India's Non-GMO Soy Sector Prepares for EUDR Compliance with Support from SOPA and TRST01
In FY 2023–24, India produced approximately 113 lakh metric tons (11.3 million MT) of soybeans. As global demand for traceable, deforestation-free Non-GMO soy rises, especially from European markets, Indian stakeholders are strategically positioning the country as a key supplier.
India's competitive advantage lies in its largely Non-GMO soy cultivation, unlike major producers such as Brazil and the USA where GMO crops dominate. This makes Indian soy a natural fit for EU buyers seeking sustainable and clean-label sourcing.
To facilitate this shift, the Soybean Processors Association of India (SOPA) Is partnering with TRST01, a sustainability technology leader, to enable exporters and farmers to comply with EUDR requirements efficiently and affordably.
Key Features of TRST01's EUDR Solution: • Geo-mapping of soy cultivation areas • Digital traceability from farm to port • Immutable blockchain records for audit trail • Automated generation of GeoJSON files and Due Diligence Statements (DDS) • Farmer onboarding, training, and field support Strategic Vision: SOPA and TRST01 are committed to building India as a Non-GMO soy export powerhouse. Through this collaboration, the target is to facilitate traceability and certification for over 10 lakh metric tons of soy in the coming export cycles.
Field-level mapping initiatives, exporter training workshops, and data standardization drives have already begun across major soy-producing regions—Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Telangana.
Why Indian Non-GMO Soy Matters: • GMO-free by default: India's soy production is Non-GMO, aligning naturally with EU regulations.
• Sustainable cultivation practices • Higher trust quotient in global markets • Opportunity for premium pricing and market preference in the EU About SOPA: The Soybean Processors Association of India (SOPA) is the apex body representing soybean processors, exporters, and stakeholders, dedicated to the growth and global competitiveness of India's soy industry.
About TRST01: TRST01 is a global sustainable technology company providing traceability, ESG, and compliance solutions. With operations across 9+ countries, TRST01 is at the forefront of EUDR compliance for commodities like rubber, coffee, cocoa, and soy.
(Disclaimer: The above press release comes to you under an arrangement with PNN and PTI takes no editorial responsibility for the same.).
This is an auto-published feed from PTI with no editorial input from The Wire.
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