
No Safe Return: The Case Against Deporting Afghan Refugees
Following the Taliban's return to power in August 2021, Afghanistan has experienced a precipitous collapse on nearly every front: economic, political, and humanitarian. While some officials in host countries attempt to justify deportations by referencing 'improved security' or 'de facto governance,' the facts on the ground paint a starkly different picture. The Taliban have instituted a regime marked by gender apartheid, the systematic persecution of minorities, widespread economic devastation, and the brutal targeting of anyone affiliated with the former government, Western institutions, or civil society.
Economically, the country is on the brink of disaster. The withdrawal of foreign aid, which previously constituted over 70 percent of the national budget, has led to an implosion of essential services. The World Bank reported that Afghanistan's GDP contracted by over 26 percent in the months following the Taliban takeover. Inflation has surged, unemployment is rampant, and nearly 15 million Afghans face acute food insecurity, according to the World Food Program. Public services such as education and healthcare, particularly for women and children, have all but disappeared. Women health workers have been pushed out of hospitals; female educators removed from schools; and countless NGOs banned or shuttered for employing women.
The humanitarian collapse alone should be enough to halt deportations. Yet it is the deliberate and systemic repression under Taliban rule that makes return not just impractical but life-threatening. The Taliban's policies toward women constitute one of the most extreme forms of gender discrimination seen in modern times. Girls are banned from attending secondary school and university. Women are prohibited from working in most sectors, from traveling without a male guardian, and from accessing public spaces such as parks, gyms, and even beauty salons. Women's visibility in society is not only discouraged; it is criminalized. Numerous cases have been reported by UNAMA and Human Rights Watch where women who dared to protest or speak publicly were arrested, beaten, or disappeared.
These policies are not isolated or culturally relative. They represent gender apartheid, a term rooted in international human rights law, which refers to the segregation and exclusion of people based on gender in both public and private spheres. The Taliban's rules are codified and enforced through coercion, and they target not only women in public roles but also their families, colleagues, and communities. Deporting Afghan women or families with young daughters back to this environment is not only morally indefensible – it is a violation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Refugee Convention itself.
Beyond women, Afghan minorities face equally harrowing threats. Ethnic and religious communities such as the Hazaras, Sikhs, Hindus, and Shia Muslims have long been subjected to violence, but the Taliban's return has intensified their marginalization. Hazaras, in particular, have faced targeted killings, forced displacement, and denial of access to education and employment. The Taliban have consistently failed to protect these groups from attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and, in some cases, have actively participated in abuses. For many of these communities, returning to Afghanistan is equivalent to returning to persecution or even death.
The most underreported victims of deportation are those who previously worked with NATO forces, U.S. missions, international NGOs, or Afghan government institutions. Despite promises of relocation and protection, many of these individuals remain stranded in legal limbo across host countries. Those who have been deported often face immediate reprisal. Reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the BBC document instances in which returnees have been detained at the airport, interrogated, and in some cases never seen again. The Taliban's intelligence networks have compiled extensive databases, often with the help of documents and data left behind after the U.S. withdrawal, making it easier to identify and punish those once associated with the former state.
Even beyond physical security, the psychological toll of forced return is immense. Afghan refugees — many of whom have spent years in exile — have built fragile yet meaningful lives in host countries. For children born abroad, Afghanistan is an unfamiliar and frightening land. Deportation tears families apart, pushes individuals into poverty, and inflicts trauma that lasts for generations. There have even been cases of suicide and self-immolation among Afghan refugees facing imminent deportation, especially in Iran and Pakistan. These are not isolated incidents; they are the consequence of policies that strip individuals of dignity and hope.
From a legal standpoint, such deportations contravene the principle of non-refoulement, enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and reaffirmed by the UNHCR (the United Nations' refugee agency) and numerous international courts. Non-refoulement prohibits the return of individuals to countries where they face threats to life or freedom. Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, clearly meets this threshold. UNHCR has consistently advised against any forced return to Afghanistan, emphasizing that conditions remain unsafe, and that all states have a responsibility to ensure individual risk assessments before repatriation.
Despite this, many host governments continue to push for mass deportations. Pakistan has announced the forced removal of over a million undocumented Afghans, many of whom fled Taliban violence and lack any formal protection status. In Turkiye, Afghan refugees are frequently detained and deported without legal representation. In the United States, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghans, which protected them from deportation, is set to end in mid-July following a decision by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) based on the bizarre conclusion that 'Afghanistan has had an improved security situation, and its stabilizing economy no longer prevent [Afghan TPS recipients] from returning to their home country.' Even in Europe, where international law is robust, some states are tightening asylum procedures or quietly supporting 'voluntary' returns under duress.
The international community must reject the false narrative that Afghanistan is safe for return. It must resist the political temptation to wash its hands of Afghan refugees by labeling them as economic migrants or 'security concerns.' Instead, it must reaffirm its legal and moral obligations to those who have fled genuine, documentable persecution.
What is needed is a comprehensive and coordinated response: immediate suspension of all deportations to Afghanistan; restoration and expansion of temporary protection programs; humanitarian visas for women, minorities, and former civil servants at risk; and increased funding for refugee integration and mental health services in host countries. Host nations must also engage in diplomatic pressure on the Taliban not just to open schools or employ women but to end systemic repression and uphold basic human rights.
Refugees are not a burden. They are survivors, educators, artists, professionals, and future leaders. Afghan refugees in particular have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and a commitment to rebuilding their lives in exile. To deport them now is to reward authoritarianism, punish resistance, and betray the very principles that World Refugee Day was created to defend.
The world must choose: Will it uphold the dignity of the displaced or participate in their erasure?

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