Taiwan will 'not provoke confrontation' with China, vice president says
'We do not seek conflict. We will not provoke confrontation,' said Bi-khim Hsiao, adding that her government has urged Beijing to communicate 'with parity and respect.'
Hsiao, who has served under Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te since their election win last year, said her government has seen 'a dramatic uptick in provocative and proactive CCP efforts to infiltrate, sabotage and divide our society," referring to the Chinese Communist Party.
China claims self-ruled Taiwan as its own territory and has repeatedly threatened to annex it, by force if necessary. In recent years, Beijing has ramped up its military intimidation of the island, sending jets and ships nearby almost daily.
China refuses to speak with Hsiao and Lai and has labeled them 'diehard 'Taiwan independence' separatists,' a designation for which it has threatened the death penalty.
In a notable attempt of alleged intimidation by Beijing, Czech intelligence officials last month said Chinese diplomats planned to stage a car crash during Hsiao's 2024 visit to the country. No crash occurred, but a Chinese official ran a red light while following Hsiao's car.
Speaking at the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents' Club in Taipei, Hsiao said she has experienced 'varying degrees of pressure and threats' over the years, including sanctions by China.
'But I will not let that intimidate me or stop me from voicing my views or from voicing the views of the people of Taiwan, and we will continue to be active in the international community,' she said.
Regarding recurring U.S. intelligence reports that China may be planning to invade Taiwan before 2027, Hsiao said her government is focused on preempting that.
'Everything we are doing right now is to prevent such a conflict from happening — not just in 2027, but ever,' she said.
Taiwan is 'very urgently investing in our self-defense capabilities' in order to deter 'any miscalculation and any attempt at disrupting the peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait,' she added.
Taiwan on Friday wrapped up annual military drills, which simulated defenses against a possible invasion by China. The drills included fortifying ports and possible Chinese landing points on the island, as well as civil defense exercises.
Taiwan sources most of its weapons from the United States, which is bound by its own laws to provide the island with the means to defend itself.
Like most countries, the U.S. does not recognize Taiwan as country, but acts as its main unofficial ally. Washington supports preserving the status quo in Taipei's relationship with Beijing, which means neither side should make a move toward independence or annexation, respectively.
Taiwan's relationship with the U.S. is 'very important' and has historically held through different administrations while garnering bipartisan congressional support, Hsiao said.
Trade negotiators from the two sides are working 'around the clock' to reach a deal that would pre-empt tariffs of 32% on all Taiwanese goods from coming into effect Aug. 1, she said. Washington lowered tariffs on Taiwanese goods to 10% for 90 days to allow for the trade talks.
The tariffs are part of duties President Donald Trump levied against nearly all U.S. trading partners beginning in April, accusing them of running large trade surpluses.
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The Diplomat
10 hours ago
- The Diplomat
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Nikkei Asia
14 hours ago
- Nikkei Asia
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