Chinese Military Jets Make Aggressive Passes Near Japan
このページを 日本語 で読む
At a press conference on June 12, General Yoshihide Yoshida, Chief of the Joint Staff of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, addressed the aggressive actions of Chinese military aircraft. He described the behavior as deliberate, noting, "They followed us for 40 minutes, then 80 minutes — and it happened two days in a row."
Chinese J-15 fighter jets, launched from the aircraft carrier Shandong , approached Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) P-3C patrol aircraft at dangerously close range on two consecutive days. The Shandong had advanced to waters near Japan's Okinotorishima, more than 1,500 kilometers from the Chinese mainland.
According to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the first close encounter occurred on June 7. A lone J-15 tailed Japan's P-3C for approximately 40 minutes, repeatedly veering side to side as it approached and retreated, eventually closing to within just 45 meters on the aircraft's left side.
On June 8, a second J-15 tailed a Japanese P-3C for roughly 80 minutes, coming as close as 45 meters on the aircraft's right side. As it disengaged, the jet crossed in front of the patrol plane at the same altitude, just 900 meters ahead. That day, another Chinese fighter also joined the pursuit.
Describing the 45-meter proximity, a Japan Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) pilot said it felt like "a total stranger walking shoulder to shoulder with you — close enough to break a cold sweat."
At the time, China had deployed two aircraft carriers to the western Pacific simultaneously for the first time. Reflecting on the maneuver, one ASDF official remarked, "It was as if they were declaring, 'This is China's airspace.'"
Frontal crossings like the one on June 8 are especially dangerous, as wake turbulence can trigger engine malfunctions.
Japan's P-3C was conducting surveillance on five vessels, including the Shandong . According to reports, the JMSDF aircraft attempted to communicate via radio, asserting that it was "conducting legitimate mission flights in international airspace." While the MOD has not released the full details of the exchange, it stated that a safe distance was maintained from the Shandong .
Chinese military aircraft have repeatedly carried out provocative maneuvers against the United States and other allied forces in recent years.
In February, a Chinese J-16 fighter jet closed to within just 30 meters of an Australian P-8A patrol aircraft over the South China Sea and released infrared countermeasure flares designed to evade missiles.
According to a 2023 announcement by the US Department of Defense, Chinese aircraft were involved in more than 180 abnormal close encounters over the previous two years. These included incidents where jets flew close enough for crew members' faces to be seen or crossed directly in front of US aircraft at dangerously close range.
Around the same time, another Chinese aircraft carrier, the Liaoning , crossed the Second Island Chain — a key US defense perimeter — for the first time.
This time, with both Chinese carriers operating simultaneously in the western Pacific, Professor Tetsuo Kotani of Meikai University, a security policy expert, offered this analysis:
"This seems to be China's way of sending a warning: 'Don't interfere with our legitimate training in this newly entered area.' It also reflects growing confidence as China continues to strengthen its carrier strike group operations."
Author: Toyohiro Ichioka, The Sankei Shimbun
このページを 日本語 で読む
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Japan Forward
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'I think they were done for propaganda purposes in mind, so if they weren't perfect in the first instance, they had to be made perfect.' But the Matthews portrait was different. 'It was simply a record of an individual at a time,' Vance said. 'It's not propaganda because I'm not sure what it would be propaganda in favour of.' Curiously, the effect is almost to render him anonymous, and the scene timeless and placeless. The subject has no identifying kit, no badges or shoulder stripes. It would take an especially keen eye to read any information in his grenades or rifle. He could be anyone. Vance said that is its strength. It also admits of different readings. The most common is something like the shell shock of the Great War or the 'thousand yard stare' of Vietnam, the physical manifestation of psychological trauma in dark, heavy, almost unseeing eyes. 'But also, if you come at it differently, you see a guy exhausted after a job well done,' Vance said. 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Many years later, in 1994, a Korean War exhibit at the Canadian War Museum would bring to light the minor controversy over the soldier's identity. Pte. Herbert Norris of Kingston, Ont., was also a signaller in Charles Company in Korea, and had been giving talks about the war and identifying himself as subject of The Face of War. This came to wide attention through media coverage of the exhibit, including the museum's presentation of a framed print to Norris at a gala. Faced with a growing scandal, the museum looked more closely into it, and based on evidence from archives, police facial recognition experts, and the confirmation of both Tomelin and the person who processed the film, concluded they had made a mistake. The Face of War was Matthews. It left Norris feeling disrespected, he would later tell the Kingston Whig-Standard. He was not the only Korea veteran to feel this way. 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There's no celebration, no Victory in Korea day,' Sayle said. Over the following years, as Korea slipped from immediate memory into modern history, there was another shooting war in Southeast Asia that coloured its remembrance. Korea was in that sense 'in the shadow of Vietnam,' Sayle said. In the 1980s and 1990s, when there was an 'explosion of memory' of the Second World War, as Sayle puts it, this sharpened the contrast with Korea, leaving its veterans sometimes overlooked, out of the Remembrance Day spotlight. 'Just because of the historical nature and context I think we can understand why it was forgotten, but that doesn't excuse the forgetting of these veterans and their experiences,' Sayle said. As this photo illustrates and reminds, any individual soldier's experience of war is 'indivisible,' Sayle said. Seventy-five years since the forgotten war began, this photo is still able to convey that experience, and to imprint it in the Canadian memory. Our website is the place for the latest breaking news, exclusive scoops, longreads and provocative commentary. Please bookmark and sign up for our newsletters here .
Japan Forward
4 days ago
- Japan Forward
Okinawa Memorial Day a Timely Reminder of Horrors of War
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