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Zawya
19 hours ago
- Zawya
Message from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the National Day of the Arab Republic of Egypt
The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, extends his warmest congratulations and best wishes to the Government and People of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the occasion of their National Day. This momentous day marks not only the birth of modern Egypt's sovereignty but also a powerful reminder of the enduring spirit of freedom, resilience, and self-determination that continues to inspire the entire African continent. Egypt has long played a central role in shaping Africa's destiny-historically, politically, and intellectually. As a founding Member State of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), Egypt has consistently demonstrated unwavering commitment to the ideals of Pan-Africanism, unity, and regional integration. Today, we celebrate Egypt's contributions to peace and security, education, science, innovation, infrastructure, and continental diplomacy. The African Union greatly values Egypt's leadership in key continental initiatives and its active engagement in the realization of Agenda 2063- our shared vision for a united, prosperous, and peaceful Africa. Happy National Day! Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Union (AU).


Zawya
a day ago
- Zawya
Africa's minerals are being bartered for security: why it's a bad idea?
A US-brokered peace deal between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda binds the two African nations to a worrying arrangement: one where a country signs away its mineral resources to a superpower in return for opaque assurances of security. The peace deal, signed in June 2025, aims to end three decades of conflict between the DRC and Rwanda. A key part of the agreement binds both nations to developing a regional economic integration framework. This arrangement would expand cooperation between the two states, the US government and American investors on 'transparent, formalized end-to-end mineral chains'. Despite its immense mineral wealth, the DRC is among the five poorest countries in the world. It has been seeking US investment in its mineral sector. The US has in turn touted a potential multi-billion-dollar investment programme to anchor its mineral supply chains in the traumatised and poor territory. The peace that the June 2025 deal promises, therefore, hinges on chaining mineral supply to the US in exchange for Washington's powerful – but vaguely formulated – military oversight. The peace agreement further establishes a joint oversight committee – with representatives from the African Union, Qatar and the US – to receive complaints and resolve disputes between the DRC and Rwanda. But beyond the joint oversight committee, the peace deal creates no specific security obligations for the US. The relationship between the DRC and Rwanda has been marred by war and tension since the bloody First (1996-1997) and Second (1998-2003) Congo wars. At the heart of much of this conflict is the DRC's mineral wealth. It has fuelled competition, exploitation and armed violence. This latest peace deal introduces a resources-for-security arrangement. Such deals aren't new in Africa. They first emerged in the early 2000s as resources-for-infrastructure transactions. Here, a foreign state would agree to build economic and social infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, hospitals) in an African state. In exchange, it would get a major stake in a government-owned mining company. Or gain preferential access to the host country's minerals. We have studied mineral law and governance in Africa for more than 20 years. The question that emerges now is whether a US-brokered resources-for-security agreement will help the DRC benefit from its resources. Based on our research on mining, development and sustainability, we believe this is unlikely. This is because resources-for-security is the latest version of a resource-bartering approach that China and Russia pioneered in countries such as Angola, the Central African Republic and the DRC. Resource bartering in Africa has eroded the sovereignty and bargaining power of mineral-rich nations such as the DRC and Angola. Further, resources-for-security deals are less transparent and more complicated than prior resource bartering agreements. DRC's security gaps The DRC is endowed with major deposits of critical minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, manganese and tantalum. These are the building blocks for 21st century technologies: artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, wind energy and military security hardware. Rwanda has less mineral wealth than its neighbour, but is the world's third-largest producer of tantalum, used in electronics, aerospace and medical devices. For almost 30 years, minerals have fuelled conflict and severe violence, especially in eastern DRC. Tungsten, tantalum and gold (referred to as 3TG) finance and drive conflict as government forces and an estimated 130 armed groups vie for control over lucrative mining sites. Several reports and studies have implicated the DRC's neighbours – Rwanda and Uganda – in supporting the illegal extraction of 3TG in this region. The DRC government has failed to extend security over its vast (2.3 million square kilometres) and diverse territory (109 million people, representing 250 ethnic groups). Limited resources, logistical challenges and corruption have weakened its armed forces. This context makes the United States' military backing enormously attractive. But our research shows there are traps. What states risk losing Resources-for-infrastructure and resources-for-security deals generally offer African nations short-term stability, financing or global goodwill. However, the costs are often long-term because of an erosion of sovereign control. Here's how this happens: - certain clauses in such contracts can freeze future regulatory reforms, limiting legislative autonomy - other clauses may lock in low prices for years, leaving resource-selling states unable to benefit when commodity prices surge - arbitration clauses often shift disputes to international forums, bypassing local courts - infrastructure loans are often secured via resource revenues used as loan security. This effectively ringfences exports and undermines sovereign fiscal control. Examples of loss or near-loss of sovereignty from these sorts of deals abound in Africa. For instance, Angola's US$2 billion oil-backed loan from China Eximbank in 2004. This was repayable in monthly deliveries of oil, with revenues directed to Chinese-controlled accounts. The loan's design deprived Angolan authorities of decision-making power over that income stream even before the oil was extracted. These deals also fragment accountability. They often span multiple ministries (such as defence, mining and trade), avoiding robust oversight or accountability. Fragmentation makes resource sectors vulnerable to elite capture. Powerful insiders can manipulate agreements for private gain. In the DRC, this has created a violent kleptocracy, where resource wealth is systematically diverted away from popular benefit. Finally, there is the risk of re-entrenching extractive trauma. Communities displaced for mining and environmental degradation in many countries across Africa illustrate the long-standing harm to livelihoods, health and social cohesion. These are not new problems. But where extraction is tied to security or infrastructure, such damage risks becoming permanent features, not temporary costs. What needs to change Critical minerals are 'critical' because they're hard to mine or substitute. Additionally, their supply chains are strategically vulnerable and politically exposed. Whoever controls these minerals controls the future. Africa must make sure it doesn't trade that future away. In a world being reshaped by global interests in critical minerals, African states must not underestimate the strategic value of their mineral resources. They hold considerable leverage. But leverage only works if it is wielded strategically. This means: - investing in institutional strength and legal capacity to negotiate better deals - demanding local value creation and addition - requiring transparency and parliamentary oversight for minerals-related agreements - refusing deals that bypass human rights, environmental or sovereignty standards. Africa has the resources. It must hold on to the power they wield. All rights reserved. © 2022. Provided by SyndiGate Media Inc. (


Middle East Eye
3 days ago
- Middle East Eye
Sudan war intensifies in Kordofan as RSF razes villages
A village in the Sudanese state of North Kordofan was razed to the ground after a massacre by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitaries, new satellite imagery shows. Hundreds of civilians were killed by the RSF on Saturday and Sunday as its war with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) intensifies in the strategically vital Kordofan region. Images collected by Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL), which has monitored the war in Sudan since it began in April 2023, show the smouldering ruins of the Shaq al-Noum, one of several villages in North Kordofan attacked by the RSF over the weekend. The HRL identified smoke rising from several recently razed structures as well as disjoined areas of thermal scarring 'indicative of intentional arson attacks'. Also visible, it said, was a pattern consistent with vehicle tracks 'around buildings and throughout the community'. More than 200 civilians are believed to have been killed, most of them burned alive in their homes or shot dead, in the attack on Shaq al-Noum, which began on 12 July. The massacre is believed to be one of the deadliest to have taken place during the war in Sudan. Footage reportedly shot in Shaq al-Noum and cited by Sudan War Monitor showed structures ablaze and RSF troops running between houses. Shouts and gunfire could also be heard. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters The Emergency Lawyers human rights group said at least 38 others were killed in simultaneous massacres in the nearby villages of Fojah, Umm Nabag, Jakouh and Mishqah, while dozens were forcibly disappeared or detained. Faheem, a man from one of these villages, told campaign group Avaaz that the RSF had arrived in his village, Fojah, in a convoy of around 30 vehicles. 'The vehicles surrounded the village, forced people to line up, and began detonating explosives in homes,' he said. 'Our houses are mostly made of straw, so fires broke out quickly. 'I saw my aunt's house burning. She's one of the oldest women in the village. I grabbed my children and we ran. We didn't hear from anyone else.' The importance of Kordofan Kholood Khair, a Sudanese analyst and founder of the Confluence Advisory think tank, told Middle East Eye that the intensification of 'back and forth' fighting across Kordofan was reminiscent of the beginning of the war, when the two sides were yet to settle into their respective power bases - the RSF in the western region of Darfur, the army in the central and eastern areas of the country. The city of el-Obeid, a strategically vital point that sits close to roads that run to Darfur and to the capital Khartoum, is held by the army but was previously under an RSF siege. The paramilitaries are now shelling it again to try and wrest back control. On 13 July, 46 civilians, including pregnant women and children, were killed in an RSF attack on the village of Hilat Hamid, close to the town of Bara, which has been under paramilitary control for most of the war. Egypt hosts secret talks between Sudan's Burhan and Libya's Haftar in bid to mend ties, sources say Read More » In West Kordofan, SAF air strikes killed at least 23 civilians from 10 to 14 July, and on 17 July at least 11 more civilians were killed in another strike in the Bara locality. 'Kordofan is now the strategic point,' Khair said. Key roads run through North Kordofan to el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur besieged by the RSF, and Khartoum and its twin city Omdurman, which have recently been retaken by the army. With Sudan's rainy season at its worst between June and September, Khair said that both the RSF and the army are looking to make gains in Kordofan to mount offensives on el-Fasher or Omdurman when the dry weather comes in October and November. Witnesses told MEE that drones are being used by both sides across Kordofan - as they are in other parts of Sudan. The back and forth fighting comes as both sides await a diplomatic intervention from international actors - particularly the US administration of President Donald Trump. 'Both sides very much want to pursue a military push while they are putting in place all the necessary conditions for themselves ahead of any diplomatic mediation - particularly from the US,' Khair said. Sudan's army-led government is being run from Port Sudan, on the Red Sea coast, while the RSF has set up a governing alliance in Nyala, South Darfur. Humanitarian operations The intensification of fighting across Kordofan has 'badly affected' the operations of aid agencies there, Shihab Mohamed Ali, a senior programme manager for Islamic Relief in Sudan, told MEE. The charity runs 36 health centres in West Kordofan and 48 health centres in North Kordofan in collaboration with the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) and Unicef. Islamic Relief distributes food, water and cash to Sudanese civilians whose lives have been upended by the war, which has now forced over 12 million people to flee their homes. How Trump's assault on USAID 'will lead to surging mortality' in Sudan Read More » Two Islamic Relief offices in West Kordofan have been looted - one in August 2024, the other in May 2025, Ali said. In both cases, the looting took place in the midst of RSF invasions, though the charity cannot say for sure who was responsible. 'Most parts of West Kordofan are under RSF occupation and the conflict is continuous,' Ali said. 'In that state, Islamic Relief, Unicef and the WFP are trying to distribute aid.' Ali said that away from Kordofan, 'the situation is improving. The local community has played a great role with the community kitchens, where they provide food for people,' referring to the kitchens run by Sudan's Emergency Response Rooms, a network of mutual aid groups. 'They have managed to pass a difficult time,' Ali said, referring partly to the threatened withdrawal of US funding following the dismantling of USAID. 'But the situation is improving in different parts of the country.'