Zelensky names outgoing justice minister as Ukraine's US envoy
"I have signed a decree appointing Olga Stefanishyna as the Special Representative of the President of Ukraine for the Development of Cooperation with the United States," Zelensky said on social media.
"All the necessary procedures for approving her candidacy with Washington as Ukraine's ambassador to the United States are underway."
Stefanishyna would be taking over from Oksana Markarova, who faced accusations from leading US Republicans that she sided with the Democratic Party.
"She had very good contacts with the Biden administration," political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko told AFP of Markarova, adding that this led to some problems when Trump took office.
Stefanishyna took part in finalising a natural resources deal with the United States.
Zelensky said she would "continue to work with the United States on this basis, adding mutually beneficial economic substance to our political and diplomatic interaction".
Stefanishyna's nomination is a surprise turn. Zelensky had indicated that outgoing defence minister Rustem Umerov, who had taken part in negotiations with Russia, could be the next US ambassador.
"Approval had to be obtained from Washington. And they didn't get it there," lawmaker Yaroslav Zheleznyak, said on social media.
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