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India Today
31 minutes ago
- India Today
China urges India to ‘act cautiously' amid row over Dalai Lama's successor plan
China on Friday objected to Minority Affairs Minister Kiren Rijiju's remarks that the incarnation of the Dalai Lama should follow his own wishes, urging India to act cautiously on Tibet-related issues to avoid its impact on the improvement of bilateral should be clear of the anti-China separatist nature of the 14th Dalai Lama and honour its commitments on Xizang (Tibet) related issues, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told a media briefing here responding to a question on Rijiju's comments. China refers to Tibet as should exercise caution in its words and actions, stop interfering in China's internal affairs with Xizang related issues and avoid impact on the improvement and development of the China-India relationship, Mao said. Rijiju on Thursday asserted that the decision on the incarnation of the Dalai Lama would be taken by the established institution and the leader of Tibetan Buddhists himself and no one was the first reaction from a senior Indian government functionary on the comments of the Dalai Lama on his Wednesday, the Tibetan spiritual leader said that the institution of the Dalai Lama will continue, and only the Gaden Phodrang Trust - founded by his office in 2015 - will have the authority to recognise his future remarks came after China rejected the Nobel Peace laureate's succession plan, insisting that any future heir must receive its seal of a practising Buddhist, and Rajiv Ranjan Singh, a fellow Union minister, are representing the Government of India at the Dalai Lama's 90th birthday celebrations in Dharamshala on July minister said that the birthday event is a religious function and has nothing to do with reiterated China's stand that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, the second-high priest of Tibetan Buddhism, has to comply with rigorous religious rituals and historical conventions in line with domestic search, lots drawn from a 'golden urn' and the central government's present 14th Dalai Lama went through this procedure and was approved by the then-central government, she reincarnation of the Dalai Lama must uphold those principles and follow religious rituals, historical conventions, Chinese law and regulations, she comments related to the improvement and development of relations refer to the efforts by both India and China to normalisation of ties after over four years of freeze following the Eastern Ladakh two countries resumed ties after a meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit at Kazan in Russia last year followed by a series of high-level resumption of the Kailash and Mansarovar Yatra for Indian pilgrims, which began recently, is stated to be the first step initiated by the two countries to normalise ties.- EndsTune In
Hindustan Times
33 minutes ago
- Hindustan Times
Pacific defence pact would organise core coalition to combat China: Ely Ratner
As the Quad foreign ministers wrapped up their meeting, former US assistant secretary of defence for Indo-Pacific affairs Ely Ratner pitched for a new Pacific defence pact that will organise a core coalition of countries to combat China in the Indo-Pacific. In an interview with HT, Ratner argued that the Quad is not prepared for high-intensity military operations in the Indo-Pacific, and stressed that India should allow more foreign military to operate in and around the country to boost interoperability with key partners. He also said that India should expand its area of focus to the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, where China's policies pose the threat of serious instability. Edited excerpts: Ely Ratner argued that the Quad is not prepared for high-intensity military operations in the Indo-Pacific. (X/elyratner) You recently made the case for the creation of a new Pacific defence pact. What does that mean? Why exactly does it matter? The place to start is the principal objective of the United States, which is to secure a free and open Pacific. That's an objective that's shared broadly among countries throughout the region. There is a recognition of the threat from China, which is increasingly building up the ability to revise the regional security order in ways that better meet its authoritarian interests. One of the most important questions in U.S. foreign policy through its defence strategy is how do we strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific such that China does not go in the direction of trying to revise the geopolitical order in a way that could have catastrophic consequences. My perspective is that the U.S. requires somewhat of an evolution from the traditional American approach with its alliances. Throughout most of the 20th century, and into the 21st century, you had the hub and spoke model with America at the centre and with bilateral alliances. Now, you have a more networked architecture. Given the scale of the challenge posed by China, my view is that the United States should consider leading a more formal Pacific defence pact that would bring a select set of allies together to make the whole greater than the sum of the parts. This pact would be able to integrate planning, command and control, and exercises and operations in a way that would make that collective power much more effective. And the countries that I've proposed starting are the United States, Australia, Japan and the Philippines. Why these specific countries? Some have compared your proposal to plans for an Asian NATO. Also, how do you see countries like India fitting into this proposal? So the idea of a Pacific defence pact is not meant to replace other bilateral and multilateral security arrangements already present in the region. Nor would it displace existing regional institutions like ASEAN. This would coexist and overlap with other initiatives. In terms of this proposed grouping, the difference between it and NATO would be that the latter is a pan-regional organisation. That does not really apply to the Pacific defence pact since there are a number of major regional countries like India and South Korea in Southeast Asia that may not necessarily align with the grouping at this time. That being said, the idea of a Pacific defence pact could expand to include other countries that share a similar threat perception from the People's Republic of China. South Korea would be one key country in this regard. When it comes to India, in the future, there may be opportunities to cooperate in a less formal way through observer status or ad-hoc participation in exercises. I worked the India account at the Pentagon for several years. My sense was very much that India values its 360-degree approach to diplomacy and values its independence in foreign policy matters. But if India did want to join such a Pacific defence pact, I think other countries would welcome India with open arms. You've said that the Quad doesn't have a very strong defence and security focus. Why is that? Will the Trump Administration push a stronger security focus going ahead? I think the United States has been open to the Quad taking on a greater security role. During the Biden administration, we saw the Quad working more on maritime defence and domain awareness. And of course, we've seen cooperation on security through the Malabar defence exercises. But as for why the Quad doesn't have a greater security focus, the reason is that at particular points in time, other partners like Japan, Australia and India for their own particular reasons - often because of their ties to China - have been hesitant to expand the Quad's security agenda. So the focus has been on issues like providing public goods for the region. I have been encouraged by some of the recent developments I have seen. There are a lot of opportunities for the Quad to do more on security and defence. The way for that to move forward is not just for the foreign ministers to meet and discuss, and the militaries to exercise together. The defence establishments and policy arms of their defence ministries should be working much more together in the Quad format. Is the Quad ready to handle a security contingency with China at this time? Well, the Quad was born out of a response to a humanitarian disaster, and some of those activities the Quad has developed work well today. I think when it comes to higher-end military cooperation, the Quad still lacks the number of abilities that we would want to be able to operate seamlessly in a high-intensity format. Many of the things that exist among America's East Asian allies do not exist in the Quad format. For instance, on the question of force posture and reciprocal access, it would be important over time for Australia, Japan, and the United States to have more reciprocal access agreements with India, such that those countries may be able to operate in and around facilities in India. The Indian military would also be able to operate around foreign military facilities. There have been some efforts with regard to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, but nothing comprehensively exists. India opening up a broader consideration of opportunities for foreign militaries to operate in and around India would allow for new types of military cooperation and deterrence as well. So force posture is one aspect of things. A second would be just on actual military planning. The Quad would need much closer efforts to try to coordinate planning among the four countries to know what kinds of roles and missions they would need to take on during a crisis or contingency to be able to operate effectively. There are a number of areas where these capabilities are non-existent or still underdeveloped. I think the efforts on maritime security do hold promise where the four countries can develop the ability to synchronise their operations in real-time. All of that should be on the table and I think those are the kinds of activities that the Quad should be aspiring for. That said, how satisfied are you with the state of the U.S.-India defence relationship at this point? Well, obviously, there's incredible growth. I think there's still strong momentum in the U.S.-India bilateral relationship. We have had some of the conversations and discussions that I was describing earlier related to border issues with China. We've obviously had an experience of ways in which we can collaborate from a capability perspective, a technology perspective and other areas related to these crises and difficulties on the India-China border. We've also had discussions on China's naval operations in the Indian Ocean. But neither of those relates to higher-end crises or contingencies with China. And neither of these conversations are being had in close coordination with the Japanese and Australians. And these conversations are also not related to possible contingencies in East Asia. So the bottom line is that there is incredible growth in India-US defence relations in getting some foundational defence agreements done and advancing defence industrial cooperation. But there are two or three areas that I think could see more growth. One is to be thinking more about how these industrial-based corporations that we're working on together are translating directly into operational cooperation. Sometimes, you can get stuck with technology-sharing cooperation agreements, and that's important because what they need to do is to be focused on the actual implementation with militaries operating together and using these new technologies. I think the second point would be to talk about India integrating more deeply with other partners in the Indo-Pacific region. The third point, from my perspective, is that it is important for India and America to work more together on the South China Sea and on possible contingencies related to issues like Taiwan in East Asia. At this time, India's defence conversations with the United States are, rightly so, related to the Indian Ocean, which also includes the East Coast of Africa and the Middle East. I understand that India is thinking about its periphery, its borders and the maritime threats from China. But when you think about the Indo-Pacific as a whole, the principal sources of instability are in the South China Sea and over the Taiwan Strait. And at this point in time, the US-India defence relationship is not really focused on these areas. It is too limiting to make the sole objective of India-U.S. defence relations simply supporting India's position and hegemony in South Asia. It needs to do more as a net security provider contributing to deterrence in the East Asia littoral. I would also point out that if China manages to achieve its objectives in the Pacific and the South China Sea, then it will truly have encircled India. So India has a very large interest in ensuring that maritime corridors in that region remain open. I would call for India and America to do more work on that front. To what extent does India's existing store of Russian defence equipment create challenges, if any, for the kind of India-US defence cooperation that you're proposing? It is a problem, but it's one that India, for its own reasons, has been addressing by reducing its reliance on Russian equipment. So what I see is that India's efforts towards indigenisation, as well as its partnership with the United States and Europe and other Indo-Pacific powers have helped diversify its defence relationships. So the trend lines are definitely moving in the right direction. But there are some areas like undersea domain awareness as well as air defence where India operating Russian equipment does create technology security – as well as interoperability - challenges for India and the United States to work together. So the US perspective is that while acknowledging that India cannot simply turn off the supply of Russian equipment, reducing reliance on Russia will widen the aperture and scope of US-India defence cooperation.
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First Post
an hour ago
- First Post
China rattled by Rijiju's backing of Dalai Lama succession tradition, says it could 'impact' bilateral ties
'India should exercise caution in its words and actions, stop interfering in China's internal affairs with Xizang (Tibet) related issues and avoid impact on the improvement and development of the China-India relationship,' said Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning read more Days after Union Minister for Minority Affairs Kiren Rijiju said that only the current Dalai Lama and the conventions established by him can determine his successor, China on Friday objected to the minister's remarks, urging India to act cautiously on Tibet-related issues to avoid its impact on bilateral relations. 'India should be clear of the anti-China separatist nature of the 14th Dalai Lama and honour its commitments on Xizang (Tibet) related issues,' News 18 quoted Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning as saying. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD 'India should exercise caution in its words and actions, stop interfering in China's internal affairs with Xizang related issues and avoid impact on the improvement and development of the China-India relationship,' Mao added. The statement comes after Rijiju, a practising Buddhist, made the remarks on Wednesday, in what is widely seen as a direct rebuttal to China's assertions on the matter. 'The Dalai Lama is the most important and defining institution for Buddhists,' Rijiju said, adding, 'All those who follow the Dalai Lama feel that the incarnation is to be decided by the established convention and as per the wish of the Dalai Lama himself. Nobody else has the right to decide it except him and the conventions in place.' On Tuesday, the 14th Dalai Lama issued a statement reaffirming that the institution of the Dalai Lama would continue and that only the Gaden Phodrang Trust holds the legitimate authority to recognise his future reincarnation. The announcement comes ahead of the Tibetan spiritual leader's 90th birthday on July 6, amid growing concerns that China may attempt to unilaterally appoint a successor, leveraging its political control over Tibet. In response, the Chinese foreign ministry reacted sharply, with Spokesperson Mao Ning asserting that the reincarnation 'must be chosen by drawing lots from a golden urn, and approved by the central government (of China).' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD She further claimed that while China upholds a policy of religious freedom, it also 'implements regulations on religious affairs and methods for managing the reincarnation of Tibetan living Buddhas.' With inputs from agencies
