logo
Decoding ASEAN's Measured Engagement with BRICS

Decoding ASEAN's Measured Engagement with BRICS

The Diplomata day ago
Following Thailand and Malaysia, Vietnam last month became the third Southeast Asian 'partner country' of BRICS. BRICS partnership, an extended cooperation mechanism established at the grouping's Kazan Summit in October 2024, allows countries to engage with the grouping in a flexible manner. In addition to these three nations, Indonesia in January became the first nation in Southeast Asia to attain full membership in BRICS.
Why did Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur and Hanoi only join BRICS as 'partner countries' while Indonesia was determined to seek full BRICS membership? By pursuing partner status, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam are walking a fine line between BRICS and the West, which remain at odds on many important issues.
With 10 full members and 10 partner countries across three continents, BRICS now accounts for 40 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), positioning it as a powerful platform for countries seeking to reduce their dependence on the West. Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam –all of which pursue foreign policies aimed at strategic balance – fit this profile. Thailand pursues 'proactive diplomacy,' opening to collaboration with 'all sides.' Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra recently underlined the importance of engaging with global economic institutions, including BRICS, to boost the country's economy.
Malaysia considers its economy as 'highly open' and maintains a 'neutral' foreign policy. Hence, joining BRICS is a vital step towards diversifying the country's economic relations. Meanwhile, Vietnam remains committed to 'bamboo diplomacy' – an overarching foreign policy strategy rooted in multi-alignment, multilateralism, and strategic autonomy. Hanoi's partnership with BRICS allows it to lay low geopolitically while enhancing its ability to 'influence international affairs' through the bloc, via 'forums and meetings that facilitate dialogue, cultural exchange, and cooperation' in security and economic matters.
However, BRICS partnership is not a risk-free endeavor. Heavily influenced by Russia and China, the bloc is advancing a de-dollarization agenda aimed at challenging U.S. financial dominance. In the wake of the Ukraine war and Russia's SWIFT exclusion in 2022, Moscow has pushed BRICS members to advance this agenda by building an alternative international payments platform, thereby strengthening BRICS' role in the global financial and monetary system. In 2024, Russia announced a series of initiatives – including the BRICS Pay e-payment system, the BRICS Bridge cross-border payment platform, and the BRICS Grain Exchange – as part of its broader efforts to establish an independent economic and financial framework relatively immune from Western influence.
But a vision of a single BRICS currency and the bloc's efforts to reduce Western dominance are stoking anger in Washington, with President Donald Trump threatening to impose a 150 percent tariff on products from BRICS nations should they continue attempting to undermine the U.S. dollar. Trump's warning makes full BRICS membership a highly precarious choice for the three developing countries.
An economic alignment with BRICS through full membership could put Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam's efforts to deepen economic ties with the U.S. and other Western partners at risk. The stakes are even higher as all three countries are still negotiating with the Trump administration to reduce the 'reciprocal' tariffs in early April. During Trump's 'liberation day' tariff announcement, Thailand was hit with a 36 percent tariff, Malaysia 24 percent, and Vietnam 46 percent, and all three nations are under pressure to reach agreements before the new tariff rates take effect on July 8. In this context, pursuing full BRICS membership could derail their ongoing negotiations with Washington. Partner status, which entails limited voting and decision-making power within BRICS, may offer a lower-risk alternative for these countries.
Moreover, full BRICS membership is unlikely to offer substantial additional economic benefits for the three countries, which already have or are negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with most major BRICS economies: with China through the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, with India through the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (Thailand and UAE are on the fourth round of negotiation for a bilateral FTA ), and Indonesia through the ASEAN Free Trade Area.
All of this raises the question of why Indonesia decided to seek full BRICS membership, a step that former President Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo was hesitant to take . At the BRICS Summit in 2023, Widodo received an invitation from BRICS leaders for Indonesia to join the bloc as a full member, but he declined the invitation.
First, Indonesia has explicitly communicated its ambition to expand its influence beyond ASEAN by engaging with larger multilateral mechanisms. As Southeast Asia's leader in key geoeconomic indicators, including GDP, population, and land area, Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian member of the G-20. Since 2024, the country has also set its sights on becoming the first Southeast Asian nation to join the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, aiming to achieve membership within the next two or three years. Thus, it is not surprising that BRICS has been on Jakarta's radar. Indonesia's 'bebas-aktif' (free and active) foreign policy provides a strong foundation for deepening its engagement with multilateral organizations in both the Global North and South.
Second, Indonesia's decision to join BRICS also reflects clear economic reasoning. Membership in BRICS serves as a stepping stone for Jakarta's efforts toward membership of the New Development Bank (NDB), the bloc's strategic lending vehicle. As the Indonesian government is seeking funding for its stalled capital relocation project, access to NDB's infrastructure loans could provide the country with much-needed fiscal relief. Moreover, BRICS membership enhances Indonesia's economic alignments with Global South states, particularly those in the Middle East – a region of growing strategic interest for President Prabowo Subianto's administration. Following Jakarta's official accession to BRICS in January, Prabowo conducted a week-long visit to the Middle East in April, securing a $10 billion investment commitment from the UAE for Indonesia's newly established sovereign wealth fund, Danantara, and establishing a strategic partnership with Egypt. In addition, despite Western sanctions on Iran, Jakarta has maintained robust trade ties with Tehran and has signed a preferential trade agreement that includes a provision for barter-style payments.
At last year's BRICS Summit in Kazan, Malaysia's Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli discussed the potential for deeper ASEAN–BRICS cooperation, noting that Malaysia – as chairman of ASEAN in 2025 – saw 'tremendous synergies between ASEAN and BRICS.' This message echoes the broader strategic ambitions of ASEAN countries in strengthening their engagements with the bloc and suggests that, when engaging with external actors, ASEAN member states – regardless of their individual political and economic status – do not act in isolation, but instead seek input and coordination with their regional counterparts.
Nonetheless, the four ASEAN countries must engage with BRICS in a pragmatic and cautious manner, because there is no such thing as a free lunch. While BRICS membership and partnership presents a range of strategic opportunities, it also entails costs and could 'bring pitfalls in the short term, if not carefully managed.' These countries now face heightened vulnerability amid escalating strife between BRICS and Western powers to shape the global order and global economic governance. To maintain their non-aligned stances, Jakarta, Hanoi, Bangkok, and Kuala Lumpur must remain cautious of political coercion, economic overdependence, and the risk of being drawn into a BRICS-or-West rivalry.
The good news, however, is that the U.S and other Western countries have thus far refrained from opposing these ASEAN states' deepening engagement with BRICS, suggesting a degree of strategic tolerance. Moving forward, what matters most is how these four countries calibrate their level of participation in BRICS initiatives to make the most of the group's economic clout while carefully avoiding being perceived as taking sides.
Orange background

Try Our AI Features

Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:

Comments

No comments yet...

Related Articles

NATO's Donald Trump dilemma
NATO's Donald Trump dilemma

Japan Times

time3 hours ago

  • Japan Times

NATO's Donald Trump dilemma

NATO's just-completed summit in The Hague came at a time of extraordinary tension. Since returning to the White House, Donald Trump has repeatedly accused Europe of free riding on U.S. defense spending, raising serious concerns about the health of the Atlantic alliance. His decision to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities just three days before the summit — in coordination with Israel and without informing America's NATO allies — has only intensified those fears. Trump's strikes against Iran evoked memories of the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, when NATO expanded its role beyond addressing conventional military threats to include counter-terrorism operations. While the alliance supported the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq was far more divisive, owing to the lack of convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and the absence of an explicit United Nations Security Council mandate. The resulting rift prompted then-U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to draw a controversial distinction between 'Old Europe' and 'New Europe.' But the current situation is even more alarming. Unlike in 2003, when the United States at least made an effort to consult its allies, Trump now keeps them in the dark. He provided no credible evidence to justify the attack on Iran and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi contradicted his claims of an imminent nuclear threat, stating just days earlier that there was no proof of a 'systematic' Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons. Strikingly, many NATO leaders were informed of the attack only after it had been carried out. By sidelining NATO, Trump has effectively reduced the alliance to a passive observer, undermining its core principles and signaling a dangerous shift in global diplomacy. Imagine if Iran had retaliated by targeting U.S. bases in Turkey, potentially dragging my country into war. And if a nuclear leak had occurred, endangering Turkish civilians, who would have borne responsibility? Although Israel and Iran accepted Trump's announcement of a ceasefire, NATO members had been thrust into a dangerous situation without warning. This was particularly worrisome for Turkey, which shares a border with Iran and is highly vulnerable to the consequences of regional escalation. Trump's behavior has jeopardized NATO's collective security. After all, there is no guarantee that Israel will not violate the ceasefire, as it did in Gaza in March. NATO members must now confront a fundamental question: Can the alliance survive if member states may launch unilateral military action that puts others at risk? The U.S. may have legitimate evidence that Iran violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty or was just about to do so. But if that were the case, the proper course would have been to present the evidence to the IAEA and pursue a coordinated response through the U.N. Security Council. Alternatively, the U.S. may have assumed that Iran would not retaliate and saw the attack as a way to force the Iranians back to the negotiating table. But talks between the two countries were already set to resume before Israel's intervention derailed them. A third explanation is more cynical but may be true: the attack was meant to divert attention from Israel's brutal war in Gaza. Whichever explanation proves true, Trump's actions could have far-reaching consequences for NATO and the alliance's future could depend on how its leaders respond. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for example, must clearly outline the risks that regional instability poses to NATO's collective defense posture — especially given Turkey's proximity to Iran. As leaders of countries with permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, French President Emmanuel Macron and U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer could play a vital role in strengthening coordination between NATO and the U.N. Likewise, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will be instrumental in shaping NATO-EU relations, while Norwegian President Jonas Gahr Store and his Finnish counterpart, Alexander Stubb, could help reinvigorate diplomacy and restore the alliance's moral compass. Ultimately, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte's effectiveness will largely depend on leaders' commitment to pursuing rational, law-abiding security policies. Even beyond the immediate Iran crisis, NATO finds itself at a crossroads. The Hague summit may ultimately be seen as a defining moment — one that will determine whether the alliance can remain the world's most powerful defense organization, grounded in its members' shared concerns and contributions, or is destined to become a mere instrument of U.S.-Israeli strategic interests. If I were in office today, I would use the summit to highlight Israel's growing aggression and the security risks facing Turkey as the only NATO member in the region. I would ask Trump whether, in his 'America First' hierarchy, NATO allies now rank below nonmember Israel. Any leader willing to pose that question would take a principled stand against reckless military adventurism — and might just help save the alliance itself. Before the Iraq War, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder were dismissed as representatives of 'Old Europe' for opposing U.S. intervention. Had their warnings been heeded, the catastrophic costs of the war might have been avoided and Iran's regional influence would likely not be as significant as it is now. History has shown that wars launched before exhausting every diplomatic avenue lead to ruin for all involved. Russia's miscalculations in Ukraine serve as a grim reminder that while starting a war is easy, ending one is far more difficult. Today, as Trump's actions threaten further erosion of hard-won international laws, European leaders must push back. If NATO fails to uphold the rule of law, it risks forfeiting its role as the cornerstone of global security. The alliance's fate — and the future of global stability — will hinge on whether its leaders insist on pursuing peace rather than confrontation. Ahmet Davutoglu is a former prime minister (2014-2016) and foreign minister (2009-2014) of Turkey. © Project Syndicate, 2025

Japan seeks 8th round of tariffs talks in U.S. amid Trump impasse
Japan seeks 8th round of tariffs talks in U.S. amid Trump impasse

The Mainichi

time3 hours ago

  • The Mainichi

Japan seeks 8th round of tariffs talks in U.S. amid Trump impasse

TOKYO (Kyodo) -- The Japanese government has informed the United States that its chief negotiator intends to conduct an eighth round of ministerial-level talks in Washington early next week, a source close to the matter said Thursday. With President Donald Trump appearing to harden his stance ahead of next Wednesday's deadline for his administration's 90-day pause on country-specific tariffs, Japan's last-ditch effort will hinge on whether Ryosei Akazawa can secure a deal that includes a reduced tariff rate on cars, the source said. In rounds of talks since April, the United States has been reluctant to accept Tokyo's request to withdraw or reduce the additional 25 percent tariff on cars. Amid the stalemate, Japan is seeking an extension of the tariff suspension deadline to allow talks to continue. Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba on Thursday expressed confidence that bilateral tariff negotiations with the United States are making steady progress. "We need to cover a wide range of areas, including nontariff barriers. But we are steadily and certainly making progress on each of them," Ishiba told a program on public broadcaster NHK. "Japan is the largest investor in the United States and the biggest contributor in terms of creating jobs. Our hope is that this will be taken into consideration," he said, underscoring the need for Washington to focus on investment rather than tariffs. His remarks came as Trump on Tuesday floated the idea of raising tariffs on imports from Japan to as high as 30 percent or 35 percent, while complaining about Japan's purchases of American rice and cars. "I'm not sure we're going to make a deal. I doubt it," Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One, calling Japan "very tough" and "very spoiled." The dispute over auto tariffs has been a key obstacle to a deal, with Washington also pressuring its Asian security ally to boost imports of U.S. farm products, including rice, cars and oil, to help reduce its large trade deficit. In return, Japan has highlighted its contributions to the U.S. economy and proposed a package deal that includes increased investment in the United States and cooperation on economic security, the source said. Without an extension to the 90-day pause on part of the so-called reciprocal tariffs, Japan will face an additional 14 percent country-specific tariff on top of the 10 percent baseline duty the United States has imposed on imports from all countries. The Wall Street Journal reported earlier this week that the United States warned Japanese officials during talks in late May that it might demand a cap on the number of vehicles Japan could export to the United States -- a policy known as a voluntary export restriction, citing people familiar with the matter. But Japanese officials held firm, telling their U.S. counterparts they would not accept any deal that preserves Trump's 25 percent automotive tariff, resulting in a deadlock in the negotiations, the U.S. newspaper said.

Uniqlo hopes for breathing room under US-Vietnam tariff deal
Uniqlo hopes for breathing room under US-Vietnam tariff deal

Nikkei Asia

time3 hours ago

  • Nikkei Asia

Uniqlo hopes for breathing room under US-Vietnam tariff deal

Uniqlo parent Fast Retailing had predicted a 2%-to-3% hit to operating profits due to Trump's tariffs. (Photo by Hiroki Endo) TAKESHI SHIRAISHI TOKYO -- The tariff reductions announced by the U.S. and Vietnam are expected to provide relief for companies like casualwear retailer Uniqlo, which depends on the Southeast Asian nation for a large portion of its supply chain. U.S. President Donald Trump said Wednesday that U.S. imports from Vietnam will face a 20% tariff, down from the 46% originally proposed. The Vietnamese side did not say what level of tariffs had been agreed on.

DOWNLOAD THE APP

Get Started Now: Download the App

Ready to dive into a world of global content with local flavor? Download Daily8 app today from your preferred app store and start exploring.
app-storeplay-store