Conscription, once buried, returns to the debate at a turning point in Germany's defence arrangement

Straits Times

8 hours ago

Apart from efforts to attract volunteers, the idea of reinstating conscription – suspended in 2011 – is now in the spotlight. PHOTO: SERGEY PONOMAREV/NYTIMES
Conscription, once buried, returns to the debate at a turning point in Germany's defence arrangement
– The Bundeswehr seems to be everywhere in Germany these days – on posters, sandwich wrappers, in television adverts and across social media.
The German military sends personalised postcards to hundreds of thousands of 16 and 17-year-olds and promises 'exclusive experiences' and 'up-close impressions' at open days aimed at enticing them to sign on.
Since the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 in what Germany calls its Zeitenwende – a historic turning point – the military has launched a major image campaign. The reason is simple: Far too few young Germans are volunteering for service.
Apart from efforts to attract volunteers, the idea of reinstating conscription – suspended in 2011 – is now in the spotlight at a time when the German military budget is set to rise significantly in the coming years.
At its recent summit, Nato acceded to US President Donald Trump's demand that European allies vastly increase defence spending to 5 per cent of their respective gross domestic product (GDP) from the erstwhile 2 per cent expectation.
Seen as a Cold War relic at the time, Germany's conscription system was suspended in the wake of professionalisation trends across Nato and a waning perception of immediate military threat, particularly from Russia.
The Bundeswehr was streamlined, and defence policy pivoted towards international missions and soft power.
By the time of its suspension, mandatory service had already been reduced to just six months and applied to only a fraction of eligible recruits.
Questions about both the duration and fairness of the draft process undermined its legitimacy, leading to its indefinite suspension.
Things changed, however, when Moscow annexed Crimea and occupied the Donbas in eastern Ukraine in 2014 and then unleashed a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Russia is now again a security threat, with the German military short of funds, arms and troops. Moreover, the US, with Mr Trump's appeasement approach towards Russian President Vladimir Putin, is no longer a reliable ally.
Germany has committed the funds towards beefing up its military but needs to address the shortage of fighting men.
'We need conscription again,' said Lieutenant-General Alfons Mais, Germany's army chief, at the Munich Security Conference in February. 'Our goals can't be achieved otherwise.'
One of those goals, set by Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, is for the Bundeswehr to grow to 260,000 troops from the current 182,000 within a decade, ready for high-intensity warfare.
This would bring the Bundeswehr to around its strength at the turn of the 21st century, when it had about 250,000 troops, but still short of the more than 500,000 at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s.
Mr Pistorius is currently banking on a revamped voluntary service model to reverse the Bundeswehr's recruitment shortfall.
Under the new initiative, set to begin in the latter half of 2025, all 18-year-old men will receive a questionnaire to assess their willingness and fitness for military service. Those who express interest may be called in for further screening, with the goal of gradually increasing the number of full-time soldiers and reservists.
The programme offers several incentives: Recruits can earn a monthly base salary starting at around € 1,800 (S$2,700), receive free accommodation, healthcare and training, and are given pathways to civilian careers within the Bundeswehr system.
However, Mr Pistorius has made it clear that if the voluntary route fails to meet Germany's ambitious personnel goals, he will not hesitate to push for a return to mandatory conscription.
'If we don't succeed voluntarily, we will have to consider other steps,' he warned at an interview in May, signalling a significant cultural shift in Germany's post-Cold War defence policy.
Germany projects that its defence expenditure would more than double from € 62.4 billion in 2025 to € 152.8 billion by 2029. Of the eventual 5 per cent of its GDP invested in defence, Chancellor Friedrich Merz aims to spend 1.5 per cent on dual-use infrastructure and 3.5 per cent directly on the Bundeswehr.
To unlock this funding, the new German government had pushed through a constitutional amendment enabling significant new borrowing – underscoring the urgency and importance of this policy change.
Dissent among politicians
Against the backdrop of the broader debate on national defence, it is perhaps of little surprise that many observers are rubbing their eyes in disbelief.
Is it really Germany – of all countries, the one responsible for two world wars in the last century – that is now setting out to build one of the most powerful armies in Europe once again?
A group of Social Democrats led by former parliamentary leader Rolf Mutzenich recently published a paper protesting against the massive increase in defence spending, while rejecting the stationing of US long-range weapons on German soil. They also called for a renewed policy of cooperation with Russia, harking back to the generally cooperative relations between Germany and Russia in the two decades after the Cold War.
The Social Democratic Party is part of the current ruling coalition led by Mr Merz's Christian Democratic Union.
'This paper is a denial of reality. It exploits the people's understandable desire for an end to the terrible war in Ukraine,' Mr Pistorius, himself a Social Democrat, said in June in an interview with the German Press Agency.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine is perceived by most European states as an existential threat. 2022 pushed the German political class – and much of Europe's as well – into making a long-overdue U-turn, expanding defence spending to rebuild the long-neglected armed forces of Europe's largest economy.
That rebuilding will not be easy.
Speaking shortly after Mr Putin's Ukraine invasion began, Lt-Gen Mais had said the Bundeswehr stood 'more or less bare' after years of austerity and had only limited options in the face of Russia.
That reality, he confirmed at February's Munich Security Conference, has not fundamentally changed.
'We're not in a good place,' he added. 'We're suffering from the loss of equipment sent to Ukraine and from painfully slow structural reform.'
Challenges of rapid change
To now quickly scale up the army and increase troop numbers would require new infrastructure.
This is because dozens of military bases have closed, with barracks turned into residential housing. All 52 local conscription offices were shut down in 2012 – replaced by slimmed-down career centres and advisory hubs tailored to the reduced ambition.
Mr Paul Wohlfahrt, 27, a reservist in the mountain infantry, is sceptical of such rapid German military expansion plans.
'Before we even talk about conscription, we need the infrastructure in place,' he told The Straits Times. 'Even now, not every soldier has a bed or a room – many go home to sleep. So where are we going to house new recruits?'
He claims that numerous applicants have already been turned away due to a lack of capacity.
While the Bundeswehr is tight-lipped about such claims, there are a number of reports on this, including one from public service broadcaster ZDF quoting internal papers of the reservists' association as saying that it is 'critical of the fact that interested reservists are now being put off for so long'.
Mr Wohlfahrt completed his service in 2016/17 and has regularly taken part in reserve exercises since. He believes making voluntary service more attractive would be a better path than reintroducing conscription.
'If I have to wait six to twelve months for a response after applying, I'll just take a job in the private sector,' he said.
Mass deficit
But increasing troop numbers is only one part of the challenge.
The Bundeswehr must also decide what kind of force it wants to be: a territorial army capable of defending Germany from attack, a high-tech military focused on drones and cyber warfare – or both.
'Only what is physically present in Central and Eastern Europe can deter an enemy,' Mr Hans-Peter Bartels, a former parliamentary commissioner for the German armed forces, said earlier in 2025, referring to the importance of having tanks and troops on the ground. 'Germany has to provide mass. And right now, that's missing.'
His remarks underscore the urgency of building not just capability, but also visible presence – boots on the ground, tanks in the field.
To ramp up production of military equipment and weapons, Germany's defence companies seeking to increase capacity are looking to cooperate with the country's languishing car industry.
German army recruiters set up a tent and an armoured vehicle at a go-kart race in Germany on May 25.
PHOTO: SERGEY PONOMAREV/NYTIMES
It was reported in March that Rheinmetall, Germany's largest arms producer, was repurposing two plants making automotive parts to manufacture defence equipment.
In early 2025, Hensoldt, a radar and sensor specialist, took over some workers from Continental when the car parts maker closed one of its plants in the town of Wetzlar.
Recently, Germany's largest carmaker Volkswagen signalled that it would be ready to offer industrial expertise and strategic consultancy to support military vehicle manufacturers.
The nuclear question
There is also the issue of nuclear deterrence, given that Russia is a nuclear-armed power.
Germany's and Europe's security situation has become more precarious because Mr Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on whether America would honour Nato's collective defence clause – Article 5 – in the event of an attack.
His appeasement approach towards Mr Putin, along with America's ambiguous stance on Ukraine , has sowed further doubt.
So what would European security look like without the US and without the American nuclear umbrella?
While Britain has explicitly placed its nuclear forces at Nato's disposal, France has deliberately kept its nuclear forces, the so-called 'Force de Frappe', under national command and not part of Nato's nuclear planning group.
But even if France were willing, would its stockpile of roughly 300 warheads suffice as credible deterrence?
Within Germany, public sentiment has shifted noticeably since Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
While pacifist instincts remain strong among many Germans, recent polls indicate growing support for national defence efforts.
A YouGov/dpa survey from 2024 showed that more than half of the population favours reintroducing some form of conscription, particularly among older Germans , although support remains lower among the 18-29 age group.
Nevertheless, the war has left a mark on younger Germans as well: There is a visible uptick in interest in defence-sector careers, especially in technical and logistical roles.
Companies like Rheinmetall and Airbus Defence report increased applications, and more young professionals view work in security-related fields as both meaningful and future-oriented.
Mr Wohlfahrt believes that there is a rising sense of urgency among Germans that having an operational defence is of the essence.
'Step by step, soldiers are realising that change is under way. It may be slow, but at least something is happening,' he said.
Markus Ziener is a professor at Media University Berlin and writes on political and security issues.
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