Transforming the Zulu Royal House Trust: Lessons from the Royal Bafokeng Nation
Image: File
Discussions are underway to model the KwaZulu-Natal Zulu Royal House Trust (ZRHT) to a self-sustaining revenue generator similar to the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN) in the North West Province.
This was mentioned when KZN Premier Thamsanqa Ntuli announced that the ZRHT will receive R86 million in the financial year (FY) 2025 and 2026 from the Office of the Premier (OTP) budget of R817 million.
The RBN is a Setswana-speaking traditional community and ethnic homeland in South Africa. Tim Brauteseth, MPL – DA KZN spokesperson on Finance and the Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) said that money will ensure provision of administration, maintenance, and management of the assets of the ZRHT, including the Royal palaces and farms.
Speaking at the KZN Legislature on Thursday, Brauteseth said the committee notes with grave concern the continuous failure by the ZRHT to implement fundraising. Brauteseth said the Trust was established mainly for this purpose.
Brauteseth said all political parties in the Portfolio Committee speak in unison that vigorous oversight needs to be performed to ensure this happens. The committee requested timelines for this, and the appointment of a new Board of Trustees after operating for almost a year without a Board.
'A sum of R3.6 million was allocated to the Trust in 2018 with the sole purpose of investigating ways to make the Royal Household self-sustaining and indeed a source of its own revenue for the province. This investment has remained largely unrealised. Year after year this issue is raised and year after year excuses are made and little is done,' Brauteseth said.
Brauteseth said the right team has not been assembled for this task. Brauteseth said this has to be an area of intense focus in the next year and the portfolio committee must be relentless in this pursuit.
'There are numerous monarchies and communities across the world who have decided to utilise their assets to ensure self-sustainability and assure their long-term future,' Brauteseth said.
Brauteseth told the legislature that the RBN is a success story of a traditionally governed community that strategically leveraged its wealth from platinum mining to achieve sustainable social development and build a strong investment portfolio.
'Situated on one of the world's largest platinum reserves, the RBN transformed mining royalties into a diversified investment vehicle, Royal Bafokeng Holdings which funds social programs and community projects. This community-based investment approach has enabled them to improve living conditions, support education and healthcare, and build a strong institutional framework,' Brauteseth said.
Brauteseth said RBN made strategic land acquisitions including through missionary intermediaries, to secure their resource rights and received significant royalties from mining companies, which are then invested through RBH.
Brauteseth said that RBH has invested in community projects like the Royal Bafokeng Stadium, the Kgosi Leruo High-Performance Centre, and the Royal Bafokeng Institute.
Brauteseth said the Royal Household must realise the potential of its assets for the benefit of not only the Monarchy but all of the citizens of KZN.
Ntuli said they were in the process of reviewing the ZRHT act and appointing a new board.
'We will be doing a benchmarking visit to the Royal Bafokeng Nation once the board has been constituted. We have used it as one that we need to match with what is being practiced in our province. The Trust land can unearth equity and development returns for the communities that reside on Ingonyama Trust Land,' Ntuli said.
zainul.dawood@inl.co.za
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