Who is John Donahoe, the new athletic director of Stanford?
Donahoe will assume the role on September 8, taking over from Bernard Muir at a time when Stanford is navigating competitive pressures in both athletics and academic integrity, alongside its recent transition to the Atlantic Coast Conference.
By turning to a titan of global business rather than a traditional athletics insider, Stanford is making a bold statement about the kind of future it envisions for college sports—one that blends strategic vision with institutional values.
And at the heart of this decision is Donahoe's own deep connection to the university and his decades of leadership across some of the world's most influential companies.
Molded by Stanford, defined by Dartmouth
John Donahoe's ties to Stanford run far deeper than his new title. He is an alumnus of the Stanford Graduate School of Business, where he earned his MBA and shaped a leadership philosophy that blends analytical precision with human-centered strategy.
by Taboola
by Taboola
Sponsored Links
Sponsored Links
Promoted Links
Promoted Links
You May Like
Villas Prices In Dubai Might Be More Affordable Than You Think
Villas In Dubai | Search Ads
Get Quote
Undo
That academic experience was preceded by an economics degree from Dartmouth College, where he laid the foundation for a career that would span boardrooms, digital commerce, and global brand leadership.
His educational journey wasn't just about academic excellence, it prepared him to lead large, complex systems with competing demands. Now, those same skills are being redirected toward an athletic department seeking renewal and long-term direction.
From corporate powerhouse to cardinal headquarters
Before arriving at Stanford in an official leadership role, Donahoe made his mark as one of the most seasoned executives in American business. He spent nearly two decades at Bain & Company, ultimately serving as its global CEO. He later led eBay through an ambitious expansion phase, oversaw operations at ServiceNow as it rose to prominence in the enterprise software sector, and served as chairman of the board at PayPal.
His most recent post—chief executive of Nike from 2020 to 2024—placed him at the helm of one of the world's most recognizable sports brands during a period of immense disruption and transformation. While his tenure saw its share of challenges, including corporate restructuring and shifting consumer landscapes, Donahoe's leadership was defined by long-term repositioning and innovation—a legacy he now brings to collegiate athletics.
Redefining success at
Stanford athletics
Stanford's athletic history is nothing short of extraordinary, boasting 137 NCAA team championships and a streak of at least one national title every year since 1976. Yet recent years have seen diminishing returns in headline sports such as football and men's basketball. Amid coaching turnovers, conference realignments, and intensified competition, the need for renewed vision has never been more urgent.
Donahoe's mandate goes far beyond win-loss records.
He is expected to reimagine Stanford's athletic program in a landscape increasingly shaped by media rights, NIL policies, and student-athlete autonomy. His outsider perspective, coupled with deep ties to the university's intellectual core, makes him uniquely qualified to chart a new path—one that protects Stanford's scholar-athlete model while embracing innovation and competitive relevance.
A strategic return to where it all began
For Donahoe, this appointment is more than a professional pivot—it's a return to the institution that helped shape his worldview. As he prepares to lead a department where academic excellence and athletic ambition are expected to coexist, he brings with him the credibility of corporate leadership and the insight of an alumnus who understands Stanford's distinct mission.
Ready to navigate global policies? Secure your overseas future. Get expert guidance now!
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Mint
5 minutes ago
- Mint
Trump says he'd ‘like to run' in 2028 for President—But ‘probably not'
US President Donald Trump on Tuesday (August 5) said he would like to run for President again in 2028, but quickly tempered expectations by adding, 'probably not.' 'No, probably not, probably not. I'd like to … I have the best poll numbers I've ever had,' Trump said in an interview with CNBC, referring to his current popularity among Republican voters and broader national polling. While Trump has not ruled out the possibility of running again after his current term, his comments suggest he may be leaning against seeking a third term. The remark comes as Trump continues to dominate the Republican Party. His brief comment — mixing confidence in his popularity with hesitation about extending his political future beyond 2028 — is likely to spark fresh speculation among supporters and political observers about the future leadership of the Republican Party. Trump's 2028 hint follows a series of recent campaign appearances where he has repeatedly emphasised his record while in office. However, at 82 in 2028, Trump would be older than President Biden is today. Despite the 22nd Amendment clearly limiting US presidents to two terms, Trump has repeatedly hinted at the possibility of seeking a third term—fueling speculation and controversy. Speaking to NBC News in March 2025, Trump said, 'A lot of people want me to do it,' and added he was 'not joking' about a possible third term. He even suggested there were 'methods' to make it happen, without elaborating on what those might be. When asked in the same interview about a scenario in which his Vice President, JD Vance, could run for office and then transfer power to him, Trump did not rule out the idea. He acknowledged the possibility, further stoking debate over how serious his intentions might be. Earlier in May 2025, Trump reaffirmed that he intended to serve only two terms but acknowledged continued pressure from allies. 'It's something that, to the best of my knowledge, you're not allowed to do. I don't know if that's constitutional that they're not allowing you to do it or anything else,' he said, appearing to question the legitimacy or interpretation of the rule. The US Constitution is clear on this matter. Ratified in 1951, the 22nd Amendment states: 'No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice.' Changing or abolishing this amendment would be extremely difficult. It would require either: A two-thirds majority vote in both the House and Senate, or A constitutional convention called by two-thirds of U.S. state legislatures. In either case, the proposed change must then be ratified by three-quarters of the states. As the 2028 election cycle draws closer, Trump's mixed messages are expected to keep both supporters and critics on edge. His repeated teasing of a third term, even in the face of explicit Constitutional limits, ensures that the conversation around his future role in American politics will remain active.
Indian Express
8 minutes ago
- Indian Express
A reminder for Trump: US wanted India to buy Russian crude to keep oil market stable, prices in check
US President Donald Trump seems frustrated with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin over the war in Ukraine, clearly wanting the over three-and-half-year-old war to end, while Putin appears unyielding. The American president, meanwhile, believes he has a lever the he can use to push Putin's buttons. That lever is India's significant oil imports from Russia. Trump has been berating India over its Russian oil imports and pressuring New Delhi into cutting down on imports from Moscow in the hope that threatening or penalising a key trade partner would force the Kremlin's hand into ending the war in Ukraine. While Trump evidently finds it convenient to go after India on the issue at a time when New Delhi and Washington are locked in tense trade pact negotiations, it is worth noting that the US had a major role to play in India ramping up oil imports from Russia, for which New Delhi is now being vilified by Trump and his administration. Over the course of the war in Ukraine, US officials have publicly stated that India's purchase of Russian oil had Washington's endorsement, at least implicitly. In his latest salvo, Trump on Monday said that threatened that he will 'substantially' raise tariffs on New Delhi for profiting from exporting fuels derived from Russian oil. Trump's latest attack came just days after he announced 25 per cent tariffs and an unspecified 'penalty' on India for its defence and energy imports from Russia. Responding sharply to Trump's remarks, India said that while it has been targeted by the US and the European Union for importing oil from Russia, these imports began as its traditional supplies were diverted to Europe, and the US at that time 'actively encouraged such imports by India for strengthening global energy markets stability'. When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2024, Moscow's share in New Delhi's oil imports was less than 2 per cent. The reasons were obvious: Russia was a far-away geography and already had established markets where a bulk of its crude was exported. India, on the other hand, depended significantly on West Asian suppliers like Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which are located close by. With much of the West shunning Russian crude following the invasion, Russia began offering discounts on its oil to willing buyers. Indian refiners were quick to avail the opportunity, leading to Russia—earlier a peripheral supplier of oil to India—emerging as India's biggest source of crude within a matter of months, displacing the traditional West Asian suppliers. Russia now accounts for 35-40 per cent of India's total oil imports by volume. As Europe decided to stop the import of refined petroleum fuels from Russia, Indian refiners increased fuel exports to the continent. Apart from alleging that India was helping fund the war in Ukraine by buying Russian oil, critics of India's oil and fuel trade argued that the country's refiners were facilitating a backdoor entry into Europe for fuels made from Russian crude. There was, however, nothing illegitimate about this trade as there was no specific ban on fuel imports from countries that were buying Russian oil. That ban has now been announced by the EU, and is slated to take effect from January 2026. Despite the noise from sections of the West against India over the country's hefty purchases of Russian crude, this shift in oil and petroleum product trade had Washington's blessings, as the US wanted energy markets to remain stable and well-supplied. In a recent interaction with CNBC International, global energy expert and Rapidan Energy Group President Bob McNally said that it was the Biden administration that 'begged' India to buy Russian crude to keep global energy prices in check. 'The Indians must be having some confusion (due to Trump's stance) because Joe Biden went to India after the invasion of Russia and begged them to take Russian oil…they begged India, 'Please take the oil', so that crude prices would remain low, and they did. Now we're flipping around, saying, 'What are you doing taking all this Russian oil?' The point is Trump is serious…he is frustrated with Putin,' said McNally, who served as the Special Assistant to the President on the White House National Economic Council and Senior Director for International Energy on the National Security Council during George W Bush's first term as US President. India's actions in line with US policy: Biden era officials Various US government officials during the Biden presidency also publicly acknowledged that India's actions helped balance the international oil market, and were in line with what the US wanted in order to keep the global market well-supplied. Had most of the Russian oil gone off the market—as happened with Iran and Venezuela—international oil prices would have shot up, which would have hit the global economy that was still fragile coming out of the pandemic. At an event in May 2024, the then US Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti said, 'Actually, they (India) bought Russian oil because we wanted somebody to buy Russian oil at a price cap. That was not a violation or anything. It was actually the design of the policy because as a commodity we didn't want oil prices going up, and they fulfilled that.' Garcetti was correct, as Rusian oil was and continues to be sanction-free, and only a price cap of $60 per barrel was introduced in December 2022 on seaborne Russian crude by the US and its allies. The cap prohibits export of Russian seaborne crude at over $60 per barrel if the trade involves Western shipping or insurance services. Oil importers like India, which are not part of the price cap coalition comprising G7 countries and their allies, are not bound by the price cap as long as their purchase of Russian oil does not involve any shipping or insurance service from providers in the coalition countries. In April last year, senior US officials had said at a New Delhi event that the US neither expected India to reduce its oil imports from Russia and had not even requested it to do so. The then US Treasury Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Eric Van Nostrand had said that the objective of the sanctions and G7 price cap regime was not to push Russian crude out of the market, but to keep it flowing while limiting Kremlin's revenue from oil exports, which in turn impaired Russia's ability to fund the war in Ukraine. 'The price cap is designed to leave Russia with only bad options…We want him (Putin) to choose between three bad things: selling with coalition services under the price cap, selling outside the price cap, or shutting his oil in and not putting it to market. With a strong and robust price cap regime, Putin is going to prefer to sell as much as he can outside the price cap. But in order to maximise his sales outside the price cap, when a large part of the global coalition is already involved in the price cap, he is going to have to offer it cheaper,' Nostrand said. Anna Morris, the then US Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, said at the same event that from a technical standpoint, Russian oil once refined into petroleum fuels and products could no longer be considered of Russian origin, dismissing the argument that India refiners were facilitating Russian petroleum's entry into Europe. 'I also want to specify that once Russian oil is refined, from a technical perspective it is no longer Russian oil…If it is refined in a country and then sent forward, from a sanctions perspective that is an import from the country of purchase, it is not an import from Russia,' Morris said. While the Biden administration seemed satisfied with the price cap, while letting Russian oil flow, Trump has taken a much more aggressive stance, threatening financial costs on importers of Russian energy. Sukalp Sharma is a Senior Assistant Editor with The Indian Express and writes on a host of subjects and sectors, notably energy and aviation. He has over 13 years of experience in journalism with a body of work spanning areas like politics, development, equity markets, corporates, trade, and economic policy. He considers himself an above-average photographer, which goes well with his love for travel. ... Read More
Hans India
8 minutes ago
- Hans India
Russia Condemns US Threats Against India Over Oil Trade A Illegal Coercion
Russia has strongly criticized the United States for threatening India with tariffs over its purchase of Russian oil, with Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov declaring such coercive tactics as illegal under international law. The Russian government's firm response came following President Donald Trump's latest warning to India about revised tariffs if New Delhi continues its energy trade relationship with Moscow. Speaking to reporters on Tuesday, Peskov emphasized that attempting to force countries to cease trading with Russia violates international legal principles and sovereign rights. The Kremlin spokesperson asserted that all nations possess the fundamental right to choose their own trading partners and should not face external pressure or threats for exercising this sovereignty in their economic relationships. The Russian official characterized the US pressure tactics as threatening behavior that undermines the principle of free trade and sovereign decision-making in international commerce. Peskov made it clear that Russia interprets such coercive measures against its trading partners as direct threats that challenge established norms of international economic cooperation and diplomatic relations. Peskov's statement directly addressed the broader implications of American economic diplomacy, stating that sovereign countries should have complete freedom to select their trading partners, choose forms of trade and economic cooperation, and pursue arrangements that serve their national interests without external interference or intimidation from third parties. The Kremlin's response followed Trump's Monday night warning to India, where the US President threatened substantial tariff increases unless New Delhi halted its purchases of Russian oil and military products. Trump's warning was part of his broader strategy to pressure Russia into accepting a ceasefire in the ongoing Ukraine conflict by targeting Moscow's economic relationships with major trading partners. In his social media post, Trump accused India of purchasing massive quantities of Russian oil and subsequently reselling much of it on international markets for significant profits. The US President claimed that India demonstrated indifference to Ukrainian casualties caused by what he termed the "Russian War Machine," using this moral argument to justify his threatened economic sanctions. Trump specifically announced plans to substantially increase tariffs on Indian goods, building upon the 25 percent tariffs that had already been implemented starting August 1. The US President justified these earlier tariffs by claiming that India imposed the world's highest tariffs on American goods, creating an unfair trade imbalance that required corrective action. The escalating trade tensions occur within the context of Trump's efforts to establish a ceasefire in Ukraine by pressuring Russia through economic isolation. However, the strategy of targeting Russia's trading partners has created diplomatic complications with allies and strategic partners, particularly India, which maintains a non-aligned foreign policy stance. India's Ministry of External Affairs responded to Trump's threats with a strongly-worded statement condemning what it characterized as unjustified and unreasonable targeting by the United States. The Indian government emphasized that as a major economy, it would take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security against external pressure. The Indian response highlighted the contradictory nature of US demands, pointing out that both the United States and European Union continue maintaining their own trade relationships with Russia while simultaneously pressuring India to sever its economic ties with Moscow. This apparent double standard has become a central point of contention in the diplomatic dispute. India's position emphasizes its strategic autonomy in foreign policy decision-making, particularly regarding energy security for its 1.4 billion citizens. The country has maintained that its oil purchases from Russia were necessitated by traditional suppliers redirecting their resources to European markets following the Ukraine conflict's outbreak, and that the US initially encouraged such imports during the war's early stages. The Russian support for India's position reflects Moscow's broader strategy of maintaining international economic relationships despite Western sanctions and pressure campaigns. By characterizing US threats as illegal, Russia is attempting to frame the dispute in terms of international law and sovereign rights rather than merely economic or geopolitical considerations. The diplomatic standoff illustrates the complex challenges facing the Trump administration's approach to pressuring Russia through its trading partners. While China, another major purchaser of Russian oil and a significant US geopolitical rival, has largely escaped similar threats, India's status as a strategic partner makes the coercive approach particularly problematic for broader US diplomatic objectives. The situation demonstrates the limitations of using economic coercion against sovereign nations that maintain independent foreign policies, particularly when those nations possess significant economic leverage and alternative partnerships that can offset potential US sanctions or tariffs.
