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Mining's revival must also deal with its legacy

Mining's revival must also deal with its legacy

New social contract due: Mining's harms are mainly to the environment – water, air, and soil, for example – but these have consequences for mining affected communities' health and their land. Photo: Delwyn Verasamy
Mining is still central to the South African economy. It employs roughly 480 000 people directly. With an estimated dependency ratio of 10 to one, the industry essentially supports close to five million people. That's a twelfth of the country's population.
Demand for minerals and metals is not slowing down. But our gold mining sector will close down at some stage — even current high gold prices cannot sustain going deeper because of safety risks and the associated expense. There will come a point where marginal cost exceeds marginal benefit.
Outside of gold, South Africa should be a global mining powerhouse. For the past 20 years, however, there has been very little exploration or production expansion investment.
In partnership with Mining Dialogues 360°, Good Governance Africa set out to explore what it would take to revive the mining industry and ensure that it becomes the catalyst for broad-based development. It became clear that the country needs a new vision for mining that will reconcile conflicting interests that seem to perennially be at loggerheads with each other.
Any new vision needs to begin with the end in mind; what do we want mining to do for the country? We can all wax lyrical about that, but there's an obstacle that must be dealt with first. Mining has an awful history in South Africa of imposing severe negative externalities onto both society and the environment. These are the divergences between private returns and social costs. In other words, companies mine and sell gold, reporting profits in the process, but they pollute rivers, create sinkholes, precipitate acid mine drainage, exploit labour and damage the social fabric of society in the process.
None of these ecological and social costs are recorded in company financial statements. This speaks to a broader global problem, but it's particularly acute in mining, especially here at home.
It's often mine-adjacent communities that bear the brunt of this malaise. In South Africa, migrant labour exacerbates the social costs on two fronts. First, many workers who migrate to the mines end up supporting two families; HIV proliferation has been extensive as a result. Second, many workers end up retiring to the former homelands and dying soon thereafter of silicosis or some other mining-related illness. The social costs of mining are clearly immeasurable and significant.
At our most recent dialogue, civil society representatives expressed the view that the industry seems to be geared towards short-term production targets and immediate profitability at the expense of long-term (ecologically sound) thinking and optimal wealth generation for all stakeholders. Strategies to attain consensus — and then execute on — a new vision need to be informed by meaningful discussions, not mere consultation as some kind of box-ticking exercise.
Moreover, free, prior and informed consent should be continually sought, underwritten by an acknowledgement that 'no' to mining is also a legitimate response from mine-affected or potentially affected communities. They are often left without solutions to the problems created by mining, and this needs to be addressed through purposeful discussions, not cursory consultations that amount to people being told what is going to happen to them.
Many of the harms mining causes are environmental. Regulations exist to prevent such harm, but enforcement is inconsistent. Even when the legal framework is strong, communities often lack the knowledge and tools to hold companies accountable. This asymmetry fosters moral hazard: companies externalise harm while reporting profit. Bridging these gaps requires education, in local languages, to empower rights-based action.
Beyond legal compliance, mining companies frequently bypass meaningful engagement. Social and labour plans (SLPs), meant to channel mining benefits into development, are often drawn up with minimal community involvement. The process is top-down, consultative in name only, and poorly documented. The SLPs are frequently geographically misaligned, excluding communities downstream of operations who still suffer the effects of pollution. They also rarely prepare labour for life after mining. The result is development that is poorly targeted, unaccountable and unsustainable.
Some companies worsen these dynamics by co-opting local activists or working through pliant intermediaries, fuelling internal divisions. This divide-and-rule approach minimises risk for companies but leaves communities fragmented and disempowered. The SLPs then become tools of corporate image management rather than genuine vehicles for transformation. Often, they fund short-lived projects that decline and often collapse once the mine closes, unlinked to local integrated development plans (IDPs). Even where integration is attempted, weak municipal IDPs render it ineffective.
Greenwashing is common. Companies promote their environmental, social and governance credentials, but scrutiny reveals minimal ecological remediation, long-term plans for restoration and socio-economic upliftment. Executives typically stay removed from community realities, unwilling to talk to residents and local authorities. This maintains a status quo in which firms pursue reputational insulation over authentic partnership. For communities, this entrenches an adversarial stance. Trust is absent where engagement is asymmetric.
In the absence of viable livelihood alternatives, some residents resort to informal mining. Labelling them 'illegal' dehumanises people who are often driven by survival or coerced into impossible positions by organised crime bosses. The official response, including recent commentary after the Stilfontein disaster, has lacked empathy and insight. It's no surprise that resentment festers where people are treated as expendable. A political culture defined by patronage and corruption fails to meet the complexity of this problem.
Land dispossession remains largely unresolved. Many mine-affected communities still have no title deeds, decades after democracy. That dispossession underpins the call for resource nationalism, especially among the young and disillusioned. There are strong veins of resentment here into which unscrupulous politicians can tap. While social grants may suppress open rebellion — some dialogue members mused whether welfare hadn't placated revolution — frustration simmers. Without structural change based on policy reform, the call for redress will grow louder.
Efforts to build unified community responses face further obstacles. Activists expressed disillusionment with NGOs that impose external agendas. Some community gatekeepers, meanwhile, have been accused of colluding with mining firms or of blocking access to resources. Mining companies often work with whoever shouts the loudest, further muddying accountability. These dynamics prevent the emergence of a coherent response voice. Communities are not homogeneous, nor should we expect them to be, but this should not hinder the expression of a heterogeneous set of voices.
The solution requires recognising that power is layered. Without coordination and organisation, communities remain vulnerable to fragmentation, as they struggle to build countervailing power. Yet unity is hard to achieve when trust is scarce and gatekeepers act in their own interest. Still, any serious vision for the sector must support such coordination as the basis for accountability and equitable negotiation.
Two distinct imperatives shape mining's future. On one highway, government and industry seek investment-friendly conditions. On the other, communities seek restitution and opportunity. These paths need not be in conflict, but reconciliation demands a vision centred on shared prosperity. Capital must not be prioritised over labour and land. Community benefit must become a measure of mining's success.
That shift requires credible, trackable metrics. One proposal is a national indicator for 'community well-being', with mining firms accountable for positive movement in that measure. This would reframe profitability to include social return, not just shareholder value. Others suggest revenue-sharing mechanisms such as Australia's 'royalties for regions' scheme. But concerns about corruption, especially in community trusts, remain valid. Without institutional reform, even well-designed systems can be subverted.
A new social contract is overdue. Mining cannot continue to operate in enclaves of profit surrounded by poverty. It must embrace a model of co-determination with affected communities and acknowledge its historical legacy. That demands not just consultation but free, prior, informed and continued consent. It demands not just compliance, but transformation. Without these shifts, mining will remain a source of conflict instead of development.
Ross Harvey is the chief research officer at Good Governance Africa (GGA)-SARO. Mining Dialogues 360° and GGA are hosting a plenary dialogue for all mining industry stakeholders on 29 July. To attend, please email
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G20: South Africa needs the weight of the continent for progressive outcomes
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G20: South Africa needs the weight of the continent for progressive outcomes

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Mining's revival must also deal with its legacy
Mining's revival must also deal with its legacy

Mail & Guardian

timea day ago

  • Mail & Guardian

Mining's revival must also deal with its legacy

New social contract due: Mining's harms are mainly to the environment – water, air, and soil, for example – but these have consequences for mining affected communities' health and their land. Photo: Delwyn Verasamy Mining is still central to the South African economy. It employs roughly 480 000 people directly. With an estimated dependency ratio of 10 to one, the industry essentially supports close to five million people. That's a twelfth of the country's population. Demand for minerals and metals is not slowing down. But our gold mining sector will close down at some stage — even current high gold prices cannot sustain going deeper because of safety risks and the associated expense. There will come a point where marginal cost exceeds marginal benefit. Outside of gold, South Africa should be a global mining powerhouse. For the past 20 years, however, there has been very little exploration or production expansion investment. In partnership with Mining Dialogues 360°, Good Governance Africa set out to explore what it would take to revive the mining industry and ensure that it becomes the catalyst for broad-based development. It became clear that the country needs a new vision for mining that will reconcile conflicting interests that seem to perennially be at loggerheads with each other. Any new vision needs to begin with the end in mind; what do we want mining to do for the country? We can all wax lyrical about that, but there's an obstacle that must be dealt with first. Mining has an awful history in South Africa of imposing severe negative externalities onto both society and the environment. These are the divergences between private returns and social costs. In other words, companies mine and sell gold, reporting profits in the process, but they pollute rivers, create sinkholes, precipitate acid mine drainage, exploit labour and damage the social fabric of society in the process. None of these ecological and social costs are recorded in company financial statements. This speaks to a broader global problem, but it's particularly acute in mining, especially here at home. It's often mine-adjacent communities that bear the brunt of this malaise. In South Africa, migrant labour exacerbates the social costs on two fronts. First, many workers who migrate to the mines end up supporting two families; HIV proliferation has been extensive as a result. Second, many workers end up retiring to the former homelands and dying soon thereafter of silicosis or some other mining-related illness. The social costs of mining are clearly immeasurable and significant. At our most recent dialogue, civil society representatives expressed the view that the industry seems to be geared towards short-term production targets and immediate profitability at the expense of long-term (ecologically sound) thinking and optimal wealth generation for all stakeholders. Strategies to attain consensus — and then execute on — a new vision need to be informed by meaningful discussions, not mere consultation as some kind of box-ticking exercise. Moreover, free, prior and informed consent should be continually sought, underwritten by an acknowledgement that 'no' to mining is also a legitimate response from mine-affected or potentially affected communities. They are often left without solutions to the problems created by mining, and this needs to be addressed through purposeful discussions, not cursory consultations that amount to people being told what is going to happen to them. Many of the harms mining causes are environmental. Regulations exist to prevent such harm, but enforcement is inconsistent. Even when the legal framework is strong, communities often lack the knowledge and tools to hold companies accountable. This asymmetry fosters moral hazard: companies externalise harm while reporting profit. Bridging these gaps requires education, in local languages, to empower rights-based action. Beyond legal compliance, mining companies frequently bypass meaningful engagement. Social and labour plans (SLPs), meant to channel mining benefits into development, are often drawn up with minimal community involvement. The process is top-down, consultative in name only, and poorly documented. The SLPs are frequently geographically misaligned, excluding communities downstream of operations who still suffer the effects of pollution. They also rarely prepare labour for life after mining. The result is development that is poorly targeted, unaccountable and unsustainable. Some companies worsen these dynamics by co-opting local activists or working through pliant intermediaries, fuelling internal divisions. This divide-and-rule approach minimises risk for companies but leaves communities fragmented and disempowered. The SLPs then become tools of corporate image management rather than genuine vehicles for transformation. Often, they fund short-lived projects that decline and often collapse once the mine closes, unlinked to local integrated development plans (IDPs). Even where integration is attempted, weak municipal IDPs render it ineffective. Greenwashing is common. Companies promote their environmental, social and governance credentials, but scrutiny reveals minimal ecological remediation, long-term plans for restoration and socio-economic upliftment. Executives typically stay removed from community realities, unwilling to talk to residents and local authorities. This maintains a status quo in which firms pursue reputational insulation over authentic partnership. For communities, this entrenches an adversarial stance. Trust is absent where engagement is asymmetric. In the absence of viable livelihood alternatives, some residents resort to informal mining. Labelling them 'illegal' dehumanises people who are often driven by survival or coerced into impossible positions by organised crime bosses. The official response, including recent commentary after the Stilfontein disaster, has lacked empathy and insight. It's no surprise that resentment festers where people are treated as expendable. A political culture defined by patronage and corruption fails to meet the complexity of this problem. Land dispossession remains largely unresolved. Many mine-affected communities still have no title deeds, decades after democracy. That dispossession underpins the call for resource nationalism, especially among the young and disillusioned. There are strong veins of resentment here into which unscrupulous politicians can tap. While social grants may suppress open rebellion — some dialogue members mused whether welfare hadn't placated revolution — frustration simmers. Without structural change based on policy reform, the call for redress will grow louder. Efforts to build unified community responses face further obstacles. Activists expressed disillusionment with NGOs that impose external agendas. Some community gatekeepers, meanwhile, have been accused of colluding with mining firms or of blocking access to resources. Mining companies often work with whoever shouts the loudest, further muddying accountability. These dynamics prevent the emergence of a coherent response voice. Communities are not homogeneous, nor should we expect them to be, but this should not hinder the expression of a heterogeneous set of voices. The solution requires recognising that power is layered. Without coordination and organisation, communities remain vulnerable to fragmentation, as they struggle to build countervailing power. Yet unity is hard to achieve when trust is scarce and gatekeepers act in their own interest. Still, any serious vision for the sector must support such coordination as the basis for accountability and equitable negotiation. Two distinct imperatives shape mining's future. On one highway, government and industry seek investment-friendly conditions. On the other, communities seek restitution and opportunity. These paths need not be in conflict, but reconciliation demands a vision centred on shared prosperity. Capital must not be prioritised over labour and land. Community benefit must become a measure of mining's success. That shift requires credible, trackable metrics. One proposal is a national indicator for 'community well-being', with mining firms accountable for positive movement in that measure. This would reframe profitability to include social return, not just shareholder value. Others suggest revenue-sharing mechanisms such as Australia's 'royalties for regions' scheme. But concerns about corruption, especially in community trusts, remain valid. Without institutional reform, even well-designed systems can be subverted. A new social contract is overdue. Mining cannot continue to operate in enclaves of profit surrounded by poverty. It must embrace a model of co-determination with affected communities and acknowledge its historical legacy. That demands not just consultation but free, prior, informed and continued consent. It demands not just compliance, but transformation. Without these shifts, mining will remain a source of conflict instead of development. Ross Harvey is the chief research officer at Good Governance Africa (GGA)-SARO. Mining Dialogues 360° and GGA are hosting a plenary dialogue for all mining industry stakeholders on 29 July. To attend, please email

High court rules that cryptocurrency is not money
High court rules that cryptocurrency is not money

Mail & Guardian

timea day ago

  • Mail & Guardian

High court rules that cryptocurrency is not money

Cryptocurrency was first introduced to the global market in 2009, with its most well-known form being bitcoin On 15 May, the high court handed down a landmark judgment in the case of . The judgment addressed the position of cryptocurrency assets in light of South Africa's Exchange Control Regulations. Cryptocurrency was first introduced to the global market in 2009, with its most well-known form being bitcoin. In an October 2024 publication by the South African Revenue Service it was estimated that more than 5.8 million South Africans hold a crypto asset. As new technologies emerge, the government faces several challenges in determining how to integrate them into existing legislation. This article examines an application by Standard Bank to set aside a forfeiture order issued by the Reserve Bank against Leo Cash and Carry (LCC), following multiple cryptocurrency transactions that allegedly violated the South African Exchange Control Regulations. The judgment is being taken on appeal by the Reserve Bank after it was ruled that cryptocurrency is not subject to the regulations. The high court analysed the legality of a forfeiture order issued in respect of R16 404 700.37 and R10 000 000, which was due to Standard Bank, in accordance with a prior pledge and cession agreement concluded between the bank and LCC. The forfeiture order follows an investigation from the central bank's financial surveillance department which found that LCC had contravened exchange control regulations. Passed in 1961, the exchange control regulations promulgated in terms of section 9 of the Currency and Exchange Act, aim to discourage the export of capital from South Africa and protect the economy. The court in South African Reserve Bank vs Leathern N.O . and Other held that the purpose of the regulations are threefold: to prevent loss of foreign currency resources through the transfer abroad of financial capital assets held in South Africa; to ensure effective control of financial and real assets in and out of the country and to avoid interference with the commercial, industrial and financial systems of the country. It is apparent that the legislative intent of these regulations is protective and forward-looking, which may support an expansive interpretation that includes digital finance instruments. In the matter before the high court, Standard Bank provided multiple arguments as to why they felt that cryptocurrency is not subject to these provisions. While logically sound, the arguments undermine the purpose of the legislation and the economic stability the regulations were designed to preserve. When assessing Standard Bank's claim, the high court swiftly dismissed the claim for R10 million held in a Nedbank account, ruling that it does not have legal standing to challenge this claim and thereafter only considered a claim for R16 404 700.37 which was held in a money market account. The key to Standard Bank obtaining judgment and setting aside the forfeiture order was proving that LCC had not contravened any exchange control regulations in dealing with cryptocurrencies — enabling them to successfully cede the monies as per their agreement with LCC. In doing so, Standard Bank argued that cryptocurrency is neither a currency nor legal tender in South Africa and, consequently, the regulations did not apply to it. Further to this argument, it argued that definitions in the regulations should be given restrictive interpretation and only if the legislation was amended to include cryptocurrency would it be subject to the regulations. Taking the argument even further, the bank argued that cryptocurrency was not capital and that it could not be applied to the exchange control regulations without a dedicated framework regulating cryptocurrency as an asset. At this point, one might ask why Standard Bank felt cryptocurrency was not money or a form of capital. In answering this, the bank submitted that the fundamental difference is that, when one purchased cryptocurrency, a blockchain recorded your purchase, and the record of this purchase would be stored on thousands of computers globally. In addition, the transfer of cryptocurrency to another was not payment. It was argued that, in this sense, cryptocurrency was not a sum of money. On the other hand, the Reserve Bank's argument attempted to future-proof regulation in light of the digital economy, arguing for the acceptance of cryptocurrency in the exchange control regulations. In doing so the central bank argued that both the PwC report on which the investigation into LCC was made, and the allegations made against LCC, were uncontested. Drawing from South African Reserve Bank vs Leathern N.O , the Reserve Bank submitted that, because there was a reasonable suspicion of a contravention, the high court was not entitled to set aside the blocking order. In response to the argument that cryptocurrency was not subject to the regulations, the Reserve Bank argued that a contravention of regulation 3(1)(c) did not require a payment or the identity of any receipt. Furthermore, that cryptocurrency was covered by the regulations, noting that in the definitions of the regulations, money was defined as 'foreign currency or any bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument'. Counsel for the respondents (the central bank and others) argued that cryptocurrency was an instrument which permitted payment in currency, which is not a legal tender in South Africa. In highlighting the importance of regulating cryptocurrency under exchange control regulations, the Reserve Bank submitted that when rands are paid into a South African cryptocurrency wallet, the rands would become cryptocurrencies, and the rand value would be lost from the South African balance sheet. Subsequently, in a foreign jurisdiction that cryptocurrency enabled the holder of the cryptocurrency to withdraw a sum of money equal to that cryptocurrency, operating as a form of payment. Last, when considering whether Standard Bank was entitled to the funds in the money market account, the Reserve Bank argued that Standard Bank was not entitled to the money because in terms of the cession and pledge agreement between the Standard Bank and LCC, express consent was required to realise any collateral held by Standard Bank. In reviewing the arguments presented before the high court, Judge MP Motha noted that it was undeniable that the LCC was involved in a scheme to directly or indirectly export funds, foreign currency and capital from South Africa. The court set out the extent of the LCC's transactions, noting that during 2019 LCC sent 4 405.9783 of bitcoin, amounting to R556 020 356, 68, to Huobi Global and concluding that it was therefore incontrovertible that the LCC partook in cryptocurrency transactions. The court highlighted that the answer lies in one's interpretation of the word 'currency' and held firm that cryptocurrency is not money. It noted that trying to view cryptocurrency as money leads to strained and impractical results and, if it were to be viewed as money, cryptowallets would be attached in terms of regulation 22B. Some of the practical questions raised by the court were whether one can deposit cryptocurrency and whether one must declare it when entering or leaving South Africa. T he judge held that, on any interpretation, cryptocurrency fell outside the ambit of capital in regulation 10(1)(c) and that, as Standard Bank argued, a regulatory framework dedicated to addressing cryptocurrency is overdue. He cited a published paper by the Reserve Bank itself highlighting the lack of a proper regulatory legal framework, specifically highlighting that 'there is no regulatory protection that would compensate the owner or user of cryptocurrency for any loss that may be suffered'. Considering the above, the judge held that LCC did not contravene any regulations and the forfeiture of the money held in the money market account was set aside. On 23 May, the Reserve Bank filed an application for leave to appeal, seeking to overturn the ruling. Its main argument is that the high court should have concluded that, although not considered money, cryptocurrency could, at the very least, be seen as 'capital', triggering the provisions of regulation 10(1)(c). As a result of the appeal, section 18(1) of the Superior Courts Act provides that the court's decision is suspended, pending the outcome of the Reserve Bank's application for leave to appeal. Given this prevalence, the ruling has profound implications, not only for financial institutions and regulations, but also for citizens whose assets may be subject to the regulations. Without legislative intervention, the South African government could find itself powerless in monitoring and regulating the significant volume of digital wealth cryptocurrency holds. Charlise Finch is a candidate attorney and Raffique Motala is a director at Herold Gie Attorneys.

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