
The Druze in Suwayda: A Community at the Crossroads
Suwayda governorate in southern Syria—known historically as Jabal al‑Druze—is home to around 700,000 members of the Druze religious minority. While Druze in Israel are well-integrated, those in Syria have long sought autonomy from central regimes in Damascus. Since the collapse of Bashar al‑Assad in December 2024, regional tensions have intensified, driven by competing Druze visions for Syria's future, local rivalries with Sunni Bedouin tribes, and external interventions.
In early 2025, Druze militias in Suwayda formed the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), an umbrella coalition of local armed groups led by former Syrian army officer Tareq al‑Shoufi. The council emerged with aspirations of local autonomy, coordination with Syria's new interim leadership under President Ahmed al‑Sharaa, and alignment with other decentralized forces such as the Kurdish-led SDF. It has drawn in groups like Men of Dignity and the Ahrar Jabal al‑Arab Gathering.
However, Druze religious leadership is divided: Sheikh Hikmat al‑Hijri, one of Syria's three Druze 'sheikhs al‑Aql,' rejects cooperation with the central government and accuses Damascus of complicity in massacres of Druze civilians. He frames the struggle as existential for his community and supports federalist or even secessionist tendencies.
By contrast, Sheikh Youssef Jarbou, another spiritual leader, endorses integration with Damascus, backs cooperation with security forces, and supports initiatives for religious delegation visits—including one to Israel in March 2025—believing in working within state structures.
This internal rift shapes the region's politics: while some factions lean toward relative autonomy, others push for union with central authority.
Local Spark: Druze vs. Bedouin Clashes
Tensions escalated in July 2025 following tit-for-tat kidnappings between local Sunni Bedouin tribes and Druze militias, especially those allied with Hikmat al‑Hijri. Violence quickly spiraled into widespread street fighting, ambushes, and retaliatory raids in and around Suwayda city.
Government forces were deployed to restore order. Promised ceasefires collapsed rapidly, with both sides accusing each other of violations. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported anywhere from 100 to over 360 dead in initial days, including civilians and security personnel.
The Syrian transitional government under President al‑Sharaa initially deployed troops into Suwayda city to intervene. But they soon faced accusations—from Druze leaders and independent monitors—of extrajudicial killings and targeting of Druze civilians. Field executions by individuals identified as government-affiliated or security forces were widely reported, including summary shootings near Suwayda and Harvest Guest House, with many victims in civilian clothing.
President al‑Sharaa publicly condemned violence, announced investigations into human rights offenses by troops or militias, and pledged accountability. He also announced plans to turn security control over to Druze elders and local factions under a broader ceasefire framework.
Israeli Intervention
On July 15, Israel launched airstrikes near Damascus and Suwayda, claiming to protect Syria's Druze community—a group with which it shares close ties. Initial strikes hit Syrian military vehicles and the defence ministry complex in Damascus. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said its aim was to prevent government forces from harming Druze civilians and to establish a buffer zone in southern Syria.
Israel's actions created regional controversy. Critics linked the interventions to geopolitical motives and a broader strategy to weaken Damascus. Many Druze in Syria saw Israel's involvement with suspicion, arguing it was more self-serving than protective .
Escalation: Mass Displacement and Executions
As fighting intensified, reports emerged of Druze militias—particularly those loyal to Sheikh al-Hijri—carrying out mass executions of Bedouin men, burning villages, and forcibly displacing entire Bedouin communities. Accounts describe mutilations, rape of women and children, and villages emptied of inhabitants. Over 130,000 people fled their homes amid what the UN called a humanitarian crisis. Human Rights Watch and UN officials demanded investigations into the atrocities.
Among the victims were a Syrian‑American Druze family—including Hossam Saraya, a U.S. citizen from Oklahoma—abducted and executed; his case drew international attention and condemnation, and congressional requests for clarity.
By this point, the death toll reached several hundred, and Al Jazeera reported over 300 fatalities, while other sources suggested numbers closer to or exceeding 600.
Ceasefire and Current Stakes
By mid‑July, a mediated ceasefire—brokered by Turkey, Jordan, the U.S., and Arab states—called for Syrian troops to withdraw from Suwayda city and hand over local security to Druze clerics and factions. Jordan and Turkey supported local ownership of security to avoid future violence.
While an official ceasefire holds for now, its durability is uncertain: 1. Community divisions remain deep, with local factions loyal to al‑Hijri rejecting prior agreements and insisting on continuing autonomy efforts 2. Turkey has warned that it may intervene if autonomy within Syria becomes a breaking point, rejecting any fragmentation of the state. Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan called Israeli involvement destabilizing and confirmed Ankara's readiness to act in defense of Syrian unity
3. President al‑Sharaa's ability to reassert centralized governance remains fragile, as minority communities fear a repeat of past repression or exclusion from national decisions. Confidence in the transitional regime has eroded, particularly after reports of violence in the coastal Alawite region and now Suwayda.
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Al Bawaba
3 days ago
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The Druze in Suwayda: A Community at the Crossroads
Dr. Gil Feiler Suwayda governorate in southern Syria—known historically as Jabal al‑Druze—is home to around 700,000 members of the Druze religious minority. While Druze in Israel are well-integrated, those in Syria have long sought autonomy from central regimes in Damascus. Since the collapse of Bashar al‑Assad in December 2024, regional tensions have intensified, driven by competing Druze visions for Syria's future, local rivalries with Sunni Bedouin tribes, and external interventions. In early 2025, Druze militias in Suwayda formed the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), an umbrella coalition of local armed groups led by former Syrian army officer Tareq al‑Shoufi. The council emerged with aspirations of local autonomy, coordination with Syria's new interim leadership under President Ahmed al‑Sharaa, and alignment with other decentralized forces such as the Kurdish-led SDF. It has drawn in groups like Men of Dignity and the Ahrar Jabal al‑Arab Gathering. However, Druze religious leadership is divided: Sheikh Hikmat al‑Hijri, one of Syria's three Druze 'sheikhs al‑Aql,' rejects cooperation with the central government and accuses Damascus of complicity in massacres of Druze civilians. He frames the struggle as existential for his community and supports federalist or even secessionist tendencies. By contrast, Sheikh Youssef Jarbou, another spiritual leader, endorses integration with Damascus, backs cooperation with security forces, and supports initiatives for religious delegation visits—including one to Israel in March 2025—believing in working within state structures. This internal rift shapes the region's politics: while some factions lean toward relative autonomy, others push for union with central authority. Local Spark: Druze vs. Bedouin Clashes Tensions escalated in July 2025 following tit-for-tat kidnappings between local Sunni Bedouin tribes and Druze militias, especially those allied with Hikmat al‑Hijri. Violence quickly spiraled into widespread street fighting, ambushes, and retaliatory raids in and around Suwayda city. Government forces were deployed to restore order. Promised ceasefires collapsed rapidly, with both sides accusing each other of violations. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported anywhere from 100 to over 360 dead in initial days, including civilians and security personnel. The Syrian transitional government under President al‑Sharaa initially deployed troops into Suwayda city to intervene. But they soon faced accusations—from Druze leaders and independent monitors—of extrajudicial killings and targeting of Druze civilians. Field executions by individuals identified as government-affiliated or security forces were widely reported, including summary shootings near Suwayda and Harvest Guest House, with many victims in civilian clothing. President al‑Sharaa publicly condemned violence, announced investigations into human rights offenses by troops or militias, and pledged accountability. He also announced plans to turn security control over to Druze elders and local factions under a broader ceasefire framework. Israeli Intervention On July 15, Israel launched airstrikes near Damascus and Suwayda, claiming to protect Syria's Druze community—a group with which it shares close ties. Initial strikes hit Syrian military vehicles and the defence ministry complex in Damascus. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said its aim was to prevent government forces from harming Druze civilians and to establish a buffer zone in southern Syria. Israel's actions created regional controversy. Critics linked the interventions to geopolitical motives and a broader strategy to weaken Damascus. Many Druze in Syria saw Israel's involvement with suspicion, arguing it was more self-serving than protective . Escalation: Mass Displacement and Executions As fighting intensified, reports emerged of Druze militias—particularly those loyal to Sheikh al-Hijri—carrying out mass executions of Bedouin men, burning villages, and forcibly displacing entire Bedouin communities. Accounts describe mutilations, rape of women and children, and villages emptied of inhabitants. Over 130,000 people fled their homes amid what the UN called a humanitarian crisis. Human Rights Watch and UN officials demanded investigations into the atrocities. Among the victims were a Syrian‑American Druze family—including Hossam Saraya, a U.S. citizen from Oklahoma—abducted and executed; his case drew international attention and condemnation, and congressional requests for clarity. By this point, the death toll reached several hundred, and Al Jazeera reported over 300 fatalities, while other sources suggested numbers closer to or exceeding 600. Ceasefire and Current Stakes By mid‑July, a mediated ceasefire—brokered by Turkey, Jordan, the U.S., and Arab states—called for Syrian troops to withdraw from Suwayda city and hand over local security to Druze clerics and factions. Jordan and Turkey supported local ownership of security to avoid future violence. While an official ceasefire holds for now, its durability is uncertain: 1. Community divisions remain deep, with local factions loyal to al‑Hijri rejecting prior agreements and insisting on continuing autonomy efforts 2. Turkey has warned that it may intervene if autonomy within Syria becomes a breaking point, rejecting any fragmentation of the state. Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan called Israeli involvement destabilizing and confirmed Ankara's readiness to act in defense of Syrian unity 3. President al‑Sharaa's ability to reassert centralized governance remains fragile, as minority communities fear a repeat of past repression or exclusion from national decisions. Confidence in the transitional regime has eroded, particularly after reports of violence in the coastal Alawite region and now Suwayda.

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Israel's agenda in Syria appears to oscillate between two alarming objectives: fragmenting the country into a collection of weak, rival statelets; and establishing a demilitarized, fragile zone in southern Syria—open to regular Israeli military intervention. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly declared his ambition for such a demilitarized zone. More concerning, however, is Israel's attempt to legitimize its military involvement by invoking the protection of the Druze community and engaging with Druze religious leaders such as Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri in Suwayda. Through these moves, Israel is positioning itself as a stakeholder in Syria's internal affairs, laying claim to the right to shape its future—a development with potentially far-reaching consequences for the entire region. From Amman's standpoint, what's unfolding in Suwayda resonates deeply with national security priorities. 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At the same time, the Trump administration has shown no real interest in reviving peace efforts. On the contrary, Israel appears to be implementing a premeditated plan involving land annexation, the dismantling of the Palestinian Authority, and the transformation of the West Bank into isolated, controllable cantons. What is unfolding in Syria—especially in the aftermath of the October 7 attack and Israel's war on Gaza—and what is brewing in the West Bank, are both manifestations of a dangerous new Israeli strategic doctrine. These developments suggest that no regional actor currently possesses either the political will or the leverage to halt Israeli efforts to forcibly reshape the demographic and geopolitical landscape in line with Netanyahu's long-term vision. If Israel can redraw the map in Syria, it is all the more capable of implementing even more consequential policies in the West Bank and Jerusalem, particularly regarding the Palestinian demographic question—posing a direct challenge to Jordan's core interests. Jordan's problem with Israel, then, is no longer limited to the occupation of the West Bank. It is now inseparably linked to Israel's broader regional ambitions—in Syria, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza. This means that diplomatic tensions and strategic anxieties between Amman and Tel Aviv are steadily intensifying, despite the existing peace treaty. Even more alarming is that Israel no longer seeks to present itself as a vulnerable, security-conscious state. Instead, it is acting as a dominant regional power bent on imposing its agenda and capitalizing on the overwhelming imbalance of power in its favor.


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