Latest news with #HTS
Forbes
11 hours ago
- Politics
- Forbes
Who Wants What And Why In Syria's Future?
The 30-day ultimatum reportedly delivered to Syria's Kurdish-led forces in late July 2025—though denied by SDF officials—crystallized a stark reality: eight months after Bashar al-Assad fled Damascus, the battle for Syria's future has intensified rather than abated. With Ahmed al-Sharaa's interim government controlling roughly 70% of Syrian territory, while the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) hold around 25-30%, the question of who shapes Syria's trajectory has never been more urgent—or complex. Beyond the rhetoric of unity, Syria's future is being shaped by separate visions—each united by core interests despite internal tensions—alongside outlier powers pursuing their own agendas. At the center sits Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader who has rebranded from jihadist to pragmatic statesman. Having studied his governance model in Idlib compared to other Syrian governance models, I argue that he embodies a "hybrid" ideology rather than a purely pragmatic political stance, which significantly impacts actionable intelligence for those working with or against him. His government, recognized by Washington after the July 2025 delisting of HTS, controls Damascus and most major cities. Yet control does not equal stability. Over 1,500 Alawites were killed in sectarian violence during a 72-hour period in March, while July's Suwayda clashes left over 250 dead, exposing the fragility of Sharaa's promise to protect minorities. What Sharaa wants: A centralized Syrian state under his control, with international recognition and access to frozen assets worth $400 million. Why: Consolidating power while his military advantage lasts, before regional proxies regroup. Lacking a large-scale, disciplined, and trained force, he seeks to integrate SDF fighters under his direct command to bolster his military power. The $250-500 billion reconstruction price tag requires Western and Gulf engagement, forcing his pragmatic pivot. However, the money will not flow without stability in the country. Under Sharaa's command, minorities might pay a higher price for that stability. The SDF, commanding up to 100,000 fighters, including linked local security forces, and controlling Syria's oil infrastructure, signed a March 2025 integration agreement with Damascus. Their revenue from oil production derives from fields producing approximately 80,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2025, a sharp decline from Syria's pre-war output of around 385,000 b/d in 2010, at an estimated price of $30 per barrel (a low price due to local sales and sanctions-related constraints). Ideologically, the SDF stems from democratic confederalism, mandating 40% female leadership and secular pluralism—contrasting sharply with HTS's conservative hybrid model. What the SDF wants: The Syrian Democratic Forces seek to preserve the broader governance model of DAANES (Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria), pursuing not federalism but autonomy within Syria. This means maintaining their military structure—with the SDF as armed forces and the Asayish as internal police—while protecting DAANES's multi-ethnic, multi-religious social experiment that prioritizes women's rights (with 40% female participation in administration) and communalist principles. Rather than accepting top-down control from Damascus, they aim to continue their bottom-up, decentralized decision-making through local councils and communes, preserving a governance model that fundamentally challenges traditional state structures. Why: After losing 11,000 fighters defeating ISIS, the Kurdish-led force views autonomy as existential protection against Turkish aggression, Salafi jihadism, and Arab majoritarianism. Perceived historical betrayals by local and international actors drive their insistence on constitutional guarantees. Syria's other major minorities—Druze (3-5%), Alawites (10-12%), and Christians (5-10%)—seek safeguards against reprisals, leaning toward fragmentation if their demands are unmet. Alawite fears of collective punishment have led some communities to form self-defense militias, while others explore Russian protection near coastal bases. The Druze, following July's clashes, have aligned with Israel, signaling not mere hedging but an active pursuit of autonomy backed by external guarantees—a model that could further fragment Syria if other minorities follow suit. Christians, concentrated in Damascus, Aleppo, and the Qalamoun Mountains, remain deeply skeptical after witnessing their co-religionists flee Iraq's post-2003 chaos. Despite al-Sharaa's appointment of a Christian minister, community leaders privately report that young Christians continue emigrating, viewing symbolic representation as insufficient protection against potential Islamist dominance. Each minority's calculation is stark: accept promises from a former jihadist commander or seek arrangements that could accelerate Syria's partition. What minorities want: The Druze seek autonomous protection in Suwayda; Alawites demand security guarantees; Christians desire institutional representation. Their motivation is existential survival, calculating that a weak central state better protects communal interests than HTS dominance. Why: Collective trauma from sectarian violence—1,500 Alawite deaths in March and historical memories of 1980s Muslim Brotherhood massacres—makes centralized Salafi rule terrifying without ironclad protections. Ten significant external powers pursue distinct visions for Syria, each backed by substantial investments and incompatible red lines. United StatesWhat: A managed transition preventing ISIS resurgence while maintaining counter-Iran Preparing to reduce its footprint from eight bases to two, Washington seeks a managed transition to Sharaa while preserving SDF leverage against ISIS and Iran. The U.S. has invested billions in the anti-ISIS campaign, a fraction of what it could have been without the SDF as local allies. Ambassador Thomas Barrack's declaration that "federalism doesn't work" reflects exhaustion with Middle East entanglements ahead of the 2026 midterms. The $7 billion energy deal signed in May 2025 with a U.S.-Turkish-Qatari consortium reveals the economic stakes. Barrack's blunt July message—"federalism doesn't work... we are running out of time"—signals diminishing patience for Kurdish autonomy aspirations. TurkeyWhat: Complete elimination of Kurdish autonomy, with the SDF dissolved into individual conscripts. This position remains unchanged despite the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) disarmament For Ankara, the PKK's connection with People's Protection Units (YPG) and Women's Protection Units (YPJ) represents Ankara's perceived national security threat. President Erdoğan faces a 2028 re-election, and a financial and political success story in Syria would serve him well. With thousands of troops in northern Syria and hundreds of millions in annual proxy funding, Turkey views the SDF as inseparable from the PKK. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's declaration that federalism constitutes a "casus belli" leaves no room for ambiguity. The July gas supply announcement and draft Status of Forces Agreement proposing Turkish officers within Syria's defense ministry reveal Ankara's vision: a unified Syria under Turkish security tutelage. FranceWhat: An inclusive transition post-Assad, emphasizing minority rights (e.g., Christians) and Paris has absorbed over 80,000 Syrian refugees and fears another migration wave that could fuel far-right electoral gains. Migration fears align with policy, including suspending asylum claims post-Assad. Having invested billions in humanitarian aid since 2011, France seeks returns through reconstruction contracts for French firms. President Macron's May 2025 meeting with Sharaa emphasized minority rights—particularly for Christians with historical French ties—while positioning Paris as Europe's primary Syria mediator. United KingdomWhat: An inclusive transition for stability and security, with support for Sharaa unwavering despite sectarian If Syria becomes an extremist haven, the UK could face hundreds of millions in counter-terrorism costs. London's re-establishment of diplomatic relations in July 2025, marked by the Foreign Secretary's visit to Damascus after 14 years, underscores cautious engagement with Sharaa's leadership, despite his historical ties to designated groups. This move aligns with broader security goals, including preventing Daesh resurgence, with the UK committing £94.5 million in humanitarian aid to foster stability—potentially reducing long-term counter-terrorism burdens, though specific savings remain unquantified. RussiaWhat: Preserve military bases and influence, regardless of Damascus's Tartus and Khmeimim bases save Moscow billions annually compared to projecting power from Russian territory. After investing $20 billion propping up Assad, the Kremlin's sunk-cost calculation favors pragmatic engagement with any stable government over ideological preferences. Despite reduced influence, Moscow maintains thousands of personnel at Tartus and Khmeimim. IranWhat: Maintain an albeit diminished land corridor to Hezbollah, even under a weakened Post-Assad, Iran's Hezbollah corridor is disrupted, but Tehran seeks alternatives via remnant militias. Historically, Iran spent $20-30 billion to prop up the ancien régime, with amounts reaching $6 billion in 2015 alone. IsraelWhat: A perpetually weak Syria incapable of mounting conventional The Golan Heights' strategic value—controlling Damascus's water supply and providing surveillance over southern Syria—requires ensuring no unified Syrian military can challenge the 1981 annexation. The 120+ airstrikes in 2025 systematically degrade emerging capabilities, while cultivating links with the Druze provides fragmentation tools. Saudi ArabiaWhat: Support the new Sunni-led government to counter Iranian remnants, aligning with broader regional The Kingdom's $6.4 billion reconstruction pledge represents a geopolitical investment against Tehran's regional ambitions. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 requires stable borders and secure trade routes—impossible with Iranian militias controlling Syrian territory. The calculation: it is cheaper to buy influence in Damascus than fight proxy wars indefinitely. QatarWhat: Support reconstruction via energy investments while balancing influence against The $7 billion energy deal signed in May 2025 reveals economic interests, while maintaining influence potentially counters Russian and Chinese expansion. UAEWhat: Pursue port and infrastructure deals to integrate Syria into regional trade Dubai's role as a regional trade hub requires stable logistics networks. The $800 million DP World port deal positions the Emirates for Syria's eventual integration into global markets. Unlike Saudi Arabia's ideological concerns, UAE pragmatism accepts any government providing commercial stability. ChinaWhat: Patient positioning for reconstruction contracts while avoiding current Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative views Syria's $250-400 billion reconstruction as a generational opportunity. With no historical baggage and $500-600 billion in Middle East trade at stake, China's non-interference principle allows engagement with all parties—from the SDF's oil fields to Damascus ministries—without ideological constraints. Syria's economy has contracted by 87% since 2011, with up to 90% of the population living below the poverty line. The human cost—500,000 dead, 13 million displaced—reflects the price of competing blocs operating at cross-purposes. The tragedy for 23 million Syrians remains unchanged: their welfare is absent from any bloc's core calculations. Syria has become not a nation but a space where three strategic logics intersect, ensuring managed dysfunction masquerades as sovereignty.
Russia Today
18 hours ago
- Politics
- Russia Today
Syria counting on Russian support in push for ‘domestic unity'
Syria is seeking Russia's support in its efforts to restore unity in the country after continued outbreaks of sectarian violence, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani has said during a visit to Moscow. The situation in Syria has remained volatile since the ouster of longtime President Bashar Assad by a coalition led by Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) late last year. Assad, a close ally of Moscow, was replaced by HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa. Despite the removal of Assad, who along with his family received political asylum in Moscow, Russia has pledged to continue supporting Syria. Speaking alongside his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov in Moscow on Thursday, al-Shaibani acknowledged Syria is facing 'challenges and threats' but described it as 'an opportunity to build a united, strong Syria.' 'Relations between the Russian and Syrian peoples are of a historical nature,' he said, as cited by TASS. 'Today we are representing a new Syria... We are currently working to ensure the reunification of the people in Syria. And, of course, we are interested in Russia being there with us on this path.' He added that Damascus is 'interested in establishing proper interaction and relations' with Russia 'based on cooperation and mutual respect.' Lavrov said Moscow is closely following Syria's transition and will assist Damascus in stabilizing the country. 'We sincerely wish that the Syrian people, with whom we have long-standing friendship, cope with the challenges and fully normalize the situation,' he stated. He also expressed hope that Syrian President al-Sharaa will attend the upcoming Russia-Arab League summit in October. Syria remains deeply fractured by sectarian tensions and armed groups. Since Assad's ouster, Islamist factions have reportedly targeted minority communities, including Alawites, Christians, and Druze. Earlier this month, clashes erupted between Druze militias, Bedouin tribes, and government forces in Sweida province. Complicating matters is Israel, self-styled protector of the Druze, which after Assad's fall invaded the buffer zone near the occupied Golan Heights, claiming it was to block hostile actors from its borders. Earlier this month it resumed airstrikes on Syria, including attacks on the Defense Ministry in Damascus. Moscow has condemned Israel's actions as a violation of Syria's sovereignty and urged regional powers to support the country's territorial integrity.
Al-Ahram Weekly
a day ago
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Minimum engagement with Syria
Egypt had already translated its justified concerns about Syria's new rulers into a coherent policy of minimum engagement before the present round of regional and international pressures, writes Amr Hamzawy While several Arab governments have opted to open channels with the government of Interim President Ahmad Al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohamed Al-Jolani) and Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, Egypt has upheld a distinct and more cautious position and one that, in retrospect, has proven prudent. Cairo voiced early reservations regarding the ideological backgrounds and political orientations of Syria's new rulers, who have emerged from extremist takfiri movements with violent histories and past affiliations with terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) group. Prior to their ascent to power, these actors were implicated in criminal activities and systematic human rights violations in the areas under their control, a fact well documented by both domestic and international human rights organisations. Egypt has remained unconvinced by Al-Sharaa's new media discourse, which emphasises the values of citizenship, coexistence, and tolerance among Syria's diverse communities. Instead, the evidence indicates a clear tendency by Al-Sharaa and HTS to monopolise power, resist power-sharing arrangements, and reduce nation-building and the construction of a new social contract to superficial and performative gestures. The so-called 'National Dialogue Conference' held in Damascus in February this year was widely criticised by Syrian democratic forces for its procedures and content. Likewise, the Constitutional Document issued in March postponed presidential and parliamentary elections in Syria for several years, effectively consolidating the current government as a de facto authority. Further indications of HTS's monopolistic approach have included efforts to assert unilateral control over the machinery of the state by appointing its members to leadership roles across ministries and key institutions, as well as integrating foreign fighters into Syria's military and security apparatus. The phenomenon of foreign fighters, common to groups like Al-Qaeda, IS, and HTS, has further compounded the risks of institutionalised extremism. Egypt's reservations were therefore well-founded, and its refusal to rush into an engagement with Syria's new leadership was a calculated and rational stance. Adding to Cairo's initial concerns was the documented relationship between HTS and certain regional actors whose broader Middle East policies have involved supporting extremist religious factions and militias. These policies often run counter to Egypt's conception of national and regional security, one grounded in the imperative to combat religious extremism, eliminate its sources, and confront the violence and terrorism it generates. Egypt's scepticism was further reinforced by the new Syrian leadership's silence in the face of repeated Israeli attacks on Syria's military infrastructure and capabilities, as well as the incursions of Israeli forces into southern Syrian territories beyond the Occupied Golan Heights and the demilitarised zone. More troubling still was the framing by Israel's far-right government of its role as the 'protector' of Syria's southern Druze population. The situation escalated in March with the outbreak of clashes in coastal regions of Syria that saw widespread violations and atrocities committed by remnants of the former Al-Assad regime and, more extensively and systematically, by extremist elements affiliated with or allied to HTS. These attacks targeted Alawite civilians in the provinces of Latakia, Tartus, and Hama. They revealed, on the one hand, what can be described as the 'IS-like character' of HTS, unleashing sectarian violence and indiscriminate killings while ignoring the fundamental shift in its identity from a militant group to a governing authority in a diverse nation-state. On the other hand, they also exposed the catastrophic consequences of HTS's rapid consolidation of control over the military and security institutions in Syria, which were then used as instruments of repression against Alawite communities. While these coastal clashes and the sectarian violence shocked some regional and international actors who had rushed to embrace Al-Sharaa and had been eager for photo opportunities with him at the People's Palace in Damascus, Cairo's deepening concerns led it to publicly articulate principled positions. These included a commitment to equal citizenship for all Syrians, a firm rejection of sectarian crimes and violations that threaten coexistence and drag a fellow Arab nation into civil strife, and a call for a consensual process to build Syria's new state and a fair social contract between it and its citizens. As international and regional pressure mounted on Al-Sharaa in the aftermath of the coastal clashes demanding investigations and accountability for the crimes that had been committed, Egypt had already translated its justified concerns into a coherent policy of minimum engagement with Syria's new rulers. Importantly, this policy of minimum engagement has not prevented Egypt from continuing to condemn Israeli assaults on Syria or from responding positively to developments that genuinely serve the interests of the Syrian people, such as the decision by US President Donald Trump to lift the sanctions on the country. Statements from Egypt's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in recent weeks have expressed this dual approach amid unprecedented Israeli attacks on Damascus and southern Syria, near-civil conflict between Druze and Bedouin populations in and around Suwayda (echoing the coastal clashes), and a dangerous security deterioration across Syria. These events have been accompanied by growing separatist sentiments in the east (among the Kurds), the south (among the Druze), and the west (among the Alawites) of the country, as well as mounting public scepticism about HTS's ability, or even willingness, to transcend its militant, jihadist origins and transform itself into a legitimate governing body for a country with such a complex national and societal fabric. Egypt's policy of minimum engagement, then, is not merely a diplomatic posture but instead is a direct response to a set of grave concerns: the extremist ideological foundations and exclusionary political ambitions of HTS; the trajectory of events in Syria that has exposed the group's limited commitment to citizenship, coexistence, and national reconciliation; and the broader implications of this instability for Syria's future and Egypt's national security in a comprehensive sense. The writer is a political scientist and former MP. He is currently director of the Middle East Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. * A version of this article appears in print in the 6 August, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Hindustan Times
2 days ago
- Health
- Hindustan Times
India sends diplomat for talks to Damascus
India has made a formal outreach to Syria's provisional government led by former Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, with a middle-ranking diplomat visiting Damascus for meetings with Syrian ministers. India sends diplomat for talks to Damascus This was the first official visit to Damascus from the Indian side since al-Sharaa, whose group was once affiliated to al-Qaeda, assumed power after ousting the regime of Bashar al-Assad following a lightning offensive last December. There was no official word from the Indian side on the visit by Suresh Kumar, director of the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) division of the external affairs ministry. Kumar's meetings with Syria's foreign and education ministers in Damascus on Monday were reported by state-run SANA news agency. 'A beginning had to be made and India had to register its presence. You have to open the door at some point,' a person familiar with the matter said on condition of anonymity. Syria's foreign minister Asaad Al-Shaibani and the Indian delegation led by Kumar discussed 'issues of mutual concern and ways of enhancing relations between the two countries in the interests of both peoples', SANA reported. The meeting between Kumar and Syrian health minister Musab Al-Ali focused on enhancing health cooperation, particularly in the fields of pharmaceutical industries and medical training, according to another report by SANA. The two sides also discussed a mechanism for implementing a scholarship for Syrian students, and allocating a specialised engineering cooperation programme for government employees. Al-Ali stressed Syria's aspiration to establish a strong partnership with India in pharmaceutical industries and health technologies in order to support the national health sector and provide medicines. Kumar said India will continue funding specialised training courses for Syrian personnel, coordinate the training of Syrian doctors in Indian centres, and enhance cooperation in nursing, pharmaceutical industries and pharmaceutical exports, the report said. India has had strong political ties with Syria and both countries were key members of the Non-Aligned Movement. India's traditional support for Arab causes such as the issue of Palestine was appreciated by Syria. India also backed Syria's right to the Golan Heights, currently occupied by Israel, and its full return to the country. Under the Assad family, the Syrian government usually backed India at multilateral forums, including on the issue of Kashmir. In response to a request from Damascus for emergency humanitarian aid in 2021, the Indian government gifted 2,000 tonnes of rice to Syria. During the Covid-19 pandemic, India sent a 10 tonnes of medicines to Syria. This was the largest medical assistance from any country to Syria during the pandemic. India has been monitoring the situation in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. At the time, India evacuated 77 Indian nationals from Syria. 'We hope that the new constitution, due to be drafted, takes into account the interests of all the sections of the Syrian society,' the external affairs ministry said in a statement around the time of the change of government. In January, al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda commander who went by the name Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, became president of the provisional government. People familiar with the matter said the outreach to Damascus was influenced by Syria's strategic location in West Asia – the country shares borders with five key regional actors, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon – and the long-standing ties between the two sides. The outreach also follows the US decision to end sanctions on Syria after a meeting between al-Sharaa and President Donald Trump in May.
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First Post
3 days ago
- Politics
- First Post
Indian delegation in Syria: First diplomatic visit since Al Sharaa toppled Assad regime
For the first time since opposition forces ousted the Assad dynasty in Syria, India has sent a delegation to hold talks with the country's new administration led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, a leader with a jihadist past who is supported by Turkey. read more Suresh Kumar, the Director of the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) Division at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), holds talks with Syrian foreign minister Asaad Hassan Al-Sheibani in Damascus, Syria, on Monday, July 28, 2025. (Photo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Syria) For the first time since the opposition forces ousted Syria's longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad last year, India has sent a delegation to hold talks with the country's new administration led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, a Turkey-supported Islamist leader who once headed a branch of Al-Qaeda. Last year, opposition forces led by Sharaa's Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) escalated their offensive in November. Within weeks, they reached the capital of Damascus, capturing it on December 8 and forcing Assad to flee. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD While there was no word from India on the meeting in Damascus, Syria's foreign ministry confirmed the meeting between Suresh Kumar, the Director of the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) Division at the Ministry of External Affairs, and Syrian foreign minister Asaad Hassan Al-Sheibani. 'The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Mr Asaad Hassan Al-Sheibani, received in the capital Damascus an Indian delegation headed by Mr Suresh Kumar, Director of the West Asia and North Africa Department at the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. The meeting addressed issues of common interest and ways to enhance relations between the two countries in a manner that serves the interests of both peoples,' said the Syrian foreign ministry in a statement on X. There have been concerns about the new administration in Syria, owing to the jihadist past of its leader and group —the HTS— that he runs. Moreover, Sharaa's principal supporter, Turkey, has pursued an overtly anti-India agenda lately, supporting Pakistan not just diplomatically but also militarily. 'A beginning had to be made' While there was no official word, a person familiar with the matter told Hindustan Times that India sent a delegation as 'a beginning had to be made' at some point about a bilateral relationship with the new Syrian administration. 'A beginning had to be made and India had to register its presence. You have to open the door at some point,' the person said on condition of anonymity. With Assad, India had a comfortable relationship and Assad sided with India even on the issue of Kashmir on international platforms. India also regularly sent humanitarian support to Syria. Notably, India never closed the embassy in Damascus even as a civil war raged in the country. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In the meeting with Kumar, Syrian foreign minister Sheibani 'dealt with issues of mutual concern and ways of enhancing relations between the two countries in the interests of both peoples', according to Syria's state-owned SANA news agency. Beside the foreign minister, Kumar also met Syrian health minister Musab Al-Ali and the two sides discussed ways of enhancing health cooperation, particularly in the pharmaceutical industries and medical training fields, as per the news agency. The two sides discussed mechanism for implementing a scholarship for Syrian students, in addition to allocating a specialised engineering cooperation programme for government employees, the agency reported. Al-Ali said that Syria aspired to establish a 'strong partnership with India in the pharmaceutical industries and health technologies, which would contribute to supporting the national health sector and providing medicines', the agency reported. On his part, Kumar said that India will continue to fund specialised training courses for Syrian personnel, coordinate the training of Syrian doctors in Indian centers, and enhance cooperation in the fields of nursing, pharmaceutical industries, and pharmaceutical exports, the agency reported. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
