There Are No More Reasons for U.S. Presence in Middle East

Newsweek

6 days ago

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu left Washington without a ceasefire deal for Gaza. Like U.S. efforts to broker an Iran nuclear agreement and end Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, the war in Gaza is yet another example of the United States being over-engaged and overconfident about a favorable outcome in the Middle East.
Diplomacy is a good thing; so is encouraging stability across the Middle East. But instead of obsessing about fixing the region's problems, Washington needs to focus on vital U.S. interests, of which there are few in the Middle East. That means drawing down the majority of the 40,000 to 50,000 U.S. troops spread across 30 bases in the region.
Throughout the 1980s, the United States had only two permanent bases in the Middle East. Aside from some short-lived ground operations, it largely stayed offshore with an occasional rotation of naval assets to protect the free flow of oil to global markets.
Two vital interests—oil and terrorism—eventually brought U.S. forces on shore. Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait raised the danger of a single hegemonic power controlling global oil supplies. After deploying 540,000 troops to push Iraq out of Kuwait in the First Gulf War, Washington adopted a strategy of dual containment to prevent either Iraq or Iran from dominating the region. Around 25,000 U.S. troops were stationed permanently at new bases in the Persian Gulf throughout the 1990s.
The September 11 terrorist attacks, related wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2014 rise of ISIS brought the next surge of troops. New U.S. bases emerged in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and elsewhere. Troop levels soared at times to above 200,000.
The big question now is: why are U.S. troops still in the Middle East? U.S. vital interests in the region are gone, but the forces stay. It makes no sense.
Since 2019, the United States has been a net exporter of oil, meaning it's no longer dependent on the Middle East for its energy needs. Moreover, there are no regional hegemons on the horizon. Iraq is now a U.S. strategic partner. With the near-decimation of its regional proxies, a fragile economy, and battered missile defenses, Iran is weaker now than it has been at any point since the 1978–79 revolution. It has no capacity to make a bid—even with a nuclear weapon—for regional hegemony. The recent U.S. strikes against Iran prove challenges can be handled from offshore: bombers flew from Missouri, not from U.S. bases in the Middle East, to hit Iran's nuclear facilities.
US soldiers inspect the site of reported Turkish shelling days earlier on an oil extraction facility on the outskirts of Rumaylan, in Syria's Kurdish-controlled northeastern Hasakeh province on October 28, 2024.
US soldiers inspect the site of reported Turkish shelling days earlier on an oil extraction facility on the outskirts of Rumaylan, in Syria's Kurdish-controlled northeastern Hasakeh province on October 28, 2024.
Delil SOULEIMAN / AFP/Getty Images
Washington has an interest in maintaining open sea lanes in the region to ensure stable global oil prices. But it can handle that objective with something akin to the 1980s force posture, not the bloated ground presence we have now. U.S. access to a handful of strategically located naval bases in the Persian Gulf should do the trick.
The terrorism threat is also mostly gone and capable of being handled by local actors. The ISIS caliphate was defeated in 2019 and al-Qaeda is extremely weak. Developments in post-Assad Syria have opened new avenues for regional states to work together in managing what remains of ISIS. The most influential ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliates aren't located in the Middle East and are almost exclusively local insurgencies incapable of posing a threat to the United States.
In short, the issues—oil and terrorism—that have traditionally anchored the U.S. military presence in the Middle East for decades no longer offer good reasons to keep troops in the region today.
Some might say we need to stay to protect Israeli sovereignty, counter China, or act as an insurance policy of some sort. None of these reasons hold up.
Even after the events of October 7, 2023, Israel is more secure today than at any point since its founding due to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the decimation of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. As a slew of new research shows, China has no plans or means to seize leadership in the Middle East. And staying "just in case" makes for an expensive insurance policy and gives unfriendly actors targets to fire at—U.S. forces in the region have been attacked hundreds of times in the last two years, including most recently by Iran.
Sticking around "just in case" could also do more harm than good to regional stability. The reduction of U.S. forces in Syria helped unify the post-Assad Syrian state. Likewise, a 2019 U.S. decision to not retaliate after an Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities contributed to Riyadh winding down its war in Yemen and normalizing relations with Iran.
Who knows? Stepping back might even help bring a sustainable peace to Gaza someday. So let's get going. The sooner the U.S. draws down troops, the better.
Will Walldorf is a Professor at Wake Forest University and Senior Fellow at Defense Priorities. He is currently writing a book titled America's Forever Wars: Why So Long, Why End Now, What Comes Next.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.