Who Wants What And Why In Syria's Future?

Forbes

5 days ago

The 30-day ultimatum reportedly delivered to Syria's Kurdish-led forces in late July 2025—though denied by SDF officials—crystallized a stark reality: eight months after Bashar al-Assad fled Damascus, the battle for Syria's future has intensified rather than abated. With Ahmed al-Sharaa's interim government controlling roughly 70% of Syrian territory, while the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) hold around 25-30%, the question of who shapes Syria's trajectory has never been more urgent—or complex.
Beyond the rhetoric of unity, Syria's future is being shaped by separate visions—each united by core interests despite internal tensions—alongside outlier powers pursuing their own agendas.
At the center sits Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader who has rebranded from jihadist to pragmatic statesman. Having studied his governance model in Idlib compared to other Syrian governance models, I argue that he embodies a "hybrid" ideology rather than a purely pragmatic political stance, which significantly impacts actionable intelligence for those working with or against him. His government, recognized by Washington after the July 2025 delisting of HTS, controls Damascus and most major cities. Yet control does not equal stability. Over 1,500 Alawites were killed in sectarian violence during a 72-hour period in March, while July's Suwayda clashes left over 250 dead, exposing the fragility of Sharaa's promise to protect minorities.
What Sharaa wants: A centralized Syrian state under his control, with international recognition and access to frozen assets worth $400 million.
Why: Consolidating power while his military advantage lasts, before regional proxies regroup. Lacking a large-scale, disciplined, and trained force, he seeks to integrate SDF fighters under his direct command to bolster his military power. The $250-500 billion reconstruction price tag requires Western and Gulf engagement, forcing his pragmatic pivot. However, the money will not flow without stability in the country. Under Sharaa's command, minorities might pay a higher price for that stability.
The SDF, commanding up to 100,000 fighters, including linked local security forces, and controlling Syria's oil infrastructure, signed a March 2025 integration agreement with Damascus. Their revenue from oil production derives from fields producing approximately 80,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2025, a sharp decline from Syria's pre-war output of around 385,000 b/d in 2010, at an estimated price of $30 per barrel (a low price due to local sales and sanctions-related constraints). Ideologically, the SDF stems from democratic confederalism, mandating 40% female leadership and secular pluralism—contrasting sharply with HTS's conservative hybrid model.
What the SDF wants: The Syrian Democratic Forces seek to preserve the broader governance model of DAANES (Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria), pursuing not federalism but autonomy within Syria. This means maintaining their military structure—with the SDF as armed forces and the Asayish as internal police—while protecting DAANES's multi-ethnic, multi-religious social experiment that prioritizes women's rights (with 40% female participation in administration) and communalist principles. Rather than accepting top-down control from Damascus, they aim to continue their bottom-up, decentralized decision-making through local councils and communes, preserving a governance model that fundamentally challenges traditional state structures.
Why: After losing 11,000 fighters defeating ISIS, the Kurdish-led force views autonomy as existential protection against Turkish aggression, Salafi jihadism, and Arab majoritarianism. Perceived historical betrayals by local and international actors drive their insistence on constitutional guarantees.
Syria's other major minorities—Druze (3-5%), Alawites (10-12%), and Christians (5-10%)—seek safeguards against reprisals, leaning toward fragmentation if their demands are unmet. Alawite fears of collective punishment have led some communities to form self-defense militias, while others explore Russian protection near coastal bases. The Druze, following July's clashes, have aligned with Israel, signaling not mere hedging but an active pursuit of autonomy backed by external guarantees—a model that could further fragment Syria if other minorities follow suit.
Christians, concentrated in Damascus, Aleppo, and the Qalamoun Mountains, remain deeply skeptical after witnessing their co-religionists flee Iraq's post-2003 chaos. Despite al-Sharaa's appointment of a Christian minister, community leaders privately report that young Christians continue emigrating, viewing symbolic representation as insufficient protection against potential Islamist dominance. Each minority's calculation is stark: accept promises from a former jihadist commander or seek arrangements that could accelerate Syria's partition.
What minorities want: The Druze seek autonomous protection in Suwayda; Alawites demand security guarantees; Christians desire institutional representation. Their motivation is existential survival, calculating that a weak central state better protects communal interests than HTS dominance.
Why: Collective trauma from sectarian violence—1,500 Alawite deaths in March and historical memories of 1980s Muslim Brotherhood massacres—makes centralized Salafi rule terrifying without ironclad protections.
Ten significant external powers pursue distinct visions for Syria, each backed by substantial investments and incompatible red lines.
United StatesWhat: A managed transition preventing ISIS resurgence while maintaining counter-Iran leverage.Why: Preparing to reduce its footprint from eight bases to two, Washington seeks a managed transition to Sharaa while preserving SDF leverage against ISIS and Iran. The U.S. has invested billions in the anti-ISIS campaign, a fraction of what it could have been without the SDF as local allies. Ambassador Thomas Barrack's declaration that "federalism doesn't work" reflects exhaustion with Middle East entanglements ahead of the 2026 midterms. The $7 billion energy deal signed in May 2025 with a U.S.-Turkish-Qatari consortium reveals the economic stakes. Barrack's blunt July message—"federalism doesn't work... we are running out of time"—signals diminishing patience for Kurdish autonomy aspirations.
TurkeyWhat: Complete elimination of Kurdish autonomy, with the SDF dissolved into individual conscripts. This position remains unchanged despite the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) disarmament process.Why: For Ankara, the PKK's connection with People's Protection Units (YPG) and Women's Protection Units (YPJ) represents Ankara's perceived national security threat. President Erdoğan faces a 2028 re-election, and a financial and political success story in Syria would serve him well. With thousands of troops in northern Syria and hundreds of millions in annual proxy funding, Turkey views the SDF as inseparable from the PKK. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's declaration that federalism constitutes a "casus belli" leaves no room for ambiguity. The July gas supply announcement and draft Status of Forces Agreement proposing Turkish officers within Syria's defense ministry reveal Ankara's vision: a unified Syria under Turkish security tutelage.
FranceWhat: An inclusive transition post-Assad, emphasizing minority rights (e.g., Christians) and stability.Why: Paris has absorbed over 80,000 Syrian refugees and fears another migration wave that could fuel far-right electoral gains. Migration fears align with policy, including suspending asylum claims post-Assad. Having invested billions in humanitarian aid since 2011, France seeks returns through reconstruction contracts for French firms. President Macron's May 2025 meeting with Sharaa emphasized minority rights—particularly for Christians with historical French ties—while positioning Paris as Europe's primary Syria mediator.
United KingdomWhat: An inclusive transition for stability and security, with support for Sharaa unwavering despite sectarian violence.Why: If Syria becomes an extremist haven, the UK could face hundreds of millions in counter-terrorism costs. London's re-establishment of diplomatic relations in July 2025, marked by the Foreign Secretary's visit to Damascus after 14 years, underscores cautious engagement with Sharaa's leadership, despite his historical ties to designated groups. This move aligns with broader security goals, including preventing Daesh resurgence, with the UK committing £94.5 million in humanitarian aid to foster stability—potentially reducing long-term counter-terrorism burdens, though specific savings remain unquantified.
RussiaWhat: Preserve military bases and influence, regardless of Damascus's ruler.Why: Tartus and Khmeimim bases save Moscow billions annually compared to projecting power from Russian territory. After investing $20 billion propping up Assad, the Kremlin's sunk-cost calculation favors pragmatic engagement with any stable government over ideological preferences. Despite reduced influence, Moscow maintains thousands of personnel at Tartus and Khmeimim.
IranWhat: Maintain an albeit diminished land corridor to Hezbollah, even under a weakened presence.Why: Post-Assad, Iran's Hezbollah corridor is disrupted, but Tehran seeks alternatives via remnant militias. Historically, Iran spent $20-30 billion to prop up the ancien régime, with amounts reaching $6 billion in 2015 alone.
IsraelWhat: A perpetually weak Syria incapable of mounting conventional threats.Why: The Golan Heights' strategic value—controlling Damascus's water supply and providing surveillance over southern Syria—requires ensuring no unified Syrian military can challenge the 1981 annexation. The 120+ airstrikes in 2025 systematically degrade emerging capabilities, while cultivating links with the Druze provides fragmentation tools.
Saudi ArabiaWhat: Support the new Sunni-led government to counter Iranian remnants, aligning with broader regional strategy.Why: The Kingdom's $6.4 billion reconstruction pledge represents a geopolitical investment against Tehran's regional ambitions. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 requires stable borders and secure trade routes—impossible with Iranian militias controlling Syrian territory. The calculation: it is cheaper to buy influence in Damascus than fight proxy wars indefinitely.
QatarWhat: Support reconstruction via energy investments while balancing influence against rivals.Why: The $7 billion energy deal signed in May 2025 reveals economic interests, while maintaining influence potentially counters Russian and Chinese expansion.
UAEWhat: Pursue port and infrastructure deals to integrate Syria into regional trade post-Assad.Why: Dubai's role as a regional trade hub requires stable logistics networks. The $800 million DP World port deal positions the Emirates for Syria's eventual integration into global markets. Unlike Saudi Arabia's ideological concerns, UAE pragmatism accepts any government providing commercial stability.
ChinaWhat: Patient positioning for reconstruction contracts while avoiding current conflicts.Why: Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative views Syria's $250-400 billion reconstruction as a generational opportunity. With no historical baggage and $500-600 billion in Middle East trade at stake, China's non-interference principle allows engagement with all parties—from the SDF's oil fields to Damascus ministries—without ideological constraints.
Syria's economy has contracted by 87% since 2011, with up to 90% of the population living below the poverty line. The human cost—500,000 dead, 13 million displaced—reflects the price of competing blocs operating at cross-purposes.
The tragedy for 23 million Syrians remains unchanged: their welfare is absent from any bloc's core calculations. Syria has become not a nation but a space where three strategic logics intersect, ensuring managed dysfunction masquerades as sovereignty.