Why urban renewal in Malaysia has stoked racial tensions
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More than 78 per cent of Malaysians live in cities including Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Johor Bahru, drawn by job opportunities and amenities.
But rapid urbanisation has led to haphazard development, turning pockets of the city centres into unsafe, unsanitary slums.
To address the issue, the government plans to table the Urban Renewal Act later this year, which will lay the legal ground for regeneration of dilapidated tower blocks. Authorities have said such efforts are often blocked by the refusal of some residents.
However, opposition lawmakers have pushed back, portraying it as a tool for the government to seize homes and dispossess the nation's poorest urban Malays in favour of developers, who are often ethnic Chinese.
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The opposition Islamist party PAS has called for a street rally against the bill, labelling it 'modern colonialism' that must be stopped.
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AllAfrica
an hour ago
- AllAfrica
The digital escort fraud: another major Pentagon security failure
Microsoft was caught with its pants down in a brilliant exposé by ProPublica that said that a major part of the Defense Department's Cloud Computer system was run by Chinese engineers and monitored by so-called digital escorts who supposedly looked out for any compromise of DOD information. Now, when Senator Tom Cotton called Defense Secretary Hegseth's attention to the mess, Microsoft withdrew the Chinese engineers and pretended everything was fixed. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Back in April, 2018 I participated at the Hudson Institute in a special panel review of the then-Pentagon plan to transition all its heritage computer databases to a single computer cloud. (Watch the full video here.) The Pentagon plan was to shut down the old computer systems after the cloud was up and running. DOD claimed that the cloud would be easier to maintain than a number of separate computers, and more secure. DOD's problem is that it has done a poor job on cyber security for years – and DOD contractors and sub-contractors, operating under weak departmental guidance, have been even worse. There have been many scandals as the so-called 'advanced persistent Cyber threat' has continued to get worse. A persistent cyber threat is one that operates in the shadows for long periods of time and steals vast quantities of sensitive information. At the time of the DOD cloud proposal, government and contractor computers were under constant attack from hackers. Some of these hackers were teams of Chinese and Russian operators, others came from domestic and international hackers who could sell the acquired information to different bidders, including terrorists. Still others were from rogue countries who are still engaged deeply in hacking, including from North Korea and Iran. Around the same time DOD determined that around 50 gigabytes or more F-35 stealth fighter jet data had disappeared. We know where it went: China. And we know the result: China was able to field a stealth fighter jet in record time. Chengdu J-20. F-35 stealth fighter jet data had disappeared. We know where it went: China. And we know the result: China was able to field a stealth fighter jet in record time. Of course it was not only the design information and other details that enabled China to be successful: China also conducts industrial espionage in depth, so its agents can penetrate US contractors and subcontractors and infiltrate their supplier networks. The US classifies some sensitive information, but actually quite a lot less than one might think. This enables contractors to work without the burden of cleared workers. We have seen numerous cases of people caught working in critical companies smuggling components needed by China either for further exploitation or use. In regard to cloud security in 2018 I said: DoD has laid down its own standards, if you want to call them that, or guidelines, if you want to call them that, on what it expects the security of a system that it's going to procure should look like. And basically what they've done, for the most part, is two things. One, of course, is to make sure the employees that are working in the cloud environment that's being proposed are cleared American employees. That, by the way, creates a significant problem in being able to find enough cleared American employees to do the job. And I'm not sure they are so readily available. But that is definitely a challenge, let's say, that's out there. And the second is to take some of the procedures that are used to secure DoD's existing computers and servers and equipment and apply that to the cloud. We understood, in 2018, that the cloud security problem was supposedly solved by using only security-cleared American employees. It seems that the pledge was violated by the Defense Department, which permitted foreign workers to support and service the DoD cloud so long as they were 'supervised.' The supervisors are called 'digital escorts.' The workers, so far at least in Microsoft's case, turn out to be Chinese. Chinese engineers work remotely in China, and it is probably a fair assumption that digital escorts allegedly monitor the work of the Chinese engineers, also remotely. In other words, the so-called escorts are virtual, they don't sit next to the Chinese operators. We do not know anything really about the qualifications of the digital escorts, or even if they understand the Cloud network they are supposedly protecting. They would have to understand the actual cloud software and the underlying processors, and they would need to follow guidelines on what might constitute any sort of breach of the protocols or data by the Chinese. Any clever operator in China could figure out how to insert malware into the cloud, but actually since they have full time access to it anyway there is no overpowering reason for them to do so. Instead they can just suck up all the data and run it through their supercomputers, or even their latest quantum computers. China leads the world in quantum computers, and if they really do work, they can smash encryption codes in seconds. DoD information in the cloud is supposed to be encrypted, or at least we are told that. But that may just be the outside of the system to keep out random hackers. The actual information may not actually be encrypted. That would mean a potential bonanza for China and a huge risk to US security. The original DOD contract was supposed to be to a single contractor. However, complaints from industry and the public – and from security experts, as in our panel discussio – pushed the department to support more than one cloud application (and also may have allowed for some backup if a cloud operation crashed, for whatever reason, although DoD has not told us about any backup). The question arises: If Microsoft was using Chinese engineers, were the other cloud providers doing the same thing, and did they have digital escorts, or something like them? Along with Microsoft, other participants in the DoD cloud contract, initially for $9 billion, were Amazon, Google and Oracle. All of them do business in China. Oracle has offices in Beijing. Amazon has offices in Beijing, Shanghai and Wuhan. Google has offices in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen. Of course we do not know if DoD granted them the same deal they allowed for Microsoft, but it is important to find out. Or maybe DOD never agreed to digital escorts and Chinese engineers? We don't really know, but it is unlikely Microsoft could have hired Chinese engineers without some Defense Department input. If DoD never approved, then it is another example of a security failure. If they did approve, of course, it is also a security failure. Either way it is a disaster. Hegseth understands the digital escort issue is a big deal, but he cannot just accept Microsoft's decision to end China's participation in the Defense Department cloud. Hegseth needs to back a full scale inquiry and investigation. We need an assessment of how much damage was done and, potentially, what programs may have possibly been compromised. Such an investigation has to assess just how long the Digital Escort system has been in place. How long has China had access to the Defense Department's computer heartland? Hegseth needs to find out what the other contractors are doing and if they are using foreign workers. Finally there is a serious question about outsourcing American security to private contractors, especially those who are not core defense contractors and who depend on foreign revenues to support their bottom line. Companies that are mainly commercial are inherently a risk because they lack a security culture and always want to expand into markets that can prove difficult and risky. Putting trust in them raises more than eyebrows. Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and a former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared in his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
AllAfrica
2 days ago
- AllAfrica
Signs mount Xi under pressure to cede some power
Political and economic pressures might force Chinese President and overall leader Xi Jinping to delegate some of his powers to his deputies in a highly significant move. This has prompted some observers and media outlets to speculate that Xi's grip on power may be waning. A major part of why this is happening is likely to stem from Xi's difficulties in dealing with China's economic woes, which began with a real estate crisis in 2021. For years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has relied on providing economic prosperity to legitimize its rule over the country. But the continuously lackluster performance of the Chinese economy over the past four years and Trump's trade war with Beijing are making recovery a difficult task. And this is likely to be a factor that undermines Xi's rule. These rumors about Xi started just after the latest meeting, on June 30, of the Politburo (the principal policy-making body of the party), which brings China's top leaders together to make major decisions. For people who don't follow Chinese politics, the idea of Xi delegating some authority might seem nothing special. However, in understanding China, it's important to understand that Xi has massive power, and it seems the Politburo is signaling there are some changes on the horizon. Symbolism and indirect language play an important role in how the Communist Party communicates with Chinese people. The way it is done comes through slogans or key phrases, which are collectively known as 'tifa' (提法). This method of information is important since it shapes political language and debate and influences how a Chinese audience and an international audience understand what is going on. At first glance, the Politburo's call for enhancing 'policy coordination' and the 'review process' of major tasks may appear to indicate that the central government is seeking to ensure local officials follow through with Beijing's agenda. But there is probably more to the Politburo's statement than meets the eye. The statement said that specialized bodies that exist within the party's central committee, which includes the powerful commissions that Xi's loyalists now hold, should focus on 'guidance and coordination over major initiatives' and 'avoid taking over others' functions or overstepping boundaries.' For experienced China watchers, there are hints here that this powerful decision-making body is making a veiled threat against Xi for holding on to too much power. But the opaque nature of China's elite decision-making process, where a great deal of backroom politics occurs behind closed doors, means that decoding its messages isn't always easy. Because of all of this, there is increasing speculation that a power struggle is in progress. This isn't entirely surprising given that Xi's purge of many senior party officials through anti-corruption campaigns and his dominance over the highest levels of government are likely to have earned him many enemies over the years. Another sign that all isn't going well with Xi's regime is the removal of some of his allies from key positions within the government. Xi began his anti-corruption campaign in 2012 when he became China's leader. On paper, while the campaign is officially framed as a drive to clean up corruption, evidence suggests that it may have been used to remove Xi's political rivals. The problem for Xi is that the campaign is being used against his loyalists as well. In October 2023, Defense Minister Li Shangfu, who was considered a Xi ally, was sacked due to what were later confirmed in 2024 to be corruption charges. But the dismissals of Xi loyalists continued. Admiral Miao Hua, who was in charge of ideological control and personnel appointment within the armed forces and Xi's associate since his days as a party official in Fujian province, was suspended from office in November 2024. And in June 2025, he was removed after being investigated for corruption. The previous month, General He Weidong, who was vice-chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission, was also arrested for alleged corruption. Are the purges a consequence of Xi ceding ground to political rivals? This is a possibility. But even if it weren't and the purges are part of a concerted effort to stamp out corruption, Xi's campaign will not only cast aspersions on his ability to appoint the right people into government, but also create a climate of fear among allies and potentially create further enemies. Either scenario puts Xi on the spot. But since Xi became China's head of state in 2013, he and his loyalists have taken over leadership of many key national commissions, making him the most powerful Chinese leader since the time of Chairman Mao. These commissions include the Central Financial Commission, which regulates China's financial markets, the Central Science and Technology Commission, which aims to accelerate China's technological progress, and the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission, which regulates China's digital content. But it looks like Xi is about to delegate some of his power, and there are some other decisions that may indicate a shift. For the first time since coming into power in 2012, Xi skipped the annual summit organized by the BRICS group (named after Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa,) Instead, from July 5 to 7 this year, Chinese Premier Li Qiang led a delegation to Rio de Janeiro. This isn't the first time that Li has represented Xi in high-profile conferences abroad. In September 2023, Li attended the G20 summit in New Delhi, India, and has taken part in ASEAN summits. But the BRICS appearance alongside with Li's increasingly prominent role in economic policymaking may suggest that his influence is on the rise, while Xi's is declining. Watch this space. Chee Meng Tan is an assistant professor of business economics, University of Nottingham. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
AllAfrica
2 days ago
- AllAfrica
Chinese worry Nvidia H20 chips are poisoned wine for AI industry
The relaxation of the United States' export controls for Nvidia's H20 chips won brief applause in China – while raising longer-term concerns about whether Chinese firms will over-rely on foreign artificial intelligence chips. During a trip to China on July 15, Nvidia Chief Executive Jensen Huang said in a press conference that the company will resume H20 chip sales to China, now that the US government has indicated it will soon grant export licenses. 'I hope to get more advanced chips into China than the H20,' Huang said. 'Technology is always moving on. Today, Hopper's terrific, but some years from now, we will have more and more and better and better technology, and I think it's sensible that whatever we're allowed to sell in China will continue to get better and better over time as well,' he said. He also took the opportunity to praise Huawei's achievements in making AI chips. However, some Chinese commentators viewed the development as unfavorable for China's chip-making sector. 'This is not a simple lifting of the export restrictions, but a carefully designed measure for the United States to maintain its technological blockade against China,' a Guangdong-based columnist says in an article. 'The H20's FP16 computing power is only 15% of H100, while its NVLink bandwidth is reduced from 900GB/s to 400GB/s. The chip's transformer engine (TE) is completely deleted,' he says. 'Such a design ensures the chip's AI inference ability and reduces its AI training capability, perfectly implementing the United States' strategy of blocking high-end chips, but not mid-end ones, to China.' 'By limiting the key performance of H20, the US can maintain its blockade of high-end computing power while handing Chinese companies a glass of 'poisoned wine,'' he says. In Chinese idiom, a person who 'drinks poisonous liquor to quench thirst' knows that it will kill him, in the long run, but he can't do anything to change the situation. Applied to Chinese technology companies, this means that the domestic chipmakers can benefit from foreign AI chips in the short term but will miss an opportunity to grow and establish an ecosystem. An AI firm needs tens of thousands of Nvidia's high-end chips, such as A100 or H100, to train a large language model (LLM) like ChatGPT. Once an LLM is developed, the company can use slower graphics processing units for inference tasks. In an article published by a columnist using the pseudonym 'Silicon Rabbit' says that Nvidia's Huang made a subtle and cunning move to help the US curb China's chip sector. 'Imagine that someone sold you a Ferrari with a powerful V12 engine, but downgraded its gas pipe, gearbox and wheels. This car can run normally on straight roads, but it faces limitations when continuously speeding up or making sharp turns,' he says, attributing the metaphor to an unnamed senior software engineer who had participated in the Hopper architecture's performance optimization project. He says that the computing power of a single H20 chip is far below that of the H100, while a reduced interconnect bandwidth means a significant reduction in AI training capability. 'AI training is similar to having tens of thousands of people work together, which requires fast information exchanges,' he says. 'A low interconnect bandwidth means that people communicate slowly, resulting in a low thinking efficiency.' He says that the H20 chip cannot be used to train trillion-parameter LLMs. 'The H20 generously offers 96 gigabytes of the third-generation high bandwidth memory (HBM3) – higher than the H100's 80GB HBM3e. However, the H20's memory bandwidth is only 4.0 terabytes per second (TB/s), lower than the H100's 4.8 TB/s,' he says. 'It is like someone giving you a bigger table to read more books, but making it harder for you to take books from the shelves.' The writer says the relaxation of the export rules for the H20 is aimed at permitting the US to control the pace of China's AI development precisely. Reuters, citing sources familiar with the situation, reported that Chinese internet giants, including ByteDance and Tencent, are submitting applications for the H20 chip. ByteDance denied the report. Tencent did not respond to Reuters' request for comment. On April 9, 2025, according to Nvidia, the US government informed the company that a license is required for exporting its H20 products into the Chinese market. The new curb was a part of Washington's countermeasures after China retaliated against the Trump administration's reciprocal tariffs. In announcing results for the three months ended April 27, Nvidia said sales of H20 products were US$4.6 billion before the new export licensing requirements took effect. It said it could not ship an additional $2.5 billion of H20 revenue. After US and Chinese officials held meetings in London on June 9, both sides agreed to de-escalate the trade war. Beijing decided to ease export controls on niche metals to the US. In return, the US would allow Chinese firms to use its chip-making software and export parts for China's C919 flight engines. And now, the US will enable Nvidia to ship the H20 chips to China. A Guangdong-based columnist says Nvidia's H20 chips will enjoy an advantage in the Chinese market, although Huawei's Ascend 910B chips perform better in many aspects of AI training. He says Nvidia's CUDA platform is more advanced than Huawei's MindSpore framework, making customers reluctant to use non-Nvidia chips. For example, he says that Alibaba prefers to use the H20 chips to migrate its existing AI system, while the Ascend 910B chips may target state-owned enterprises. A Beijing-based writer expects Nvidia's CUDA platform to continue enjoying an 80% market share in China, as it would be expensive for companies to switch to new platforms. On July 18, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce said the US should abandon its 'zero-sum mentality' and further remove a series of trade restrictions targeting Chinese companies that the ministry considered unreasonable. The spokesperson stated that in May, the US unveiled export control measures targeting Huawei's Ascend chips, tightened restrictions on Chinese chip products following unfounded accusations, and intervened in fair market competition with administrative measures. The spokesperson urged the US to work with China to correct erroneous practices through equal consultation. Meanwhile, the Trump administration increased its efforts to prevent China from obtaining Nvidia's high-end chips. It urged Malaysia and Thailand to curb transhipments of Nvidia's AI chips to China. On July 14, the Malaysian government announced that export, transshipment or transit of high-performance AI chips of US origin will require a trade permit. Companies must notify the government at least 30 days before shipping Nvidia's high-end chips elsewhere. Read: US plans to tighten AI chip export rules for Malaysia, Thailand
