. When bread and butter of employees will come from these, they will secure and defend it against attacks. Collective gains and losses are likely to bring the member states into an enduring bond of mutually beneficial coexistence.
The Diplomat
02-07-2025
- Business
- The Diplomat
Will China Become Iran's Major Defense Partner?
As Iran navigates the aftermath of its 12-day conflict with Israel, the Islamic Republic finds itself grappling with two imperatives: the need to overhaul its shattered air defense system and intelligence apparatus, and the equally pressing challenge of renewing its social contract with a war-weary and deeply anxious population. This recalibration inevitably raises a number of questions as Tehran searches for a partner in the defense and security domain. Against this backdrop, China is emerging as a potential, perhaps even desirable, alternative to Russia. Recent commentaries in both Iran and China have made the case for closer defense ties and Iranian purchases of Chinese military hardware. These calls often highlight Pakistan's successful use of Chinese air defense systems during its recent tensions with India. Given Iran's lost trust in the quality of Russian systems and the urgency of rebuilding its air defense system, is closer China-Iran security cooperation on the horizon? That will depend on how policymakers in Beijing assess the costs and benefits. Benefits of Increased Defense Cooperation With Tehran One of the most immediate benefits for China in becoming Iran's defense partner would be the ability to consolidate an alternative energy corridor that bypasses traditional maritime routes. By linking Iraq's energy-rich regions through Iranian infrastructure and onward into Pakistan, China could significantly expand its overland energy security. Such an Iraq-Iran-Pakistan corridor would give Beijing a secure and controllable channel to access Middle Eastern hydrocarbons while simultaneously improving the energy security of its ally, Pakistan. If this corridor develops, it would partially insulate China from volatility in maritime choke points like the Strait of Malacca and the Bab el-Mandeb, providing Beijing with long-sought redundancy in its energy supply chains. More critically, deepening defense ties with Iran would offer China indirect influence over the Strait of Hormuz. Should China become Tehran's main security partner, it is reasonable to assume that Beijing would be better positioned to moderate Iran's behavior in the event of regional tensions, ensuring that the strait remains open and navigable. This is of paramount importance for China's own economic security as well as those of the Gulf Arab states. Increasing leverage over Tehran's strategic calculus through defense cooperation would thus serve both deterrent and stabilizing functions from Beijing's perspective. Another core advantage lies in an increased chance of containing Indian influence across Central Asia. Iran's drift away from India began in earnest after New Delhi began adhering to U.S.-led sanctions in 2018 and ceased oil imports from Tehran. The strategic vacuum left by India's retreat has only widened as India has grown closer to Israel – both ideologically, through shared anti-extremism narratives, and practically, via collaborations in defense, cyber, and agriculture. These ties have diminished Iran's value in Indian strategic thinking while India's pro-Israel stance has tarnished its image in the eyes of decisionmakers in Tehran, creating space for Beijing to step in. If China becomes Tehran's principal defense partner, it would be in a stronger position to frustrate Indian ambitions in Central Asia and the South Caucasus where Iran's geography is pivotal. With deeper Iranian cooperation, moreover, Beijing could synchronize the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) more seamlessly, using Iran as both a transit route and a geopolitical buffer. This coordination could marginalize India's efforts to connect with Central Asia and Afghanistan via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which hinges on Indian investments in Iran's Chabahar port. Should Iran allow China to assume a stake in Chabahar, the INSTC's viability would be fatally undermined. This would be a double blow to India: denied strategic access to Central Asia and outmaneuvered in its attempts to counterbalance China's BRI. Last but not least, the political trajectory within Iran also favors increased alignment with China. As internal rivalries intensify in Tehran, the most probable outcome is the consolidation of a security state led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This would replicate, in many ways, Pakistan's civil-military hybrid model in which real power resides with the armed forces. For China, this is a familiar and manageable structure. Beijing has spent decades building ties with Pakistan's military elite and would likely find it easier to engage with a similar power structure in Iran. Additionally, such a configuration could facilitate improved Tehran-Islamabad relations, smoothing the path for trilateral cooperation under Chinese patronage. Risk Factors While the strategic rationale for China to expand its defense and security partnership with Iran is compelling, it is not without significant complications. Beijing would have to tread carefully, balancing its ambitions with the risk of antagonizing a constellation of other regional and global actors. Iran may be geopolitically useful, but it is also diplomatically toxic. Any overt alignment with Tehran, especially in the security and military domain, risks exposing China to a series of entanglements that could undercut its broader objectives in the Middle East and beyond. Foremost among Beijing's concerns is the potential impact on its relations with Israel. Although China and Israel do not see eye to eye on a wide range of issues, their economic and technological cooperation has been substantial. China is invested in Israeli infrastructure, including port terminals and tech start-ups, and values Israel as a hub of innovation. A significant expansion of China's military relationship with Iran would be difficult for Israel to ignore – not least because for Israel the main problem is the Iranian regime's ideology and not its nuclear program per se. Ultimately, this could compel Beijing to weigh whether its long-term interests in Israeli technology and investment partnerships are worth jeopardizing for an enhanced, and potentially lucrative, defense procurement based relationship with Tehran. Another sensitive arena is China's extensive commercial ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These states have become key economic partners for China in sectors ranging from energy to logistics and transport. Close defense ties with Iran could disrupt these relationships especially if perceived as emboldening Tehran's regional adventurism. However, this risk should not be overstated. Paradoxically, China's closeness with Iran could also enhance its leverage with the GCC states. By acting as a potential mediator or deterrent influence over Iran, Beijing could present itself as an indispensable regional stabilizer capable of assuring Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that Iran will not escalate militarily or cross the nuclear threshold. In this way, China might parlay its ties with Iran into a broader diplomatic capital with Iran's southern neighbors. A further consideration is the exposure of Chinese state-owned enterprises and private firms to secondary U.S. sanctions. Although China and Iran have collectively developed methods, and indeed networks, to circumvent some sanctions, there remains a legal and reputational risk for companies involved in dual-use technologies or defense exports to Iran. At a time when China-U.S. tensions remain high, particularly around technology and trade, Beijing is likely to consider whether the potential gains from a deeper tie with Iran as a defense supplier are worth the cost of even greater friction with Washington. Also at play is the distant, but all too real, prospect of a regime change, organically or otherwise, in Iran. Although a popular uprising leading to regime change remains unlikely in the near term, as most Iranians are currently focused on day-to-day survival amid the crisis, public sentiment is volatile. As such, there is a risk that China's investment in the regime could backfire should there be a revolution in Iran. Conclusion Despite the favorable geopolitical context that appears to support deeper defense cooperation between Beijing and Tehran, the most likely outcome is a carefully managed and limited relationship rather than a full-fledged defense partnership. The institutional scaffolding for closer cooperation is already in place; the China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in 2021 and their common membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, the implementation of this framework would likely be shaped not by ideological alignment or mutual defense aspirations but by calculation, discretion, and long-term strategic interest on the part of China. Should China make the political decision to assist Iran in upgrading its defense capabilities, it would seek to do so without assuming the political cost of being seen as Tehran's military backer. Beijing's approach would be pragmatic and quiet. Assistance and sales, whether in the form of air defense systems, cyber tools, surveillance platforms, or drone technologies, will be offered selectively, and in a manner designed to limit visibility and exposure to U.S. sanctions or regional backlash. Chinese companies involved in these arrangements will be insulated through proxies or offshore intermediaries. This cautious posture, in turn, is driven by China's broader strategic outlook. For Beijing, Iran is neither an ally nor a partner but rather a geopolitical node and a useful check on the United States' desire to pull back from the Middle East. Iran's geographic location, natural resources, and strategic desperation make it a suitable partner for China's ambitions in Eurasian connectivity, regional balancing, and economic expansion. Yet China is acutely aware of the risks of overcommitment in the Middle East. Beijing does not want to become entangled in either regional rivalries or Iran's confrontations with Israel and the United States. To this end, China would likely continue to exploit the ambiguity of its position, keeping defense ties strong enough to benefit from Iran's vulnerabilities but restrained enough to avoid provoking its rivals.
