Pro-ISIS Media Group Warns Against Infiltration By Fake Accounts Impersonating The Group
On March 6, 2025, a pro-Islamic State (ISIS) umbrella media group issued a statement warning against social media accounts impersonating the group in an attempt to "infiltrate" its supporters and followers. The statement listed a webpage listing all the group's official accounts, on platforms including Telegram, Element, SimpleX, Rocket.Chat, and Session. The statement added that any account on other platforms not listed on the webpage are fraudulent.
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It is already the "most terrorist-affected country in the world," a dubious distinction, according to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index. A quarter of all deaths caused by terrorists worldwide were in Burkina Faso. "Sheikh Mujahid" Iyad Ag Ghaly as seen in JNIM's official propaganda outlet Az-Zallaqa. Here it is JNIM, the local al-Qaeda branch, that is most likely to succeed. Jima'a Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (the "Support Group for Islam and Muslims," JNIM) is currently by far the most capable, best-armed, and best-led of all of the rival Jihadist groups in Africa (Al-Shabab and Boko Haram would come second). The group's leaders, the wily veteran Tuareg tribal aristocrat Iyad Ag Ghaly and deputy commander Amadou Koufa, a charismatic ethnic Fulani preacher, were both denounced by the Islamic State as "apostates" for their political flexibility. This seeming pragmatism (and willingness to talk to "unbeliever" media and regimes) is as dangerous as their use of violence. 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